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Abstract
Questions about state-society relations currently attract great interest in 
political science. In the case of Indonesia, much emphasis has been given to the strength 
of the state and its relative autonomy from societal forces in recent years. This study 
deals with the nature of the links between business, as one segment of society, and the 
state in contemporary Indonesia. It is an enquiry about the extent to which societal actors 
are involved in the shaping of public policy.
Dissatisfaction with existing scholarly accounts of the nature of the 
Indonesian polity was an important stimulus for this research. Insufficient attention has 
hitherto been paid to questions about societal constraints upon state actors in the formation 
of policy. What is the scope for various types of societal groups to influence policy 
outcomes in areas of special concern to them? To the extent that it does take place, how is 
communication between policy-makers and relevant sections of society organised?
Three case studies are used to pursue these themes. Their purpose is to 
illuminate the processes by which policy is formed in situations where the interests of the 
relevant sections of the state appaaratus diverge from those of industry groups. The 
cases used are from the textile, pharmaceutical and insurance industries.
There are two main strands to the thesis; one empirical and the other 
theoretical. The first strand involves an argument about political and economic change in 
Indonesia, and the increasing complexity of the relations between state and society there. 
The second is an argument that existing theoretical frameworks for the interpretation of 
Indonesian politics are excessively state-centred. In this context Indonesian politics and 
the attaching academic debates take on a wider significance; for one of the main currents 
in political science today is the proposition that insufficient attention has been accorded to 
the state. Far from scholarship on Indonesia being insufficiently attentive to the state, 
precisely the opposite has been the case.
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Gabungan Perusahaan Sejenis (Federation of Homogenous 
Enterprises).
Himpunan Industri Kecil Seluruh Indonesia (the All Indonesia Small 
Business Organisation).
Himpunan Pengusaha Lemah Indonesia (the Indonesian Weak Business 
Organisation).
Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia (the Indonesian Young 
Entrepeneurs Organisation).
Himpunan Pengusaha Putra Indonesia (the Indonesian Indigenous 
Entrepeneurs Organisation).
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (the Muslim Students' Association).
Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (the Indonesian Doctors' Association). 
Informasi Harga Obat (Drug Price Information) a manual distributed by 
the Health Department to all doctors.
Index of Medical Specialties Pty Ltd (A Singapore-based medical 
consultants firm which produces the only recognised statistics on the 
pharmaceutical industry in Indonesia.
International Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Group, a sub-section of the 
Indonesian Pharmaceutical Association (GPF).
Ikatan Sarjana Farmasi Indonesia (the Indonesian Pharmacy Graduates' 
Association).
Komar Dagang dan Industri (Chamber of Trade and Industry).
Kamar Dagang dan Industri Daerah (Regional Chamber of Trade and 
Industry).
Kesatuan Aksi Pengusaha Nasional Indonesia (the National Business 
Action Front).
Kongres Ekonomi Nasional Seluruh Indonesia (the All Indonesia 
National Economic Congress).
Kongres Importir Nasional Seluruh Indonesia (the All Indonesia 
National Importers' Congress).
Korps Pegawai Negeri (Civil Servants' Corp).
Kerukunan Usahawan Kecil dan Menengah Indonesia (the Indonesian 
Small and Medium Business Organisation).
Lembaga Pengkajian Penelitian dan Pengembangan Ekonomi (Institute 
for Economic Studies, Research & Development - KADINs economic 
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Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan & Penerangan Ekonomi & Sosial (the 
Institute for Economic & Social Research, Education & Information). 
Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat (the Institute for 
Economic and Social Research, University of Indonesia).
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OTC drugs 
Panca Sila 
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PERTEKSI
PIBTI
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PPKPHO
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Puskesmas
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SEKBERTAL
SPMI
Tataniaga
Textile Club
WALHI
WDP
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Majelis Perusahaan dan Perniagaan (the Assembly of Business and 
Trade.
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Peoples' Consultative Assembly). 
Non-Governmental Organisation
A program for the supply of cheap medicine via puskesmas clinics 
which was susidised by special Presidential funding.
Organisasi Perusahaan Sejenis (Organisation of Homogenous 
Enterperises).
Over-the-Counter drugs, available without a doctor’s prescription, 
the state ideology (a set of five social and humanitarian ideals). 
Persatuan Dokter Gigi Indonesia (the Indonesian Dentists' 
Association).
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party - an 
amalgamation of nationalist and Christian parties).
Perserikatan Perusahan Tekstil Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesia Union 
of Textile Companies).
Persatuan Industri Barang Jadi Tekstil Indonesia (the Indonesian 
Garment Makers' Association).
Partai Kommunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist party).
Panitia Pengkajian Kerasionalan Penggunaan dan Harga Obat (the 
Committee of Inquiry into Rational Drug Usage and Prices).
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party - an 
amalgamation of Muslim parties).
Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat (local-level public health clinics).
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five Year Development Plan). 
Sekretariat Bersama Industri Pemintalan (the Joint Secretariat of the 
Spinning Industry). The acronym later came to stand for Sektoral 
Kebersamaan Permintalan [the Joint Spinning Sector (Association)]. 
Serikat Pedagang Menengah Indonesia (the Indonesian Union of 
Medium Traders).
The label for the restrictive trade regime developed especially in the 
early 1980s which centred around upstream import monopolies.
An informal group formed in the early 1970s of large spinning and 
weaving companies, many of which were Japanese joint ventures. 
Wahana Lingkunan Hidup Indonesia (the Indonesian Environmental 
Association).
Wajib Daflar Perusahaan (a legal requirement for all business to obtain 
a licence by registering with the Department of Trade).
World Health Organisation.
Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen (the Consumers' Association).
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In the last few years it has become almost a commonplace for political science 
writings to open with a declaration that the state is now at the centre of our attention. This 
also applies to the present study. Broadly speaking, this thesis is concerned with the 
nature of the links between state and society in contemporary Indonesia. It seeks to 
enquire into the character of the Indonesian polity by examining the structure of links 
between state and society. It does this by focusing on the way in which interest 
intermediation is organised and, in a broad sense, the process of policy formation.
The way in which interest intermediation is organised is integral to the subject 
of state-society relations: the scope for the articulation of demands from below varies 
considerably among political systems. Closely related to this theme, but somewhat wider, 
is the question of participation in the shaping of public policy. By concentrating on the 
way in which public policy is shaped we can develop a picture of who is involved and 
what sorts of interests are (and are not) taken into account in this most basic function of 
government. These two intertwined themes are central to the character of a polity. They 
are also at the core of the study of politics.
Not surprisingly then, this topic has been the subject of some of the most 
important theoretical debates. A rudimentary, but useful, way to approach these debates 
is to think in terms of 'society-centred' as opposed to 'state-centred' frameworks. The 
former give priority to actors and interests in society to explain political outcomes, 
whereas for the latter this is reversed, and the state is given pride of place.
For a long time society-centred explanations have dominated Western political 
science. Within this tradition we can locate such seemingly odd bed-fellows as pluralist,
2Marxist and societal corporatist models. Nordlinger1 has neatly summarised the gist of 
the society-centred approaches.
It is the contours of civil society, the distribution of political resources, along with 
the policy preferences of those societal groups that control the weightiest resources 
that account for the authoritative actions and inactions of the democratic state. When 
the policy preferences of public officials differ from those of the politically best 
endowed private actors it is the latter that are almost invariably translated into public 
policy.
The pluralist framework has long occupied centre stage in American political
science. In most pluralist accounts, the state receives almost no attention as an
independent actor in its own right; instead it is generally seen as merely responding to the
competing pressures of societal groups. As Macridis2 has put it:
Power configuration is basically the configuration of competing and struggling 
interests organised into groups. Ideology, values, the state, the formal organization 
of decision-making, and the content of decisions are determined by a parallelogram of 
group forces.
While Marxist approaches have posited a more significant role for the state, it 
is a role which is still heavily determined by societal interests.3 Whereas the pluralists 
talked of groups and of power being more or less widely dispersed in society, most 
Marxists have emphasised class as the critical unit of analysis and the concentration of 
power. For present purposes it is useful to distinguish between 'instrumentalist' and 
'structuralist' Marxist accounts. According to the former, the state operates as the tool of 
the bourgeoisie, serving to protect its interests. The state is thus linked to society, or 
rather a particular social class, in an instrumental fashion. For the structuralists, the link 
between the state and the bourgeoisie is not direct. While the state is regarded as 
primarily serving to uphold the long term interests of the capitalist class, it does so not 
because it is an instrument of that class, or in other words, not because of direct political 
pressuring from the bourgeoisie, but because of the underlying logic of the capitalist 
economy. While the structuralists make use of the concept of 'relative' state autonomy, 
this is often implicitly qualified by the notion that the state cannot, in the long term,
1 Nordlinger (1981) p. VH.
2 Macridis (1977) p. 322.
3 For useful overviews of the Marxist literature which draw out the themes discussed here see, Camoy 
(1984); and McLennan (1984).
3contradict the interests of the capitalist class: again, an approach which is ultimately 
society-centred
Societal corporatist4 accounts of state-society relations are a third distinctive 
approach located within the society-centred tradition. This is a more recently established 
framework that has been applied principally to Austria, and some of the Scandinavian and 
Benelux countries. Rather than numerous autonomous and competitive interest groups, 
or classes, the units of analysis here are seen as a limited number of state-recognised and 
functionally-based representative organisations. Peak organisations representing, for 
example, the interests of labour and capital, engage in continuous negotiations with state 
officials over major policy questions. In corporatist models there is thus a distinctive 
'transmission belt' between the state and societal interests. But while this does give 
relatively more emphasis to the role of the state, it can still be seen to be firmly in the 
tradition which gives priority to societal influence in politics.
In response to this long and varied tradition of society-centred explanations in 
Western political science, there has emerged in recent years a sudden renewed interest in 
the state as an independent actor in its own right.5 In other words, to explain policy 
patterns we cannot simply look to the interests and actions of sections of society, but must 
also look at least as much to the interests and actions of the state, or its various constituent 
parts. Although proponents of a state-centred approach draw, variously, on pluralist, 
Marxist and corporatist frameworks, they are linked by a concern to overcome what is 
seen as the reductionism of society-centred studies. The state is thus seen as not merely 
reflecting societal interests - whether they emanate from competing pressure groups, the 
dominant class or corporatist associations. Though not insensitive to or wholly 
unconstrained by societal interests, the state is nevertheless depicted as pursuing coherent 
and objective interests of its own.
4 On this see Schmitter (1979 a); and Cawson (1982). Corporatism, and in particular the distinction 
between 'societal' and 'state' subtypes, will be discussed in greater detail later in Chapter 2.
5 There is a wide variety of others who fall into this category. See for example, Nordlinger (1981); 
Skocpol (1979) & (1985); Stepan (1978); Block (1980); Krasner (1977) as well as some of the essays in 
Weiner & Huntington (1987).
4Much of the recent fanfare about bringing the state back into our sights has 
been in relation to the study of Western industrialised democracies. Scholars working on 
the Third World have been paying attention to the state for rather longer, not least because 
it looms so much larger on the political landscape and now appears to overshadow 
societal groups in many of these countries. The work on Latin America during the mid- 
1970s was very important in leading the way here. While perhaps less theoretically 
developed than its Latin American counterpart, much research on Asia has followed a 
roughly comparable path. During the 1950s and 1960s work on Southeast Asian politics 
dwelt largely on social forces, but with the development of stronger state mechanisms in 
many countries of the region the pendulum swang began to swing over to the other side. 
And thus, in the last decade and a half, the state has enjoyed pride of place in many 
analyses.
If these ideas have been some of the main currents of debate in the field of 
comparative politics, what has been the case in studies of Indonesian politics? At the 
beginning of his book, On the Autonomy o f the Democratic State, Nordlinger asked two 
basic questions about studies of Western Democracies which help to place the issue in 
sharp focus: "How can we account for the authoritative actions of the democratic state, its 
public policies broadly conceived? To what extent is the democratic state an autonomous 
entity, one that translates its own policy preferences into authoritative actions?"6 If we 
were to apply the same questions to Indonesia, in short, substitute the word "Indonesia" 
for "democratic", what would be the response? That is the nub of this thesis. As will be 
made clear, the prevailing assumption in the scholarly literature on Indonesia is that the 
state is little constrained: it enjoys great autonomy in translating its own policy preferences 
into authoritative actions.
In addressing this subject the present study does not attempt to generalise 
about all facets of the state-society relationship. Rather, it focuses on one in particular: 
the relationship with business.7 Instead of a very broad-brushed exercise, a somewhat
6 Nordlinger (1981) p. 1.
7 It is normally considered impolitic to offer apologies in the introductions o f doctoral dissertations. One 
apology, though, is unavoidable at this point. In the title o f this study the term "business-government 
relations" is employed. Apart from the fact that this is a recognised generic term, the principal reason for
5narrower and more empirically detailed approach was preferred. The trade-off involved is 
clear: foregoing bolder theoretical statements for the sake of a more solid evidentiary base. 
Hopefully a satisfactory compromise has been reached. Business is one of the most 
important sections of society, both politically, and theoretically. If we are interested in 
exploring the nature and extent of societal constraints upon the state in the shaping of 
policy, business is an obvious candidate for special attention. In order to probe this 
subject, detailed evidence is marshalled from three case-studies in which we see an 
industry, or sector of business, seeking a particular policy outcome. The case-studies are 
concerned to examine the sorts of interests which were satisfied by the policy outcomes 
and the way in which this took place in each instance. The three cases are:
1. the campaign by sections of the spinning industry to overturn a policy of the 
Department of Trade to award a raw material import licence to a particular company;
2. the attempts by the pharmaceutical industry to resist the introduction of price limitation 
measures by the Health Department; and
3. the efforts of the insurance industry to persuade the Department of Finance to 
introduce a basic insurance law.
There were three main criteria used for selecting the cases (apart from 
practicalities such as accessibility); they should involve a major issue affecting a whole 
sector of industry, rather than a specific issue pertaining only to one or two individual 
companies and business people; they should be from different policy areas; and finally, 
they should be set in the mid-1980s. The first factor is in part self-evident, cases of major 
importance were preferred. But beyond this, the reason for selecting broad-based issues 
affecting many people, was to avoid generating more material illustrating the by now
using it is that the logical choice, "business-state relations" is just too jarring. This is patently an 
inconsistency as, ultimately, it is relations between business and the state, rather than just business and 
the government with which we are concerned. Most assuredly, "state" and "government" are not treated 
synonymously here. The latter, the political executive, is a sub-set o f the former. Apart from the self- 
indulgent instance in the title, the generic "business-government relations" is almost entirely avoided here. 
Moreover, to try and retrieve some meaning for the much-abused term "state", an effort is made to use 
narrower descriptions (government, department, directorate general, parliamentary committee, minister, 
president etc.) wherever possible. While in some situations distinctions inevitably blur, in general, 
"state" will be reserved for occasions when we are actually referring to that more macro entity.
6familiar phenomenon of particular highly-placed business figures securing favourable 
policy determinations by virtue of their connections to the top of the political structure. It 
is not that this unimportant, but simply that we already know a good deal about this type 
of behaviour, and it is therefore somewhat less remarkable. Issues affecting whole 
categories of business people were judged to be more interesting theoretically. The 
second criterion - selection from differing policy areas - was applied so that any cross- 
sectoral differences might show up. There is no a priori reason to assume that the mode 
of interest intermediation should be the same in all policy areas. Moreover, it is 
empirically more interesting if we are able to see a range of different actors and interests 
rather than just a few. The final criterion, that the case-studies should centre around the 
mid-1980s, was adopted not just for reasons of methodological consistency, but because 
these years appear to be a period of significant political flux in Indonesia linked to 
changes in the country's economic circumstances.
The research for the case-studies was conducted in Jakarta during 1986-87. 
As the case-studies make up a large part of the thesis, special comment should be made 
about information sources. Inevitably, much of the material in the cases is drawn from 
unpublished sources. In particular, interviews with countless business people, 
government officials, newspaper journalists and editors, Members of Parliament, and 
academics provided information of enormous value. Wherever possible, direct reference 
to the persons interviewed, their position and the date of the interview is supplied. 
Sometimes, on sensitive issues, a non-specific form of attribution, such as "senior 
industry figures" is used to protect the privacy of informants. Aside from interviews, 
another extremely useful source of information was the press. If a point to emerge in an 
interview is also reported in the press, this second, public source, is cited as well. 
References to material in newspapers provide the title of the article both to provide some 
insight into the gist of the article, as well as to facilitate relocation.
A final comment to be made on the case-study material relates to their detailed 
nature. Just as there is a need for scholars to be 'historically sensitive' and 'culturally 
sensitive', for example, there is also a need for 'political sensitivity'. It is insufficient to 
focus just on 'outcomes' in politics, we need to pay attention also to the nuances and
7contending influences at play in a given situation, in short; political context This is never 
easy. There is always scope for debate about the interpretation of political phenomena. 
This, is in the very nature of politics. Locating the 'truth' or 'reality' in any given 
situation is an inherent problem for political scientists. Not only must the observer 
contend with a mass of complex detail and confusion (something only further heightened 
when studying a foreign political culture), but also deliberate misinformation and untruths 
disseminated by the political actors themselves. Thus, in attempting generalisation one is 
always conscious of other possible interpretations.
It is with these considerations in mind, that the case-studies attempt to delve 
into the details of the situation as far as possible. Inevitably, this places demands upon 
readers. This is particularly so with the first of the case-studies, that concerning the 
textile industry. It is substantially longer than the others. No apology is offered here, for 
the story is too revealing to be cut merely for the sake of symmetry. The reward from 
detailed case-studies is a wealth of rich material and insight into the dynamics of some of 
the dimensions of political life in Indonesia.
The structure of the thesis is straight-forward. Chapter 2 locates this study 
within the existing theoretical debates on the nature of the Indonesian polity. It traces the 
main currents of debate and seeks to show why research of this sort is so needed. In 
short, Chapter 2 sets the theoretical context. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the 
political setting: the institutional, ideological and economic context in which interest 
intermediation takes place. After a general discussion, it focuses on the structures and 
dynamics of business representation in Indonesia. Chapters 4 through to 6 are the case- 
studies: Chapter 7, the conclusion, draws the main empirical findings together and relates 
them back to the theoretical literature on Indonesia and, ultimately, to the broader debates 
in political science about state-society relations more generally.
CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORETICAL TERRAIN
Although the literature on the nature of the Indonesian polity tends to be 
tangential to much mainstream political science theorising in that it treats Indonesia as sui 
generis, it nevertheless does not stand in isolation from the broad currents of debate that 
were referred to in Chapter 1. Indeed, the reason for mentioning these competing 
approaches to the study of politics is so that the interpretations of the contemporary 
Indonesian polity that I am both utilising and challenging here might be located within this 
spectrum of theories on state-society relations. As will be seen, scholarship on 
contemporary Indonesian politics falls almost exclusively into the state-centred mould. 
What follows below is an overview of the principal theoretical contributions to the study 
of the nature of the Indonesian polity. The aim is to draw out the implications of the 
various interpretations for interest intermediation and policy formation, and ultimately, 
state-society relations.
Much has been written on Indonesian society and politics during the New 
Order period. In turning to this literature, the student is confronted, however, with a 
range of conflicting theoretical images (and in some cases, arguably, models), for there 
has been substantial debate on the nature of the modem Indonesian polity which is much 
concerned with the relationship between state and society. At least six differing 
perspectives can be distinguished in the recent literature: state-qua-state; bureaucratic 
polity and patrimonialism; bureaucratic pluralism; corporatism; a class-based approach; 
and a ’restricted pluralist' approach. Although these perspectives are not always sharply 
distinguished from each other and tend to overlap, they provide a useful way of 
approaching the issues raised in this thesis.
9A State-Qua-State Approach
Of the writings on the New Order government, that which places the strongest 
emphasis on the state is an essay in 1983 by Benedict Anderson.1 He argued that the 
policies of the New Order can best be understood in terms of the interests of the state-qua- 
state. At the heart of his argument is the idea of a fundamental disjunction between the 
interests of the state and society. He offers a picture of the modem Indonesian state as a 
self-serving entity, pursuing its perceived self-interest at the expense of other diverse 
interests in society. He sees the state as greedily consuming the resources and wealth of 
the nation, while being kept afloat with foreign support and oil revenue. For present 
purposes, the most important element of Anderson's analysis is his image of the state as 
being almost entirely detached from and unresponsive to societal interests. Though the 
state is at present in the hands of the military, he argues, the basic situation has been 
essentially the same since colonial times. Policy is a reflection of the state’s interests, 
rather than of those of any extra-state class or group, with the partial exception of foreign 
capital. In this perspective, there is little scope for extra-state participation while interest 
intermediation seems to have no important role at all. Anderson's argument is perhaps 
most usefully interpreted as a response to instrumentalist Marxist views of the state as a 
tool of the capitalist class. His argument should not, however, be crudely caricatured as 
some polar extreme, for rather than focusing solely on the nature of the New Order polity, 
his principal purpose was to provide a comparative historical framework to enable the 
identification of continuities in state-society relations with earlier periods.
The Bureaucratic Polity and Patrimonial Cluster
A second approach which stresses the importance of the state revolves around 
the two related concepts of "patrimonialism" and"bureaucratic polity". The former 
derives originally from Weber and was reinterpreted by Roth2 and Eisenstadt3 (among
1 Anderson (1983).
2 Roth (1968).
3 Eisenstadt (1973).
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others), while the latter stems from Riggs’ work4 on Thailand in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The two approaches, though distinct, overlap to a very considerable extent. The essence 
of the patrimonial model is a notion of the head of state operating in a manner comparable 
to that of traditional rulers; preserving his or her position by dispensing material rewards 
and opportunities to leading members of the elite. The elite is divided into rival cliques 
which struggle for the patronage and largesse of the ruler. The patrimonialist model thus 
emphasises a pyramid-like network of patron-client relationships. An additional element 
of the patrimonial model is the notion that politics is characterised, not by conflict over 
substantive policy issues, but competition over material rewards and spoils. Those 
members of the elite nearest to the pinnacle fare the best. The interests of members of 
society who are not of the elite are simply repressed. In short, the state is thus not 
responsive to outside interests or pressures.
Slightly less generic than the patrimonial model is Riggs' bureaucratic polity. 
The gist of this is an argument that the bureaucratic elite is unconstrained by societal 
interests in the determination of policy. The bureaucratic polity has many patrimonial 
characteristics, with the political leadership relying largely on the distribution of largesse 
among elite cliques to maintain its position. Those outside the state elite are effectively 
excluded from political participation. In this respect, Riggs paid particular attention to the 
position of what he called "pariah entrepreneurs". The business community, largely made 
up of ethnic Chinese, was no exception to the pattem of political exclusion. The only 
significant opportunity for influencing political leaders lay in patron-client links.
Thus, with their joint emphasis on political exclusion and patrimonial 
interpersonal relationships, there is much common ground between these two models. 
Indeed, for the purposes of viewing Indonesian politics, the two go hand-in-hand. In this 
light, we can treat them here as loosely constituting one family, or cluster, of thought
Many writers have sought to interpret Indonesian politics from this 
perspective, so much so that it is probably fair to think of it as the conventional wisdom 
or 'mainstream' approach. Although slight differences may be distinguished among these
4 See, Riggs (1966) and (1964).
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writers, they are largely differences of definition, terminology and emphasis, rather than 
matters of major substance. Apart from being the conventional wisdom among foreign 
observers, it is also a perspective which enjoys widespread currency in political discourse 
in Indonesia itself.5 This is probably because the notions of political exclusion, as well as 
linkages between this and the feudal past, have resonance for many Indonesians.
Karl Jackson was the first (in print) to apply these ideas to Indonesia.6 His
work is also the most ’pure' or 'extreme' of this cluster. Jackson proposes a picture of
Indonesian politics in which participation in policy formation is confined almost
exclusively to senior members of the state apparatus, military and civilian alike. In this
respect, he is thus not far from Anderson. As Crouch7 has noted, Jackson's
interpretation, or definition, of the bureaucratic polity model is somewhat looser than that
of Riggs. Jackson seeks merely to distinguish it from other models of governance by the
extent to which influence on decision-making processes is confined to the state elite.
Noting the continuities with the Guided Democracy period, Jackson8 declares:
Indonesia remains a bureaucratic polity - that is a political system in which power 
and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of 
the state, particularly the officer corps and the highest levels o f  the 
bureaucracy ....Although the number of bureaucrats and army officers influencing 
policy implementation at the local level is much larger, national policies are 
established by a small ruling circle whose members primarily respond, albeit it not 
exclusively, to the values and interests of less than one thousand persons comprising 
the bureaucratic, technocratic and military elite o f the country....
In bureaucratic polities the military and the bureaucracy are not accountable to other 
political forces such as political parties, interest groups or organised communal 
interests. Actions designed to influence government decisions originate entirely from 
within the elite itself without any need for mass participation.
The only notable opportunity for participation in national policy formation by 
interests outside the state elite, according to Jackson, is during the implementation of 
policy, and then mostly minor local-level adjustments.9 Though he emphasises the 
inherently exclusionary characteristics of a bureaucratic polity, Jackson, unlike Riggs, 
does not give much attention to the position of business. The other key element of
5
6
7
8 
9
For academic exemplars see Soedjatmoko (1983); Yahya Muhaimin (1980); and Fachry Ali (1986). 
Jackson (1978).
Crouch (1980) p. 659.
Jackson (1978) p. 4.
Jackson (1978) p. 5.
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Jackson's account concerns patrimonial features of the polity. He sees political 
relationships among the members of the state elite as being characterised by competing 
cliques which are held together by a network of personalised patron-client links.10
Harold Crouch is the scholar who probably has done most to develop this 
approach to Indonesian politics. In an essay in 1979,* 11 he argued (following Anderson12 
and Willner13) that the regime which Suharto had succeeded in establishing bore important 
resemblances to the traditional patrimonial polities of Javanese antiquity. In seeking to 
apply the patrimonial model he stressed that intra-elite politics (like that of the sultanistic 
court) is not primarily concerned with factional competition over substantive policy 
matters but rather the distribution of material opportunities and the spoils of office. 
Qualifying this, he also argued that the inherent tensions associated with economic 
development were likely to result in the gradual regularisation and rationalisation of the 
polity along Weberian lines, causing major policy issues to become increasingly 
important.14 In another piece, in 1980,15 he restated this position, but also explicitly took 
on board the concept of the "bureaucratic polity". More recently, he summarised his 
position in the following terms:16
...it would be inaccurate to portray the New Order government as a "pure" 
neopatrimonial regime or bureaucratic polity in which policies are no more than the 
reflection of the struggle for power between self-interested cliques [within the 
state].17
In this Crouch has wanted to take account particularly of the evidence of 
substantive policy debates between the economic 'technocrats’ and the patronage-oriented 
military officials. In addition, though, he has sought to address the question of the 
significance of business as a political force. He remains sceptical about claims of an
10 Jackson (1978) pp. 14 & 18.
11 Crouch (1979).
12 Anderson (1972).
13 Willner (1970).
14 Crouch (1979) pp. 578-79.
15 Crouch (1980).
16 See Crouch (1986); (1987); and (1984).
17 Crouch (1986) p. 46.
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emergent bourgeoisie, viewing this as, at most, an evolutionary development of an 
uncertain and long term nature.18
Thus, the picture of government-business relations presented in the patrimonial and 
bureaucratic-polity models is still to a large extent valid at present despite the rise of  
some big [business] conglomerates and the possible long-run implications of this in 
the future.19
Specifically, in so far as the state is responsive to business interests, 
according to Crouch it is on a patrimonial basis, with individual senior officials providing 
particularistic concessions to client business people. A few individual firms, rather than 
broader segments of the business class receive satisfaction. For Crouch, then, the idea of 
pariah entrepreneurs retains much force.
In sum, while Crouch is not comfortable with descriptions of Indonesia such 
as Jackson's statement "Like islands cut off from the social seas surrounding them, 
bureaucratic polities are largely impervious to the currents in their society",20 he does see 
political participation and influence over policy outcomes as being very much limited to 
players located inside the state apparatus. Interests in civil society, notably those of 
business, have little scope for influence, except via individual clientelistic links to a patron 
inside the state. Even then, this tends to concern particularist issues rather than policy 
matters affecting a broader constituency.
A number of other scholars have also sought to interpret Indonesian politics in
this fashion. John Girling21 has done so in the context of a comparative study of the
ASEAN countries, and Ruth McVey22 in an essay which highlights similarities between
the New Order state and the Beamtenstaat of Dutch colonial times. On the central
question of state-society relations, their conclusions are close to those of Crouch.
Similarly, Jamie Mackie has argued that influence over policy formation is very much
monopolised by senior figures within the state:
...other countervailing centres o f economic power or political influence outside the 
state, rooted in the "society "...rather than the "state", are still puny and relatively 
impotent.23
18 Crouch (1986) pp. 46-47.
19 Crouch (1986) p.52
20 Jackson (1986) p. 4.
21 Girling (1981).
22 McVey (1982).
23 Mackie (1986 a) p. 24-25, see also Mackie (1986 b).
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More specifically, in considering the political position of business in Indonesia, he has 
argued:
For all the talk we have heard since the early years of the New Order about the close 
connections between wealthy Chinese cukong and powerful Indonesian generals, 
there is little evidence that any of them have been able to carry much weight in the 
general decision-making processes that determine the broader outlines of national 
economic or social policy formulation (e.g. exchange rate policies, budgetary 
allocations, industrial priorities etc.): at most they can exert some influence over 
particularistic decisions about the allocation o f contracts, licenses, credits and so 
on.24
The key elements of the bureaucratic polity and patrimonialist interpretations 
of Indonesian politics should by now be clean there is almost no significant participation 
in, or influence over, policy formation by societal interests, especially in the field of 
economic policy. Interest intermediation is thus not a major question for this cluster of 
theorists. This is not to say that they regard the state as being necessarily insensitive to 
societal interests. Some extra-state interests may indeed benefit from government policy; 
but in such instances it is not as a result of interest representation by the section of society 
concerned. Such links as do exist between society and the state in this bureaucratic-polity 
image of Indonesia, are seen as essentially patrimonial in nature, and productive of 
specific (usually material) benefits for individuals, rather than broader social or economic 
groupings.
As has been emphasised, while there are some differences among the writers 
in this cluster, they are matters of nuance, rather than major schisms.25 Like Anderson's 
state-qua-state approach, this one is also heavily state-centred. It differs from the former 
in that it does not view the state as a coherent corporate actor, pursuing objective interests 
of its own. Rather than an actor, for these writers the state is conceived more as an arena 
in which elite cliques compete. Both, however, emphasise the exclusion of societal 
interests from policy formation processes.
24 Mackie (1986 a) p. 17-18.
25 Another major study which falls into this theoretical cluster is that o f Jenkins (1984).
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Bureaucratic Pluralism
A third distinguishable theoretical position is that of bureaucratic pluralism 
which has been advanced by Donald Emmerson.26 Emmerson (like a number of the other 
writers discussed here) is dissatisfied with existing images of the Indonesian polity. His 
purpose is to provide an alternative approach to what he sees as the two extremes of, on 
the one hand, the monistic nature of Anderson's account of the state and, on the other, the 
bureaucratic-polity picture of patrimonial cliques competing merely over the spoils of 
office.
The crux of the bureaucratic pluralist position is that politics at the national 
level in Indonesia is both more regularised and more pluralistic than most observers have 
acknowledged. In order to explore and support this proposition Emmerson has used a 
case-study involving policy choices over a major industrial development project in 
Sumatra. His conclusion is that within the parameters of the regime's security concerns, 
serious debate about policy issues does take place among various agencies within the 
bureaucracy. He is thus arguing, first, that the state is considerably more pluralistic than 
Anderson27 for example, allows, and second, that political competition is not simply 
about the distribution of personal advantage among client groups (as Jackson in particular 
suggests), but also, importantly, substantive policy debates. In this latter respect, it 
should be remembered that not all of the bureaucratic polity and patrimonial cluster went 
as far as Jackson in stressing clientelistic competition over the perquisites of office. 
Crouch, for instance, while seeing clientelism as being the prevalent mode of political 
behaviour, explicitly pointed to a trend towards more substantive policy debate as the 
economy developed and became more complex.28
Emmerson's focus is on the nature and internal characteristics of the state 
itself. In developing his case for a "limited pluralism" approach, he does not claim that
26 Emmerson (1983).
27 While Anderson nowhere explicitly depicts the state as a near-monistic entity, he does invite this 
interpretation with his emphasis on the state as an institution that has interests of its own which it 
wilfully pursues. Certainly he does not draw attention to pluralism within the state.
28 Crouch (1979) p. 579; and Crouch (1986) p. 47. This is a view with which Emmerson is in clear 
agreement Emmerson (1983) p. 1239.
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there are significant pluralist-like inputs from interests outside the state apparatus. In an
earlier essay, however, he made it clear that he saw the state as being relatively immune to
societal demands and as having gutted representative channels linking state and society.29
He argued that under the New Order, the bureaucracy has become less of a political arena
in which various political groups competed, and instead, more a rationalised instrument in
the hands of the government He saw this as having been achieved at the cost of the state
becoming much more isolated from and unresponsive to extra-state interests.
In sum, top-down authority and one-way communication characterize the Indonesian 
bureaucracy both internally and in relation to the society it administers. 
Unresponsiveness to social problems... is a necessary cost o f this kind of political 
and administrative closure.30
And:
In short, bureaucratic transformation in Indonesia has meant the cutting of links and 
the clearing of space around the regime.31
The distinctive quality of the bureaucratic pluralist approach is the emphasis it
gives to the existence of a plurality not only of interests but also policy orientations within
the state. Though he accepts the existence of intra-state competition over largesse, it is
bureaucratic competition over substantive policy issues that he is concerned to
underscore. Importantly, for present purposes, Emmerson, in common with the two
earlier approaches, does not see the state as responding to societal pressure or demands.
The state (or sections of it) may, by virtue of its own internal diversity, be sympathetic to
various extra-state interests, but policy formation is not generally guided by societal
demands. As he puts it, officials may a view a set of interests with suspicion:32
But that does not stop those ’aspirations' being attended to under another guise. For 
the bureaucracy is diverse enough to allow the representation of some different points 
o f view.
In so far as policy decisions may satisfy societal interests, it is because the diversity of 
actors and interests within it enables some vicarious representation to take place. 
Ultimately then, in this approach too, influence over policy is heavily monopolised by the 
state.
29 Emmerson (1978).
30 Emmerson (1978) p. 130.
31 Emmerson (1978) p. 99.
32 Emmerson (1983) p. 1238.
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Corporatist Interpretations
Another distinguishable position in the theoretical spectrum is that associated 
with corporatist interpretations. The principal writers involved here are Dwight King33 
and David Reeve34. Manuel Kaisepo in Indonesia has also reviewed the ideas associated 
with this approach in an approving way.35 Of the three, King has been the most active 
proponent of the utility of viewing Indonesian politics through a corporatist lens. Reeve, 
in his political history of GOLKAR, does not talk explicitly in terms of corporatism, 
although it is evident that despite differences in vocabulary, the substance is similar. 
However, Reeve is not primarily concerned to advance this as a theoretical construct with 
which to interpret contemporary Indonesian politics. Rather, he aims to identify and 
analyse a particular strand of Indonesian political thinking. Consequently, given that we 
are here concerned with theoretical approaches to the understanding of the New Order, 
our attention will be focused on the work of King.
In seeking to analyse Indonesia in terms of corporatist ideas, King draws on 
the pioneering work of Juan Linz,36 Philippe Schmitter37 and particularly, the large and 
rich literature that has ensued in relation to Latin America.38
Corporatism, as discussed earlier, refers to a particular pattem of interest
intermediation between the state and interests in society. It is typically contrasted with
pluralism as a form of political organisation. Corporatist strategies are thus one means of
political management by which a government can control interest intermediation. Stated
simply, corporatist strategies seek, as Malloy39 puts it,
...to eliminate spontaneous interest articulation and establish a limited number of 
authoritatively recognised groups that interact with the government apparatus in 
defined and regularised ways. Moreover, the recognised groups in this type of regime 
are organised in vertical functional categories rather than horizontal class categories 
and are obliged to interact with the state through the designated leaders of 
authoritatively sanctioned interest associations.
33 King (1977), (1979), (1982 a) and (1982 b).
34 Reeve (1985).
35 Manuel Kaisepo (1986).
36 See, for instance Linz (1970).
37 Schmitter (1979 a).
38 For an overview see, Malloy (1977 a); and Collier (1979).
39 Malloy (1977 b) p. 4.
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Similarly, following Stepanr40
Corporatism refers to a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for 
structuring interest representation. Where such arrangements predominate, the state 
often charters or even creates interest groups, attempts to regulate their number, and 
give them the appearance of a quasi-representational monopoly along with special 
prerogatives.
As King and most writers emphasise, it is important not to view a political 
system as being ’either corporatist or not'. Corporatism, or more usefully, a corporatist 
strategy, is a political construct that can be present - to a greater or lesser degree - in 
different countries and different political fields within them. Furthermore, there is not 
simply one variant of coiporatism. Corporatist patterns of interest intermediation in some 
contemporary Western European countries are quite distinct from those in Latin 
America.41 In this respect King follows Schmitter1 s42 distinction between "societal" and 
"state" corporatism. The societal variant (the one referred to in Chapter 1) is a more co­
operative arrangement between the state and organised interests in society, with the latter 
being autonomous from ,and penetrating, the former to a considerable degree. Under 
state corporatism, however, the state is in a much stronger position, controlling and 
penetrating the various dependent interest associations. State corporatism43 is thus seen 
as the form characteristic of authoritarian developing countries and is the one with which 
we are concerned here.
King brings his earlier work on corporatist interest intermediation in 
Indonesia together by employing the concept of the bureaucratic-authoritarian polity, 
which he declares to offer more insight and methodological rigour than the other 
approaches to Indonesian politics.44 The notion of bureaucratic-authoritarianism derives 
from the experiences of Brazil and Argentina with the collapse of democracy and its 
replacement by military rule. Guillermo O'Donnell has been the most prominent in the
40 Stepan (1978) p. 46.
41 For general overview of the theoretical debates on corporatism in Western industrialised nations, see 
Roger (as distinct from Dwight) King (1986) pp. 115-40; and Schmitter & Lembruch (1979).
42 Schmitter (1979 a) pp. 20-22.
43 Henceforth, when the term corporatism is used in this thesis, it is intended to refer only to the state 
variant, unless otherwise indicated. It is certainly not suggested by this writer, or any other, that societal 
corporatism pertains in Indonesia. Stepan takes this sub-division a stage further, drawing a distinction 
between inclusive and exclusive state corporatism as two ideal types. [Stepan (1978) pp. 76-81.] 
Indonesia, while falling between the two, would presumably be thought closer to his exclusionary pole.
44 King D.,(1982 a), op.cit.
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development o f this model. O'Donnell posed a causal link between this political 
transformation and the economic shift from import substitution industrialisation to 
industrial deepening.45 While King does not take up this specific link to economic 
transition, he argues that the bureaucratic authoritarian model is very useful for 
understanding Indonesian politics. For King, the efforts of the New Order government 
to circumscribe political pluralism can be helpfully understood in terms of a corporatist 
strategy for the management of interest intermediation, something which has come to 
typify bureaucratic authoritarianism (though the two are not synonymous).
Herein lies the distinctiveness of this position. King sees many interests in
society as wanting to make demands upon the state, but argues that in order to regulate, if
not suppress, the flow of these demands, the government has imposed a corporatist
network over the top of much of society. He has described many organised interest
associations (especially in the business and labour sectors) that are part of this pattem and
which have met (he suspects46) with varying degrees of success in influencing policy
formation. He emphasises, though, that he regards the corporatist framework as serving
to limit, not facilitate, interest articulation. King is very clearly, and self-consciously,
working within a state-centred approach to politics.
Preoccupation with "basic” socio-cultural variables (eg. aliran ), and the dominant 
theoretical approaches to politics - - liberal - pluralist and Mantist alike - - have 
downplayed and/or denied the relative but significant autonomy of the state’s 
executive decisional element from immediately enforceable accountability to any 
single social group, faction, class, aliran or institution.... in other words, the course 
of internal political change will likely be determined less by social mobilization, 
class, sectoral, and regional conflict, electoral activity .legislative debates, ideological 
pronouncements and even revolutionary struggle - - and more by [quoting Schmitter] 
shifting coalitions currying for special favour with their national leader, infighting 
between bureaucratic agencies for control over policy areas and within agencies for 
personal power and status; complex manoeuvres in the hierarchy of military 
command;...defensive efforts by corporatised interest groups to protect existing 
privilege against further incursions of the state; preemptive co-optation of emergent 
class and sectoral leaders...and the mobilization of legal violence through repressive 
police and judicial actions.
45 See O'Donnell (1978) and (1977).
46 King's evidence of the successes of these organisations in representing the interests of their 
membership is inconclusive. In the case of business, for example, he tells us that of the business 
association leaders he interviewed, many claimed to have successfully "pressed upon authority groups a 
specific project related to their interests". [King (1977) p. 18; and see also, King (1982 a) p. 115 fn. 32.] 
As will be argued later, while many association leaders have secured government contracts and the like for 
themselves (as distinct from their members) this is a very different matter from influencing a broader 
policy issue. Indeed this particularistic activity (securing individaul contracts or favours, etc.) is little 
different from the patrimonial behaviour described by the bureaucratic polity cluster. It is not clear what 
King means by a "project" here, or how reliant he is on the word of his informants.
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While he sees influence over policy heavily concentrated within the state 
apparatus, he does nevertheless identify channels for the representation of extra-state 
interests. In this respect he differs from the bureaucratic polity and patrimonial cluster. 
Importantly though, following Robert Kaufman's work on Latin America,47 he sees 
clientelistic political relationships coexisting with this corporatist network. Yet while not 
denying the existence of patron-client relations, he argues that patrimonialism is not an 
adequate conceptual tool for interpreting Indonesian politics.
A Neo-Marxist Approach
The writings of Richard Robison48 present a challenging and distinctive 
approach to the problem of interpreting the nature of the Indonesian polity. While he 
largely accepts the empirical picture that others have painted, Robison believes that the 
theoretical undeipinnings of the other approaches seriously flaw them.
Robison's work provides something of a taxonomical problem as his 
approach has evolved significantly in recent years. In 1978 he presented a view of the 
state which had much in common with that of the bureaucratic polity and patrimonialist 
cluster.49 Indeed, he talked explicitly of the "neopatrimonial nature of the bureaucratic 
state".50 However, while he saw influence over policy as being monopolised by the state 
(due to the failure of a strong indigenous bourgeoisie to emerge) and patrimonial links as 
the norm, he did so in the broader context of a dependency framework in which foreign 
capital was seen to be an overriding extra-state force.
More recently, Robison's position has shifted - paralleling his identification of 
an emerging domestic bourgeoisie. In his earlier analysis the major domestic capitalists, 
the "bureaucratic capitalists", were seen as mere rentiers, but it is the emergence of a
47 See, for instance, Kaufman (1977).
48 The principal pieces of interest here are: Robison (1978), (1981), (1982), (1985), (1986 a), (1986 b), 
(1986 c) and (1988).
49 Indeed, King classified Robison under the bureaucratic polity label. See King (1982 a) pp. 106-7 & fh. 
11. See also Crouch (1986) pp. 49-50.
50 Robison (1978) p. 18.
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domestic capitalist class which is coming to stand independently of the state that is the
centrepiece of his recent argument. The transition from simple rent-seeking economic
activity to entrepreneurship is critical in this.
A sufficient proportion of the windfall profits derived from extortion appear to have 
been reinvested to transform what we might term primitive accumulators into 
capitalists. Whilst the initial accumulation of capital was made possible by the 
exercise of political power, [ie. through favoured treatment by officials] the 
accumulation process, once under way, is now following a more normal path of 
accumulation through the generation of profits by capital investment51
For present purposes the key question centres around the nature of links
between this capitalist class and the state. Is it able to influence policy outcomes
significantly, and if  so, how? In terms of his theoretical account of the nature of interest
intermediation, there is an important overlap between his view and that of writers in the
corporatist cluster. In The Rise of Capital, in summarising his theoretical approach to the
analysis of state policy and the political structure o f the New Order, he points to the:
continuation of the Guided Democracy practice of establishing state-sponsored 
corporatist political organisations, within which the activities of social and economic 
interest groups are contained. Such corporate, or functional, groups operate as 
institutions of control, mobilisation and patronage in the fields of labour, business, 
the civil service, youth and a variety of other areas.52
And, most recently:
Although the new regime of General Suharto had the political support of the land­
owning and capital owning classes and the middle classes these were quickly 
disabused of any expectations that they would participate in government. Control of 
the state apparatus was rapidly assumed by the military and selected civilian 
bureaucrats. Authoritarian rule was reinforced by the consolidation of corporatist 
institutions and ideologies.53
Robison thus makes it clear that he does not regard major societal interests, 
including business, as having any direct influence over, or participation in, policy 
formation. But in this, he is aware of confronting a theoretical dilemma. If the 
bourgeoisie does not yet exert instrumental influence over policy (in part because the great 
majority are Chinese, and thus politically vulnerable), what then is its political 
significance? In seeking to explain this seemingly paradoxical situation in which "the
51 Robison (1985) p. 316.
52 Robison (1986 a) p. 107.
53 Robison (1988) p. 10.
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ruling class does not rule", he adopts what is essentially a structuralist framework and 
emphasises the need to pay attention to broader and underlying structural factors and the 
systemic 'imperatives' which constrain the state to sustain the long-term health of the 
economy, if only because o f the need to preserve (among other things) its own position 
and political stability.54 In other words, even if the newly emerging bourgeoisie cannot 
itself induce the particular policy outcomes it wants, in the long run its most fundamental 
interests will be upheld by the state. In making an argument for relative state autonomy, 
Robison does not, however, wish to discount the importance of societal forces, 
particularly the bourgeoisie.
While we must stress that state power in capitalist society is not immediately 
reducible to class power and that the state is a system of political domination 
relatively autonomous of class forces, the fact that the state exists in the context of a 
particular system of class relationships does limit and shape the form and exercise of 
state power.55
In this vein he points in the final page of the Rise of Capital to the growing 
significance of the Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) and the likely increased influence of 
business within the state political party (GOLKAR).56 There is a tension here o f which 
Robison himself is aware. In his most recent essay57 he seeks to overcome this tension 
between the conflicting implications of instrumentalist and structuralist frameworks by 
introducing a "state-centred" approach.58 His aim in this is to portray the state as more 
porous and relatively more constrained by social forces than a strictly structuralist view 
allows, while still stopping well short of having the state as little more than the 
handmaiden of capital, as is the instrumentalists’ tendency. In short, he attempts to
54 Robison (1988) pp. 2-4.
55 Robison (1986 a) p. 118. In a subsequent piece, Robison has argued that KADIN is in fact ineffectual, 
and that instead it is the Young Businessmen’s Association (HIPMI) which is better positioned to serve 
the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie. Robison (1986 b) p. 46. These themes will be pursued in 
Chapter 3.
56 Robison (1986 a) p. 396.
57 Robison (1988).
58 Some explanation is necessary here, as the argument of this thesis is that Robison is already working 
within a ’state-centred' tradition, prior to his introduction of this term. It needs to be made clear that 
Robison is using the term in a narrower sense than that employed in this thesis. Essentially, Robison is 
using it to delineate a theoretical position between the poles of a state heavily constrained by the capitalist 
class and an autonomous or socially unconstrained state. In this study, however, the term 'state-centred' is 
simply used as the counterpoint to 'society-centred' theoretical frameworks; and thus embraces all those 
approaches - Marxist and non-Marxist alike - which see the actions and interests of the stare as the most 
critical factor in explaining political outcomes.
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reconcile a role for societal actors (principally business) with what is ultimately a 
structuralist core in his analysis.59
Robison can be seen as providing a theoretical approach to Indonesian politics 
that is distinctive, while also sharing some features with others. Although he has 
explicitly criticised the approaches of Anderson and the bureaucratic polity and 
patrimonial theorists60 as being inadequate for interpreting Indonesian politics, he believes 
that policy control is concentrated in the hands of the state and that clientelistic links 
between individual capitalists and officials are widespread. At the same time, imposed 
over the top are corporatist representational channels.
In Robison's view the state is not as hermetically sealed as it is in the accounts 
of Anderson or some of the bureaucratic polity cluster. In this, his view is akin to that of 
the corporatists: the state is largely immune to interest representation from classes or 
groups in society seeking to influence policy. Though on the one hand he has argued the 
importance of an emerging bourgeoisie as the most significant domestic extra-state 
interest, on the other he has said that it is not yet able to influence policy itself in a direct 
or systematic way. For Robision, then, the mechanisms for interest intermediation - the 
transmission belt between state and society by which demands are (more or less fluently) 
channelled - are those described by the bureaucratic polity/patrimonial cluster and the 
corporatist theorists.
For those outside the military, access to even the outer circles of power and influence 
is confined to informal patron-client networks or to government-controlled and 
sponsored corporatist organisations...61
59 It should mentioned that in a recent review, Winters (1988) accused Robison of being insufficiently 
’state-centred’ in his analysis, and indeed of being 'society-centred'. This is an extraordinary proposition. 
Undoubtedly Robison spends a great deal of time talking about an emerging bourgeoisie, but this does not 
mean he therefore believes that societal forces are the prinicpal determinants of policy [which is what 
’society-centred’ ultimately means: see, for instance, Nordlinger (1981) & (1987) and Skocpol (1985)]. As 
is argued here, a close reading of Robison reveals that he undoubtedly believes the means for transmitting 
societal preferences into policy to be extremely limited. As a result, he sees the state having very great 
autonomy in the determination of policy, with the major constraint upon its actions being the underlying 
structural developments in the international and domestic economies. Robison may well have sins to 
answer for, but 'society-centredness' is not one of them.
60 See Robison (1986 a) pp. 111-17; and Robison (1981) pp. 4-8.
61 Robison (1985) p. 306.
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Restricted Pluralism
Finally, an important contribution to the debate, representing a position 
towards the pluralist-end of the spectrum is that advanced recently by William Liddle and 
which we might term ’restricted pluralism'.62 Liddle is the only major foreign observer of 
Indonesia to examine policy formation processes in terms which allow for some 
significant interplay of both state and extra-state interests.
Like a number of the other scholars discussed here, Liddle seeks to
differentiate his interpretation from the various other approaches already outlined. The
gist of Liddle's contribution is a claim that politics generally, and influence over policy in
particular, is considerably more pluralistic in Indonesia than is normally acknowledged.
He certainly agrees with Emmerson that there can be a range of different actor's interests
within the state structure involved in policy formation and that substantive policy debate
does indeed take place, with the exception of sensitive 'high politics' matters. Where he
differs markedly from Emmerson (and virtually everyone else) is in his argument that
there is a wide variety of cxfra-state actors which may all at times have some influence on
policy outcomes. One of his central conclusions is thus that:
a political system of military and bureaucratic authoritarianism, at least in Indonesia, 
does not preclude a policy process in which actors outside the central state apparatus 
play a significant role.63
Specifically, he identifies the press, intellectuals, individual Members of 
Parliament, producer and consumer interests as well as local level officials as often having 
significant, albeit varying, degrees of influence. (Note however, that some of these - 
Parliamentarians and local officials - though typically overlooked by other analysts, 
should still be considered as members of the state apparatus, even though their interests 
may in some respects vary substantially from those of the government.) Liddle's 
arguments are based on a series of case-studies of agricultural policy formation which 
highlight competing actors and demands. Beyond claiming that their influence over 
policy is not narrowly monopolised by the upper echelons of the state structure, Liddle
62 Liddle (1985) and (1987).
63 Liddle (1987) pp. 142-43.
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seeks to identify some of the mechanisms by which these 'outside' actors are able to 
achieve a measure of influence.64 While he finds some signs of extra-state groups being 
able to achieve direct influence on particular policy issues, he concludes that indirect 
influence is more characteristic. To illustrate this notion of indirect influence, he points in 
his case-studies to instances where decision-makers anticipate societal demands and adjust 
policy sufficiently to pre-empt representational activity by the groups concerned.65 Thus, 
for instance, the government tries to satisfy at least the minimum interests of farmers in 
advance of their grievances resulting in rural unrest. Liddle also sees ideology, or more 
broadly, the climate of ideas, as playing an important part in the policy process by 
influencing political discourse and constraining policy-makers, sometimes to the 
advantage of weak groups in society.
Liddle offers a distinctive picture of the nature of interest intermediation, and 
by extension, the polity. He sees a restricted pluralism- certainly not a uniform or 
egalitarian distribution of opportunity for influencing policy outcomes - but a political 
system in which some measure of extra-state pluralism can be found. He is the only 
major analyst of Indonesian politics who explicitly points to non-state actors as having a 
capacity to influence policy formation in other than a clientelistic fashion. In doing so, 
however, he does not seek to overturn or reject the images provided by others, but rather, 
to extend them:
I have not discovered that the image of centralized power in Indonesia is wrong, only 
that it is incomplete 66
Although still maintaining a state-centred approach, Liddle is the writer who 
seems most concerned to delineate the possible significance of at least some societal actors 
in the shaping of policy.
Conclusion
The purpose of this overview has been to outline the more significant 
theoretical images used in discussions of the nature of interest intermediation. Put more
64 Liddle (1987) pp. 142-44.
65 This proposition while clearly more 'voluntarist', is not dissimilar to Robison's argument about 
structural imperatives ensuring that the fundamental interests of capital are preserved by the state.
66 Liddle (1987) p. 144
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broadly, it has been concerned to probe the existing scholarly literature for guidance on 
the nature of state-society relations in Indonesia.
There has been continuing debate as to the utility of the various theoretical 
images for interpreting Indonesian politics among their respective proponents. Few 
analysts, for example, appear comfortable with Jackson's rather 'purist' bureaucratic 
polity position, and almost none with Anderson's portrait of a near-hermetically sealed 
state. But if the image of a state almost entirely cut-off from society is problematic, what 
of the other possibilities discussed here?
Those who think in terms of a more porous bureaucratic polity tell us little - 
beyond gesturing in the direction of patron-client links - about how and to what extent 
interests outside the state are represented. The image contained in Emmerson's 
bureaucratic pluralism approach is, in this respect, not far from the bureaucratic polity 
cluster. Here too the state seems relatively immune to societal demands, except perhaps 
via vicarious representation of at least some societal interests by virtue of the internal 
plurality within the state structure.
Dwight King and others have drawn our attention to the existence of 
corporatist channels which link a range of interests in society to the state and he has 
argued that these are means to preserve policy freedom for the state through the restriction 
of the flow of societal demands. Very little hard evidence, however, has been provided 
about their actual significance or the extent of their policy influence. We are given an 
interesting taxonomy of corporatist-like political structures, but little guide to their actual 
performance in terms of regulating pluralism and interest representation.67 This is the 
problem of formalism warned against by Stepan.68 Simply pointing to the existence of 
structures that appear corporatist-like tells us little about what they actually do. In short, 
we need guidance on function as well as form. Regardless of whether these structures 
operate to facilitate or suppress interest articulation, we need more systematic evidence. 
If, for example, they are merely lifeless shells (which need not be the same thing as
67 For a more general discussion of this, see Milne (1983).
68 Stepan (1978) pp. 71-72.
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serving to suppress demands) then King is not really telling us much more than the
bureaucratic polity theorists. As Liddle has rightly argued:69
The least researched and understood institutions in New Order politics are the 
corporatist and quasi-corporatist organizations and procedures that link the 
government or one of its departments to particular segments of the population.
There are questions to be asked of Robison as well. If the state constitutes, 
rather than, represents the interests of capital, what importance is to be attached to 
demands by business other than those of a narrow and particularistic nature? Are they 
just absorbed and lost within corporatist structures? In the absence of a political vehicle 
to represent the interests of business, to what extent is business, or sections of it, able to 
influence policy outcomes, and how?
Liddle goes the furthest in probing the question of links, or means, by which 
some societal interests might be incorporated in policy design. He does not reject the 
arguments of other writers that the state is largely unrestricted by social forces, but instead 
seeks to supplement this by pointing to indirect means by which extra-state actors have 
been able to gain some satisfaction. But Liddle is primarily concerned with the impact at a 
local level of agricultural policy and the interests of politically weak groups. What is the 
situation for stronger extra-state interests at the national level? Are they dependent on 
indirect means for seeking policy satisfaction?
Overall, the striking feature about the theoretical debates on the nature of the 
Indonesian polity is not the divergence, but rather the convergence of opinion. Certainly 
the various scholars have come from different theoretical starting points and have different 
purposes in mind, but it is inescapable that there is an underlying consensus centring 
around the idea that the state is largely unfettered by societal interests in its determination 
of policy. With the partial exception of Liddle, all the approaches are very heavily state- 
centred: very little scope is allowed for the possibility that extra-state actors have a major 
role in policy formation. This is not surprising given that almost no attention is given in 
the literature to the question of interest intermediation: it is difficult to talk of societal 
inputs into policy if one has little knowledge of the means by which this might be taking
69 Liddle (1985) p. 73.
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place. Such differences as there are among the various approaches in this regard are 
differences of degree; the earlier they appear in the theoretical spectrum described the less 
scope they allow for societal input into policy formation (and correspondingly, the less 
attention they give to the subject).
Ultimately we are left with three possible mechanisms for the transmission of 
societal interests to policy makers: patron-client links, corporatist channels and 'osmosis' 
(or indirect and vicarious representation). The first is, by definition, restricted to 
personalised and particularist concessions from a patron within the state to an individual 
or individuals on the outside. Patron-client links do not, therefore, pertain to broad or 
'univeralist' issues. In the case of the second possibility, there is some uncertainty as to 
how the corporatist structures in fact function, although the presumption is that they 
generally restrict and suppress the flow of demands. Finally, in terms of osmosis 
(Emmerson's vicarious representation and Liddle's anticipation) it is obvious that this is 
heavily dependent upon the behaviour of state officials rather than societal actors 
themselves: the initiative lies within the state rather than society.
Arising out of this strongly state-centred orthodoxy, then, are two basic 
questions which together constitute the focus for this study:
1. to what extent does extra-state participation in policy formation take place?
2. assuming, a priori, that such participation does take place to at least a small extent, 
what (in Schmitter’s terms70) is the mode (or modes) of interest intermediation? Or 
more simply, if interest intermediation does take place, how is it organised?
In seeking answers to these two fundamental questions, this study does not 
attempt to generalise about interest intermediation between all segments of society and the 
state. Instead, as indicated in Chapter 1, it concentrates on only one segment - business 
(itself, a vast category). The main reason for this (apart from the dictates of time and 
space) is that most people would agree that if any section of society is likely to be able to 
influence policy, it is business. How then might interest intermediation by business be 
explored? Stated simply, the method adopted here is to focus on concrete cases in which 
particular business groups have wanted something from the state. Very deliberately,
70 Schmitter (1979 b).
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cases have been chosen which do hot just involve the particularistic interests of one or 
two business people, but rather cases which involve issues of major concern to whole 
sectors of business (for example, the pharmaceutical or textile industries). The reason 
for this, as suggested in Chapter 1, is to avoid material which does little more than throw 
up further evidence of the existence of clientelistic links. The continued importance of 
patron-client links is, quite simply, taken as a 'given' in all this. Of more interest here is 
the question of whether other, more broadly-based, forms of interest intermediation also 
come into play, or perhaps, are coming into play as Indonesia’s economy and political 
system grow more complex.
Some public-policy theorists might object that a study of this sort is 
misguided in focusing on the 'inputs' rather than 'outputs' end of the policy process. 
Certainly it must be acknowledged that if one thing has been made clear by public policy 
studies in the last two decades, it is that 'implementation matters'. It is generally assumed 
that in so far as political participation does take place in developing countires it is at the 
implementation stage.71 However, the potential for influencing policy outcomes during 
implementation is simply taken for granted here. It is not difficult to accept that there is 
considerable scope for circumventing a new regulation, or failing to implement it fully, 
particularly at the local level. But from the point of view of this study, more interesting - 
and more contentious - is the question of the extent to which extra-state participation takes 
place earlier in the policy process. While activity at the implementation end of the cycle 
certainly comes into play in the case-studies here, it will not be the centre of our attention.
There is also a more serious methodological weakness that might be seen to 
be associated with a study seeking to explore the extent to which business interests are 
able to achieve policy satisfaction on matters of major concern to them. It concerns the 
parallels between this approach and that of the 'pluralists' in American political science 
during the 1960s. As is well known, they were widely criticised for, amongst other 
things, using a methodology which facilitated their drawing the conclusion that power
71 For an illustration of this in the Indonesian context see Amir Santoso (1986). In relation to 
developing countries more broadly see, among many others, Grindle (1980), Migdal (1977) and Smith 
(1973).
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was widely dispersed throughout society. Notable among the critiques of pluralism72 
were those of Bachrach and Baratz,73 and Lukes.74 The pluralists were said to be dealing 
with only the "first face" of power - that is, the observable capacity of a group to have 
policy-makers take account of their interests. Bachrach and Baratz argued that the 
pluralists failed to take account of the less observable "second face" of power, the 
capacity of strong groups to prevent an issue or policy option from being placed on the 
political agenda. These are the so-called "non-decisions" by which the interests of the 
weak are overlooked because they do not make it on to the agenda. Lukes took this 
approach a stage further, with the notion of a "third face" of power, which centred around 
the concepts of ideological hegemony and false consciousness, and the way in which they 
can be exploited to present the interests of a particular group as also being the 'national 
interest'.
The essential point to be drawn here is that critics of the pluralists have argued 
that non-observable aspects of power will not show up in an approach which deals only 
with the first face of power. These critiques carry considerable force. And yet, despite 
the fact that this study will inevitably also share the behaviouralist characteristic of the 
pluralists in dealing primarily with the "first face" of power, I would argue that it is quite 
defensible here. This is because, far from trying to establish that power (the capacity to 
bring about a desired policy outcome) is widely dispersed in Indonesian society, the aim 
of this project (to exaggerate a little) is to explore the extent to which power resides at all 
outside the state apparatus. One can do this and still accept a priori that there are other 
dimensions to power to be explored in Indonesia. While it would seem absurd to set such 
a limited research objective in the context of a Western democracy, our survey of the 
theoretical literature on Indonesia has shown that there is little support for the idea that 
societal interests in Indonesia are muscular enough to influence policy issues (except on a 
narrow and personalised basis through patrimonial links). In a situation where even the
72 For a neat distillation of these debates, see Wilson (1981) pp. 1-16.
73 Bachrach & Baratz (1962).
74 Lukes (1974).
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idea of a "first face" of power is not widely accepted it is probably overly ambitious to try 
to establish a "second" or "third face".
This chapter has sought to provide a theoretical backdrop for an examination 
of interest intermediation in Indonesia. More particularly, in drawing attention to the areas 
of debate, it has attempted to make clear that there is an acute shortage of detailed 
empirical material on the subject. This is something the case-studies in the following 
chapters aim to provide. Before proceeding to the case-studies, however, the next chapter 
seeks to provide the political context for them by giving an overview of the institutional, 
ideological and economic setting.
CHAPTER THREE
THE POLITICAL SETTING
The main aim of this chapter is to survey the processes of political 
representation in Indonesia. It provides an outline of the context in which interest 
intermediation takes place, giving attention, after a general description of the main 
political trends during the New Order, to three significant institutional channels for the 
representation of extra-state interests: the House of Representatives, the press and non­
governmental organisations. Next, the focus shifts to channels of communication which 
are specific to business interests: business representative associations and particularly the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). The chapter concludes with a brief 
overview of Indonesia’s economic environment in the mid-1980s, which forms a critical 
part of the background to the case-studies.
Interest Intermediation in Indonesia: an Overview
A quick survey of the political landscape in Indonesia today reveals a maze of 
corporatist institutions of the sort identified by Dwight King and others. Thus, for 
instance, we can see specific state-anointed bodies representing the interests of teachers, 
students, peasants, youth groups, army officers, civil servants, civil servants' wives, 
journalists, doctors, lawyers and innumerable subdivisions of business. For almost 
every conceivable set of interests in Indonesian society there seems to be a functionally- 
oriented corporatist body nominally responsible for the representation of matters 
concerning its client group to the state.
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As David Reeve1 emphasised in his excellent study of the emergence of the 
quintessential corporatist body, GOLKAR (the state political party), the idea of corporatist 
representation far predates the New Order government. Corporatist strategies were also 
employed during the years of Guided Democracy under Sukarno. While the military has 
been the most active proponent of a corporatist approach to the management of interest 
representation in recent decades, in doing so it has drawn on a deeper philosophical 
current that can be traced back to some of the early influential nationalist thinkers. 
Though the terminology of corporatism was not employed in this tradition of thought, the 
concepts were much the same. Functionally-organised interest representation, rather than 
a competitive political party structure, imbued with a collectivist spirit, was seen as both 
an indigenous and, more broadly, Asian alternative to what was regarded as divisive 
Western capitalist and liberal democratic thinking.2
While this tradition of political thought proved useful to the armed forces 
during the Guided Democracy period, it is under the New Order that the development of 
corporatist representation channels has reached its zenith. Following Reeve,3 we can see 
that in its early years, the New Order government introduced a wide range of measures to 
fuse the institutions of political representation into a corporatist form. After this 
groundwork had been laid, the emphasis later in the 1970s and 1980s came to be on 
consolidation of the strategy.
Early on, military leaders within the government set about unfastening the 
links between the political parties and societal interests. In the place of parties they 
established a system of functionally-based organisations to act as the conduits between 
societal interests and the state. These corporatist structures were in turn usually fused, or 
brought together, under the overarching umbrella of GOLKAR. A first step in this 
direction was to address the large social sectors which had been linked to political parties. 
Thus, for example, all existing representative bodies covering labour, peasants,
1 Reeve (1985). It must be stressed that Reeve, an historian, does not himself talk in terms of 
corporatism. He analyses the emergence of GOLKAR in terms of traditional Javanese ideas about 
political representation. That the picture he puts forward matches corporatist models is, however, quite 
clear.
2 Reeve (1985) especially pages xviii-47.
3 Reeve (1985) pp. 322-65.
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fishermen, youth and women were fused into five officially designated organisations. 
These functional categories received special attention, as some had in the past been a 
source of radicalism, a spectre which remained a concern for the New Order government, 
despite the elimination of the Communist Party (PKI). This corporatist strategy was not, 
however, confined solely to these mass social categories: it was extended right across the 
spectrum.4 Numerous associations were established as the sole representative bodies for 
particular client groups. Priority was given to those interest areas of strategic significance 
within society. So, in addition to the five major mass organisations mentioned above, 
teachers and business people, for example, also acquired a single officially recognised 
body to represent them. By emphasising functional divisions it was hoped that class and 
other political cleavages would be blurred.
These corporatist channels were not established in a dramatic way. The new 
representational structures were not openly or confrontationally imposed upon the various 
social groups. Under the guidance of the political strategists in General Ali Moertopo's 
Special Operations unit, feelers were put out to key elements within each group. Via a 
process combining patronage and political suasion, existing organisations were turned to 
the government's purposes, or new ones were specially created. As Reeve5 notes, by 
virtue of this low-profile method, the government was able to stand back and welcome 
these new single vehicles as if they were spontaneous societal initiatives.
Parallel with this strategy of establishing a network of corporatist structures to 
cut the links between the political parties and society was an outright push to emasculate 
the parties themselves.6 The nine remaining political parties (other than GOLKAR, which 
claimed it was not a party) were fused into two new all-embracing parties, one 
amalgamating the former Muslim parties, and the other former nationalist and Christian 
parties. The titles given to the two new parties, respectively, the Development Unity 
Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), concealed their heritage and 
provided no clue as to their political orientation. More important than this was the fact
4 In addition to Reeve, see also Dwight King (1977).
5 Reeve (1985) p. 131
6 For a more thorough study of the position of parties in Indonesian politics see, among others, Liddle 
(1978), Crouch (1978), and Ward (1974).
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that the fusion created artificial new political organisations which were fraught' with 
internal tensions. This, together with the filling of party leadership positions with 
compliant individuals and the vetting of all candidates for election, helped to ensure that 
the parties would be in no position to challenge the government's authority.
The final stroke was the introduction of regulations preventing the 
establishment of party offices in villages and small towns, where most of the population 
was located This came about with the development of the concepts of "depoliticisation" 
of the countryside and the creation of a "floating mass", by detaching the bulk of the 
population from all but state-approved political channels.7
Within the state apparatus major changes were wrought as well. Not only had 
PKI supporters and suspected sympathisers been eliminated from various government 
departments, but all civil servants (as well as state enterprise employees) were required to 
become members of the Civil Servants Corps (KORPRI) - the organisation nominally 
responsible for the representation of their interests. This was part of the drive to establish 
"monoloyalty" to GOLKAR among state employees. As Emmerson8 has noted KORPRI 
was "meant to be the sole organisation in their lives outside the office." However, of 
KORPRTs five stated objectives, only the last referred to the well-being of civil servants; 
the others emphasised notions such as discipline and patriotism. KORPRI, being an 
integral component of GOLKAR, operated more as an instrument of control than 
representation, with all civil servants being required to vote for and support GOLKAR at 
elections. Apart from guaranteeing GOLKAR a portion of the voting population, this had 
the important benefit of allowing it to sidestep the prohibition on political parties operating 
at the village level, for the village officials, being civil servants, were thus also members 
of KORPRI and GOLKAR, and therefore well placed to do GOLKAR's political bidding.
The effect of this political restructuring was to eliminate, or emasculate, less 
controllable (and thus possibly threatening) channels of interest articulation from the 
political landscape, and to develop in their place a vast corporatist network. This new 
corporatist architecture, which had GOLKAR as its capstone, did not however function to
7 See Ward (1974).
8 Emmerson (1978) p. 107. See Emmerson for a more detailed account of the development of KORPRI, 
especially pp. 101-9.
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channel demands upwards or articulate societal interests in any meaningful sense. It did
not serve to provide a functionally based system for societal inputs into policy formation.
Lacking a life of its own, it lay dormant on the political sidelines. And yet GOLKAR's
passivity did not represent a political failure by its designers. Quite the opposite.
The Army leadership had been in no way committed to creating the sort of 
"dynamic" political vehicle that some public spokesmen had claimed Golkar would 
become. That the majority of the populace should be drawn away from the parties 
into a vehicle under military control, committed to "harmony" and "stability", had 
been enough.^
For Ali Moertopo, the principal political architect of the New Order, this 
corporatist strategy was a great success. It aimed to reduce drastically the opportunity for 
demands to be made upon the state by societal interests. Rather than facilitate interest 
articulation, its aim was to absorb demands passively, thus serving as a means of social 
control. In a sense, it was a strategy of 'representational overkill'. There was a plethora 
of corporatist channels to soak up demands; but they did little more than this, for demands 
were not generally then transmitted, in any effective way, up to policy makers. That 
providing an effective interest representation network was not one of the priorities of this 
approach was reflected in the junior position GOLKAR itself held within what became 
known as the Grand GOLKAR Family (Keluarga Besar GOLKAR ). Apart from 
GOLKAR itself, the other two elements of the "family" were the armed forces and 
KORPRI. This was indicative of the overall character of the New Order state - a structure 
controlled by a military and bureaucratic elite.
This corporatist framework was steadily developed through the late 1970s and 
into the 1990s. Functionally organised representational associations continued to be 
established, even as some withered through inertia. Rather than operating as an organ for 
interest aggregation, GOLKAR functioned primarily as an electoral vehicle for the 
government and has secured growing majorities at five yearly intervals. During these 
years control of the press was tightened, with recalcitrant papers being shut down. 
Journalists too were brought under a single association imposing tight discipline. 
However, perhaps the most striking instance of this intensifying corporatist strategy was
9 Reeve (1985). 322.
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the enshrining in law (finally achieved in 1985) of the requirement that all social and 
political organisations have as their foundation the state ideology,10 Pancasila. At a 
formal level Pancasila enunciates five social and humanitarian principles. However, the 
term has become so loosely used that it functions primarily as a hazy ideological shroud in 
which the government cloaks itself to legitimise its corporatist strategies for political 
management. All interest associations in society (including the various religious groups) 
were formally required to acknowledge Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation. 
The Muslim-based PPP, in particular, had conspicuous difficulty in reconciling this with 
its religious affiliations. For present purposes, the significance of the requirement to 
adopt Pancasila is that it symbolises the extent to which corporatist strategies had 
permeated society.* 11
The implementation of this corporatist strategy has been thoroughgoing. One 
of the more striking manifestations is the process by which the Broad Outlines of State 
Policy document, or, GBHN, is formulated.12 After the Constitution, the GBHN is 
officially the most important set of guidelines for all government policy initiatives. A new 
GBHN document is developed every five years, corresponding with the formulation of 
the REPELITA, the Five Year Development Plans. While the REPELITA is more 
significant in terms of actual policy implications, the GBHN is seen to be of considerable 
symbolic and ideological significance, representing a distillation of national aspirations. 
To this end the GBHN is drawn up by a special government-appointed team. The 
members of this team are all senior government officials - reflecting the fact that it is an 
executive-controlled exercise. Ultimately, a wide-ranging document is considered
10 By ideology, is here meant a coherent body of socially constructed ideas and values which provide a 
way of thinking about the world and one’s place in it. Note, though, that Dwight King, apparently using 
a very particular concept of ideology, declares that Pancasila should not be considered an ideology. See 
King (1982 a) p. I l l ,  fn. 17. For a broad consideration of the notoriously slippery concept of ideology 
see: McLellan (1986), Mullins (1972) and Giddnes (1979).
11 In 1978 the government introduced legislation requiring all citizens to undertake the intensive two 
week P4 program {Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila - the Guide to Realisation & 
Implementation of Pancasila) on the meaning of Pancasila and the social obligations for citizens implied 
by i t  At first the program was compulsory for all civil servants, but was subsequently extended to 
universities and schools. For further details on this enormous social and political education program see, 
Morfit (1981), Weatherbee (1985) and Watson (1987).
12 For some insight into the background of the GBHN see Rufinus Lahur (1973).
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(sometimes heatedly) by the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR) before being 
ratified.13
In preparation for the 1988 GBHN, the MPR in late 1986 sent out a 
questionnaire to 229 state institutions and prominent individuals seeking their views on a 
broad range of national issues.14 This, the Deputy Head of MPR said, was to try to 
overcome the impression that the GBHN was merely a product of the executive. While in 
principle the MPR may reject or amend the document that is ultimately submitted to it, in 
practice - as is openly acknowledged - this is politically inconceivable.15 The inevitability 
of the MPR's endorsement of the GBHN neatly captures some of the ambivalence of 
Indonesian political life. Straight-forward authoritarian control interweaves a political 
culture which, at least nominally, is uncomfortable with adversarial conflict and places 
great store in consensus.
The GBHN is of great symbolic importance, but its actual impact upon policy 
is limited. This is not to say that the GBHN is insignificant, but simply to note that it 
acts as a 'negative' rather than 'positive' constraint upon policy. In other words, the fact 
that an idea or principle is included in the GBHN does not ensure policy action to 
implement it, but rather serves to prevent, or make difficult, any policy initiatives in 
contravention of it. This is not without political significance. As will be seen later, 
securing recognition of a principle in the GBHN can be valuable strategy for protecting it 
from political opponents.16 The symbolic importance of the GBHN lies in the fact that it 
has been endorsed by the MPR, and thus supposedly expresses the peoples’ will. The 
GBHN is a broad statement of policy directions of which the government approves, 
although in a less focused way than the President's annual national address, or even the 
REPELITA. A principle acknowledged in the GBHN bears the state imprimatur and is 
thus invested with something approaching ideological sanctity.
13 A  view often heard in Jakarta was that the discussion o f the GBHN drafts by the MPR and its 
committees has become more vigorous, and that the draft recommnedations are not as readily accepted as 
they were apparently earlier in the New Order.
14 "MPR Sebarkan Kuesioner Untuk Himpun Bahan GBHN 1988-1993", Kompas, 26 November 1986.
15 See, "Siapapun Boleh Sumbang Pemikiran Untuk GBHN", Kompas, 5 June 1987.
16 Interview with Mohammed Sadli (Chairman o f the KADINs LP3E - Institute for Economic Studies, 
Research & Development; and former Cabinet Minister) 22 April & 24 August 1987. See also Reeve 
(1985) pp. 348 & 354.
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The Cabinet is another prominent political institution in which, like the 
GBHN, the appearance of unanymity is all-important. 17 The full Cabinet meets only once 
a year in the largely formal Sidang Paripurna which reports on the annual budget. Much 
more frequent are the three categories of restricted sessions (Sidang Terbatas) which 
comprise, respectively, ministers in the areas of economic, political and social affairs. 
The President will always attend the economic and political gatherings, but rarely those 
for social affairs. Even at these limited sessions, however, serious debate is very 
uncommon. Instead, discussion usually takes the form of presentations 'before' the 
President. Priority is given to avoiding the appearance of disharmony in the presence of 
Suharto, for this would require acknowledgment of the existence of conflict within the 
government. If a particular minister has an unsatisfied concern, rather than raise it at a 
restricted session of Cabinet, he or she is likely to pursue this in the context of a private 
bilateral meeting with the President. Not only does this avoid embarrassment for the 
minister concerned, more importantly, it obviates the need for open presidential 
acknowledgment of discord. It is not that the President cannot be informed of bad news 
or conflict, but rather that this must not take place openly. Suharto is, apparently, 
therefore quite accesible to ministers wishing to come to him. Whereas some senior 
figures (such as General Sudharmono, General Murdani and Habibie) are seen to have 
unlimited access, most ministers would only go to the President directly to complain 
about a dispute with another minister on a very serious matter.
Substantive policy debate among ministers takes place away from the 
President, in special ad hoc working meetings. These may take take place up to several 
times a week, depending on the initiative of individual ministers in arranging them. They 
tend to be very small, involving only those few ministers immediately concerned with a 
particular issue (officials do not attend). Meetings such as these provide opportunities for 
one minister to 'enquire' about a controversy in the portfolio of another which is reported 
in the press. These meetings are used to thrash out policy compromises which can then 
be presented to the President.
17 This discussion of the Cabinet draws on interviews with three former New Order ministers: 
Mohammad Sadli (22 April & 24 August 1987); Daoud Joesoef (20 August 1987) and Frans Seda (4 May 
1987).
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Even at the cabinet-level of politics, then, priority is given to minimising the 
appearance of political differences. Though the process for the limitation of pluralism is 
more refined here, the principal is the same as that which underlies the GBHN, and, 
ultimately, the vast network of corporatist structures; political participation must be via the 
designated channels - channels which are themselves filtered.
So far, this discussion has concentrated on the decline of the political parties 
and the recasting of existing representative institutions into a corporatist form. Emphasis 
has been given to the limitation of the scope for political representation and the detachment 
of policy-makers from societal interests. And yet, as argued in the previous chapter, even 
at an a priori level one can question the idea that political representation has completely 
withered. How tightly has political pluralism been circumscribed? If parties no longer 
function effectively to aggregate demands and channel them upwards, what of other 
institutions? Three institutions which, to varying degrees, do serve to communicate 
demands to policy-makers are the House of Representatives, the press and non­
governmental organisations. Each is considered below.
The House of Representatives
One institution in the Indonesian political system which is conspicuously, and 
almost universally, ignored as a vehicle for interest representation is the national House of 
Representatives (DPR). We have already seen that the parties do not function as a means 
for channeling societal interests to policy-makers. Curiously, however, while the parties 
themselves can perhaps be dismissed in this, the DPR should not.
The foreign academic literature on Indonesian politics almost completely 
overlooks the DPR and its workings, as indeed do a great many Indonesians. There is a 
presumption that it is at best, a marginal political arena, generally irrelevant to the 
determination of policy outcomes. Many Indonesians have also described it as little more 
than a charade. This attitude was epitomised by former Vice President Adam Malik's 
description of a DPR member’s life as consisting of the "four D's": daftar, duit, duduk,
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diam (clock in, collect your pay, sit back and keep quiet).18 Such widespread derision is 
certainly not without foundation: the DPR is indeed very largely dominated by the 
government. Although both the DPR and the executive are constitutionally entitled to 
initiate legislation, the New Order practice has been for all legislation to originate from the 
executive branch. We have already seen that the electoral process is thoroughly 
'managed' by the government, and that the scope for an unfavourable political outcome is 
remote. Furthermore, of the 400 members of the DPR, 100 are from the armed forces 
and are appointed by the government. This, together with the general inertia of the two 
minor parties and the fact that GOLKAR holds the great majority of the 300 elected seats, 
does indeed ensure that the DPR is not a forum in which the government's policies are 
subject to vigorous scrutiny.
Having said this, however, it nonetheless remains the case that the DPR can, 
in a limited and sporadic fashion exercise some influence on legislation and perform some 
oversight functions. The focus of attention here is not on the DPR as a whole, but on the 
activities of the various committees within it. Some of these have, on occasion, delayed 
or indirectly forced alterations to government legislation. A recent prime example of this 
was the KADIN Bill; it was delayed by the leadership of several committees for many 
months, before being finally passed in late 1986.19 In such situations, the stalling of a bill 
typically takes place before it is even submitted to the DPR for deliberation. Usually this 
would occur when senior officials from the relevant section of the bureaucracy approach 
the appropriate committee to discuss the issue and gauge their reaction. This is the one 
significant opportunity Members have to 'oppose' legislation. A bill to which the 
government is committed would never be overturned. But it is precisely because of this 
that the occurrence of delays is interpreted as indicating serious opposition. Interestingly, 
and contrary to expectations, it appears that it is the GOLKAR and ABRI representatives 
who are often the most likely to take the initiative in expressing concern about aspects of
18 "View from the Pinnacle", Indonesian Observer, 22 July 1987.
19 Interviews with Beren Ginting (Deputy Head Committee VII, GOLKAR fraksi) 13 June & 19 August 
1987.
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proposed legislation.20 If they voice reservations which cannot be resolved by negotiation 
with departmental officials, the matter is passed up the state hierarchy, on one side 
through departmental channels, and on the other through GOLKAR and ABRI channels, 
to be determined at a ministerial, or, if necessary, presidential level.
The other potential opportunity DPR Members have for some input to policy 
debates is through Committee hearings on particular issues.21 The agenda of matters to be 
considered by a committee is set following discussion amongst the leadership groups of 
the four fraksi22 in the Committees prior to each sitting of the DPR. The agenda is thus 
usually a matter of compromise and any fraksi leader can veto an issue he or she does not 
want aired. The public is able to request that an issue be addressed, there being around 
two or three such requests from the public to a committee per session (depending on the 
policy area). There are four two-month sittings of the DPR per year, with about three 
weeks being devoted to public hearings each time. At the public hearings the Committees 
may invite senior government officials and even ministers, as well as members of the 
public to appear before it. Depending on the interests and determination of the Committee 
leadership, these can be valuable opportunities to question government leaders about 
policy issues. While the Committees have no power to force officials to cooperate or 
provide information, it does appear that most committees are of such standing that an 
appearance before them is not treated lightly. The presence of journalists covering issues 
greatly strengthens these public meetings, as all government representatives are wary of 
receiving negative press coverage. In addition, these meetings can provide a forum in 
which societal interests can broadcast their viewpoint, as the hearings are usually covered 
by the press.
Beyond these formal channels, prominent Members can receive numerous 
calls for assistance from individual members of the public. In 1986, there were
20 Systematic evidence to support this assertion is not available. It was however supported not only by 
the case-studies, but moreover, by the great majority o f people (both in and outside parliamentary circles) 
interviewed.
21 For much o f the information here, I am grateful to Djoko Sudjatmiko (Committee VI, Deputy Leader 
GOLKAR fraksi - interview 6 June 1987); Hamzah Haz (Committee XI, Leader PPP fraksi - interview 9 
June 1987); and Beren Ginting (Committee VII, Deputy Leader GOLKAR fraksi - interviews 13 June & 
19 August 1987).
22 Members o f the DPR are divided into four fraksi - formal institutional divisions corresponding to 
GOLKAR, the two minor parties, and the armed forces appointees.
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approximately 200 such pleas. These are from people with medium size businesses with 
grievances about alleged mistreatment by state officials or from low income groups who 
are being forcibly uprooted as a result of land redevelopment. If a Member is willing to 
take up an issue, there is some scope for bringing about redress by using his or her status 
to induce a more senior official to review the matter. In this respect, the DPR appears to 
be more approachable to people with limited political resources than are the government 
departments.
It must be stressed, however, that none of these comments is intended to 
suggest that the Indonesian Parliament is somehow a strong and effective check on 
executive behaviour. Clearly it is not. Indeed, if nothing else, its lack of widespread 
public prestige is testimony to this. The point to be made, though, is that the DPR is not 
as irrelevant to the policy-making process as it might appear. It is an institution to which 
non-state interests can look in seeking to have an aspect of policy amended. As will be 
seen, business groups can and do take advantage of this with some success.
There are very clear constraints on the DPR’s capacity to influence 
government. Most conspicuous is the importance of the quality, convictions and 
determination of individual Members. Many are seen to be compliant and docile. Some 
are willing to take up issues or causes that are brought to them, but very few are prepared 
to push a matter in the face of governmental opposition. Those that do attempt to do so, 
and thereby embarrass the government, are likely to be declared ineligible for the next 
election. To summarise the significance of the DPR as a means of interest representation, 
it can be said that while it is not totally irrelevant, it does remain the forum of the weak. 
Groups or individuals that have substantial political resources, and more importantly, the 
option of dealing directly with senior government officials, will not need to use it. For 
those without this luxury, it can sometimes be of value.
The Press
Another institution given insufficient attention in terms of interest 
representation is the press.23 Of the three institutions discussed here it is the most potent.
23 Much of the material in this section draws on interviews with Yakob Oetama (Chief Editor of 
Kompas) 24 April 1987; August Parengkuan (a Kompas editor) 8 September 1987; Sanyoto (Chief Editor
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Most of what has been published about the press in Indonesia concerns the constraints 
under which it operates.24 We thus know a good deal about formal and informal 
censorship as well as the self-censorship patterns among magazine and newspaper 
editors. Certain sensitive issues are simply not reported in the press. The government 
continually stresses that journalism must be "responsible" and suppportive of its 
development plans.
Most newspaper editors have little difficulty in delaying and downplaying 
communally divisive issues such as race tensions. More problematic are the unwritten 
rules that no criticism should be voiced of the first family or security policy. The ABRI 
Information Office and the Department of Information will contact editors if there is an 
issue which they do not want reported. Interestingly though, it is often not the major 
political controversies which attract censorial intervention (these may usually be reported 
after a short time lag), but rather matters which though nationally insignificant are 
personally embarrassing for senior military figures.25
Many publications have fallen foul of the censorship ground rules. While 
there has not in recent years been the large scale banning of papers that took place in 
connection with the Malari riots of 1974 and the general election of 1978, newspapers are 
periodically forced to close down if they are seen to be too provocative or questioning of 
government rule. The closure of the very influential Sinar Harapan in late 1986 and the 
more sensational Prioritas in mid 1987 are just the most recent examples. A more 
systematic restriction on the press is the limitation on newspaper size and advertising 
levels. Since 1980 the maximum length of any daily paper has been twelve pages, with 
not more than 30% of the total page space to be used for advertising. While the restriction 
was officially justified in terms of protecting the smaller publications, it seems clear that 
the real aim was to prevent the largest newspapers from expanding their circulation and
of Business News) 2 February & 2 September 1987; Mohammad Chudori (General Manager o f the Jakarta 
Post and Chairman o f the Indonesian Journalists' Association) 10 March 1987; Endang Ahmadi (Deputy 
Chief Editor Berita Yudha) 8 April 1987; and Suwachman (Managing Editor of Prioritas) 8 April 1987; 
as well as numerous other journalists.
24 In this regard see Peter Rodgers' (1980) very useful monograph; Nono Anwar Makarim (1985); and 
Tjipta Lesmana (1985). For a recent overview of the newspaper industry see "The Killing Business" and 
Christianto Wibisono’s "Siapa Raja Pers Indonesia", Swasembada, vol. 12, no. in, April 1988.
25 Based on Goenawan Mohamad (Chief Editor of Tempo), "The Press in Indonesia", seminar in the 
Department o f Political & Social Change, the Australian National University, 23 March 1988.
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influence.26 Similarly, Jakarta national dailies may not be printed outside the capital itself, 
thereby restricting their regional reach.27
Nevertheless, as Rodgers argues28
...newspapers have pride of place in reflecting and moulding attitudes of Indonesia's 
national political elite and as barometers of the political and socio-economic weather 
in Indonesia. And in spite of the various formal, 'informal', and financial pressure 
upon them, Indonesia's more independent newspapers maintain fairly high reporting 
standards, probably conducting the most sophisticated political debate of any 
domestic ASEAN press.
Providing they avoid the most sensitive 'high politics' issues, newspapers in 
Indonesia are able to maintain a very lively and often surprisingly critical coverage of 
political affairs. As the electronic media is state-controlled (apart from Citizen Band 
radio), the quality press is essential reading for the political elite. While the daily, 
Kompas, stands out as the premier newspaper (circulation: over 500,000) there are 
others that are both respected and influential. Among them are Suara Pembaruan 
(formerly Sinar Harapart, circulation 50,000); the GOLKAR-controlled, yet relatively 
independent Suara Karya (60,000); Merdeka and Business News (both of which have 
small circulations) and the widely read weekly magazine Tempo. Different publications 
reach different audiences. Thus some of the military-linked newspapers such as Berita 
Buana, Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersenjata, while not major papers, do reach a 
specifically military audience.29
In the absence of other sources of open political debate, press commentary 
assumes particular importance in influencing the political agenda.30 Indeed, in the 
absence of any formal parliamentary 'Opposition', the press is often seen as assuming 
this role in a de-facto fashion. It is generally recognised that government ministers and 
senior officials are extremely sensitive to press coverage which points to controversy or 
mismanagement in their area of responsibility. Even more pointed are "letters to the 
editor", which very often enable newspapers to print criticism they would not be willing
26 Rodgers (1980) p. 17.
27 Goenawan Mohamad (1988).
28 Rodgers (1980) p. 4.
29 This section draws on Goenawan Mohamad (1988).
30 The following draws on interviews with three former New Order ministers - Mohammad Sadli (22 
April & 24 August 1987); Daoud Joesoef (20 August 1987) and Frans Seda (4 May 1987).
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to write themselves. Critical press coverage is so threatening to senior political figures 
because it draws areas of weakness to the attention of their superiors. Most worrying of 
all is the possibility of such coverage prompting presidential censure. By all accounts, 
Suharto views the appearance of controversy in political management with considerable 
disfavour. Another way in which press coverage may have influence over policy issues 
is by providing ammunition which a faction within the state elite can invoke in policy 
debates. Thus for example, a minister opposed to the policy initiatives of another, might 
bring in copies of newspaper headlines criticising the policy in question and use them to 
embarrass his opponent, or at least stimulate debate.
Perhaps the clearest testimony to the influence of the press in reaching up to 
the most senior echelons of the government is the comment during an interview with one 
of the leading national newspaper editors, that he is approached a number of times each 
year by ministers asking him to give prominent coverage to an issue so as to strengthen 
one side of a policy debate.
The significance of the press is thus that it provides a most effective channel 
for groups or individuals wanting to influence policy-makers. In much the same way as a 
minister might approach a newspaper editor, groups and individuals in the community 
approach journalists and editors to promote a cause. If a story seems of sufficient interest 
it stands a good chance of being published. Sometimes the individual or group concerned 
will pay a journalist to write a favourable story - the so-called "envelope syndrome" (from 
envelopes full of banknotes). Other times a story will get coverage because a journalist, 
or editor, is sympathetic. Still other times, it is simple 'newsworthiness' which 
determines whether a story is taken up. The more sophisticated the newspaper or 
magazine, the greater the likelihood that the matter will be researched and checked prior to 
publication.
The press is, within certain limitations, a potentially effective conduit for the 
channeling of ideas and arguments from motivated societal groups to senior political 
circles. The press seeks issues and stories itself, but is also sought by interests in society 
wishing to use i t  The press is a more wide-ranging, more accessible and more influential
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channel than the DPR (which itself, it should be remembered, is largely dependent on the 
press for much of its limited ability to influence matters).
Non-Governmental Organisations
A third potential avenue for interest intermediation is through the non­
governmental organisations (NGOs).31 Surprisingly, perhaps, NGOs have generally 
managed to preserve considerable independence from the state. NGOs sprang up in 
Indonesia during the early 1970s, with new trends in development theory at that time 
being an important stimulus. Often, they were established by intellectuals or student 
activists. Since then, the number of NGOs in Indonesia has grown markedly, though 
they have faced a continual balancing-act in seeking to pursue their ideals while avoiding 
the censure of the security organisations.
The delicate status of the NGOs is reflected in their Indonesian title, Lembaga 
Swadaya Masyarakat: Communal Self-Help Organisation. This was deliberately chosen 
to avoid political, or oppositional connotations. Among the most prominent NGOs are 
the Legal Aid Institute, the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and 
Information (LP3ES which publishes the respected journal, Prisma), the Consumers' 
Association, the Environmental Association and the Development Studies Institute. 
Beyond the fifteen-odd large NGOs which operate at the national level, there are also 
several hundred small grass-roots organisations at the local level.32 The most active and 
controversial of the NGOs is the Legal Aid Institute which has clashed openly with the 
government - especially on human rights issues - by providing legal representation for 
defendants in politically sensitive trials.33
31 This section draws on interviews with Aswab Mahasin (Director of the LP3ES - the Institute for 
Social & Economic Research, Education & Information) 14 February 1988; Ema Witoelar (former head of 
the Environmental Association & current head of the Consumers' Association) 15 August 1987; Tini 
Hadad (Secretary o f the Consumers' Association) 18 August 1987; and Permadi (former head of the 
Consumers' Association) 24 May 1987.
32 Technically the largest NGOs are known as Lembaga Swadaya Pembangunan Masyarakat (Communal 
Development Self-Help Organisations) with the term Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat being reserved for 
the numerous small local-level organisations. In practice, the latter term is often used as a generic label 
for them all.
33 For a useful study of the Legal Aid Institute, see Lev (1987).
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Generally, NGOs have two main sorts of potential influence on policy 
outcomes. The first is through acting directly as professional consultants to various 
government departments on technical policy questions. This is a role which has increased 
in recent years. Second, they can have indirect influence via the press attention which 
they readily attract
The issue of political control, or state guidance, has come to assume 
increasing prominence for NGOs in Indonesia since the 1985 Mass Organisations 
(ORMAS) Legislation was introduced.34 The purpose of the controversial ORMAS 
legislation was to limit the scope for independent political action outside state-sanctioned 
guidelines. It is now, for instance, less easy for some NGOs to receive foreign 
assistance. In addition, anyone wishing to establish a new NGO will be required to 
obtain a special government permit (in the past this could be done simply by lodging a 
declaration with a notary). To date, however, the government has not moved to 
implement the provisions of the ORMAS law in relation to the NGOs in any systematic 
fashion. This appears to reflect ambivalence within the government towards the NGOs. 
While the security organisations are less well-disposed to them, in some quarters (such as 
the Department of the Environment, the Department of Public Works, and also, 
apparently, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Department of Internal Affairs) the NGOs are 
viewed with favour. This depends, however, on the individual organisation and the 
particular issue.
For present purposes, the significance of the NGOs is that they represent 
another potential channel for the articulation of extra-state interests. While some, such as 
the Legal Aid Institute and the Consumers Association, do take up grievances of 
individuals, NGOs tend to represent collective societal interests. Broadly speaking, they 
also tend to promote ideas supportive of the weaker groups in society. Their influence is 
limited and sporadic but, nevertheless, most of the large NGOs have managed to achieve 
some notable victories. This, of course, is dependent on their operating within limits
34 For a critical review of the implications of the ORMAS law for NGOs see, Rickard (1987).
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acceptable to the govememt. More generally, however, as Eldridge35 has noted in his 
study of Indonesian NGOs:
Many foreign critics o f the Indonesian state are inclined to see it as all-powerful. The 
inability or unwillingness o f the authorities to prevent the proliferation o f  
community action groups [NGOs] is therefore worth noting, while their success in 
co-opting them has been only moderate.
Business Representation
Up to this point consideration of interest intermediation has been at a very 
general level. Attention will now be shifted to links between the state and one particular 
segment of society: business. The (then) Minister for the Promotion of Local Products 
and Investment Board Chief, Ginandjar Kartasasmita told a public gathering in 1986 that 
it was no secret that communication with the government was very difficult for 
business.36 How does business attempt to deal with the state?
A general argument has been made here that parties in Indonesia are of little 
significance in terms of interest intermediation. A good illustration of this is the fact 
business groups seeking to influence policy outcomes do not bother with them. Business 
in Indonesia today does not make major financial donations to the political parties at 
election times.37 As far as business representation is concerned then, the parties can be 
set aside. This is true of the NGOs as well, for they are most unlikely to be willing to act 
as vehicles for business interests. Mention has already been made of DPR Members and, 
particularly, the press as being of potential assistance to business. But what of those 
bodies formally responsible for the representation of business interests? What role do 
business associations play?
35 Eldridge (1984-85) p .459.
36 "Menmud Ginandjar Akui: Swasta Sulit Berhubungan Dengan Pihak Pemerintah”, Kompas, 2  August 
1986.
37 This is not simply a product o f the fact that GOLKAR and the two minor parties are all subsidised by 
the government. The fundamental point is that the government's position is not primarily dependent on 
election outcomes. In relation to the attention paid by business to political parties, it seems that Japan, 
Thailand, and even South Korea all differ from Indonesia. Of the countries o f East and Southeast Asia, it 
seems that Taiwan offers the closest comparison with Indonesia. Compare, for example, Johnson (1987) 
pp. 156-57 with Ramsay (1987) pp. 256-57; Jones & Sakong (1980) pp. 67-69; Curtis (1975); and 
Allinson (1987).
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There are hundreds of state-approved business associations operating at the 
national level of politics in Indonesia. For virtually every sector, and then subsector of 
business, there is a separate association. A small, random selection might include - the 
Architects' Association, the Shipowners' Association, the Coffee Exporters' Association, 
the Real Estate Association, the Car Tyre Manufacturers' Association, the Pesticide 
Producers' Association, the Tooth Paste Manufacturers' Association and (needless to say) 
a separate Association for Tooth Brush Manufacturers.38 Standing at the centre of the 
field is KADIN (the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry). It is the peak 
organisation for the articulation of business interests.
Historical Background
KADIN is a creation of the New Order period, having been established in 
1968. A variety of business associations had preceded it. During the period of 
Parliamentary Democracy in the 1950s the Central Economic Council of Indonesia (DEIP) 
operated as the peak business organisation, with numerous sectoral associations affiliated 
to it. By 1956 this was in decline and was subsumed within the Council of Business and 
Trade (DPP) at the national level and the Assembly of Business and Trade (MPP) at the 
regional level. These two bodies were created by government decree and were aimed at 
introducing greater regulation of business representation. This, however, did not prevent 
the proliferation of other independent business associations. The intense and fragmented 
political party competition of the period encouraged the multiplication of such 
organisations. Among others to spring up around this time were the All Indonesia 
National Economic Congress (KENSI); the Indonesian Union of Middle Traders (SPMI); 
and the All Indonesia National Importers' Congress (KINSI). A central aim of many of 
these was to oppose Chinese domination of the economy.39
In the Guided Democracy years Sukarno attempted to reform the business 
representation structures in a bid to increase the state's capacity to control the business 
sector. Presidential Decree no. 2 of 1964 established the National Business Council
38 For a much more extensive list see, KADIN (1987 a) pp. 111-21.
39 For further details see Robison (1986 a) pp. 60-61; and the useful three part article by Amaludin Ganie 
(the first Secretary General of KADIN): "KADIN dan Sejarahnya", Afercfefoj, 20-22 September 1982.
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(BAMUNAS) as the peak association through which business could communicate with 
the state. This was thus a forerunner to the corporatist organisations of later years. In 
practice, however, as Robison reports, BAMUNAS tended to function primarily as a 
fund-raising organisation for the government. In addition to BAMUNAS, two further 
types of state-sponsored bodies were set up to oversee industry: the Federation of 
Homogenous Enterprises (GPS) which operated at a sectoral level, and the Organisation 
of Homogenous Enterprises (OPS) which operated at a sub-sectoral level. These took 
over roles that had been played by the DPP and MPP.40
Following the fall of Sukarno and the emergence of the New Order, business 
representation structures changed yet again. Following the 1965 coup, a new business 
grouping known as the National Business Action Front (KAPNI) was formed. It was, 
however, more concerned with supporting the new regime than promoting business 
demands, and lasted only a short time before its momentum dissipated.41
As the New Order government became more established, it set about 
remodelling the channels for business representation along the lines of the military's 
favoured corporatist strategies. In June 1967 Presidential Decision no. 84 abolished the 
Sukarno-created BAMUNAS. A number of associations attempted to fill this void. The 
most significant of these was Forum Swasta (the Private Entrepreneurs Forum), set up 
under the leadership of the prominent textile industrialist, Hussein Aminuddin, in 
February 1968.42 Forum Swasta was, however, unable to establish itself as the pre­
eminent business representative organisation because it met with heavy opposition from 
Soedjono Hoemardhani, a close military adviser of Suharto. The government's choice 
for the task of peak business organisation emerged in September 1968, with the formation 
of KADIN Indonesia as a national business association. The basis for this was laid with 
the creation in November the year before of KADIN Jakarta, a purely Jakarta-based 
business organisation sponsored by the city's Governor, Ali Sadikin. Within a few 
months of the founding of KADIN Jakarta (or KADIN Jaya, as it became known) the
40 See KADIN (1987) pp. 2-3; and Robison (1986 a) p. 81.
41 Amaludin Ganie (1982) and KADIN (1987 a) pp. 3-4.
42 For some reference to Forum Swasta see, "Meningaktkan Kedudukan dan Peranan KADIN Sebagai 
Organisasi Dunia Usaha Nasional Dalam Kerjasama Dengan Pemerintah", Suara Karya, 13 September 
1984; and Robison (1986 a) p. 367 fn 3.
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government sponsored the formation of regional equivalents in the provinces. At a 
congress convened among the various regional KADINs in September 1968 the creation 
of KADEN Indonesia as the peak national body was formalised, thus marking the birth of 
the organisation which henceforth became the officially designated conduit for 
intermediation between the state and the business community.43 The government's 
corporatist strategy did not involve the thoroughgoing organisational restructuring in the 
business sphere that it did in others, notably labour (where the Communist Party had been 
strong). While KADIN and many other sectoral business associations were deliberately 
created, or induced, some associations which had been in existence for many years were 
permitted to continue.44 On the whole, however, such bodies gradually acquired 
corporatist characteristics during the 1970s.
Leadership of the KADIN was initially in the hands of senior military figures 
involved in business. The first three chairmen, from 1968 until 1979, were military 
figures.45 Since then two prominent civilian pribwni businessmen, Hasjim Ning and 
Sukamdani Gitosardjono, have occupied the top position. While there may have been 
symbolic significance in the government allowing private business figures, rather than 
state officials to fill the position, there has, in practice, been no effective distancing of the 
KADIN leadership from the state, as both Hasjim Ning and, especially, Sukamdani are 
very closely interlocked with the state's political leadership. During this period the 
position of KADIN as the peak association for business representation was given 
statutory recognition with Presidential Decision no. 49 in December 1973. This official 
recognition, or affirmation, of KADENTs position as the pre-eminent business association 
was (at KADIN's urging) enhanced further in 1983 with specific mention in the GBHN 
and then in 1984 REPELITA IV. Specific reference was made in these two important 
policy outlines to the role to be played by KADIN in participating actively in national 
economic development.46
43 Amaludin Ganie 1982, op.cit.
44 See King (1977) pp. 14-16.
45 These were, Brigadier General Usman Ismail, Brigadier General Sofyar and Air Marshall Suwoto 
Sukendar.
46 For further details see, KADIN (1987 b) p. 18.
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KADIN: Dynamics and Structure
Despite moves such as these to enhance the standing of KADIN, it has never
commanded a good reputation in the eyes of either the business community or the state.
Put bluntly, the business community has tended to see KADIN, or more specifically its
leadership, as both self-serving and virtually a tool of the government rather than as a
representative of industry interests. Evidence of the currency of such attitudes is not hard
to find. Almost all business figures interviewed, including those who were themselves in
senior positions within KADIN, were openly dismissive o f KADIN. Robison47
encountered a similar reaction, and notes that:
KADIN is widely regarded as a collection of business failures scrabbling for the 
crumbs of patronage who hypocritically set themselves up as leaders of business in 
Indonesia....[and] as a club dominated by self-seeking and well-connected 
businessmen...
Public criticism of KADIN within Indonesia is not hard to find either.
Prominent Jakarta businessman Abdul Latief has frequently lambasted the KADIN
leadership for its failure to represent business interests. In a speech in August 198748 he
called for a more professional KADIN and argued that:
The business community clearly wants a [KADIN] leadership which genuinely 
understands their interests, and does not simply promote its own private interests 
while proclaiming that it represents those of its membership.
A perusal of the press often reveals statements of dissatisfaction from both the 
business figures and editorial writers. Indicative was a report49 which, having opened 
with an account of a bitterly disappointed businessman's experience with KADIN, went 
on to argue:
Complaints such as this are becoming increasingly common, not just in business 
circles in Jakarta, but also in the provinces. They believe that all of KADIN’s 
activities are just for show, and aimed only at promoting the KADIN leadership. 
Meanwhile KADIN’s real role, to serve the interests of the business world, has been 
forgotten.
47 Robison (1986 b) p. 45.
48 Abdul Latief "KADIN Untuk Mempersatukan Dunia Usaha, Sentuhan Profesionalisme dan 
Transparansi Bisnis di Indonesia" presented to a forum on Professionalism and the Business Environment, 
Jakarta, 4 August 1987.
49 "KADIN Harus Membenahi Dili", Kompas, 15 September 1984. Among many others, see also, for 
example, "Musyawarah Pengusaha Indonesia" (editorial), Berita Yudha, 23 September 1987; "Pergulatan 
KADIN Indonesia Dengan Asosiasi Berlangsung Hangat", Prior it as, 16 June 1987; "Bolstering the 
Chamber" (editorial), Jakarta Post, 25 September 1985; and "KADIN’s Leadership Role" (editorial), 
Jakarta Post, 23 April 1984.
54
Membership of KADIN as well as, at a more immediate level, the appropriate
industry association, appears to be generally seen by business as an unavoidable burden.
Membership involves the payment of fees and investment of time for very little return.
Meetings held by KADIN and the associations were often dismissed as being little more
than talk-fests. As one newspaper50 put it:
The majority of business people are fed-up with [business] organisations, with their 
levies and dues for which there is little clear benefit
Perhaps the most telling indication of the low esteem in which KADIN is held 
by the business community, is the fact that very few of the major Chinese business 
people bother to join it. This is particularly true of the giant Chinese corporate groups, 
which have their own individual patron-client links to decision makers within the state.51
Apart from irritation with its ineffectiveness, the other widely found concern 
about KADIN among the business community is that it is too close to the government. 
Despite occasional public calls for macroeconomic reforms by the KADIN leadership, it is 
generally regarded as merely reflecting government wishes. Many of its public 
pronouncements about the need to help small (and by implication, struggling pribumi) 
business people are often pointed to as evidence of empty rhetoric designed to harmonise 
KADIN with state ideology. Efforts to conform with government interests are often seen 
to be at the expense of those of business. In particular, the KADIN leadership is seen as 
being inappropriately close to GOLKAR. As was argued in the leading daily paper, 
Kompas:52
KADIN is clearly not a political organisation [party]. However public questioning 
arises when the KADIN leadership, in a high profile and demonstrative fashion, 
registers as members of GOLKAR.
Dealings with GOLKAR persist...But this gives rise to a problem for business 
people who do not wish to be linked to politics. And, moreover, what of business 
people who wish to join a different political party?
50 "Banyak Pungutan Dari Asosiasi Termasuk Dari KADIN Sendiri", Pelita, 15 July 1985.
51 While there are a small number of the largest Chinese businessmen in KADIN, they only sit as token 
representatives on the purely formal Advisory Council. Liem Soe Liong is of special importance to 
KADIN as he, in effect, subsidises its running costs - apparently at the behest of the President. (This is 
discussed further below.) Observers say that Liem derives little direct benefit from these outlays, other 
than the expectation that the pribumi dominated KADIN will not interfere with, or, criticise his business 
activities.
5  ^ "KADIN Masih Harus Mebenahi Dili", Kompas, 15 September 1984.
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KADIN is the representative organ o f ail sides in business, and should not show 
preference to any particular party. In practice KADIN has never held meetings with 
the PDI or the PPP. Fortunately KADIN's Secretary General, Sadli, and his First 
Deputy, Chris Walean, have not followed the trend of joining GOLKAR. Because if 
this were to happen KADIN would be be regarded as merely an extension of 
GOLKAR.
It is not only its client group, the business community, which holds KADIN 
in low esteem; it also appears to have a low standing in the eyes of many sections of the 
state leadership. Despite statutory recognition and public statements53 of the President 
that if KADIN was not satisfied with co-operation and consultation by senior officials or 
ministers, it could report directly to him, the KADIN leadership is effectively 
marginalised by policy makers. Indeed the most commonly heard refrain from the 
KADIN executive is that the government does not take it seriously or pay attention to its 
viewpoint.54 The KADIN executive55 does not enjoy close relations with the key 
economic ministers, the policy makers in the area most relevant to the interests of 
business. (A partial exception to this is Industry Minister, Hartarto, with whom 
Sukamdani has a working relationship.) Its most effective links to the state structure 
(apart from the personal connections to Suharto of Sukamdani and Probosutedjo, the 
President's half-brother), are to GOLKAR head and Vice President Sudharmono.56 
While classic patrimonial links of this sort are of considerable value in terms of patronage 
and the securing of government contracts, they do not, however, influence economic 
policy. KADIN has an institutionalised 'dialogue' with the economic ministers, but this 
has only been taking place once a year. Moreover, as Sukamdani explained in a press 
interview, this meeting amounts to little more than a statement by economic ministers on 
the broad directions of government fiscal planning.57 It provides virtually no scope for a 
policy input by KADIN on behalf of business. Symbolic of KADIN’s impotence was a
53 See, "KADIN Indonesia Dapat Beri Laporan Langsung Kepada Presiden", Kompas, 18 May 1983.
54 See, for example, "Keluh Kesah KADIN Yang Cukup Panjang" (editorial), Kompas, 21 June 1986; 
"Pemerintah dan Swasta" (editorial), Kompas, 10 September 1983; and, "Pemerintah Belum Sepenuh Hati 
Mau Bekeijasama Dengan KADIN Indonesia; Sukamdani - Banyak Pejabat Masih Bersikap 'Atasan' 
Dengan *Bawahan' Terhadap Swasta”, Kompas, 9 September 1983.
55 Mohammed Sadli is not included here. His special position within KADIN is discussed below.
56 Interview with Mohammed Sadli (Chairman of KADIN's LP3E) 24 August 1987.
57 See, "Keijasama Pemerintah dan KADIN Belum Seperti yang Diharapkan", Kompas, 16 March 1985.
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remark to the international press by Sukamdani saying that KADIN was rarely consulted 
before or even after the government introduced new economic policies.58
There are at least four broad reasons for this reluctance on the part of 
ministers and senior officials to treat KADIN as a serious contributor to policy formation. 
Two of these concern ideological factors, and though intangible are nonetheless real 
obstacles to KADIN1s acceptance by government.
1. The first relates to the traditional priyayi world-view of many officials, linking the 
modem state apparatus with the feudal court of the kraton. The essence of this is a 
paternalist attitude towards those outside officialdom. Members of the business class, 
in particular, are viewed as occupying an inferior social position. Sukamdani openly 
complains of state officials regarding themselves as being above business people.59 
This problem of elitist attitudes among officials was cited and stressed during 
interviews by many leading figures in the business community. This attitude is 
accentuated in the case of the KADIN leadership because of the perception that their 
business success is largely due to special government patronage: in other words, that 
their credibility as leaders of the business world is questionable.
2. The second intangible barrier to greater influence by KADIN (and business generally) 
is the antipathy of post-independence Indonesian state ideology towards profit-making 
and the private sector.60 Drawing directly on Section 33 of the Constitution and the 
GBHN, the Indonesian economic system is always described glowingly in official 
rhetoric as a "democratic" or Pancasila economic system, as opposed to a "free fight 
liberal" or market-based system. Section 33 of the Constitution, which carries great 
ideological weight, emphasises the centrality of the sistim kekeluargan, literally, the 
family system. This invokes notions of economic collectivism and cooperation. 
Terminology such as kebersamaan (equality), kerjasama (cooperation), kekeluargaan 
(family spirit), kerukunan (harmony) and persaingan tidak sehat (unhealthy
58 "Suharto's Policies Lashed by Businessmen", Sydney Morning Herald, 20 June 1986.
59 See for example, "Pemerintah Belum Sepenuh Hati Mau Bekeijasama Dengan KADIN Indonesia: 
Sukamdani - Banyak Pejabat Masih Bersikap 'Atasan' Dengan 'Bawahan' Terhadap Swasta", Kompas, 9 
September 1983.
60 For a broad discussion of ideas about economic organisation in Indonesia, see Rice (1983).
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competition) is ubiquitous.61 These social justice ideals underlie the government's 
ideological justification of cooperatives and state enterprises as forms of economic 
organisation. While much of this rhetoric is obviously a poor guide to the reality of 
the Indonesian economy as private enterprise and private capital formation play a large 
and growing part in the country's economic development,62 it nevertheless has 
considerable political force, especially as the President appears to be its most 
committed advocate. Though intangible, these cultural and ideological factors are 
nonetheless widely seen as having real significance. As Mackie,63 in seeking to 
account for what he sees as the weakness of economic interests in Indonesia, has 
argued:
The reasons for this curious flaccidity of interest groups in Indonesia must again be 
sought in the political and ideological-cultural domain, I believe, far more than on 
the economic or structural side....many o f the principal tenets o f capitalist ideology 
are still not widely accepted as legitimate or appropriate for Indonesian society; both 
acquisitiveness and self-interest are widely regarded as reprehensible qualities in 
traditional Indonesian value-systems and they have not yet been incorporated into the 
national ideology as desiderata for the sake of achieving development
3. A more concrete factor underlying the disdainful attitude of important sections of the 
state apparatus towards KADEN centres around the perceived lack of professionalism 
and seriousness on the part of KADIN’s leaders It has only been through the 
establishment of the Institute for Economic Research and Development (LP3E) within 
KADIN as an economic 'think tank' under the leadership of the respected former 
minister, Mohammad Sadli, that KADIN’s executive has accrued any credibility on 
macroeconomic matters. LP3E was formed at Sukamdani's initiative to equip the 
KADIN leadership to address the problems confronting business. While the LP3E 
has reportedly generated useful papers on economic issues under the guidance of 
people like Sadli and Suryo Sediono, this resource has not always been exploited by 
the KADIN leadership. The LP3E conducts monthly meetings to address major 
issues, but the KADIN leaders often do not attend.64 Economic policy makers are
61 For an overview o f this see the KADIN commissioned report by the University o f Indonesia’s LPEM 
(1987) pp. x-xvii.
62 Robison (1986 a).
63 Mackie (1986 a) p. 22-23.
64 Interview with Sanyoto (Chief Editor of Business News) 2 September 1987.
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most unlikely to be willing to listen to KADIN leaders if they are ill-informed or 
appear to be dilettantes on matters of national economic development and planning.
4. A more general explanation for the unwillingness of policy-makers to heed KADIN, 
is that to do so would run completely against the grain of the New Order’s corporatist 
approach to political management. State-designated interest organisations, such as 
KADIN, are not intended to participate in, or actively contribute to, policy formation. 
Involvement of KADIN leaders in policy formation (in the sense of heading business 
demands to an extent greater than the logical dictates of structural necessities) would 
inevitably mean surrendering control over policy directions, at least to some extent 
As Sukamdani himself conceded, the relationship between KADIN and the 
Indonesian state was unlike that between industry peak associations in either the 
Anglo-Saxon or Continental countries of the West. Instead, he said, it was based 
upon the Indonesian principles of Pancasila.65 This was little more than a coded 
statement saying that KADIN does not serve as an effective channel for business 
interests. It operates as a corporatist valve regulating and restricting business demands 
upon the state.
If KADIN has any influence at all upon government policy it is only as one of 
many actors shaping the climate of ideas in which politics takes place. For example, 
public statements by the KADIN executive supporting deregulation of certain facets of the 
economy presumably do help to sustain the momentum of that particular policy reform 
movement. Certainly under Sukamdani’s leadership KADIN has developed a higher 
profile.66 And this, presumably, has boosted the organisation's ability to contribute to the 
public discourse on economic issues and the climate of ideas. But even here KADIN1 s 
influence is very limited: it does not set or even shape the agenda for policy debate. In 
terms of influencing the climate of ideas, KADIN’s voice is still weak compared with 
those of the key economic policy segments of the state elite, the press and foreign 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
65 See "Struktur Organisasi KADIN Indonesia, Akan Tetap Sama", Suara Karya, 5 March 1987.
66 Interview with Sukar Samsudi (Deputy Head of the KADIN Honourary Council) 30 August 1987.
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Emphasis has been given to establishing the claim that while KADIN may 
considerably benefit the fortunes of its individual leaders, it is not important as a vehicle 
for the advancement of broad business interests. This proposition requires qualification 
though, for when people speak of KADIN they usually have in mind the national 
executive. There is, however, much more to the organisation than this. Aside from the 
executive, KADIN is made up of three strands: the regional KADIN branches (the 
KADINDA), the "aspiration groups", and the sectoral and sub-sectoral industry 
associations. 67 A little should be said about each as there are quite separate sets of 
interests involved.
The dominant strand is that of the KADINDA. While KADIN is the national 
organisation, it has regional and district branches below, scattered throughout the 
country. Many of the regional and district KADINDA exist almost in name only, having 
little membership or organisational depth. Lacking any dynamism of their own, in most 
cases, the KADINDA tend to be controlled by the regional GOLKAR officials, who are 
themselves usually the regional political administrators. Thus, at the regional level the 
KADIN network is primarily an instrument of control for the political authorities, herding 
business people into a single corporatist pen. For example, while the national 
government has not made membership of KADIN compulsory (despite the KADIN 
executive's pleadings) some regional political authorities have decreed membership of the 
local KADINDA to be mandatory.68 In general the KADINDA are seen as passive and 
pliant organisations, whose membership tends to be dominated by building contractors. 
(The dominance of building contractors is due to the fact that public sector work, which 
represents a huge slice of the industry, is unobtainable unless they are members of 
KADIN.)
67 It should be noted here that this has changed as a result of the KADIN law of January 1987. As will 
be be explained later, state enterprises and co-operatives have now been brought into KADIN and are 
included in this third, industry, strand.
68 See for example, a report o f the Governor of East Kalimantan declaring membership to be 
compulsory: "Tanpa Kecuali, Semua Hams Masuk KADIN", Kompas, 18 October 1983. By contrast, the 
rationale at the national level is precisely the obverse. Probosutedjo, half-brother of President Suharto and 
Deputy Chairman of KADIN, emphasised that he could see no circumstances in which the government 
would agree to allowing KADIN to secure compulsory universal membership at the national level. 
Interview, 8 September 1987.
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A second strand of the KADIN structure is what is called in Indonesia the 
"aspiration groups". There are only a few organisations in this category, most of which 
which emerged during the 1970s. Basically, they are very loose bodies representing 
different 'classes' of business people. The term "aspiration group" is an ideological 
nicety, referring to the fact that these nominally represent weak economic interests. Thus, 
for example, there is the Veterans' Business Organisation (DEVI), the All Indonesia 
Small Business Organisation (HIKSI), the Indonesian Small and Medium Business 
Organisation (KUKMI), the Indonesian Weak Business Organisation (HIPLI), the 
Indonesian Indigenous Entrepreneurs Organisation (HIPPI) and the Indonesian Young 
Entrepreneurs Organisation (HIPMI). Except for the last two organisations, these 
aspiration groups are insignificant, merely standing as testimony to the government's 
corporatist strategy of providing an official body with the ostensible task of acting as a 
conduit to interests in society.
HIPPI (indigenous entrepreneurs) and HIPMI (young entrepreneurs) are of 
some importance; the former due to the fact that it is sponsored by Probosutedjo, 
Suharto's half-brother and the Deputy Chairman of KADIN. A political maverick, 
Probosutedjo has used this as a forum from which to criticise the dominant position of 
Chinese capital in Indonesia, a perennial and sensitive subject Only his unassailable 
position as a member of the President's family has allowed him to do this, even though it 
is a theme which enjoys much support among non-Chinese business people.
More noteworthy in terms of business representation is HIPMI. This was 
formed in the early 1970s by Abdul Latief and other prominent young business figures 
such as Abdul Bakrie, Tanri Abeng and Ponco Sutowo (most of whom were associated 
with the Muslim Students' Association, HMI). In its early days, HIPMI developed an 
image as a group of outspoken 'young turks'. They were seen as more willing to 
confront the government and speak out on behalf of business, so much so that they 
antagonised General Ali Moertopo and other senior security managers.69 In the absence 
of KADIN acting as an effective petitioner for business, some have seen HIPMI as an
69 Interview with Abdul Latief, 1 September 1987.
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emerging forum for business activists.70 This, however, appears very unlikely to be the 
case. Despite the fact that HIPMI has established a "think tank" of its own (following 
KADIN1 s LP3E), it remains little more than a marginally noisier and rather brash version 
of KADIN. It is widely seen (like KADIN) to be primarily generating business 
opportunities for its leadership, rather than promoting the broad interests of its 
constituency.71 Furthermore, it is today less outspoken than in the past, having been 
coopted by the government within the KADIN and GOLKAR network.72
Apart from HIPPI and HIPMI which are only significant at the level of 
rhetoric, the aspiration-group strand of KADIN is of no major importance. The third 
strand, the associations, however demand serious attention.
It is widely recognised that the only real representation of business interests 
lies with the individual industry associations.73 It is at the association level, for example, 
that foreign firms in joint ventures are most likely to have membership. As mentioned 
earlier, there are some 350 industry associations registered in Indonesia, although only 
about two thirds are actually members of KADIN. The associations which are members, 
are grouped into various sections. There is, for instance, a financial services section, a 
basic chemicals section, a metal and motor industries section, and a m ining and energy 
section. Each section has its own administration and leadership and subsumes numerous 
sectorally related industry associations.
While many of the associations - at least 60% according to one observer74 - 
are as docile as the rest of the business representational structures, there are some which 
do actively promote the interests of their sectoral constituency. KADIN leaders, together 
with the government's political strategists, have wanted individual business people to
70 Robison (1986 b) pp. 46-47.
71 For public reference to this attitude see, for example, "Wapres Kepada HIPMI: Jangan Menjadi 
Pengusaha Fasilitas", Suara Karya, 30 June 1983; and "Fasilitas Pemerintah Membuat Orang Berebut 
Kursi Kepimpinan HIPMI", Sinar Harapan, 18 April 1986.
72 Interview with Abdul Latief, 1 September 1987.
73 Interviews with, among many others, Mohammed Sadli (Chairman of KADINTs LP3E) 22 April & 24 
August 1987; Sjahfiri Alim (President Director of Goodyear Pty Ltd & Head of KADINs Chemical 
Industries Section) 25 August 1987; Sjahrir (Chief Economist for Centre for Policy Studies) 4 September 
1987; Sanyoto (Chief Editor of Business News) 4 September 1987; Dr Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti 
(Director of the LPEM, University of Indonesia) 28 August 1987; and Abdul Latief (President Director of 
Sarinah Jaya Pty Ltd) 1 September 1987
74 Interview with Abdul Latief (President Director of Sarinah Jaya Pty Ltd) 1 September 1987.
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become KADIN members via the KADINDA rather than via sectoral industry 
associations. This is because, as argued above, the associations are often less amenable 
to government control. While many associations are passive and unthreatening, those 
which are active are seen as unwilling to accept quietly an unfavourable policy 
environment.75
So stark is this contrast that it represents a fundamental cleavage within 
KADIN. On the one hand there are the activist industry associations, while on the other, 
lined up against them, are the KADINDA, the mainstay of support for the executive. The 
two sides are representative of the forces of assertive business as opposed to those of 
state corporatist political engineering. Since the early 1970s there has been continued 
tension between the two. The activist associations have pushed against what has been 
seen as the weak and ineffective leadership of successive KADIN leaderships by seeking 
greater influence within the KADIN structure. Consistently, however, they have been 
thwarted by an internal power distribution which sees the first strand of KADIN, the 
KADINDA, controlling the election of the KADIN executive. Until recently it has been 
only the KADINDA which have been entitled to participate in the ballot to elect the 
executive board every five years. The associations were permitted to nominate some 
candidates for the ballot, but not to vote. Thus, in view of the fact that strong links 
existed between GOLKAR and the KADINDA, the scope for the election of a candidate 
unpalatable to the government was much reduced. Unlike the associations, the 
KADINDA could be orchestrated without much difficulty. Nevertheless, the government 
has always carefully monitored the election of the KADIN executive, with all candidates 
being first interviewed individually by the (former) State Secretary, Sudharmono.76 
Moreover when there has been controversy over the chairmanship of the organisation, 
Presidential "guidance" has resolved the matter 77
75 Interviews with Sukar Samsudi (Deputy Head of the Kadin Honourary Council) 30 August 1987; 
Mohammed Sadli (Chairman of KADIN's LP3E) 22 April & 24 August 1987; and Suryo Sediono 
(Deputy Chairman of KADIN's LP3E) 19 August 1987; and Sjahfiri Alim (President Director of 
Goodyear Pty Ltd & Head of KADIN’s Chemical Industries Section) 25 August & 10 September 1987
76 Interviews with Sjahfiri Alim (President Director of Goodyear Pty Ltd & Head of KADIN’s Chemical 
Industries Section) 25 August & 10 September 1987.
77 The conflict over the leadership positions is usually simply a case of different individuals scrambling 
for positions offering great patronage potential. In 1985 Sukamdani was locked in a close and bitter battle 
with Probosutedjo for the leadership, and it was only Sudharmono's intervention, indicating that the
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The persistent pressuring by the activist associations to have KADIN's
constitution amended to allow them voting rights (which came to a head with the
introduction o f the KADIN law) is symbolic of attempts by some industry activists to
shake-off the corporatist shackles encumbering KADIN and turn the organisation to their
own purposes, namely an effective vehicle for the articulation and promotion o f business
interests.78 This struggle was captured nicely in one newspaper editorial:
...they (the genuine entrepreneurs) should determine KADIN policy, not the pseudo- 
entrepreneurs. The voice of the genuine entrepreneurs must be heard, and for the 
sectoral business associations, which represent the crest of the wave, must be given a 
real role and decisive say 79
KADIN's Search for Security: the Law of 1987
Recognising its limitations, as well as public consciousness of them, the 
KADIN leadership has consistently sought a stronger legal basis for the organisation. 
The attainment of recognition in the GBHN and REPELITAIV, noted earlier, represented 
partial fulfilment of this aim. The ultimate target, however, was the enactment by the 
DPR of a law which would specify KADIN as the sole business peak organisation and 
hopefully enhance its authority and influence. An act o f Parliament would be a stronger 
statutory basis than an executive decree, as it could be less readily overturned. Great 
expectations were held for such a legislative basis. It was hoped that it would 
simultaneously eliminate the possibility of a threat to KADIN’s position as the pre­
eminent business association; resolve KADIN’s most serious weakness, an inability to 
raise sufficient funding to operate effectively and autonomously; and, more broadly,
President wished to see Sukamdani re-elected, which sealed the contest In the two previous elections at 
which civilians were chosen (Sukamdani 1982, and Hasjim Ning 1979) indications of Presidential 
preference had also been crucial to the resolution of the battles among the contestants, all of which had 
powerful backers within the state elite. [See for example, Handley P., "A Matter of Influence", Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 17 October 1985, p. 64; and "KADIN reelects Sukamdani Chairman for Next 
4 Years", Jakarta Post, 30 Septmeber 1985.] Interestingly, this is true of the HIPMI leadership elctions 
as well. The HIPMI election of April 1986 reduced to a contest between Gunariyah Mochdie and Sharif 
(Cicip) Sutardjo. The former was the younger sister of the Minister for the Promotion of Local Products, 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, and was strongly backed by Sudharmono, whereas the latter was backed by Co­
operatives Minister, Bustanil Arifin. Reportedly, the contest was decided at the eleventh hour when 
President Suharto's second son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, arrived at the convention in Bali and 
conspicuously joined Sharif Sutardjo for lunch. This act, according to an eye-witness, was sufficient to 
influence the contest decisively, as electors rapidly re-calculated their prospects for business patronage.
78 For an overview of this conflict see, "Perang Saudara Perlu Diakhiri", Sinar Harapan, 20 September 
1982; and "Kepentingan Perjuangan Barisan KADIN dan KADIN Indonesia", Business News, 27 April 
1984.
79 "Musyawarah Pengusaha Indonesia" (editorial), Berita Yudha, 23 September 1987.
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improve its standing - and thus its capacity to deal on a more equal basis with state 
officials and government leaders.
The first of these motivations, KADIN's interest in self-preservation, 
reflected a concern about the typically short life-span of business associations in 
Indonesia. As already seen, there have been numerous business peak associations in 
Indonesia. The KADIN executive was anxious to reduce the risk of another state- 
approved association emerging to challenge or supplant it. KADIN had long sought to 
increase its authority through the introduction of compulsory membership for all firms 
and sectoral business associations.80 If all firms and business associations were roped in 
under KADIN's umbrella, the scope for challenges to the organisation's position as the 
pre-eminent body would be reduced. Many sub-sections within the business community 
were conspicuously unhappy with KADIN’s performance and leadership, and thus either 
withheld their support or were, in some cases, openly critical. In 1982, for example, 
there was great controversy over reforms to KADIN’s constitution. Some factions were 
very hostile to proposals by the KADIN leadership and openly signalled a split with the 
organisation. This resulted in the formation in early 1983 of the Federation of Industry 
Associations (BMAI) by a range of business groups, especially those in the metal and 
chemical industries. This took place under the sponsorship of then Industry Minister 
Suhud.81 While this schism ultimately came to nothing (the BMAI later faded away, in 
large part because of a change in Industry Minister), it was a clear indication of the 
serious discontent with existing industry representation arrangements. KADIN’s interest 
in compulsory, or at least greatly expanded, membership was thus twofold: on one hand 
it wanted to secure its position against possible rival institutions, while on the other, if its
80 For reference to public calls by Sukamdani for compulsory membership, see "Diharapkan Semua 
Pengusaha Jadi Anggota KADIN", Suara Karya, 17 March 1987. In 1984, he urged that companies not 
members o f KADIN be removed from the state register o f firms eligible to tender for government 
contracts. See "Harapan KADIN: Pengusaha Bukan Angotta KADIN Tidak Diikutkan Dalam DRM 
[Daftar Rekanan Mampu]", Suara Karya, 25 September 1984.
81 For an insight into this episode see, for instance, "Grup Musa Ikut Beraksi: Menolak Rancangan 
AD/ART KADIN", Jurnal Ekuin, 6 July 1982; "Musa Grup: Frans Seda & Probosutedjo Cocok Untuk 
Ketua Umum KADIN", Jurnal Ekuin, 6 September 1982; "Menteri Suhud Anjurkan BMAI Himpun Dana 
Untuk Biaya Kegiatan-Kegiatan", Sinar Harapan, 3 January 1983; and "BMAI Ganti Nama", Kompas, 27 
January 1983.
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membership was near-to-universal rather than fragmentary, its bargaining position with 
the government would be enhanced.
The government appears to have been very wary of this prospect. Trade 
Minister Rachmat Saleh was reported as telling the DPR during a hearing on the KADIN 
law that the government did not view universal compulsory membership as desirable.82 
KADIN was already the only official peak organisation for the entire business 
community, even though its actual membership fell far short of this. The government, it 
seems, while committed to the idea of KADIN as a compliant corporatist body, was 
unwilling to allow it to expand to the point of commanding membership of all business 
people. Some 'leakage* was desirable, otherwise KADIN might possibly become 
stronger than its political masters desired.
The second of KADINs ambitions in pursuing a legislative basis for itself, 
finance ,was even more keenly felt. As LP3E chairman, Mohammed Sadli, emphasised, 
KADIN's biggest weakness has always been its inability to finance itself from 
membership dues.83 Of those individual companies and business associations which 
were actually members of KADIN, many did not pay their dues. While figures for 
individual companies are not available, it is known that approximately 350 business 
associations existed in 1985, with 210 of these being KADIN members. Of this total 
only 75% paid their dues, Sukamdani complained.84 As KADIN was unable to compel 
fee payment, it was faced with an acute dilemma: revoke membership for non-payment of 
dues (and thus risk large scale disaffection) or lamely tolerate the situation. The latter 
option has prevailed. In consequence KADIN has been unable to fund itself adequately. 
In this situation it has fallen to a small number of very large Chinese businessmen 
(principally Liem Soe Liong) to subsidise the organisation's activities - apparently at the 
behest of the President. (Liem's son, Liem Foeng Seng, heads the KADIN treasury 
section.) Public statements by Sukamdani and other KADIN leaders indicate their 
discomfort with this arrangement.85 Speaking before the State Budget Committee (XL) of
82 "KADIN Terbuka Bagi Pengusaha Anggota GOLKAR, PPP dan PDF', Suara Karya, 6 October 1986.
83 Interviews with Mohammed Sadli, 22 April 1987 & 24 August 1987.
84 ”25 Persen Anggota KADIN Menungguk Bayar Iuran", Merdeka, 19 Septmeber 1985.
85 This requires some explanation for, like Liem Soe Liong, Sukamdani himself also enyoys a close 
personal relationship with the First Family. It was thus not a question of business ethics. Instead, it
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the DPR, Sukamdani asked why the Government did not allocate funds to assist with the 
running of KADIN. He said that this would be preferable to the organisation being 
dependent on handouts from a few large businessmen and risking an impression of 
bias.86 An ability to raise sufficient revenue itself would open the possibility of KADIN 
pursuing a more effective style of operation, without being beholden to its financiers.
The question of funding was linked with the issue of compulsory 
membership. If KADIN could obtain a larger membership, its coffers would also swell 
(presuming that members could be constrained to pay their dues). But more promising 
still, in terms of raising revenue, was the administration of the government's recently 
introduced requirement that all firms register themselves with the Department of Trade to 
obtain a business licence.87 KADIN dearly sought the right to administer this registration 
requirement, the WDP. A universal registration charge would an immediate and 
continuous supplementary revenue supply. However, it was also for precisely this 
reason that the Trade Department was unwilling to surrender the WDP: it also valued the 
fund raising tool highly. As a compromise, KADIN proposed that the Trade Department 
retain the initial registration function, but that KADIN be granted the follow-up role of re­
registering firms. The Department was not willing to bargain on this lucrative exercise 
though. Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh, publicly signalled the government's 
unwillingness to compromise when he told the DPR that the government regarded fund 
raising as an internal problem for KADIN to resolve itself.88 As with the issue of 
universal membership, the government was aware of the potential political implications of 
allowing KADIN to obtain financial independence. If it remained financially hamstrung 
(and dependent on the patronage of a few key Chinese businessmen, who were 
themselves beholden to the government) it was unlikely to be able to challenge the 
government's control over policy.
appears that an important part o f the KADIN leadership’s discomfort was the image o f being beholden to 
Chinese business patrons.
86 "Keijasama Pemerintah dan KADIN Belum Seperti Diharapkan", Kompas, 16 March 1985. See also 
similar statements by KADIN Deputy Chairman, Arnold Baramuli, in "Keijasama Pemerintah dan 
KADIN Belum Seperti yang Diharapkan”, Kompas, 16 March 1985.
87 "KADIN Minta Wewenang Atur Dunia Usaha", Kompas, 13 April 1984.
88 "KADIN Terbuka Bagi Pengusaha Angoota GOLKAR, PPP and PDI", Suara Karya, 6 October 1986.
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The third of KADINs hopes for a law was the achievement of a better footing 
from which to negotiate with the government on matters of concern to business. An 
unequivocal statement in law stipulating a role for KADEN would enable it to achieve 
greater political influence and override the traditional disdain of state officials. This 
broader concern was also bound up with the two previous aspects, strength of 
membership and finance. If these were secured, there would be still greater pressure for 
change in the behaviour of state officials towards business. A law would not, of course, 
immediately constrain officials to treat KADEN seriously: but it could be expected that 
important recognition of this sort would go some distance towards slowly breaking down 
the status distinction between business and officialdom.
Finally, after lobbying for many years, the KADEN law was ratified by the 
President in January 1987.89 KADIN had agitated for the introduction of such a law since 
at least the time of Hasjim Ning's leadership in the late 1970s. Under Sukamdani two 
major drives were mounted - the first following his attainment of the chairmanship, and 
the second in 1986. These involved making approaches and submissions to various 
government departments and the Parliamentary Committees, as well as extensive use of 
the press.90
An important factor which delayed the law since the late 1970 was the 
question of restructuring KADEN. If the government was to agree to the introduction of a 
specific law enshrining KADEN's position, it first wanted assurances that KADEN was 
the sort of organisation with which it would remain comfortable. It was for this reason 
that the internal struggle between the KADEN executive and the KADENDA, on one hand, 
and the industry activists from some of the sectoral associations, on the other, was of
89 Undang-Undang no.l 1987 Tentang Kamar Dagang dan Industri, 28 January 1987.
90 Interviews with Beren Ginting (Deputy Head of Parliamentary Committee VII, GOLKAR fraksf) 19 
August 1987; and Probosutedjo (Deputy Chairman of KADIN) 8 September 1987. For some insight 
into KADINs long-running campaign for a legislative basis, see for instance, "RUU KADIN Merupakan 
Impian Yang Sudah Lama Ditunggu", Sinar Harapan, 6 August 1986; "Sukamdani: Ada Petugas Yang 
Suka Mengutit Barang", Kompas, 28 July 1986; "Menteri Radius Prawiro Sambut Baik Rancangan 
AD/ART KADIN", Antara, 28 May 1983; and "Mengisi Epilog Munas Khusus KADIN 1981", Kompas, 
14 May 1981.
68
such importance. Upon it hung the control of KADIN, and thus the whole orientation of 
the organisation.
When ultimately promulgated, the KADEN law was in many respects an anti­
climax. It confirmed that the government would not abandon lightly its corporatist 
strategy for the management of interest intermediation. No provisions were included for 
compulsory membership of KADIN, and there was no provision for new funding sources 
for KADIN. In a compromise gesture, however, the government included in the Act, 
clauses which left open the possibility of further changes being introduced by subsequent 
implementing regulations both on the issue of membership and, by implication, 
funding .91 The KADIN leadership, assuming that it would soon be granted such 
privileges, began, almost immediately after the ratification of the law, to call for the 
introduction of the implementing regulations which had been implied.92 There was 
however no response from the government. Indeed, two members of the DPR openly 
refuted the suggestion by KADIN leaders that membership would become compulsory as 
a result of the new law.93 In reality, there seems very little likelihood that the government 
will meets KADINs wishes on either front.
The aspect of the new law which attracted greatest attention was the 
stipulation that henceforth KADIN members would be drawn not just from the ranks of 
private enterprise, but also from the state enterprises and cooperatives. This was a 
striking change, and led to some speculation that it was intended to increase the 
government's capacity to influence KADIN activities by diluting the strength of the 
private industry's voice through the inclusion of public sector business.94 While this 
remains uncertain, it seems likely that government was motivated less by machiavellian 
considerations than a desire for ideological symmetry. Rather than trying to weaken or
91 See Articles 8 and 10, Undang-Undang Tentang Kamar Dagang dan Industri, no.l 1987. With regard 
to funding, the relevant clause explicitly left open the possibility of KADIN being granted special duties 
by the government in the future. "Special duties" was interpreted as possibly meaning administering the 
lucrative WDP.
92 See, for example, "KADIN Segera Siap Sesuaikan Organisasi Dengan U U  no. 1 Tahun 1987”, 
Business News, 2 February 1987; and "UU KADIN Diharapkan Mampu Meningkatkan Peran Koperasi", 
Prioritas, 23 February 1987.
93 "Tak Ada Kewajiban Untuk Menjadi Anggota KADIN", Suara Karya, 17 June 1987.
94 Interview with Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti (LP3E member and Director of the LPEM, University 
of Indonesia) 28 August 1987.
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restrict business, it simply wished to embrace all three forms of enterprise with the one 
law.95
Despite the rhetoric of the KADIN leadership about the bright new future 
opening for the organisation with the new law, many people interviewed were of the 
opinion that it would do little to improve KADIN s capacity to represent business interests 
and achieve a greater voice in policy formation.96 Ironically, the one aspect of the new 
law which does suggest a brighter future for KADIN in terms of interest intermediation 
and dealings with the state received very little attention. For the first time anywhere in an 
official Indonesian legal statute, the profit motive is acknowledged as the defining 
characteristic of economic enterprise. While the existence of private enterprise has long 
been acknowledged, it has always lacked ideological legitimacy in Indonesia. In the 
Constitution and the GBHN, the key repositories of New Order state ideology, profit and 
competition are nowhere acknowledged Instead the language used is that of collectivism. 
Even more telling is the fact that KADIN s own constitution does not attempt to legitimise 
these concepts. The explicit acknowledgement of the profit motive in legal statute is thus 
obviously not lightly undertaken. As one political observer put it: this recognition and 
legitimation of the market represents an ideological turning point in the political economy 
of Indonesia.97 More than any other aspect of the KADIN law this holds the greatest 
potential for boosting the capacity of business to achieve greater influence on policy. How 
long it will take for such a shift in the ideological climate to take hold (assuming it is not 
reversed) remains to be seen.
95 An account from one senior source suggested that the inclusion of the state enterprises was at the 
intitiative of two ideologically zealous junior officials within the Department of Trade and the State 
Secretariat. It seems that after having been included at an early stage of the Bill's drafting, no one more 
senior saw fit to change i t  While, of course, top-level figures would have been aware of the 
implications, it does seem that this was not a carefully calculated political strategy. (I am grateful for this 
point to David McKendrick of the School of Business Administration at the University o f California, 
Berkeley.) Certainly there were no officials from the Department of Internal Affairs or politico-strategists 
from the security agencies involved in the drafting of the law. Only the Departments of Trade, Industry, 
Co-operatives and the State Secretariat participated. Interview with Beren Ginting (Deputy Head of 
Committee VII, GOLKAR fraksi) 19 August 1987.
96 Interviews with, for example, Sjahfiri Alim (President Director of Goodyear Pty Ltd & Head of 
KADINs Chemical Industries Section) 25 August 1987; Sjahrir (Chief Economist for Centre for Policy 
Studies) 4 September 1987; Abdul Latief (President Director of Sarinah Jaya Pty Ltd) 1 September 1987; 
Eki Sjahruddin (President Director of Pan Asia Research & Communications Pty Ltd & former Jurnal 
Ekuin journalist) 5 September 1987; and Sanyoto (Chief Editor of Business News) 4 September 1987.
97 Interview with Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti (Director of the LPEM, University of Indonesia) 28 
August 1987.
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The Economic Environment of the Mid-1980s
Thus far, this chapter has examined the political context in which business- 
government relations are located in contemporary Indonesia. However, before we 
proceed to the case-studies for a detailed examination of interest intermediation by 
particular sections of the business community, it is necessary to provide first a brief 
overview of the economic context of the mid-1980s. This is fundamental to much of the 
politics of the period.
Much has been written elsewhere on the nature of Indonesia's economic crisis 
of the mid-1980s, so the main elements are by now familiar.98 Following the buoyant 
years of oil-led growth in the 1970s, the Indonesian economy between 1982 and 1987 
has been subject to extreme buffeting from developments in the international economy. 
The most serious of these was the two-stage collapse in oil prices. The country’s gross 
earnings from oil and gas exports, having reached a high-point of almost $19 billion in 
1981/82, plummeted to $14.7 billion in 1982/83, slid further to $12.4 billion in 1985/86 
and then dropped all the way to $6.9 billion in 1986/87. In a situation where oil receipts 
constituted as much as three-quarters of the country's total export earnings and two-thirds 
of government revenue, this was indeed an enormous blow. Figure 3.1 below shows 
changes in the value of oil and gas both in terms of export earnings and also government 
revenues. (The data has been converted to US dollars both to remove the disguising 
influence of several devaluations and to highlight international purchasing power.) In 
addition to a collapse in oil and gas earnings, the value of Indonesia's non-oil primary 
commodity exports (which represent approximately 20% of export earnings in the mid 
1980s) also suffered from a general tumbling in commodity prices. While not every non­
oil commodity was affected equally, by 1985 the World Bank's international index of 
primary commodity prices was at a level 20% below that of 1979-81.
98 Among the many useful sources on the subject, those drawn-on here include the World Bank (1987), 
and (1986), Robison (1987) as well as the regular surveys of economic developments in the Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, Australian National University, Canberra; and Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia, LPEM, University of Indonesia.
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FIGURE 3.1
Export Earnings and Government Receipts From Oil & Gas 
(Constant Prices)
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Source: Department of Information (1988). This data was converted to constant prices using deflator 
indeces with 1969 being the base index of 100. For details see Appendix A.
Coinciding with this collapse in export earning potential were the flow-on 
effects of the international economic downturn, particularly in the United States. These 
factors came together to induce a recession in the Indonesian economy, so that in 1985, 
growth in the GDP totalled only 1.9% compared with 6% the year before. (A more 
telling figure, Gross Domestic Income, which makes adjustments for declining terms of 
trade, would reveal an even bleaker picture.) Thus at a time when economic planners 
were searching for alternative sources of investment to generate growth, local business 
activity was contracting.
In responding to this situation, the government was severely constrained by a 
rapidly deteriorating balance of payments and a greatly reduced revenue base. In the 
longer term there was the broader problem of the need to restore sustainable levels of 
growth in income, investment and employment. One of the first measures adopted was 
an austere fiscal policy, with development expenditure being cut back sharply. To avoid 
stalling the economy completely, greater use was made of foreign borrowings for 
investment in development projects. Aid came to constitute a much larger proportion of
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developmental expenditure. This had implications for the debt-service-ratio, however, 
which had been seriously affected by unfavourable international currency realignments. 
(The bulk of Indonesia's export earnings were denominated in the declining the US 
dollars while, conversely, much of its imports and debt were denominated in the rapidly 
strengthening Japanese yen and European currencies.) In an inevitably unpopular bid to 
prevent the balance of payments deficit from getting out of control, the rupiah was 
devalued sharply by a nominal 45% in September 1986. In addition to these 
macroeconomic adjustments, important structural change was also undertaken to boost 
desperately needed foreign exchange earnings. A range of measures was introduced to 
reform the country's restrictive trade regime (tata niaga) of government controls of a 
variety of import monopolies. The import monopolies had become very controversial 
both because they undermined the international competitiveness of downstream exporters 
affected and because of their links in many cases to senior political figures and exorbitant 
rent-taking practices. Movement in the direction of tariff rather than non-tariff barriers, as 
well as the overall reduction of dispersal in trade protection levels was therefore 
introduced only slowly." In addition to measures seeking to facilitate non-oil exports 
through lowering of cost inputs, deregulatory reforms were also undertaken to encourage 
increased foreign investment to assist in economic regeneration.
Many of these reform measures were politically very contentious, as they 
represented virtually a U-tum on various key elements of economic policy during the 
booming years of the 1970s and early 1980s. During the oil-rich years an over-valued 
exchange rate had obstructed non-oil exports while encouraging imports. In this period 
of prosperity, lax financial discipline and the establishment of import monopolies attracted 
less controversy. The onset of hard times provided the stimulus for serious consideration 
of how to address the problem of an over-regulated, "high-cost" economy. The balance- 
of-payments crisis of the mid-1980s brought the arguments for the promotion of non-oil 
exports into sharp focus. This was the crux of the much-discussed debates within the 
government between the economic nationalists and the so-called 'technocrats' who
"  For a discussion o f the problems and reform efforts surrounding the Tata niaga, see Pangestu (1987) 
pp. 27-35.
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favoured deregulation. The technocrats were behind the drive to shift from import- 
substitution towards an export-oriented trade and industry policy.
As Robison has argued, many of the deregulatory measures introduced 
directly threatened the interests of major corporate groups engaged in upstream production 
and the importation of similar industrial inputs, together with those of some powerful 
elements within the state structure who were financially linked to these ventures through 
their involvement in the initial granting of monopolies and other concessions.100 
Inevitably, this imbued discussion of the tata niaga arrangements with great political 
sensitivity.
Many of these issues will be illustrated in the course of the case-studies. The 
point of this overview has been to emphasise the acuteness of the economic crisis that 
confronted the government, especially between 1985-87. Much political debate emerged 
during this period over the impact of economic conditions and of some of the bold policy 
reforms aimed at tackling the situation. Policy makers were caught between the 
macroeconomic imperatives, which manifested themselves in ways ranging from 
catastrophic reports of a balance of payments deficit to the increasingly conspicuous need 
for employment creation, and the less obvious, but no less real, political resistance from a 
variety of sources opposed to the reforms. In short, the politico-economic context in 
which the following cases were located was, to say the least, turbulent.
100 por an excellent survey of this issue see, Robison (1988).
CHAPTER FOUR
THE SPINNING INDUSTRY AND THE 
CONFLICT OVER IMPORT MONOPOLIES
This chapter focuses on a conflict within the textile industry, or more 
particularly the spinning industry. It is a lengthy and at times complex story, which has 
at its crux a conflict concerning the Department of Trade's decision to grant a particular 
company a monopoly over the procurement of raw materials for the spinning industry. 
The company, CBTI (Indonesian Textile Fibre Development), was controlled by the 
leadership of the Indonesian Textile Association (API), the peak representative 
organisation for the entire textile industry. Many within the spinning industry regarded 
CBTI's operations, and its links to API, as highly threatening. This led to the formation 
of a new representative association, the Spinning Industry Joint Secretariat, or, 
SEKBERTAL, which mounted a long and hard-fought campaign during 1986-88 to have 
the bundle of policies empowering CBTI reversed.
The significance of this case for our theoretical concerns is that it offers much 
illuminating material on some of the processes of interest intermediation between business 
and the state. In particular, aspects of this case challenge the idea that extra-state actors 
are of little significance in the determination of policy.
The chapter begins with a profile of the textile industry and, in particular, the 
spinning sub-sector. This is followed by an overview of the interest representation 
structures within the textile industry. One of the more confusing aspects of the case is the 
bewildering number of representative bodies that exist. Before we proceed to the details 
of the story itself, to place it in its context, there is also a short outline of the background 
to the conflict that erupted over CBTI.
A Profile of the Textile Industry
The textile industry is frequently one of the first parts of the manufacturing 
sector to experience rapid growth in newly industrialising countries. It is made up of a
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number of distinct sub-sectors. A simple functional diagram of the entire textile industry 
from the upstream synthetic fibre makers through to the garment makers, at the 
downstream end of the production line, is set out below in Figure 4.1. Note that the 
diagram also includes the traditional weaving and batik cloth-making industries. In the 
past these traditional manufactures have tended to be small-scale and scattered throughout 
rural areas, but this is changing. However, at each level they are still quite separate from 
the mainstream modem textile industry, which is of course technologically more 
advanced and has a vastly greater production capacity. Our concern in this chapter is with 
the modem textile sector, and in particular, the spinning industry.
FIGURE 4.1
Structural Overview of the Textile Industry
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Prior to the liberal economic policies introduced by the New Order 
government, the bulk of productive activity in the textile industry, apart from the 
traditional cottage-based sector, was confined to weaving and, to a lesser extent, 
spinning. During the 1950s and early 1960s, state enterprises came to assume a 
dominant role within the textile industry. The government's political commitment to state 
economic intervention led to the state becoming heavily involved in the production of yam 
and fabric as well as controlling the importation of cotton. A number of state-owned 
spinning mills and weaving factories were established during this period and scattered 
around the country.1 The modem-sector textile industry in Indonesia only really began to 
flourish from the early 1970s onwards. In the spinning industry, for example, the total 
number of spindles did not much exceed 500,000 until 1970. By 1979, this figure had 
risen to about 1.7 million spindles, and by 1985 to 2.5 million. Similarly in the weaving 
industry, the total number of mechanical looms in 1970 was approximately 35, 000, but 
by 1984 there were around 82,000. Following this rapid growth in the productive 
capacity of the yam and fabric forming industries, there was a resultant expansion and 
development of fabric processing industries such as bleaching, dyeing and printing. 
Synthetic fibre manufacturing varied somewhat in that production only began in 1973 
with 4,000 tons per year. By 1985 this had grown to over 200,000 tons.2
The rapid growth of the textile industry during the 1970s was largely a 
product of the government's various forms of protection for local producers. As a result 
of these measures, traders and wholesalers who had hitherto concentrated on importing, 
switched to local manufacture. Large scale foreign investment, particularly by Japanese 
firms, also played a key role in the expansion of the industry, especially during the first 
half of the 1970s. Indeed, foreign investment in the textile industry accounted for more 
than one third of total foreign investment in manufacturing in Indonesia up until 1977.
1 For background on the textile industry in Indonesia, see Makarim Wibisono (1987), Hill (1979), and 
Palmer (1972).
2 This data is drawn from the report on the Indonesian textile industry by the World Bank (1987), pp. 
40-41.
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As Hal Hill has explained, this level declined somewhat once the early ’easy phase' of 
import substitution passed.3
Table 4.1 compares the three major sub-sectors within the textile industry, 
and contrasts them with the total figures for all manufacturing in Indonesia.
TABLE 4.1
Comparison of Major Sub-Sectors of the Textile Industry in 1985 
(Prices in millions of Rupiah)
NUMBER EMPLOYMENT VALUE OF VALUE ADDED
OF FIRMS GROSS OUTPUT (AT FACTOR COST)
SPINNING 94 66,586 889,840 285,170
WEAVING 1030 155,025 1,063,299 336,664
TEXTILES & GARMENTS 775 80,800 373,503 131,632
ALL MANUFACTURING 12,909 1,672,162 23,027,322 7,203,692
Source: Bureau of Statistics (1987).
This case-study is principally concerned with the spinning industry. The 
spinning industry occupies a strategic position in the overall scheme as nearly 80% of all 
the fibre used in Indonesia is in staple form (whether cotton or synthetic) and thus must 
be converted into spun yam.4 In other words, the downstream manufacturing sectors 
rely to a large extent on local yam production. In 1987 there were eighty-eight spinning 
mills, of which eighty-two were operational. The spinning industry is very heavily 
concentrated in Java (97% of all spindles), particularly around Bandung and Jakarta. 
Table 4.2 details size and ownership of firms in the spinning industry. From this it can 
be seen that local private firms dominate the market with approximately 47% of spindle 
capacity, followed by a combined total of 27% among the joint ventures, with the state 
firms holding 26% of spindles. It should be noted, however, that the state-owned 
spinning mills operate for a substantially shorter number of average hours per year (4,000 
- 5,000) than the privately-owned mills (8,000 - 8,400).5 Table 4.2 also makes clear that
3 Hill (1988) pp. 83-84.
4 World Bank Report (1987) p. 60. For a more complete overview of the textile industry see also pp. 
43-7.
5 World Bank Report (1987) p. 61.
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the local private spinning industry is heavily dominated by Chinese Indonesian firms. In 
addition, the table also distinguishes those firms (a total of thirty-five) which have 
integrated production facilities. Rather than just specialising in yam production, 
integrated factories engage in fabric forming and, in some cases, fabric processing as 
well.
TABLE 4.2
The Spinning Industry by Size and Ownership 1987 
(Size measured by total number of spindles)
LOCAL COMPANIES 
STATE * PRIVATE (ETHNICITY)
JOINT VENTURES 
JAPAN HONGKONG INDIA
A.C.T.E.M. 3,600 •
Adetex - 48,864 (Chinese) - - -
Argopantes*** - 89,856 (Chinese) - - -
Banjaran 64,480 - - - - -
Bapintri - 47,008 (Chinese) - - -
Batamtex** - 43,216 (Chinese) - - -
Bekasi 39,806 - - - - -
Bitratex - - - - - 24,000
Centex*** - - - 31,536 - -
Cilacap 60,000 - - - - -
Cimanggis - 19,968 (Chinese) - - -
Cipadung 34,188 - - - - -
Dan Lins*** - 81,168 (Chinese) - - -
Dasatex - 24,468 (Chinese) - - -
Dayasamatex - 28,520 (Chinese) - - -
Dharma Kalimas - 11,520 (Chinese) - - -
Dharma Manunggal - 34,992 (Chinese) - - -
Dj antra 33,184 - - - - -
Eastemtex*** - - - 31,344 - -
Edi Sandang - 2,660 (Chinese) - - -
Elegant - - - - - 26,760
Eratex Jaya** - - - - 30,352 -
Famatex*** - 30,720 (Chinese) - - -
Five Star*** - - - - - 15,360
G.K.B.I. Cirebon 38,016 - - - - - -
G.K.B.I. Medari*** 47,808 - - - -
Gokak Indonesia - - - - - 31,520
Grati 41,172 - - - - -
Horizon Syntex** - - - - - 21,008
Imogari*** - 832 (pribumi) - - -
Inbritex*** 29,032 - - - - -
Indaci - - - 5,888 - -
Indonesia Barn - 23,296 (Chinese) - - -
Indorama - - - - - 44,064
Intra Troika - 8,000 (Chinese) - - -
Isada - 1,952 (Chinese) - - -
Istem*** - - - 20,400 - -
I.T.T. Bandung 8,400 - - - - -
Kahatex*** - 6,652 (Chinese) - - -
Kamaltex - 28,800 (Chinese) - - -
Kasta Timbul - 45,144 (Chinese) - - -
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TABLE 4.2 Continued
LOCAL COMPANIES 
STATE * PRIVATE (ETHNICITY)
JOINT VENTURES 
JAPAN HONGKONG INDIA
Kewalram _ _ _ _ 22,000
K.T.S.M.*** 29,376 - - - —
Kumatex - - - 29,536 - -
Lawang 34,784 - - - - -
Lucky Abadi*** - 19,392 (Chinese) - - -
Malaktex - - - 5,200 - -
Maligi - 60,960 (Chinese) - - -
Mertex*** - - - 20,000 - -
Misutex - 18,304 (Chinese) - - -
Naintex Dua - 25,000 (Chinese) - - -
Oceanic - - - - 17,676 -
Palembang 30,000 - - - - -
Pancatex - 44,560 (Chinese) - - -
Pardedetex*** - 10,000 (pribumi) - - -
Peony Blanket** - 2,180 (Chinese) - - -
Primatexco** - - - 49,872 - -
Primissima** 36,288 - - - - -
Putra Sejati - 37,552 (Chinese) - - -
Sandratex*** - 65,760 (Chinese) - - -
Sari Warna** - 30,240 (Chinese) - - -
Secang 36,372 - - - - -
S.C.T.I.*** - - - 22,080 - -
Senayan*** 60,000 - - - - -
South Grandtex*** - 53,312 (Chinese) - - -
Sukuntex - 15,000 (pribumi) - - -
Sunrise - - - - - 25,920
Superbtex - - - - 20,280 -
Tarumatex - 40,000 (Chinese) - - -
Texin*** 11,560 - - - - -
Textra Amspin** - 55,296 (pribumi) - - -
Tohpati 20,400 - - - - -
Tristate** - 23,200 (Chinese) - - -
Tubantia - 36,480 (Chinese) - - -
Tyfountex*** - - - - 64,176 -
Unilon*** - - - 23,328 - -
Unitex*** - - - 22,000 - -
Vonex - - - 8,000 - -
Wastra Indah** - 37,560 (Chinese) - - -
Wing Indotex** - - - - 12,800 -
World Yamatex - 20,160 (Chinese) - - -
Young Indonesia** - - - - 31,9788 -
TOTAL 654,866 1,172,592 272,784 177,262 210,632
(100%) (26%) (47%) (11%) (7%) (9%)
* A small number o f the mills listed under the state category are in fact either cooperatives or semi-state 
enterprises. For present purposes these sub-categories are not significant.
** Denotes integrated mills conducting both spinning and weaving activites
*** Denotes integrated mills conducting both spinning, weaving and finishing activities.
Source: API, SEKBERTAL and the Department of Industry.
Within the the textile industry, spinning is one of the most technologically 
sophisticated sub-sectors. The available data suggests that the technological base for the
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Indonesian spinning industry is very modem, rating only behind South Korea in terms of 
the age of the machinery installed.6 While clear statistics are unavailable, it seems that 
roughly half of the total yam produced is derived from cotton, and half from synthetic 
fibres. About 80% of the spinning industry's synthetic fibre needs are satisfied by the 
eleven local producers. In the case of cotton, however, the local supply is extremely 
limited, and as a result, around 95% of total cotton requirements are imported.7 The 
Indonesian government has been very keen to develop a local cotton industry, both for 
reasons of economic self-sufficiency, and because of an official commitment to assisting 
small-scale farmers. In 1978/79 there were some 1,500 hectares under cultivation, and 
by 1984/85 this had grown to over 30,000 hectares. Nevertheless, cotton's record in 
Indonesia is not encouraging as yields-per-hectare have been declining rather than 
improving.8 In late 1987, for example, there was open discussion of the failure of the 
government's smallholder cotton intensification program to achieve its targets. The 
average yield in 1986/87 was only 359 kilograms per hectare (the lowest in the nine years 
of the program) and far short of the projected levels of 2,000 - 3,000 kilograms per 
hectare.9 Aside from the economic difficulties confronting cotton growing in Indonesia, 
the climatic conditions are not especially suited to the crop.
Interest Representation in the Textile Industry
Like most other sectors of business in Indonesia, the textile industry has a 
government-designated corporatist structure, nominally charged with promoting the 
interests of its constituents. One of the difficulties in attempting to organise all business 
people in the textile industry into a simple association is that because the industry 
embraces such a range of manufacturing stages, the interests of the various sub-sectors 
frequently diverge. At the most simple level, upstream producers naturally want a
6 World Bank Report (1987) pp. 63 & 72.
7 World Bank Report (1987) p p .4 4 & 4 7 .
8 World Bank Report (1987) pp. 52 & 73; and Data Consult Inc. (1986) p. 7.
9 See "Cotton Intensification Fails", Jakarta Post, 7 October 1987; and more generally, the report, 
"Program Nasional Penelitian Tanaman Serat Buah 1988-1995", prepared by the Tobacco and Plant Fibre 
Research Institute (1988).
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guaranteed market downstream. On the other hand, downstream producers usually prefer 
to import their raw materials rather than use the more expensive local products. The 
diversity of interests between the different sub-sectors of the textile industry is reflected in 
its representational structures. Although our main concern here is with developments in 
the mid-1980s, it will be useful to review briefly the background to the current 
representational arrangements, since some of the seeds of the conflict on which we will 
be focusing lay here.
Following the rapid growth in the textile industry during the 1970s, a number 
of representative associations were established - the Indonesian Garment Makers' 
Association (PEBTI), the Indonesian Synthetic Fibre Makers' Association (APSYFI), the 
Indonesian Spinners’ Association (ASPI), and the Textile Club (an informal group of a 
few large spinning and weaving companies, most of which were joint-ventures with 
Japanese firms). As PIBTI, APSYFI, ASPI were all sectorally based, they had little 
concern with developments in other areas of the textile industry. An organisation which 
was a partial exception to this pattem was the All-Indonesia Union of Textile Companies 
(PERTEKSI). In theory, PERTEKSI was representative of the entire Indonesian textile 
industry. In practice, however, PERTEKSI tended to represent only a selection of 
spinning and weaving companies, mostly in West Java. Its only significant 
representational function was (and is) to present the employers' case at annual wage 
negotiations with the textile worker’s union.
A catalyst which brought change to these representational arrangements was 
introduced in 1978 when the various ASEAN governments decided to form an ASEAN­
wide textile organisation as a step towards greater regional cooperation. Suddenly, there 
was a need for a national textile organisation to represent Indonesia within the region. To 
this end, the Federation of Indonesian Textile Associations (F-API) was formed in 
October 1978 as an umbrella organisation to represent the entire textile industry.
Apart from the actual creation of F-API, another important development at 
this stage was the involvement of Frans Seda in the representational processes of the 
textile industry. Seda was to play an important part in subsequent events. A former
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cabinet minister in both the Old Order and early New Order governments10 and an
outspoken pribumi figure, he was judged to be a potential asset as an articulate and well-
*
connected industry spokesman. Seda, however, was a relative newcomer to the industry 
and some difficulties had to be overcome to find him a position of appropriate standing 
within its forums. His own company was in the garment-making sector; but as the 
garment-makers' association, PIBTI, was headed by Arnold Baramuli, a well-established 
and influential pribumi figure within KADIN, it was not possible to give Seda the 
leadership of that. A solution was found in the creation of a new but otherwise 
unimportant body - the Indonesian Textile Products Trade Association.* 11
As the new peak organisation for the textile industry, F-API embraced all 
sectoral textile associations. Apart from those pre-existing associations which chose to 
join the new federation (the already mentioned PIBTI, APSYFI, ASPI and PERTEKSI) a 
number of other associations were also created and brought into the F-API fold.12 Partly 
as a result of its multiple constituent parts, F-API was riven with factional differences and 
conflicting sets of interests. Within a year of being established it was in turmoil because 
of the various divisions among the sub-groupings of the organisation. The inability of the 
F-API leadership's to stabilise the situation, led to Frans Seda being invited to lead the 
organisation. It was hoped that he could overcome the problems bedevilling F-API and 
also help to promote textile industry interests through his wider political connections.
Apart from Frans Seda, two other prominent pribumi figures in the new 
leadership group were Fahmy Chatib and Musa. All three were widely regarded as 
'political' figures rather than entrepreneurs. None was actively involved in company 
management. Musa, for example, had an enduring association with the Chinese textile 
magnate, Thee Nian King, who controlled the largest and most widespread corporate
10 Among his various posts, Seda had been Minister of Finance in the late 1960s, as well as head of the 
Catholic Party.
11 Interview with Alif Martadi (Secretary General of PIBTI and former F-API official), 22 May 1987. I 
am indebted to Alif Martadi for much of the information on the background of the representative 
organisations in the textile industry.
12 These included, the Indonesian Weavers' Association (ASPINDO), The Indonesian Knitting and 
Embroidery Association (APBI), the Indonesian Batik Association (ABI), the Indonesian False Twisters’ 
Association (APBTI), the Batik Cooperatives Association (GKBI), the Indonesian Union of Bonded 
Warehouse Industries (PIBWI), the All Indonesian Textile Consultants' Association (IKATSI) and Frans 
Seda's already mentioned Indonesian Textile Products Trade Association (APPPTI).
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network in the Indonesian textile industry.13 Thee Nian King, himself, maintained a very 
low profile, relying on Musa as his pribumi spokesman. Despite this, Thee was 
nevertheless very closely associated with the F-API leadership. Fahmy Chatib played a 
similar role to Musa and was retained by another Chinese textile entrepreneur, Max 
Mulyadi Supangkat, owner of a large knitting firm. Another key figure in this leadership 
group was Handoko Tjokrosaputro. Handoko, also Chinese, was another very large 
producer, having interests (like Thee Nian King) which were spread from synthetic fibre­
making, through integrated spinning and weaving, to batik and garment manufacturing.14
These men were the principal figures in F-API's new leadership clique. 
Apart from their standing as leading identities within the textile industry, a vital aspect of 
their power-base was their close ties with the Department of Trade.15 All of these 
members of the F-API leadership were to play an important role in the conflicts that 
emerged within the industry during 1986-88.
As head of F-API, one of Frans Seda’s first priorities, in seeking to 
strengthen both his own leadership and the organisation's representational capabilities, 
was to locate a source of revenue. Ordinary membership fees apparently did not generate 
sufficient funds. The difficulty he faced in this was that many textile producers were 
sceptical about the purposes to which any such revenue would be put. This issue 
dragged on for some time. In order to overcome resistance within the textile industry, the 
F-API leadership, in conjunction with the Trade Department, determined a policy 
whereby a compulsory levy would be applied on all textile and garment exports to
13 His flagship within the spinning industry is Argopantes Pty Ltd (the largest single mill in Indonesia). 
His other mills include, Dharma Kalimas Pty Ltd, Dharmatex Pty Ltd, South-Grandtex Pty Ltd, World 
Yamatex Pty Ltd, as well as three joint ventures (with Japanese firms), - ACTEM, ISTEM and Kumatex. 
In addition he has major interests in synthetic fibre-making (Kuraray Manunggal Pty Ltd, a Japanese joint 
venture) as well as the textile and garment sub-sectors (Perintis Pty Ltd, Pola Sejati Pty Ltd and Timatex 
Pty Ltd, a Japanese joint venture). He thus heads a vast empire, integrating upstream and downstream 
functions. In addition to textiles, his major interests include an integrated steel and rolling mill, 
chemicals and dyestuffs, lease financing, poultry, and general trading.
14 Handoko's flagship is the giant Batik Keris Pty Ltd, a large producer of batik and an exporter o f batik 
garments. In addition, he owns Dan Litis Pty Ltd (an integrated spinning mill only slightly smaller than 
Thee Nian King's Argopantes Pty Ltd) and has a major share in the synthetic fibre maker Tri Rempoa Pty 
Ltd.
15 It was widely believed in Jakarta business circles that this group enjoyed a very close relationship with 
a number o f the most senior officials in the Department of Trade - notably the die Director General for 
Internal Trade, Kardjono Wirioprawiro, and the Director General for External Trade, B.M. Kuntjoro-jakti. 
It was also widely assumed that as a former Finance Minister, Frans Seda must have been well-known to 
Trade Minister (and the former Govenor of the Bank Indonesia) Rachmat Saleh.
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Western countries for which quota restrictions applied. Under this arrangement, 
exporters could only obtain the necessary clearance permits from the Department of Trade 
after providing proof that they had deposited the required levy in F-APrs bank account.16
This was an unusual policy to introduce at a time when the government was 
increasingly looking to promote non-oil exports. The rationale provided for it was that 
the money raised (a sizeable sum) would be used by F-API to assist in the further 
development of the textile industry. Garment exporters within PIBTI were very strongly 
opposed to the policy. In spite of this, the combined will of the F-API leadership group 
and the Department of Trade prevailed. This episode marked an important point in the. 
growth of disaffection among sections of the textile industry towards the F-API 
leaders.17
The episode is also important because it marks the beginning of the F-API 
executive's ability to raise funds on a very substantial scale. This, in turn, gave it 
increased organisational flexibility and enhanced its capacity for action. The achievement 
of this capability, however,was not without problems. While the levying of export 
charges, which F-API called dues (iuran), had been sanctioned by the Department of 
Trade, there remained some technical debate over the legality of the procedure. This 
stemmed from the fact that F-API was only legally entitled to levy dues on its own 
members. As a federation of associations, rather than an association itself, F-API was, 
then, technically entitled to collect dues only from its constituent associations, and not 
from individual companies. (The individual companies were members of the various 
specific sectoral associations rather than of F-API, and hence if individual companies 
were to be levied it could only be via their specific associations.)
In a bid to overcome this legal difficulty, the F-API executive convened a 
special national congress of the organisation in March 1985 and effected changes to its
16 Many producers believed that both the F-API leadership and some senior officials within the Trade 
Department had a mutual material interest in this arrangement. The requirement to pay a compulsory 
levy to F-API was contained in cable no. 236/DAGLU-21/KWT/VIII/84, dated 10 July 1984, from the 
Director General o f External Trade to Regional Trade Department offices. Note however, that the 
instruction from the Director General was preceded by an F-API decree (no. 002/SK/Dp-API/84 of 10 
April 1984), making the same determination. This strongly suggests that the Director General's 
instruction was intended to reinforce an unpopular F-API ruling.
17 Interview, AlifMartadi (Secretary General of PIBTI and former F-API official), 30 April 1987.
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constitution such that the Federation of Indonesian Textile Associations, became the 
Indonesian Textile Association. In short, F-API became API. Instead of being a 
federation of individual associations, it became one giant association itself. This was 
achieved by fusing the various sectoral associations together to create a new transformed 
unity - API. The various individual sectoral associations within the old F-API ceased to 
exist, their functions being performed instead by a number of sectorally oriented 
compartments within the new organisation.
The significance of this move was that API members now became individual 
companies rather than sectoral associations and as such, the executive was legally entitled 
to collect dues from them. The controlling group in the leadership of F-API, centred 
around Frans Seda and Musa, naturally ensured that they remained at the helm of the new 
API.
This transformation, or "fusion" of F-API into API was, predictably, very 
controversial. Not surprisingly,those groups opposed to the export levy, or dues, were 
also strongly opposed to this move, as it would strengthen that policy and and entrench 
Frans Seda's group in leadership positions. PIBTI, PERTEKSI and APSYFI refused to 
join the new API, remaining as autonomous bodies outside its jurisdiction. APSYFI's 
refusal to participate in the new API had less to do with the issue of levies (synthetic 
fibre-makers were selling to the local market and thus were not greatly affected) than with 
the fact that the head of APSYFI, Arnold Baramuli, also happened to be the head of 
PIBTI. This, together with the personal antagonism that was known to exist between 
Baramuli and Frans Seda, meant that it was scarcely surprising he should try to 
strengthen the protest vote by keeping both of the organisations he headed out of the new 
API. More generally, the leadership of all three of these associations were concerned to 
preserve their institutional autonomy, as they were not part of the leadership group in API 
and were, furthermore unhappy with its modus operandi.
Further controversy resulted from the manner in which the fusion and the 
special national congress had been conducted. Many people emphasised that the whole 
procedure was very carefully stage-managed by the API executive to eliminate dissent, 
and certain questions were raised about the legality of the exercise. The weaving
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association ASPINDO, had not formally opposed the change, but nor had it dissolved 
itself following the fusion, and thus remained in limbo. The spinning association 
(ASPI), on the other hand, did formally fuse into API and dissolve itself, but did so with 
little membership support. 18 Moreover, three major groups had boycotted the whole 
exercise.
The controversy over the legitimacy of the new API received considerable 
press coverage, following a vigorous attack on the proceedings of the congress by 
Baramuli in his other position as Deputy Head of KADIN. Speaking at a KADIN press 
conference, Baramuli lashed out at the API leaders, alleging they had employed 
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices to bring about the fusion. The API executive, 
assured of Trade Department support, denied all these allegations.19
The protests of people such as Baramuli were insufficient to impede the 
transformation of API or the progress of the leadership group. This was in part because 
he received little public support. As in many areas of business representation in 
Indonesia, most producers were not alarmed by the whole exercise, regarding it as 
competition for the spoils of office; effective representation of industry interests was not a 
question. While some sections of the textile industry were already dominated by the API 
leadership clique (principally the large-scale integrated spinning and weaving operations), 
others were co-opted, and still others were simply apathetic. Of those strongly opposed, 
only Baramuli spoke out; PERTEKSI, as usual, remained fairly quiet. Underlying all of 
this was the realisation that the API transformation was backed by the Trade Department 
Furthermore, the fusion enjoyed a certain superficial legitimacy in so far as it brought a 
multiplicity of business associations together under one tight lid, something very much in 
line with the government's broad corporatist approach to the management of interest 
intermediation.
18 Interviews with Djon Wono (Dasatex Pty Ltd) 1 May 1987, Alif Martadi (Secretary General of PIBTI 
and former F-API official) 22 May 1987, as well as two other spinning mill owners who requested 
anonymity.
19 See, for example, "Kadin: Kongres Khusus F-API Tidak Sah", Kompas, 23 March 1985; and "Tidak 
Relevan Mempersoalkan Sah Tidaknya Kongres Khusus API", Kompas, 27 March 1985.
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Within the textile industry, this episode marked another important stage in the 
alienation of rank-and-file manufacturers from the API leaders. There was concern 
among some people that the transformation of F- API into API had been carried out purely 
to strengthen the political and financial position of the organisation's leaders, and by 
questionable means at that
The purpose of this discussion has been to provide an overview of the 
representational structure in the textile industry. As has been seen, one of the main 
features of the textile sector is the significance of sub-sectoral divisions. This is one of 
the main reasons for the multitude of representative associations. Inspired by the needs 
of an ASEAN cooperation exercise, F-API was formed as a national umbrella 
organisation, bringing the various sectoral associations together. But beyond being 
desirable for reasons of regional coperation, the establishment of a single corporatist body 
as the sole designated representative association was entirely consistent with the pattern 
elsewhere in the Indonesian business world. What set the textile industry somewhat 
apart was the fact that the constituent sectoral associations within F-API had a life of their 
own, and were, in some cases, reluctant to sacrifice authority to the peak body.
This became of special significance following the rise of a group within F- 
API centring around Frans Seda, Musa, Handoko Tjokrosaputro and Thee Nian King, all 
of them well-connected and prominent figures in the business community. Following 
this group's success in securing the leadership of F-API, they introduced - in cooperation 
with the Department of Trade - a levy on exporters, ostensibly designed to generate 
operational funds for the organisation. This policy, together with the transformation of 
F-API into the consolidated API, resulted in the alienation of many of those producers not 
associated with the leadership group. Those who did not enjoy the benefits of these 
changes began to drift away from API, usually through non-payment of membership 
fees20 and decreased participation in its activities. This alientation process was gradual
20 API membership fees were reportedly Rp 150,000 per month. Interview with Danny Lukita 
(President Director of Fit-U Garments Pty Ltd), 28 April 1987.
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and sporadic. However, three sectoral associations, PIBTI, APSYFI and PERTEKSI, 
stood defiantly apart from the peak body.21 Of these, only PIBTI was a serious critic of 
API.
Apart from illustrating the coporatist characteristics of API, this picture is 
important as many of the tensions within the textile industry's representative structure 
were integral to the bitter dispute over the monopoly powers of CBTI which arose in 
early 1986 (less than a year after the formation of API). As will become clear, CBTI, an 
import company, was the agent of API. For the present, all that needs to be remembered 
is that even before the eruption of the conflict over CBTI, there was already a good deal 
of scepticism and discontent with API and the representational services it was supposed 
to offer the industry. It is to the background of the specific conflict over CBTI that we 
now turn.
The Background to the Conflict Over CBTI
In one sense the CBTI affair began with a series of Ministerial decrees by the 
Trade Minister, Rachmat Saleh, in late 1985 and early 1986. However, the real genesis 
lies a little further back, and centres around two main factors - fluctuations in the 
international price of cotton, and, the domestic ramifications of the negotiations over the 
General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on reducing trade protection. This 
backrop merits brief consideration.
The raw materials of the spinning industry in Indonesia are cotton fibre, 
polyester staple fibre and rayon staple fibre, and individual firm may produce pure cotton, 
synthetic, or a blended yam. While about 85% of the spinning industry's synthetic raw 
materials are supplied locally, in the case of cotton, 95% is imported. Local cotton had
21 It should be noted that API was a very much larger organisation that any o f the other individual 
associations. Aside from the Chairman (Frans Seda) and the full-time professional Secretary General 
(Fahny Chatib), API had a total o f fifteen sectoral and functional sections, each of which had a chairman 
and leadership committee (for example, the Spinning Section and the International Trade section). There 
was also a separate Treasury Section. In nearly all cases, the leadership positions were filled by people 
closely associated with Frans Seda’s group. Beyond its head-office, API also had a parallel regional 
structure scattered throughout the country. Indeed, it was such a large organisation that the KADIN 
executive viewed its failure to join KADIN with some suspicion.
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been cheaper than imported cotton prior to late 1984-85, but its quality was generally 
regarded as being inferior to that obtained overseas. Local cotton was mostly consumed 
by the state-owned spinning mills, while private spinners preferred to buy their cotton 
internationally. The purchase of cotton, whether local or imported, was conducted on an 
unrestricted and autonomous basis by individual companies.
This system worked relatively well in so far as all spinners were able to 
purchase the type and quality of cotton they wanted at the market price. At the same time 
Indonesia's fledgling cotton growing industry could be confident that all its produce 
would be absorbed, largely because of the price advantage it enjoyed over the better 
quality cotton on the world market. However, disruption came suddenly in 1985 when 
the international price of cotton fell sharply. The local cotton growing industry, beset 
with many inefficiencies, was unable to reduce its costs sufficiently to remain 
competitive. As a result, consumers of local cotton suddenly found the more desirable 
imported cotton to be cheaper than the local product. Predictably, falling demand for 
local cotton soon led to the rapid build-up of unsold stockpiles.
These developments in turn had political repercussions. The Directorate 
General for Plantations (within the Agriculture Department) became alarmed about the 
future of the cotton growing estates. Falling demand for cotton was endangering the 
small-scale cotton growers - to which the government, and the President in particular, had 
a strong commitment. At this stage, seeing an opportunity for itself, API became 
involved. Following discussions among API, the Directorate General for Plantations and 
the Department of Trade, it was agreed that API would undertake to guarantee the 
absorption of all local cotton by the spinning industry.22
Following on from this, the Trade Minister, Rachmat Saleh, issued two 
decrees on 5 December 1985 requiring all spinning companies to use local cotton in a 
ratio of 1:10 with imported cotton. Spinners were henceforth only permitted to import 
cotton after demonstrating that they had purchased a volume of local cotton equal to one
22 Interviews with Husein Aminuddin (Textra Am spin Pty Ltd), 18 April 1987; Suwachman (an editor 
of Prioritas), 18 April 1987; Endang Achmadi (Deputy Chief Editor BeritaYudha), 18 April 1987; and 
Alif Martadi (Secretary General of PIBTI and former F-API official), 30 April 1987.
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tenth of the amount they wished to import.23 By this means it was expected that the 
absorption of all local cotton would be assured, since it amounted to only 5% of total 
cotton consumption.
In the wake of these momentous decrees, API moved to cement its position 
as the implementing agent for the new regulations. In a forcefully worded letter to all 
spinners, it argued the new regulations necessitated collective action by the spinning 
industry, and hence, all spinners would have to sign what was in effect a formalised carte 
blanche. In short, they were required to agree, in advance, to any measures taken by 
API, or an organ appointed by the API executive. Failure to comply, the letter 
emphasised, would result in sanctions being applied against offending companies24.
This chain events was one of the catalysts for the conflict which gripped the 
spinning industry in 1986. The second catalyst, though concurrent, was quite separate. 
It concerned the subsidies on fabric and garment exports paid by the Indonesian 
government.
Indonesia produces around 2.5 billion metres of cloth per year, of which 
75% is sold on the domestic market and the remainder exported. These exports (until 
mid-1986) were supported by government subsidies to the textile industry totalling US$ 
120 million.25 However, as an immediate consequence of becoming a signatory to the 
GATT code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Indonesia was obliged to terminate 
its direct state subsidisation of garment and fabric exports. As 1985 progressed, the 
government thus emphasised to the textile industry that the existing SE (Sertifikat 
Eksport) system of export subsidies would stop on 30 March 1986 in order to bring 
Indonesia in to line with the GATT.
The Minister for Industry, Hartarto, called in both API and the Garment 
Manufacturers' Association (PIBTI) for consultations in late 1985 so as to guage industry 
attitudes towards the prospect of the withdrawal of the SE subsidy. (PIBTI, it will be 
recalled, was one of the associations which refused to join the new API following the
23 Rachmat Saleh's Ministerial Decrees no. 1066/KP/XII/85 and no. 1067/KP/XÜ/85.
24 The official API letter was no. 171/API/XÜ/85, dated 30 December 1985.
25 This data was obtained from Fahmy Chatib (Secretary General of API), 2 April 1987.
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March 1985 fusion.) In the course of these discussions, Hartarto, is said to have 
mentioned in passing the idea of a cross-subsidy, referring to the arrangement in the glass 
industry where a large Japanese company, Asahimas Pty Ltd, subsidised the operations 
of its export-oriented downstream divisions with some of the profits of its successful 
upstream, locally-oriented division.26
In the weeks that followed, API went on to develop an idea for a scheme 
under which export-oriented garment manufacturers would, ostensibly, be subsidised by 
the upstream spinning industry. While API adopted the term ’’cross-subsidy", mentioned 
by Hartarto, their proposal was fundamentally different, as the cross subsidy would not 
be 'intra-firm', but 'inter-firm'. The subsidy would not come from one branch of a 
firm's activities and go to another, but instead from one firm to another quite separate 
firm. In other words, under an API-controlled scheme, firms in the spinning industry 
would be required to subsidise unrelated firms in the garment manufacturing industry 
through a levy on all the raw materials they purchased, especially cotton.27 The actual 
details about how the revenue raised by this levy would be transferred to the garment 
manufacturers were, however, never made clear. The only implication to be drawn was 
that API, or an agent of it (CBTI), would somehow distribute the money among garment 
exporters.
On the surface, at least, the idea of some form of indirect subsidy seemed 
attractive to the garment manufacturers in PIBTI. After all, it was not them, but the 
spinners who would bear the cost of the scheme. There was little scope for protest by the 
spinners as the former spinning association, ASPI (which had been headed by Musa), 
had officially fused itself into the new API structure in 1985. The API executive seems to 
have calculated that Musa, now the head of the spinning section in API, could be relied 
upon to control any debate and unrest among spinners and contain it within API's walls. 
One of the aspects of this plan, then, was to placate the hostility of PIBTI (hitherto the 
principal opponent of the API executive), but at the expense of the spinners.
26 Interview with A lif Martadi (Secretary General of PIBTI and former F-API official), 22 May 1987.
27 As we have seen, however, in some cases large spinning factories were "integrated", meaning that not 
only did they spin yam, but they also wove cloth, and in some instances also had garment manufacturing 
related activities. Prominent API leaders were in this category.
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API then approached Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh with the idea in 
December 1985, offering it as an attractive solution to the government’s GATT 
headaches. The scheme had appeal for the Trade Department, for not only did it 
apparently provide a way out of the GATT problem28 while helping to underwrite a very 
valuable export industry, but also it did not require any outlay of government revenue. 
(This was of added significance in view of the general climate of fiscal austerity enforced 
by the country's deteriorating terms of trade.) In short, API was apparently offering to 
take the problem off the government's hands. To put a further shine on the plan, API 
was able to imply that the idea had been endorsed by Industry Minister Hartarto, and 
moreover claim that, as the national textile organisation, it (API) represented the overall 
will and interests of the industry. As we shall see, however, not only was Hartarto 
unenthusiastic about API's particular notion of cross-subsidy, but much of the spinning 
industry was vehemently opposed to it.
Rachmat Saleh and the Department of Trade evidently supported the plan.29 
Following the formation of the API-controlled company, CBTI, in January 1986, 
Rachmat Saleh issued a decree in February granting CBTI the sole rights and 
responsibilities for the procurement of all local and imported cotton. A few weeks later 
this was followed by two corresponding decrees giving CBTI sole authority over the 
procurement of the main synthetic fibres used by the spinning industry - polyester staple 
fibre and rayon staple fibre.30 The granting of such import monopolies was quite 
consistent with the Department of Trade's tata niaga policy: many other similar 
monopolies had already been created in different parts of the manufacturing sector. That 
it was consistent with other similar decisions did not, however, make it uncontroversial. 
Plainly, all such restrictive measures ran counter to the deregulatory spirit of the reform 
drive being mounted by other economic ministers in the government. The justification
28 As will be discussed later (see fn. 80 below), it is not at all clear that the API scheme would have 
satisfied the requirements of GATT.
29 With hindsight, many spinners interviewed were of the opinion that at least some senior officials 
within the Trade Department had been involved in the development of this scheme from the outset, and 
that it was nothing more than a device to generate revenue for these officials and the API leadership.
30 Decrees of the Minister o f Trade, no. 70/KP/II/86 18 February 1986 (cotton fibre), no. 82/KP/III/86 
6 March 1986 (polyester staple fibre) and no. 83/KP/III/86 6 March 1986 (rayon staple fibre). The fact 
that the company was suddenly formed just prior to Rachmat Saleh granting it the monopoly, indicates 
that CBTI's founders knew in advance that they were to receive this special status.
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offered in this instance was that CBTI's monopolies were intended to help to promote 
garment and fabric exports.
CBTI was the product of API’s involvement in two separate policy problems: 
the surplus of locally-grown cotton and the question about export subsidies for textile 
products. It was depicted as the means by which API would tackle these issues. On the 
one hand CBTI would directly oversee the utilisation of all local cotton as well as acting 
as a national trading company, buying cotton in bulk on the world market. In this respect 
it would, ostensibly, help both local cotton growers (by guaranteeing the absorption of 
their entire crop) and the spinning industry (by obtaining cheaper cotton prices by 
international bulk-buying). In addition to all of this, CBTI would also assist fabric and 
garment exporters through the provision of a cross-subsidy to be based on a levy applied 
to all fibre purchases by spinning mills. At first glance, then, API’s various plans seemed 
quite respectable: here was a case of a business association, in conjunction with the 
Deparment of Trade, working to serve the national interest by promoting cooperation 
among its members. However, as 1986 progressed it became clear that the spinning 
industry, in particular, took a somewhat less benign view of the situation.
The three ministerial decrees in January and February 1986 (granting the 
monopoly rights) along with the two issued in December 1985 (requiring consumption of 
local cotton) gave API and CBTI great power over the spinning industry. Spinners had 
to make all purchases of cotton and synthetic fibre via CBTI and, moreover, were 
required to purchase 10% of their cotton needs from local stock before they were able to 
import cotton - both at prices determined by CBTI. These were the core issues in the 
dispute that subsequently unfolded.
The Conflict Over CBTI
The formation of CBTI on 1 January 1986 was a low-profile event and 
attracted little attention. Of greater significance, however, was the equity structure of the
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new company. The initial equity capital of the company was Rp. 10 billion, spread 
among 100 priority shares and 900 ordinary shares. The company was founded by ten 
prominent individuals in the textile industry, each of whom purchased ten priority shares 
(thus together consuming all 100 of them) and ten ordinary (or lesser) shares. The ten 
founders of the company also made up its board of directors. This was crucial as all ten 
of these individuals either belonged to the API leadership group themselves, or else were 
very closely linked with it. Prominent among them were Handoko Tjokrosaputro (the 
president director), Musa (representing Thee Nian King31) and Fahmy Chatib (the 
pribumi Secretary General of API).
In short, the equity in CBTI was very largely held by the API leadership. 
This fact suddenly came to light several weeks later when Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh 
awarded CBTI sole control over cotton procurement.
The immediate reaction of anonymous textile industry sources quoted in the 
Jakarta press32 was one of incredulity that the government had bestowed this authority on 
a company which was barely a month old. This was immediately followed by questions 
about the appropriateness of a small group of senior API people having such a tight 
control over this new company which had been given far-reaching powers. These 
concerns were voiced by individual spinners as well as PIBTI which, at this stage, was 
the main institutional opponent to API. However, this expression of concern took place 
in a very ad hoc and uncoordinated way, reflecting in part the fact that little was yet 
known about CBTI or its plans.
In response to criticism that CBTI existed only for the benefit of its 
leadership, in a late February press interview, Fahmy Chatib said that all business people 
in the textile industry were welcome to buy (ordinary) shares in CBTI. He went on to 
emphasise that there were no provisions restricting shareholding in CBTI to API 
members.33
31 In addition, two other members o f the board, Willy Brata and Chan Wing Wah, were also from Thee 
Nian King's Damatex group.
32 See for example "Menperdag Tunjuk Pelaksana Tunggal Pengadaan Serat Kapas Untuk Industri", 
Sinar Hcurapan, 27 February 1986.
33 "Salah Bila Menganggap CBTI Untuk Kepentingan Segelintir Pengusaha", Suara Karya, 3 March 
1986.
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Evidence of the disquiet on the matter can be gleaned from the fact that Trade 
Minister Rachmat Saleh apparently felt the need to comment on the subject of perceived 
inequity. He was quoted in the press as saying that CBTI should review its articles of 
association and remove the distinction between priority and ordinary share holdings.34 
This would place the company's leadership (who held all 100 of the priority shares) on a 
more equal footing with regular shareholders and broaden the equity base.
The first open and public attack on CBTI came several days later when, on 4 
March, the head of the Indonesian Importers' Association (GINSI) told a press 
conference that the appointment of CBTI as the sole importer of cotton was a regrettable 
decision. He argued that such decisions inevitably resulted in higher prices and a 
concentration of economic power to the detriment of the rest of the industry, and was, 
moreover, in contravention of the GBHN.35
GINSrs role here is interesting since its direct involvement in the matter was 
limited. GINSI is an organisation representing the interests of importers in general, and 
as such, the affairs of the spinning industry concerned only a small percentage of its total 
membership.36 Rather than being motivated by the particular interests of spinners, 
GINSI was concerned by the broader problem of the growing network of restrictive 
import regulations. Tata niaga had become the code-word for import monopolies, one of 
the most widespread grievances of the business community in Jakarta. As emphasised at 
the end of Chapter 3, the tata niaga issue was probably the single most controversial 
aspect of government policy vis-a-vis the business world. The reform-minded 
technocrats in the government who were anxious to restructure the Indonesian economy, 
were keen to remove the upstream impediments that the tata niaga system imposed on a 
wide range of industries, especially those which had implications for exports. In this 
policy environment CBTTs monopolies were bound to attract great attention.
34 This is reported in "PT CBTI Mengubah Anggaran Dasar", Kompas, 24 March 1986.
35 See "GINSI Menyesalkan Penunjukan Importir Tunggal Serat Kapas", Sinar Harapan, 5 March 1986.
36 GINSI is one business organisation that stretches back to the 1950s. (It is a descendent o f KINSI.) Of 
the numerous business associations in contemporary Indonesia, GINSI can be considered as one o f  the 
more dynamic and effective. It has a staff o f thirty (nine import company heads, and twenty one support 
staff). It was very active, and ultimately successful, for example, in having a bonded warehouse created in 
Jakarta. It has also been a long standing proponent of reform of port procedures in Jakarta. An indication 
of its seriousness o f purpose is to be found in the fact that its activities have not always endeared it to the 
government
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An illustration of this came the day after the GINSI comments, on 5 March, 
when Rachmat Saleh's decree granting CBTI the cotton procurement monopoly was 
reported to an economic and finance session of the Cabinet attended by the President At 
a press conference afterwards Information Minister, Harmoko, apparently saw a need to 
defend the government's decision on CBTI.37
That the issue reached cabinet level was itself telling. Only a very small 
percentage of Ministerial decrees are reported to the Cabinet, and ministers are 
empowered to issue these independently. Normally, only decrees of great weight or wide 
implication are taken to the Cabinet. Interestingly, however, in this case the matter was 
endorsed by the Cabinet several weeks after the decree had been issued. GINSI officials 
later speculated that this was because the matter was proving more controversial than 
expected and Rachmat Saleh felt the need to have the policy endorsed by the Cabinet, 
thereby strengthening its authority. Rather than being merely the decision of a single 
minister, responsibility for it was broadened to include the whole government38 Another 
factor involved in the decision by Rachmat Saleh to seek Cabinet endorsement probably 
lay in his desire for political backing, as the following day he was to issue the two further 
decrees (mentioned earlier) extending CBTI's sole procurement rights to rayon and 
polyester staple fibre.
One of the factors about this case which perplexed many observers was that 
Rachmat Saleh, as a minister in charge of an economic portfolio, was widely held to be 
one of the technocrats. It thus seemed odd that he should be promoting a policy that was 
at odds with the whole deregulatory orientation of his colleagues. Furthermore, he had 
been active in the mid-1970s in challenging the massive misuse of funds in the state oil 
company, Pertamina. No clear explanation of his behaviour has been put forward.39
37 See "Maret, Rapat Koordinasi Pengawasan Pembangunan", Kompas, 6 March 1986.
38 Interview with Zahri Achmad (head of GINSI), 29 April 1987.
39 The most unremitting critics of CBTI and API took the view that Rachmat Saleh himself had a 
material interest in the CBTI venture. Others found this implausible, and suggested instead that it was 
senior trade officials, and in particular, the Director General for Internal Trade, that stood behind it. As 
such, it was argued that Saleh simply turned a blind eye to the affair. Another account places a slightly 
less suspicious interpretation on his role, arguing that he was under intense pressure to award the import 
monopolies to interests associated with President Suharto's family, but that instead o f acceding to this, he 
sought to ensure that at least the rents derived remained within the textile industry that is, CBTI and API. 
As will be noted below (see fn. 48) there is evidence to suggest that rumours of involvement by President 
Suharto's family were not only false, but deliberate red herrings.
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In addition to the Information Minister defending CBTI, API itself was also 
actively involved. In a press conference, Frans Seda rejected GINSrs criticism of CBTI, 
claiming instead that it was set up collectively by people in the industry and would only 
serve to promote efficiency and lower costs.40
In mid-March an important development in the story took place when Husein 
Aminuddin became involved. Aminuddin, the head of one the large spinning mills 
(Textra Amspin Pty Ltd), had been active in textile industry affairs in the 1960s.41 The 
immediate significance of Aminuddin's involvement in the imbroglio was that he was a 
pribwni producer of sufficient standing to command some attention. His first step was 
to send a letter to Industry Minister Hartarto on 15 March. Officially registered copies 
were also sent to the Coordinating Minister for Economics, Finance and Industry, the 
Finance Minister, the Trade Minister, the Cooperatives Minister, the Research and 
Technology Minister, the Governor of Bank Indonesia and the Minister for State 
Apparatus. This was a procedure he was to use continually throughout the months that 
followed to great effect.
This was, to say the least, a bold move by an individual business person who 
did not hold any formal office. The letter was a lengthy and detailed argument 
questioning the awarding of sole procurement rights to CBTI and the procedure for the 
absorption of local cotton. It claimed that CBTI's status as sole importer of cotton would 
only harm Indonesia's trading position by further contributing to the "high-cost- 
economy", at the same time forcing up the price of textile products locally. The letter
40 See "Monopoly of Cotton Imports Defended", Jakarta Post, 11 March 1986.
41 In 1963-64, at the request of Chairul Saleh (then Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs) 
Aminuddin became the industry representative on the Textile Team in the Komando Tertinggi Operasi 
Ekonomi (KOTOE) appointed by President Sukarno. The Textile Team was responsible for the removal 
of market distortions via yam allocations, and promoting the development of the textile industry. 
Following this experience, in 1967 he headed the National Textile Development Movement (Gerakan 
Pembangunan Sandang Nasional), an organisation of private mill owners aimed at reinvigorating the 
textile industry. Though it was not long lived, this was the first textile association of the New Order 
period. He also led the first Indonesian business promotion mission of the New Order to the United 
States in 1969 and was the head of Forum Swasta (the Private Entrepeneurs Forum) As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, this was the first business association of the New Order period. (Forum Swasta declined after 
it came into conflict with Soedjono Hoemardhani, a key military adviser to the President, and Bob 
Hassan, a close business associate.) Since the early 1970s he had refused to involve himself again in 
textile industry affairs, concentrating his attention instead on his own factory and its development 
Partly as a result, he enjoyed a reputation for producing the finest quality yam and having a 
technologically very advanced mill. In general, Aminuddin appears to have had a reputation as a lone 
operator (he did not join any of the textile associations to be formed in the 1970s or 1980s) but as an 
individual to be reckoned with.
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also drew attention to the fact that CBTTs legal foundations were invalid because the 
company had not been registered with the Justice Department prior to the sale of its 
shares. Finally, the letter called for the replacement of the new 1:10 requirement for local 
cotton consumption with a "proportional" system allocating local cotton to all spinners on 
the basis of their production capacity. This was of special importance. Since only 5% of 
industry cotton needs could be satisfied by local growers, there were obvious 
contradictions in only permitting spinners to import on 1:10 basis (instead of, say, 1:20). 
It meant either that the level of spinning output must inevitably fall, or, more likely, that 
the regulation would not be applied uniformly. In other words, CBTI would force some 
mills to buy on a 1:10 basis, while exempting others. If the obligation to consume local 
cotton was dispersed proportionately (using the objective measure of the number of 
spindles per mill) the scope for manipulation by CBTI would be reduced.
These arguments came to form the basis of Aminuddin's campaign to 
persuade the government to reconsider its policy on CBTI. This letter, like subsequent 
ones, was buttressed with an array of appendices including supporting press articles, 
copies of relevant government decrees, copies of letters from API or CBTI to spinners, 
copies of the legal acts for CBTTs formation as a company, as well as detailed outlines of 
how a proportional scheme for the absorption of cotton might work.
Four days after this first letter to Hartarto, Aminuddin sent a second, with 
registered copies again going to a range of other senior economic ministers. After 
emphasising the issues raised in the previous letter, he went on to decry CBTTs 
introduction of a levy of .125% of the value of cotton to be imported by spinners. 
Imports could not proceed without endorsement by API of the importer's Letter of Credit, 
and this could not be obtained without payment of the CBTI levy. The letter also argued 
that a conflict of interest existed for the leadership of API as it also, in effect, constituted 
the executive of CBTI.
These letters were studded with statements seeking to cloak Aminuddin's 
position with the legitimacy of official government rhetoric. He emphasised, for 
instance, his commitment to the success of the local small-scale cotton growing industry 
and constantly invoked the government's own rhetoric on the need to promote export
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industries and tackle the problems of a high cost economy. In short, he presented his 
case in a fashion eminently acceptable to government leaders.
In response to the various forms of criticism that had been levelled against it 
in the preceding weeks, CBTI reformed its articles of association on 22 March, in a bid to 
stop the allegations about the differences between priority and ordinary shares. 
Announcing this change, CBTI president, Handoko, told the press that this move would 
allow wider ownership of the company, and that regardless of ownership, it would strive 
to serve the entire textile industry equally. He went on to reject the use of the word 
"monopoly” to describe CBTTs operations, arguing that everyone would benefit from the 
cost savings that could be achieved by CBTTs bulk buying of cotton on behalf of the 
spinning industry.42 Plainly, the use of the term "monopoly", alluding as it did to the 
broader tata niaga debate, had had more to do with corruption than concentration of 
ownership.
During April and into early May, the CBTI met with the spinners on various 
occasions and outlined their plans for the introduction of the cross-subsidy to replace the 
SE system of subsidies to the fabric and garment industries. Again, however, all the 
emphasis was on how the funds would be collected, rather than distributed. The CBTI 
executive had originally planned to impose a Rp. 900 per kilogram levy on cotton fibre 
and only Rp. 100 per kilogram levy on synthetic fibres. This was plainly an attempt to 
control the spinning industry by divide-and-rule tactics.43 After further negotiations, 
however, the CBTI executive appears to have concluded that the Rp. 900 figure was 
untenable, and instead decided on a figure of Rp. 450 for all raw materials, whether 
cotton or polyester. A decision was taken on 28 April to impose a flat fee of Rp. 450 per
42 "f t  CBTI Mengubah Anggaran Dasar", Kompas, 24 March 1986, and "Tidak Ada Saham Prioritas 
PT Cerat Bina Tekstil Indonesia", Business News, 24 March 1986. However, a newspaper article 
published later in the year suggested that in fact the reform of CBTI's articles o f association and equity 
structure were only cosmetic, as the CBTI leadership continued to hold an equally large percentage of the 
share issue. See, "CBTI, Wisma Dagang Yang Keabsahannya Diragukan", Prioritas, 4 November 1986.
43 Tactically this was a shrewd move by the CBTI executive. While a levy of Rp. 900 per kilogram 
would be a very large financial drain for most spinning companies (many of which consumed around 
600,000 kilograms a month) a Rp. 100 kilogram levy would be quite manageable. This dual rate would 
serve to separate the interests of spinners who primarily used cotton fibre from those who primarily used 
synthetic fibre. Predictably, the cotton spinners were horrified by the proposal, whereas as the polyester 
spinners (most o f whom were the Indian based joint ventures) were quite willing to accept the proposed 
arrangement. [Interview with the head of an Indian joint venture spinning company who requested 
anonymity, 14 May 1987.]
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kilogram on both cotton and synthetic fibre purchases.44 This would have represented a 
huge financial drain for spinners. For instance, a company using 600,000 kilograms of 
cotton per month, would be liable to pay Rp. 270 million (US$ 238,000) per month in 
levies. The decision was followed the next day with a telex to all spinners explaining that 
CBTI would not process the Letters of Credit for imports of any company that did not 
forward a signed statement acceding to all and any decisions taken by CBTI in connection 
with the promotion of fabric and garment exports.45 In other words, should any mill 
owner resist, CBTI was threatening to withhold the necessary authority to import raw 
materials.
In doing this the CBTI leadership was taking a risk. It was still seeking to 
impose a very heavy levy, but instead of isolating cotton-using spinners from polyester- 
using spinners by a price differential and placing a very much greater burden on the 
former, it bound them all together by imposing a standard fee on all raw material 
purchases. This, as we have seen, was buttressed by the threat of withholding the 
authority to import should any spinning company seek to resist.
The spinners now found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. They 
were facing a situation in which CBTI, a company owned by their business rivals, was 
seeking to impose a levy which would cut severely into their profitability (and in some 
cases, allegedly, jeopardise actual business viability); yet the prospect of opposing CBTI, 
and thus API, seemed unthinkable. Many spinners emphasised that CBTI's position at 
this stage seemed, quite simply, unassailable. There were a number of facets to this.
1. CBTI was able to point to the various ministerial and Cabinet decisions which 
explicitly provided them with wide-ranging powers. Equally CBTI could insist that it 
was government policy both to guarantee the absorption of local cotton, and to replace 
the SE subsidy system, with an industry-run cross subsidy.
2. There was the knowledge that CBTI and API enjoyed very close links with key 
officials in the Department of Trade.
44 Decree of the Board of CBTI no. 02/SK/CBTI/4/86,28 April 1986.
45 Telex no. T-49/CBTI/4/86., 29 April 1986.
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3. The President of CBTI, Handoko, was widely perceived to have (and frequently 
boasted of) close business connections with President Suharto's family 46
4. Private spinning mills that were not a part of the CBTI group were almost exclusively 
owned by local Chinese, or were joint ventures involving Indian or Hong Kong 
companies, none of which were in a politically strong position. This was especially 
so in comparison with the high profile pribumi figures in the API/CBTI leadership. 
Local Chinese spinners, in particular, emphasised that it would be unthinkable for 
them to stand up against Frans Seda or Musa.
5. The CBTI leaders frequently made it plain that the spinners should be grateful that it 
was CBTI which had been granted the monopoly control of raw materials, suggesting 
strongly that business interests associated with the President's family (who have had 
reputations for being extraordinarily rapacious)47 had also been keen to obtain the 
monopoly. In short, the spinners would be well-advised to remain silent and accept 
the situation as it could be much worse.48
Almost any one of these factors would have been sufficient to intimidate the 
majority of spinners. Faced with all o f them at once, the spinners simply could not 
conceive o f opposing CBTI. This was later emphasised to me by many different 
spinners.49 Conversely, it was also manifested in the very confident and high-handed 
manner in which the CBTI leadership dealt with them. A number of them recounted 
situations in which Handoko would disdainfully tell meetings with the spinners that if
46 This stemmed from the apparent long-standing association of Mrs Tien Suharto with Batik Keris 
Pty. Ltd., a batik garment factory controlled by Handoko.
47 For a discussion of this, see Jones S. & Pura R., "Suharto-Linked Monopolies Hobble Economy", 
Asian Wall Street Journal, 24-26 November 1986.
48 It was widely speculated that President Suharto's sons had been anxious to secure the monopoly 
rights gained by CBTI, and that the spinning industry was fortunate Rachmat Saleh made the decision he 
did. This seems to have been largely the result of a deliberate disinformation campaign by Handoko to 
intimidate the spinners. One interviewee informed me that he had personally spoken to Sudwikatmono, 
a foster-brother of President Suharto, very prominent in business circles, who had insisted that the 
President's family had been offered the monopoly rights, but declined as the spinning industry was 
perceived to be too politically sensitive. In other words, business interests associated with the President 
had the option of taldng up the textile monopoly but decided, on tactical grounds, that to be seen to be 
deriving enormous economic benefits from the textile industry (as opposed to other industries) would be 
risky as clothing had come to be seen as a basic need.
49 Almost all of the many spinners interviewed, regardless of whether of Chinese, pribumi, Indian, 
Japanese or Hong Kong origin, emphasised that they had been extremely concerned and felt quite helpless 
to do anything to preserve their financial position in the face of the CBTI proposals.
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they did not like what CBTI was doing, then it was their bad luck, as they would have to 
go against Cabinet policy if they wished to do anything about i t
A clear illustration of the confidence with which CBTI viewed its position 
was its persistence with the plan to introduce a Rp. 450 cross-subsidy levy. The CBTI 
executive persevered with this, despite direct opposition from the Minister and 
Department of Industry. In a meeting with CBTI leaders on 28 April, Industry Minister 
Hartarto had explained that the government would shortly unveil a new policy initiative 
(the "May 6 Packet") aimed at tackling the country's trade problems and the high cost 
economy issue. As such, any steps counter to the spirit of this policy direction should be 
avoided. This was followed up on 6 May by a telex from the Director General for 
Multifarious Industries (the most senior official in the Department of Industry responsible 
for the textile industry) to CBTI reminding it of the meeting with Hartarto and warning 
against the introduction of measures conflicting with the government's new trade reform 
package.50 In spite of this, CBTI not only took the decision to introduce the Rp. 450 
levy, but on the very same day as it received the telex from the Director General it 
convened a meeting with the spinners to ratify the decision. This extraordinary show of 
confidence - blatantly disregarding directives from Hartarto and his department - simply 
reflected API/CBTI's confidence that it enjoyed the full backing of the Minister and 
Department of Trade and, by implication, the endorsement of President Suharto.
The Rise of SEKBERTAL
The first signs of possible CBTI miscalculation emerged at the CBTI meeting 
called on 6 May to ratify the new Rp. 450 levy. Part way through the meeting 
Aminuddin, who surprised many people by attending, openly challenged the CBTI 
leadership, and called on all other spinners in attendance who were opposed to the levy to 
join him in signing a petition declaring their refusal to pay it. Of the approximately fifty
50 Telex no. 100/TLX/5/1986, DEPIND JKT, 6 May 1986.
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spinners present, only six were prepared to commit themselves openly by joining 
Aminuddin. The rest remained silent51
While Aminuddin failed in this gambit, a new element had clearly been 
introduced into the equation. CBTI had been openly challenged by someone in the 
spinning industry for the first time.
That same evening, immediately following the CBTI meeting, Aminuddin 
and the six spinners who supported his move, met again and decided to set up a formal 
group to lobby the government in a campaign against CBTI.52 The new organisation was 
to be known as SEKBERTAL, or the Spinning Industry Joint Secretariat, with 
Aminuddin its head.
As a first step, SEKBERTAL wrote on 16 May to the four leading economic 
ministers Ali Wardhana, Radius Prawiro, Rachmat Saleh and Hartarto, reiterating the 
concerns raised by Aminuddin in his earlier letters, and informing them of the 
establishment of SEKBERTAL. The letter argued that SEKBERTAL was not a narrowly 
based set of interests, but represented a majority of large-scale spinners, both local and 
foreign. It set out detailed calculations of the projected costs to the spinning industry of 
CBTTs Rp. 450 levy. (A reasonably sized firm would have to pay around US$238,000 
per month or, US$ 2.9 million per year.)53
It is important to remember that open and formally organised lobbying does 
not fit well with the Suharto government's preferred mode of interest representation, 
namely via the corporatist network of organisations described in Chapter 3. Aminuddin's 
open challenge to CBTI - and by extension the government - was certainly not without 
political risk, as indicated by the unwillingness of other spinners to support him at the 
outset. This was even more the case as, SEKBERTAL, unlike API, was not an 
officially recognised or sanctioned business organisation. Indeed, in many respects
51 Interviews with Hussein Aminuddin ( President Director, Textra Amspin Pty Ltd) 23 April 1987 and 
Dion Wono (Executive Director, Dasatex Pty Ltd) 1 May 1987.
52 Interview with Djono Wono (Executive Director, Dasatex Pty Ltd) 1 May 1987.
53 SEKBERTAL letter, dated 16 May 1986. Public reference to this SEKBERTAL letter can be found 
in the press. See, for example, "CBTI Dituduh Lakukan Pungutan Paksa Atas Setiap Pembelian Bahan 
Baku Pemintalan", Sinar Harapan, 31 May 1986. This article actually cites a subsequent SEKBERTAL 
letter of 23 May (referred to below), though it in fact also contains much o f the material from the 16 
May letter.
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SEKBERTAL had all the hallmarks of a renegade body that would not only be 
unsuccessful, but might well find itself closed down following intercession by security 
officials. It is in this context that the tactics and style adopted by SEKBERTAL became 
important
One of the very first steps taken by Aminuddin after SEKBERTAL was 
formed was to report the fact to the Jakarta Laksusda (.Pelaksana Khusus Daerah) of the 
KOPKAMTIB security apparatus. This was a technically necessary (though frequently 
overlooked) requirement for any newly-formed organisation. SEKBERTAL's aim in 
registering itself with the security forces was to reduce its vulnerability to accusations by 
its opponents that it was politically destabilising or subversive. This step was taken very 
consciously in light of the fact that SEKBERTAL was seeking to overturn government 
policy. Similarly, the name SEKBERTAL itself, was carefully chosen to evoke 
association with the state political party GOLKAR, which had earlier been known as 
SEKBER-GOLKAR.54
Equally, the presentation of SEKBERTAL's case in the numerous letters sent 
to the government was always very respectful, with caution being taken to allege that it 
was CBTI, rather than the policies of Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh or his department, 
which was at fault. For instance, the SEKBERTAL letter of 16 May sent to the four 
economic ministers argued that CBTI was in contravention of Rachmat Saleh’s 
Ministerial Decision no. 70 (which established the cotton monopoly), creating the 
impression that their grievance was not with the actual policy but the way in which it was 
being improperly implemented by CBTI. In fact, of course, they sought the elimination 
of both CBTI and the policy.55 Further, as mentioned earlier, the letters were studded 
with phrases invoking the government’s own rhetoric, promoting the image that their 
views were in concert with government policies, rather than challenging the government 
and important elements of what it stood for. Registered copies were also sent to a wide 
range of senior government ministers. A list of those officially receiving the letter was 
always included at the end of the letter. This served to emphasise the fact that
54 Interview, Hussein Aminuddin (President Director, Textra Amspin Pty Ltd) 30 April 1987.
55 SEKBERTAL letter 16 May 1986, p .l.
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SEKBERTAL was seeking to deal with as many senior people in government as 
possible, and was also suggestive of wide-ranging access to people at top political levels. 
Equally, this put some pressure on the person or persons to whom the letter was 
addressed to take the matter seriously, as many of their colleagues would be in receipt of 
copies.56 (Appendix A contains a sample SEKBERTAL letter.)
In the light of SEKBERTAL's demonstrated willingness to oppose CBTTs 
cross-subsidy measures, the Director General for Multifarious Industries convened a 
meeting between the two sides on 20 May. The following day, the Director General sent 
a telex to CBTI, stressing that CBTI should take immediate steps to revoke its decision of 
28 April regarding the Rp. 450 levy on raw material purchases and avoid introducing 
measures with destabilising consequences for the industry.57
The remarkable feature about the Director General's action is that it illustrates 
the extent to which the Department of Industry was willing to go in support of the 
interests of the spinners gathered in SEKBERTAL in opposition to CBTI and API. 
Several factors help to explain this. First, there was a good deal of rivalry between the 
Industry Department and the more senior Trade Department. The former was thus 
predisposed towards any group which was in conflict with the Trade Department or one 
of its client groups (in this case API and CBTI). Second, Aminuddin enjoyed a good 
personal relationship with both the Director General for Multifarious Industries and his 
assistant, the Director for the Textile Industry, and this naturally facilitated his lines of 
communication. Third, both the Director General and the Director appear to have been
56 In addition to the actual addressees, and those who received officially registered copies, Aminuddin 
sent copies of SEKBERTAL letters to a large number of prominent business, political, media and 
academic figures in Jakarta to boost SEKBERTAL's profile and hopefully attract some support A broad 
range of such people interviewed in Jakarta commented on how professional and impressive this letter 
campaign was. For example, Mohammed Sadli (Chairman o f LP3E, KADIN) 22 April 1987; Sjahfiri 
Alim (President Director of Goodyear Indonesia Pty Ltd and head o f KADITTs Basic Chemicals Industry 
Section) 25 August 1987; Yakob Oetama (Editor in Chief o f  Kompas) 24 April 1987; Indrawan 
(economics editor of Kompas) 8 May 1987); Marah Sakti (Tempo journalist) 29 April 1987; and 
prominent University o f Indonesia economists Dr Doradjatun Kuntjoro-jakti (Director of the LPEM, 
University o f Indonesia) 28 February 1987; and Dr Anwar Nasution (Faculty of Economics, University 
of Indonesia) 25 March 1987.
57 Telex no. 113/TLX/5/1986, DEPIND JKT, dated 21 May 1986. For public reference to this telex 
see, "CBTI Dituduh Lakukan Pungutan Paksa Atas Setiap Pembelian Bahan Baku Pemintalan", Sinar 
Harapan, 31 May 1986; and "Industri Pemintalan Bentuk SEKBERTAL Untuk Hadapi PT CBTI", Suara 
Karya, 19 June 1986.
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objectively opposed to CBTTs operations because it ran counter to efforts to rationalise 
the economy and eliminate rent-taking practices.58
Yet if the Director General's intervention illustrated his support for the 
SEKBERTAL position, it also, ironically, illustrated the strength of CBTI; for CBTI 
merely ignored the directives contained in the telex. In short, the CBTI leadership 
apparently perceived their position and their support from the Trade Department (and by 
implication, the President) to be so secure that they could simply disregard instructions 
from Industry.
Several days after this telex, SEKBERTAL sent a second letter to the 
economic ministers. It followed the same format as the first, though going into greater 
detail about complaints against CBTI and the two types of levy it was now seeking to 
impose on the spinning industry (the .125% levy on the value of imports, and the flat Rp. 
450 per kilogram levy on cotton, polyester and rayon purchases). The letter also 
contained a copy of the Director General's telex, inviting the interpretation that CBTI was 
ignoring government instructions. It specifically noted that CBTI claimed that all its 
actions were taken with the knowledge and blessing of the Trade Minister and that as 
such they (the spinners of SEKBERTAL) had no option but to form themselves into a 
"forum lobby". This terminology left no doubt as to how they saw themselves and what 
they intended to do. The reference to the Trade Minister was deft in the ambiguity of its 
implications - either Rachmat Saleh was inappropriately linked to a dubious business 
venture, or a dubious business venture was unrightfully invoking his name to legitimise 
its actions. A final noteworthy feature of the letter, was the short but politically-charged 
reference to the likelihood of CBTI's policies resulting in higher clothing prices for the 
Indonesian people in the lead-up period to the 1987 general election.59
In response to this wholly unexpected frontal challenge, CBTI began to 
pressure the still small group of spinners associated with Aminuddin in SEKBERTAL,
58 Note, however, that Industry Minister Hartarto was not much involved at this stage. Further more 
(though this image is changing), Hartarto had been regarded as generally sympathetic to economic 
nationalist policies rather than liberalising and export-oriented approaches.
59 SEKBERTAL letter no. 003/SEKBER/5/1986, 23 May 1986, p. 3. For public reference to this 
see, "CBTI Dituduh Lakukan Pungutan Paksa Atas Setiap Pembelian Bah an Baku Pemintalan", Sinar 
Harapan, 31 May 1986.
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while also seeking to limit any criticism of CBTI and API. This was attempted by, for 
example, holding up the applications for the opening of Letters of Credit for imports of 
Dasatex Pty Ltd, one of the local companies involved in the foundation of 
SEKBERTAL. SEKBERTAL responded immediately with another detailed letter to the 
economic ministers outlining the problems being experienced by Dasatex Pty Ltd.60 The 
delays soon ceased. Measures such as this were meant to dissuade spinners from 
associating with SEKBERTAL.61
At the same time CBTI and API adopted several strategies to pre-empt any 
other possible outbreaks of dissent within the textile industry. Producers in the garment 
industry were wooed with the prospect of a subsidy for their exports from the revenue 
gathered by the Rp. 450 levy on spinners. The garment manufacturers were not averse to 
any windfall benefit such as this, even if it was at the spinners' expense. The API 
leadership surmised that by this means they could prevent the possibility of any 
cooperation between SEKBERTAL and already disenchanted producers in the garment 
industry under PIBTI's umbrella. This approach was coupled with a campaign to 
encourage those presently outside API to join that organisation.62
Another measure adopted by the API/CBTI leadership was to encourage 
others to buy shares in CBTI. This would help to bind more people to the CBTI venture. 
While they would certainly not be given a controlling influence in the company, it would 
constrain them from opposing it. A broader equity base would also help overcome the 
image of CBTI as a company of and for the interests of a nanrow group centring around 
the leadership of API. It also served to raise capital for CBTI. Garment and fabric 
makers who hoped to benefit from the cross-subsidy were encouraged to buy CBTI
60 SEKBERTAL letter no. 004/SEKBER/5/1986, 27 May 1986.
61 Another tactic employed was to try to entice some SEKBERTAL members away by playing upon the 
mercurical and sometimes abrasive personality of Aminuddin to divide the SEKBERTAL camp.
62 The Bandung Garment Club, a loose and informal group of mostly garment manufacturers located in 
Bandung, was an early target for this strategy. (The Bandung Garment Club had no relationship 
whatsoever with the earlier mentioned Textile Club - Musa's old power base and a constituent part of 
API.) Members of the Bandung Garment Club were offered leadership positions in the regional branches 
of API together with various suggested financial incentives if they joined. In this case, the strategy was 
largely successful in absorbing a previously active organisation which was independent of API control. 
[Interview with Tigor Nasoetion (President Director, Imogari Pty Ltd) 18 April 1987.] Nasoetion was 
himself a member o f the Bandung Garment Club who was initially attracted by the API overtures, but 
subsequently broke away and joined SEKBERTAL.
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shares. At the same time, many spinners who were otherwise reluctant to invest in the 
company were strongly encouraged to purchase CBTI shares. A considerable number 
did so, as they apparently felt there was nothing to be gained from opposing CBTI. This 
was especially so in the case of the Japanese joint ventures in the spinning industry.63
CBTI took matters one step further on 3 June by arranging a press conference 
to publicise their position. It was reported in the press that Musa and Handoko 
emphasised that the Rp. 450 surcharge on raw materials (which, they said, had still not 
been finalised) was needed to replace the SE subsidy if Indonesia's garment and fabric 
exporters were to compete internationally. Further, they claimed that spinning companies 
should not complain about this, as it was intended to help the entire textile industry, as 
well as farmers growing cotton.64 That CBTI took these steps suggests that they judged 
their position to be appreciably less secure than they had earlier believed it to be, and they 
apparently felt the need to explain and justify their position.
SEKBERTAL escalated its confrontation with CBTI at a Shareholders' 
General Meeting of the latter on 3 June. Aminuddin, who did not himself hold shares in 
CBTI, attended as the proxy representative of a supporter who did. Part way through the 
meeting Aminuddin challenged the legality of the meeting, as CBTI had sold shares, but 
was not legally registered with the Justice Department. Following legal advice, an 
apparently embarrassed CBTI executive had to declare the meeting closed.65
This event was significant for a number of reasons. First, it marked a more 
confident and aggressive approach by SEKBERTAL. Second, it constituted a public 
victory for SEKBERTAL and a conspicuous humiliation of CBTI, as it had been shown 
to be operating in technical breach of the law. And third, this small tactical victory by 
SERKBERTAL served to accelerate the movement of other spinners away from resigned
63 Interviews with Hirokai Okubo (President Director, Centex Pty Ltd) 22 May 1987, and Hideo Takei 
(President Director, Indachi Pty Ltd) 20 June 1987.
64 See, for example, "Pungutan PT CBTI Dimaksudkan Membantu Eksportir Tekstil", Sinar Harapan, 4 
June 1986, and "PT CBTI Tidak Lakukan Pungutan Paksa, Rinciannya Saja Belum Disepakati", 
Business News, 4-6 June 1986.
65 Interview with Husein Aminuddin, 5 May 1987.
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acceptance of CBTI and API, and into the SEKBERTAL camp. Aminuddin capitalised 
on the event by using it as the pretext for another letter to the government.66
SEKBERTAL now became increasingly bold, taking the issue openly to the 
media. On 18 June it held a press conference, distributing the first of what was to 
become a lengthy line of formal press releases to journalists. The 18 June press release 
summarised SEKBERTAL's general position, and included the most recent developments 
that had been raised in its last letter (14 June) to the government. This was followed by 
widespread and favourable press coverage of the SEKBERTAL case.67
SEKBERTAL's aggressive approach, characterised by its preparedness to 
make vigorous use of the press, was not something undertaken lightly. High-profile 
public attacks on government policy, or in this case, attacks on a body created by an act 
of government, are certainly not everyday occurrences in Indonesia, especially on an 
issue of such political sensitivity as reform of the tata niaga import monopoly system. 
Direct use of the media constituted a new tactic for SEKBERTAL, as it had previously 
concentrated on more private attempts to influence the government, through its letter 
writing campaign. SEKBERTAL was encouraged in its decision to diversify its tactics 
and make systematic use of the press by confidential advice to Aminuddin from senior 
political figures. Apparently, Sumarlin, the influential head of the Economic Planning 
Board (BAPPENAS), indicated that it would be easier for those who were inside the 
government and sympathetic to SEKBERTAL's position (in so far as it sought economic 
deregulation) to lend their support if the CBTI controversy received wide publicity. In 
short, Sumarlin's advice was to push the issue in the media so as to place it prominently 
on the political agenda, thus requiring the government to take notice. If the matter came 
to the President's attention, there would be pressure at the ministerial level to explain the 
cause of the the discord. At the same time, it also provided a pretext for other 
sympathetically disposed ministers such as Sumarlin to raise the issue at meetings of the
66 SEKBERTAL letter no. 008/SEKBER/6/1986, 14 June 1986, pp. 4-5. W hile no direct public 
reference for this letter is available, much o f it was repeated by Aminuddin at a press conference several 
days later. See fn. 67 below for press references to this.
67 See, for example, "Cara Kerja PT CBTI Mirip Syahbandar Zaman VOC", Sinar Harapan, 20 June 
1986; Tndustri Pemintalan Bentuk Sekbertal Untuk Hadapi PT CBTI”, Suara Karya, 19 June 1986; and 
"Iklim Usaha Industri Tekstil", Business News, 23 June 1986.
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economic ministers. If there was no critical press attention being directed to the matter, it 
would be more difficult for sympathetic ministers to attempt to intervene in Trade Minister 
Rachmat Saleh’s area of responsibility. The press thus assumed great importance as a 
means by which SEKBERTAL could hope to publicise its grievances and lodge them on 
the political agenda.
SEKBERTAL's press releases themselves deserve mention, if only because 
of their very professional nature. They were carefully set out to be immediately usable by 
journalists. This was reflected in the fact that newspaper articles dealing with the 
spinning industry conflict frequently just reproduced large slabs of the material in the 
SEKBERTAL press releases. Similarly, evocative and sensational labels were concocted 
by the SEKBERTAL leadership to attract the attention of journalists and editors.68 By 
treating journalists well, SEKBERTAL encouraged a favourable press attitude towards 
their cause.69 This was a very deliberate tactic designed to help overcome the political 
odds they faced.70
The battle lines in the conflict between SEKBERTAL and CBTI had become 
clearer by m id-1986. Press reports at this stage suggested that 60% of spinning 
companies supported SEKBERTAL against CBTI.71 A confidential memo prepared by 
the Department of Industry estimated the division of support within the industry to be as 
follows.72
68 For instance, Aminuddin at one stage likened CBTTs methods of operation to those of the Dutch East 
India company of colonial times, a simile which received widespread currency in the press. See "Cara 
Keija PT CBTI Mirip Syahbandar Zaman VOC", Sinar Harapan, 20 June 1986.
69 Many journalists and senior figures in press circles commented to me on on the impressive and 
professional presentation of the SEKBERTAL case. Frequently commended was the way in which 
SEKBERTAL provided a great array of data to buttress its arguments. These ranged not just from costing 
estimates of the implications of CBTI policies, but also the provision of specific dates of meetings, 
copies of signed memos or decisions by, for example, the CBTI executive or the Director General of 
Multifarious Industries. This information made it easier for the more professional journalists to check 
information, as well as providing them with hard data to enhance their stories. [Interviews with Endang 
Achmadi (Deputy Chief Editor of Berita Yudhd) 8 April 1987; Yakob Oetama (Chief Editor of Kompas) 
24 April 1987; Sanyoto (Chief Editor of Business News) 2 February 1987; Suwachman (an editor of 
Prioritas) 8 April 1987; Indrawan (economics editor of Kompas) 8 May 1987, Marah Sakti {Tempo 
journalist) 29 April 1987, and Bluher Gultom {Sinar Pagi journalist) 14 March 1987.]
70 Interview with Husein Aminuddin, 30 April 1987.
71 For instance, "Iklim Usaha Industri Tekstil", Business News, 23 June 1986.
72 Unpublished Directorate General of Multifarous Industries memo, of 30 June 1986, on the conflict 
within the spinning industry.
I l l
Pro CBTI ± 650,000 spindles
Contra CBTI ± 1,240,000 spindles
Neutral ± 610,000 spindles
Estimation of actual loyalty was quite difficult because some companies 
retained their shares in CBTI or else continued to be members of API and yet were 
politically active in supporting SEKBERTAL.73 This was so particularly during these 
early stages of the conflict when many of the smaller companies, while supporting 
SEKBERTAL, were afraid to formally sever links with API and CBTI in case 
SEKBERTAL was unsuccessful, or worse, crushed.
The position of those companies considered neutral in the dispute was a little 
more complex in that they fell into two groups. The first included those mills which were 
state-owned, or semi state-owned. As public enterprises they could not formally 
comment on the conflict between the two industry groups because of the wider political 
implications of being seen to be opposed to official government policy. Nevertheless it is 
quite clear that their actual sympathies were with those opposed to CBTI, if only because 
they were controlled by the Department of Industry, which was itself sympathetic to 
SEKBERTAL.
The second group of nominally neutral companies consisted of the Japanese 
spinning mills.74 This group was less homogeneous in its attitudes towards the conflict. 
A number of the big Japanese mills were actually in joint venture with Indonesian 
companies directly linked to API and CBTI (primarily via Thee Nian King's extensive 
group of companies) and were very unlikely to oppose CBTI policy openly. More 
generally, Japanese firms were reluctant to engage in open and direct politicking, 
regarding it as politically dangerous and possibly injurious to company prosperity.75 
Typically, Japanese spinning companies, when confronted with a political problem, 
would consider the matter privately among themselves (in an organisation known as
73 Interview with A R .S . Djoemena (Director of Textiles, Department o f Industry) 4 May 1987.
74 This information derives from interviews with Hiroshi Oshima (Director o f the Japan External Trade 
Organisation - JETRO) 21 May 1987, Hirokai Okubo (President Director, Centex Pty Ltd) 22 May 
1987 and Hideo Takei (President Director, Indachi Pty Ltd) 20 June 1987.
75 This point was emphasised by Hiroshi Oshima (Director of the Japan External Trade Organistion - 
JETRO), interview 21 May 1987.
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Akhir Kai) and then approach either the Embassy or the Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO) to convey their grievances to the government.76 On the CBTI 
issue, however, they were internally divided. Some firms, especially those that were 
linked financially to Thee Nian King and were integrated in terms of productive 
capability, supported CBTI. Others that were either seriously hurt by CBTI policies or 
that did not stand to derive any of the CBTI spoils, remained quite opposed to its 
existence and operations.
As a result of this internal division within the Akhir Kai ranks, the Japanese 
Embassy declined to take up the matter with the Indonesian government. In 
consequence, those Japanese companies opposed to CBTI did not participate in the 
political conflict in any systematic or very effective way. This is not to say that the 
Japanese remained completely on the sidelines. Some of those companies most 
concerned about CBTI had approached the Director General for Multifarious Industries 
early on in the conflict to seek his assistance. At that stage (prior to the formation of 
SEKBERTAL), the Department of Industry was apparently quite hesitant about lending 
its support to any moves to oppose CBTI, API and the Department of Trade, believing 
them to be too powerful.77 The Japanese did later express some concerns about the 
situation during meetings arranged with the head of the Foreign Investment Board 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita (29 July 1986) and Industry Minister Hartarto (29 August 1986). 
However, these meetings were designed to cover the whole range of Japanese 
investments in Indonesia, of which the spinning industry was just one small part78
Thus the Japanese companies opposed to CBTI did not participate very 
effectively in the political conflict over this issue. Indeed, even those companies that 
were very strongly opposed to CBTI were unwilling to openly link themselves with
76 Akhir Kai (which literally means "last Thursday", derived from its members' regular golf match on 
the last Thursday o f each month) could only approach the Japanese Embassy to lobby on their behalf if its 
members were all in agreement. It was understood that the Ambassador would not involve himself if they 
were internally divided.
77 Interview with Hideo Takei (President Director, Indachi Pty Ltd) 20 June 1987.
78 These meetings were arranged by JETRO; the Japan-Indonesia Entrepeneurs Association (Himpunan 
Usahawan Indonesia-Jepang, an organisation for joint ventures only); and the Jakarta-Japan Club (an 
organisation for both joint ventures and wholly-owned Japanese companies). These forums were the 
primary conduits for the expression o f broad Japanese business interests. The less formal Akhir Kai, by 
contrast, was specifically for the textile industry. Interviews with Hiroshi Oshima (Director, JETRO) 21 
May 1987; and Hirokai Okubo (President Director, Centex Pty Ltd) 22 May 1987.
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SEKBERTAL, being wary of Aminuddin's confrontational style or of being seen to be 
engaging in local politics. Usually the most that was done was to communicate privately 
with the SEKBERTAL leadership and convey sentiments of support
TABLE 4.3
Support Measured by Ownership 
(numbers of individual firms)
OWNERSHIP CBTI SEKBERTAL NEUTRAL
STATE . 18
PRIVATE 14 23 .
JAPANESE - - 13
HONGKONG - 6 -
INDIAN - 8 .
TOTAL 14 37 31
Source; API, SEKBERTAL and the Department o f Industry.
FIGURE 4.2
Relative Division of Support 
(percentage of individual firms)
1  As a Percentage of Total ü  As a Percentage of Non-
Firms Neutral firms
Source; API, SEKBERTAL and the Department of Industry.
Table 4.3 (above) divides support within the spinning industry on the basis of 
ownership. In order to highlight the support for SEKBERTAL and CBTI, Figure 4.2 
(above) presents their respective totals as both a percentage of the non-neutral companies, 
as well as the overall total number of companies. By calculating the support for CBTI
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and SEKBERTAL as a percentage of non-neutral companies, a clearer estimate of the 
strength of one relative to the other can be obtained79
The Tide Begins to Turn
The first sign that SEKBERTAL's campaign was having an effect came with 
the convening of a two day meeting between the two sides on 23-24 June. The meeting 
was called by Bustanil Arifin, an influential minister close to the President, who was 
acting as Trade Minister while Rachmat Saleh was overseas. The negotiations were 
intended to reach a settlement to the conflict, which had by now received considerable 
media coverage.
Immediately before the meeting, SEKBERTAL had sent Bustanil Arifin a 
lengthy and detailed letter setting out their grievances. It emphasised the economic costs 
CBTI policies were imposing on the industry, and suggested that the cross-subsidy 
proposal might still leave Indonesia in breach of the GATT Code of Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties (assuming any revenues collected were actually distributed).80
The negotiations were apparently conducted in a very vigorous fashion. 
Bustanil Arifin's main concern seems to have been to settle the matter one way or another 
and ensure that it ceased to be a source of controversy. Indeed, he reportedly suggested 
to Aminuddin that instead of continually attacking CBTI, a compromise be found 
whereby he join, or even lead CBTI, thereby himself deriving the material benefits to be 
had from its revenue raising activities.81
79 It will be noted that these figures vary somewhat from those quoted earlier from a Department of 
Industry memo. In those figures the gap between the spindle capacity supporting CBTI and 
SEKBERTAL was substantial greater. This was because the Department of Industry classified fewer 
companies as neutral. Because of the already mentioned problems in being certain of the allegiance of 
these companies, and more importantly what that might mean in terms of political action, the more 
conservative estimate contained in Figure 4.2 is preferred. It should be borne in mind though, that this 
probably underestimates the strength of support for SEKBERTAL within the spinning industry.
80 SEKBERTAL letter no. 009/SEKBER/6/1986, 23 June 1986. The suggestion that the cross-subsidy 
proposal might still leave Indonesia in breach of GATT stemmed from the possibility that the whole 
arrangement might be seen by other countries as a thinly veiled attempt to provide indirect subsidisation 
of exports with which the government was still involved. (In outlining its intention to impose a levy for 
cross-subsidy purposes, CBTI had emphasised that its authority to do so stemmed from Ministerial Decree 
no. 70 of Rachmat Saleh, which was die enabling legislation creating CBTI in the first place.)
81 This unverifiable account comes from Aminuddin himself. Interview 18 April 1987.
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The agreement ultimately hammered out represented an important victory for 
SEKBERTAL, due partly to the chance occurrence that Bustanil Arifin chaired the 
proceedings rather Rachmat Saleh (who was absent on the pilgrimage to Mecca). As 
Minister for Cooperatives and Head of the Logistics Board, he had had little association 
with the industry or API, and had no particular predisposition to support them.
The following day SEKBERTAL sent a further letter to Bustanil Arifin 
outlining what it understood to be the terms of the agreement that had been reached.82 
Significantly, registered copies of the letter were also sent to General Benny Murdani, 
head of the Armed Forces and the security organisation KOPKAMT1B, the Coordinating 
Minister for Defence and Security, General Surono, Manpower Minister Sudomo, 
Research and Technology Minister Habibie, Cabinet Secretary Murdiono and various 
others, as well as the customary list of economic ministers. The preamble to the letter 
stated that the spinners gathered in SEKBERTAL trusted that this agreement would 
overcome the chaos that had prevailed in the industry as a result of CBTrs activities and 
which had led to an inflation of textile and clothing prices during the Lebaran festive 
period and in the lead up to the 1987 general election. This apparently had some effect, 
as General Murdani is said to have sent a personal aide to meet SEKBERTAL leaders and 
discuss their grievances.83
Of the various terms listed in the letter, the most salient were as follows:
1. CBTI could only levy surcharges on the industry with the express approval of the 
government.
2. the Rp. 450 levy on all raw material purchases (reputedly to fund the cross-subsidy) 
was not to go ahead.
3. the .125% fee charged by CBTI on all cotton imports was to be halved to .0625%.
4. the structure of CBTI was to be reformed so that it more accurately reflected the 
interests of the spinning industry.
5. the spinning industry accepted the need to consume all locally grown cotton, but 
welcomed the decision that henceforth individual spinning mills were to be able to
82 SEKBERTAL letter no. 010/SEKBER/6/1986,25 June 1986.
83 Interviews with various figures in Jakarta business circles.
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purchase this cotton independently. In other words, contracts would be negotiated 
between the banks representing individual spinning mills and the state-controlled 
cotton growing plantations. Most importantly, there was no longer any need for the 
spinners to deal via CBTI.
6. each mill would be allocated an amount of local cotton to be purchased on a 
proportional basis (ie. in proportion to its number of spindles). To this end 
SEKBERTAL was to check the validity of an allocation list drawn up by Fahmy 
Chatib, the Vice-President of CBTI, during the meeting.
7. SEKBERTAL, at the direct request of Bustanil Arifin, was to refrain for the time 
being from issuing press releases concerning the meeting and its proceedings. This 
was the only condition constraining SEKBERTAL rather than CBTI.
The Director General for Domestic Trade (who was closely associated with the API 
leadership) announced some (but not all) of the terms of this agreement to the press after 
the conclusion of the meeting. 84
In principle, SEKBERTAL had achieved a major triumph. Not only had a 
meeting chaired by the influential Bustanil Arifin acknowledged and apparently largely 
accepted SEKBERTAL's diagnosis of the situation, but an agreement had been reached 
requiring a range of specific remedial measures. SEKBERTAL had succeeded in having 
the idea of a cross-subsidy via a Rp. 450 levy on all raw material purchases defeated and 
formally revoked. This represented the elimination of a very large financial threat to most 
spinning mills. In addition, other very welcome developments were the reduction of the 
.125% levy and the call for reform of CBTI to overcome claims that it operated as a self- 
serving organisation controlled by a small number of people. Beyond this, the proposal 
for a return to a system of direct transactions between local cotton growers and spinning 
mills, without CBTI operating as a 'middleman', had been keenly sought. As has 
already ben explained, if spinners were going to be required to consume local cotton, 
SEKBERTAL wanted it to be spread fairly and uniformly throughout the industry.
84 For a summary, see "Setiap Pungutan Yang Dilakukan CBTI Harus Sepengetahuan Pemerintah", 
Antara, 24 June 1986.
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Under the CBTI 1:10 formula, the allocation was much more arbitrary. Even more 
important than the equity issue, however, was the fact if all local cotton transactions had 
to take place via a middleman (CBTI) there was a great likelihood that the price paid by 
the spinning mills would be significantly higher than had they bought the cotton directly 
from the growers themselves. The prospect of independent and direct purchasing was 
thus extremely welcome.
SEKBERTAL drew some pride from the fact that one of the conditions of the 
agreement was that it refrain from going to the press in connection with the negotiations. 
It suggested that their lobbying strategies were finding their mark. In short, sections of 
the government were becoming uncomfortable, and concerned about possible Presidential 
reaction to the controversy.
While SEKBERTAL was justifiably pleased with the outcome, it soon 
became apparent that not all the terms of the agreement would be respected. Certainly the 
cross-subsidy idea had gone, but beyond this CBTI seemed not to feel compelled to 
implement the agreement fully. This appeared to stem from the fact that the agreement 
was, after all, an intra-industry agreement, not a government decision. Bustanil Arifin 
had made no decree; he had merely officiated at negotiations. Furthermore, with 
Rachmat Saleh's return from abroad, Bustanil would no longer be supervising the matter. 
All of this, however, took some time to emerge.
After a lull of several weeks as both sides waited to see what would follow 
from the Bustanil Arifin meeting, SEKBERTAL wrote to all spinners informing them that 
the Director General for Multifarious Industries had drawn up an official list for the 
proportional allocation of cotton to all mills.85 SEKBERTAL then tried to arrange a 
meeting with CBTI to follow up on the decisions that had been reached at the Bustanil 
Arifin meeting. When CBTI did not respond, SEKBERTAL sent another letter to its 
growing list of senior ministers, enclosing copies of its telex invitations to CBTI and 
noting the latter's lack of cooperation.86
85 SEKBERTAL letter no. 012/SEKBER/7/1986,11 July 1986.
86 SEKBERTAL letter no. 013/SEKBER/7 1986, 15 July 1986.
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Relations between CBTI and SEKBERTAL continued in a highly 
acrimonious vein with CBTI holding up the processing of Letters of Credit for cotton 
imports by several SEKBERTAL supporters. This led, in early August, to the Director 
General for Multifarious Industries sending a telex to the CBTI executive calling on them 
not to obstruct import procedures. Official copies of the telex were also sent to several 
senior economic ministers.87
The Conflict Intensifies
CBTI was by now well aware that it was facing a major challenge to its 
authority from SEKBERTAL and began to take the need to respond more seriously. This 
led, in a revealing development, to Fahmy Chatib branding SEKBERTAL in the media as 
a "kelompok petisi " ("group of petitioners", or protesters).88 The term was carefully 
chosen with the aim of portraying SEKBERTAL as political subversives challenging the 
government's authority and threatening the stability and proper functioning of the textile 
industry. The basis for this was the implicit reference in the term kelompok petisi to the 
informal political grouping known as the Petisi Lima Puluh (or Petition of Fifty) which 
had constituted an unofficial challenge to the government prior to the previous general 
election. In short, CBTI was likening SEKBERTAL's letter writing campaign seeking 
changes in the status quo of the textile industry to the open letter the Petisi Lima Puluh 
had sent to the government in 1980 calling for change to the overall status quo in the 
political system. This was potentially a very damaging attack on SEKBERTAL, for if the 
label had 'stuck', SEKBERTAL's chances of persuading the government to alter its 
policies would be reduced. SEKBERTAL might thus be seen in the same light as other 
potential challenges to the country's internal security.
The leaders of SEKBERTAL had been concerned to guard against just such a 
contingency from the time they first founded the organisation. They had been very 
conscious of the need to avoid creating the impression that they were 'engaging in
87 Telex no. 189/TLX/VUI/1986, 6 August 1986. Reference to this can be found in "PT CBTI Diminta 
Untuk Tidak Menahan Aplikasi L/C Kapas”, Sinar Harapart, 9 August 1986.
88 See, for example, "Bisnis Stempel", Tempo, 9 August 1986, p. 77.
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politics’. It was for this reason they had hitherto deliberately focused their attack on 
CBTI and its improper' implementation of Rachmat Saleh's Ministerial Decrees, rather 
than the Decrees themselves, the Directors General for Domestic and Foreign Trade in the 
Department of Trade or for that matter the Minister of Trade himself - all of whom were 
actually regarded by SEKBERTAL as being as culpable as CBTI and API. Similarly, it 
was for this reason that they couched their campaign within the government's own 
rhetoric, explicitly linking their claims with the stated aims of current government policy. 
Equally, this was why they sent officially receipted copies of their letters to so many 
senior political figures. This was also the reason that they took the meticulously correct 
course of reporting the formation of SEKBERTAL to KOPKAMTIB. Similarly, this 
concern lay behind SEKBERTAL's deliberate use of a number of newspapers that were 
closely associated with the military or the government in their ownership and readership. 
These included Berita Yudha, Berita Buana, Suara Karya, Pelita and Harian Umum AB 
(or Angkatan Bersenjata as it became known when it reverted to its old name during 
1987).
SEKBERTAL's caution was due to the unstated, but widely recognised, 
links between their cause and the wider issue of import monopolies in Indonesia which 
ran right to the heart of the country's political leadership. Thus, for instance, Aminuddin 
was at pains to persuade journalists not to link the problems in the textile industry with 
those in others such as the very sensitive plywood or plastics industries.89 Not only 
would this guarantee the failure of SEKBERTAL's campaign, but it would possibly earn 
them the wrath of the country's security managers.
Furthermore, Aminuddin had a personal interest in this. He did not welcome 
attempts to portray him as an anti-government agitator. This was because he had been 
arrested in 1957 following charges of involvement with an assassination attempt on a 
senior Communist Party official and again in 1958 in connection with the secessionist 
movement, the Revolutionary Republican Government of Indonesia (PRRI). While he
89 See Jones S. & Pura R., "Suharto-Linked Monopolies Hobble Economy", Asian Wall Street Journal, 
24-26 November 1986, for a detailed discussion of the situation in these industries.
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had subsequently been completely exonerated of these charges, there was still a risk that 
his opponents might seek to revive these allegations concerning his past.90
In view of all of this it was scarcely surprising that SEKBERTAL decided to 
strike back vigorously. Accordingly, on 9 August (the same day as the Tempo article 
containing the kelompok petisi reference), SEKBERTAL held a press conference and 
issued a lengthy press release.91 The press release went to great lengths to dispel the 
kelompok petisi allegation, accusing CBTI instead of being the ones who wished to 
politicise the whole affair and claiming that SEKBERTAL sought to handle it in an 
"objective" and "technical" manner. SEKBERTAL, the press release stated, was only 
concerned about "economics", not "politics". It called for a return to the system prior to 
CBTI's existence whereby spinning mills could import raw materials autonomously, 
saying that CBTI’s activities had led to widespread increases in production costs. For 
added effect, several of the foreign companies which were active within SEKBERTAL 
attended the press conference and informed journalists that they were having to review 
their plans for further foreign investment in Indonesia because of the uncertainties CBTI 
was bringing to the textile industry.
The press release went on to attack CBTI for not abiding by the terms of the 
agreement reached under Bustanil Arifin, adding that until now SEKBERTAL had 
respected the Minister’s request not to inflame the issue in the press, but that since CBTI 
had publically branded them a "kelompok petisi ", they had no alternative but to respond. 
It decried the fact that CBTI, which was itself a private company, was seeking to regulate 
the rest of the spinning industry, and invoking the name of the Department of Trade to 
legitimise its activities. CBTI and API were described as mere parasites which were not 
even members of KADIN (something expected of most business groups). Interestingly, 
the press release had a lengthy and laudatory description of Aminuddin’s character and
90 According to Aminuddin, senior API figures, in an attempt to taint him politically, told a number of 
journalists that he had been found guilty o f involvement in the PRRI affair. In order to convince 
journalists otherwise, he had showed them the letters of clearance from the military court examination of 
his case. Interview with Husein Aminuddin, 30 April 1987.
91 Press Release titled "Sekbertal Disebut CBTI Sebagai 'Kelompok Petisi"’, 9 August 1986. Actual 
press references to this are cited in fn. 92 below.
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personal history, a response to the rumours about his political past allegedly circulated by 
CBTL
SEKBERTAL's press conference had great effect, for it quickly received 
very widespread and favourable coverage.92 Virtually all of the aspects that had been 
raised at the press conference were reported. There were even glowing accounts of 
Aminuddin as a former guerilla fighter during the Revolution and the fact that he had been 
sent overseas by the government for training and had graduated from Cornell University.
Though this media counter-attack had been quite dramatic, SEKBERTAL 
then took a bolder and far more decisive step on the same day as the press conference, 
when it delivered a formal report on the situation in the spinning industry and the 
problems it was having with CBTI to the President's private residence.93 This was the 
first time SEKBERTAL had dared to communicate directly with the President, though he 
was certainly part of the audience it was trying to reach via the media campaign.
The ramifications of SEKBERTAL's lobbying of the President were almost 
immediately evident. On 11 August Suharto summoned State Secretary Sudharmono, 
Acting Trade Minister Bustanil Arifin (Rachmat Saleh was still away), Industry Minister 
Hartarto and the Minister for the Promotion of the Use of Domestic Products Ginandjar 
Kartasasmita, for a special meeting to consider the problems besetting the spinning 
industry.
Immediately after the meeting at the Palace, Hartarto and Ginandjar jointly 
addressed the press. Hartarto announced that the President had called for the reform and 
improvement of CBTI's structure and composition. At the same time, Hartarto said, he 
wanted to ensure that all domestically grown cotton was absorbed by the spinning 
industry so as to assist the development of the cotton growing industry. There was also a
92 See, for example, "Dampak Monopoli Impor Kapas Oleh PT CBTI: Banyak Investor Asing Tunda 
Investasi Dalam Pemintalan" Merdeka, 11 August 1986; "SEKBERTAL: Bukan Petisi, Hanya Laporan 
Berkala", Business News, 11 August 1986; and "CBTI Nekad Langgar Kesepakatan Bersama", Pelita, 
11 August 1986.
93 Though not reported in the press, this action was corroborated by a number of separate interviews. 
For instance, Husein Aminuddin 5 May 1987; Indrawan (economics editor of Kompas) 8 May 1987; 
Djon Wono (Executive Director, Dasatex Pty Ltd) 1 May 1987; and Sital Roesminem (President Director, 
Kewalram Pty Ltd) 21 May 1987. According to Aminuddin, the report to the President was a compilation 
of material already used in previous letters to the Government, as well as material that was used 
subsequently in others. Certainly SEKBERTAL letter no. 017/SEKBER/9/1986 of 11 September 1986 
listed the President as being one of its registered recipients.
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Suggestion in the media reports of the press conference that the system for the absorption 
of local cotton required review, although it was unclear whether this represented the view 
of Suharto himself. The press drew attention to the fact that the 1:10 relationship was 
impractical when local cotton supplies amounted to only five percent of industry needs.94
It is not entirely clear what instructions the President actually gave his 
ministers.95 While it appears he urged that CBTI be reformed and all local cotton be 
absorbed, newspaper reports seem to suggest that it was Hartarto, rather than Suharto, 
who advocated the use of a proportional system for the allocation of local cotton. (This 
would fit more closely with the actual course of events as they unfolded, as it was some 
time before the proportional system was universally recognised as the official allocation 
system.)
Nevertheless, what is clear is that this was an extraordinary breakthrough for 
SEKBERTAL. That the President himself should call for an overhaul of CBTI would 
have seemed inconceivable just a few months earlier. CBTI was a body that had been 
legitimised by Cabinet decision, and moreover was widely perceived to enjoy personal 
links to the President's own family. This was a telling indication that SEKBERTAL had 
come a long way 96
As a result of the late June meeting under Bustanil Arifin, SEKBERTAL had 
achieved one of its main objectives, namely the defeat of the CBTI proposal to levy the 
spinning industry with a Rp. 450 charge on all raw material purchases, allegedly for the
94 See "Presiden Minta PT CBTI Dibenahi", Prioritas, 12 August 1986; "Presiden Minta Industri 
Tekstil Gunakan Kapas DN", Suara Karya, 12 August 1986, and "Organisasi PT CBTI Akan 
Disempumakan: Secara Bertahap Kita Mengurangi Ketergantungan Pada Kapas Impor”, Sinar Harapan, 12 
August 1986.
95 It is not unusual that there should be this measure of uncertainty as to the President's precise wishes. 
It is widely recognised in Jakarta that the President very rarely gives direct and explicit rulings, especially 
when there is a conflict between two of his ministers which involves loss of face for one of them. More 
often, apparently, he merely indicates that he wishes the matter to be to be tidied up and controversy 
overcome.
96 SEKBERTAL took great comfort from its own 'intelligence sources' that Suharto had been impressed 
by their submission, and was apparently not unsympathetic to their cause. Indeed they were told that 
Suharto had expressed the wish to all the Ministers at the meeting that the issue was to be "diselesaikan 
secara baik-baHC, which was taken by SEKBERTAL to mean that it should be resolved in a manner not 
prejudicial to SEKBETAL. SEKBERTAL further believed that the President had asked General Murdani 
to monitor the situation. If true, this presumably related to potential political implications should the 
price of textiles and clothing rise inordinately in the months leading up to the coming general election, as 
well as any possibility of wider agitation, especially with regard to the sensitive monopoly issue. 
Certainly, as mentioned earlier, Murdani had sent a personal aide to meet the SEKBERTAL leadership to 
enquire about the controversy after his receipt of SEKBERTAL letters.
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purpose of a cross-subsidy. The threat of this levy had precipitated the formation of 
SEKBERTAL. Having achieved this aim, SEKBERTAL's next priority targets were:
1. CBTTs continuing import monopoly;
2. CBTTs non-compliance with the agreement for the use of a proportional scheme for 
the allocation of domestic cotton;
3. the exclusive control by the small API clique which headed CBTI over the funds 
collected by compulsion from the other spinning companies.
With regard to the first of these items, CBTI had so far never actually 
implemented its proposal to act as a national 'trading house' and buy cotton 
internationally for the whole of the spinning industry. Under this scheme it was intended 
that spinners would buy the imported cotton directly from CBTI. It was claimed that this 
system would lead to great savings through CBTI's ability to make bulk purchases 
internationally. Instead, under the system that actually operated, spinning mills imported 
individually, but could only open Letters of Credit for importation with their banks after 
they had obtained an authorising stamp from CBTI. This however, was available only to 
those companies which satisfied CBTI's criteria. This stamp on Letter of Credit 
applications cost the spinning mills .0625 % of the import contract, assuming that CBTI 
did actually give its approval and did not stall the application (as had happened to several 
SEKBERTAL members).
The second problem of major concern to SEKBERTAL, the introduction of a 
standardised system for the proportional allocation of local cotton, was something CBTI 
had supposedly accepted at the June meeting. As already noted, if the spinners were to 
use local cotton (as was the clear wish of the President), they wanted to make sure that 
the burden was distributed fairly. This was not surprising in view of the fact that local 
cotton was selling for Rp. 1,700 per kilogram, while imported cotton cost Rp. 700 per 
kilogram.
The third and most irksome SEKBERTAL concern was the fact that their 
business rivals controlling CBTI were collecting money from them in a wholly 
unaccountable fashion. Had the industry benefited uniformly from the revenue raised, an
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unwanted system might have been slightly more palatable. As things stood, 
SEKBERTAL was profoundly suspicious of the ends to which any revenue collected by 
CBTI would be used. Indeed, Suharto's call for the reform of CBTI seems to have 
followed on from the failure of Bustanil Arifin's intervention to resolve the problem of its 
narrow equity base.
As an immediate consequence of Suharto's intervention, a two-day meeting 
was convened later that week (14-15 August) in the Department of Trade between CBTI 
and SEKBERTAL which was chaired by the Director General for Foreign Trade (from 
the same department) and the Director for Textiles (from the Department of Industry). 
The purpose of the meeting was to address the need for a reform of CBTI expressed by 
the President Predictably, there was little willingness to compromise on either side. The 
CBTI executive wanted to retain control of the company, whereas SEKBERTAL wanted 
to wrest it from them, if not dispense with it altogether.
Ultimately, after marathon debate, the Director General for Foreign Trade, 
who was no friend of SEKBERTAL, decreed that the articles of association of CBTI 
were to be reformed so that its board be expanded from ten members to twenty-two. Ten 
would be the original CBTI members, and twelve would be from SEKBERTAL.97 This 
was another major victory for SEKBERTAL, as the decision would give it control of the 
board of CBTI.
Presumably, this was a decision which the Director General for Foreign 
Trade did not reach easily. He was handing a victory to the group that had constantly 
attacked CBTI, and thus a policy with which he was closely associated. Clearly, 
however, it was not practicable for him to disregard such a clear signal from the 
President.
The issue however, was still far from resolved. In order to formalise legally 
the changing of CBTI's articles of association and the inclusion of twelve of its 
representatives onto the company's board, SEKBERTAL sent a letter on 18 August 
containing the required statutory documents to CBTI's attorney. This proved to be in
97 Public reference to this outcome can be found in "Sekitar Adanya Kesepakatan Untuk Mengubah 
Anggaran Dasar PT CBTI", Sinar Harapan, 30 August 1986.
125
vain, as the existing CBTI board members failed to reciprocate by supplying the legal 
documentation required of them for the reform to go ahead. In short, CBTI simply did 
not act on the Director General's ruling. As a result, the changes to CBTI never came to 
pass and SEKBERTAL did not gain control of the company.98
In spite o f this, CBTI's inaction only postponed change rather than 
preventing it from finally occurring. On 26 August, Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh quite 
unexpectedly invited Aminuddin to his home for private talks on the evening before he 
left the country on official business. According to Aminuddin, Rachmat Saleh was very 
conciliatory during the meeting, asking Aminuddin for his reaction to the idea of a 
Department of Trade official being installed as caretaker-manager of CBTI. The official, 
Totong Kuswara, was in fact already associated with CBTI as a Departmental consultant 
Nothing was decided, but Aminuddin concluded that Rachmat Saleh was being forced to 
alter his position in view of the President's intervention during his previous absence.99
Several days later, a telling editorial appeared in one of the leading daily 
newspapers, drawing attention to the fact that the tide was now running in 
SEKBERTAL's favour in its battle with CBTI.100 The editorial provides an interesting 
synopsis of the situation.
...The meeting between President Suharto and Minister for Industry Hartarto, State 
Secretary Sudharmono, Minister for the Promotion of the Use of Domestic Products 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita and Acting Trade Minister Bustanil Arifin on 11 August 
1986, which specifically considered the case [of CBTI vs. SEKBERTAL] provides us 
with a strong hint that it will be resolved once and for all.
The involvement of the Head of State himself indicates that the problem is not just a 
simple one....Because if the apparatus below the President could have resolved the 
issue earlier, then of course the President would not have had to intervene....
If we examine carefully the directives which have been given by the Head of State 
regarding the resolution of the case, it would appear that they are in line with the 
ideas which have been frequently put forward by the spinning companies gathered in 
SEKBERTAL. The gist of the President's directives are that CBTI Pty Ltd must be 
overhauled (its articles of association reformed and its shareholders increased), its 
organisation put in order and its cotton procurement procedures improved....
The Acting Trade Minister Bustanil Arifin in fact almost succeeded in resolving the 
crisis when, late in June, he organised a marathon two-day negotiation between CBTI 
Pty Ltd and SEKBERTAL. The agreement which was achieved at that stage - and 
which doesn't in fact differ much from the guidelines given by the Head of State -
98 SEKBERTAL letter no. 14/SEKBER/8/1986,18 August 1986. Some public reference to the issue is 
made in "Penyempumaan AD/ART PT CBTI Tak Peroleh Dukungan Pengurus", Suara Karya, 25 August 
1986.
99 Interview, Husein Aminuddin, 30 April 1987.
100 "Mempercepat Penyelesaian Kasus PT. CBTI-SEKBERTAL" (editorial), Sinar Harapan, 29 August 
1986.
should have been sufficient to resolve the matter. And yet while that agreement still 
stands, it appears that it is not being implemented.
Two days after the editorial appeared, Rachmat Saleh returned to Indonesia 
and told journalists that the directorship of CBTI had been temporarily transferred to 
Totong Kuswara of the Trade Department. He said that this was in accordance with the 
President's directive that CBTI be reformed. He added that CBTI would be reformed, 
not abolished, observing that the current managers were too busy with their own 
companies to give sufficient attention to CBTI.101
Nevertheless, the pace at which steps were being taken against CBTI was 
slow. In large part this was because of the perceived need to avoid loss of face for API, 
the Trade Department and, above all, Rachmat Saleh, the minister who endowed CBTI 
with its powers. This was recognised to be one of the major difficulties (apart from the 
sheer tenacity of the CBTI leaders) in persuading the government to move against them. 
It was reflected also in the President's oblique references to the issue. SEKBERTAL 
itself knew that if change was to come at all, it would come in an incremental fashion. As 
such, the SEKBERTAL leadership could not afford to allow the pressure for action to 
abate.
The Conflict Enters a New Phase
Sudden and dramatic evidence that SEKBERTAL's efforts were finally 
bearing fruit came in early September when Sumarlin revealed at a conference that, 
following an instruction from the President, CBTI would be "frozen".102 Anxious to see 
that this did in fact come to pass, SEKBERTAL continued to press its case with a 
strongly worded letter on 11 September to the six top economic ministers, with registered 
copies going to twenty-one of the most influential figures within the government - 
including conspicuously, the President, General Murdani and State Secretary
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102 "Tugas-Tugas Direksi CBTI Untuk Semetara Di Tangan Totong", Suara Karya, 1 September 1986. 
102 For reference to this, see "Industri Tekstil Bagai 'Jatuh Terhimpit Tangga'", Prioritas, 24 September 
1986 and "Handoko Tjokroseputro: Paket Enam Mei Ancam Kematian 25 Persen Dari Industri 
Pertekstilan", Angkatan Bersenjata, 26 September 1986.
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Sudharmono.103 The letter argued that CBTTs monopoly of cotton procurements was 
having a very harmful effect on the industry, was contributing to a high-cost economy 
and was in contravention of the policy aims outlined by the President in his 15 August 
speech to Parliament to mark Independence Day. The letter also reiterated the report that 
CBTI had been "frozen" at the President's instruction. But, importantly, the letter went 
on to raise SEKBERTAL's sights from CBTI itself, and began to criticise the very 
purpose for which it had been set up. It argued that yam production would be much 
more efficient if mills were allowed to obtain their raw materials directly, without having 
to go through CBTI, and if local cotton was allocated on the basis of the proportional list 
drawn up by the Director General for Multifarious Industries (rather than Rachmat 
Saleh's 1:10 ruling). This marked a very important shift in the emphasis of 
SEKBERTAL's campaign. It was no longer primarily attacking the conspicuous 
irregularities and improprieties in the behaviour of CBTTs management, but instead it 
was targeting the function CBTI was intended to perform and the principles that lay 
behind Rachmat Saleh's legislation empowering it.
SEKBERTAL had apparently succeeded in discrediting the performance of 
CBTTs leadership and perhaps wounding them mortally. What it was now seeking was 
the reversal of the policy providing for both an import monopoly, and the restrictive 1:10 
requirement. In other words, while key CBTI leaders might well have been politically 
damaged, the government policies underlying the institution remained.
In the wake of Sumarlin's comments and its own strong 11 September letter, 
SEKBERTAL easedup a little on the intensity of its campaign, as it waited to see what 
action resulted. Welcome support came at this stage from public statements by Sukar 
Samsudi, head of the normally quiet PERTEKSI, who said that his organisation was 
totally opposed to the activities of API and CBTI and that it applauded the efforts of 
Aminuddin and SEKBERTAL.104 On the other hand, in something of a rearguard action,
103 SEKBERTAL letter no. 017/SEKBER/9/1986, 11 September 1986. Public reference to several 
(though not all) aspects of the letter can be found in "Sedang Dilihat, Kemungkinan Dirubah Atau 
Tidaknya Tata Niaga Teikendali", Merdeka, 24 September 1986.
104 See "Pembinaan Industri Pertekstilan Nasional Sepenuhnya Harus Oleh Pemerintah", Merdeka, 15 
September 1986.
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the CBTI management appeared before Committee VI of the Parliament on 27 September 
to defend its activities.105
In mid-October SEKBERTAL renewed its strategy of widening the focus of 
its attack from just the CBTI management by sending another letter to the government, 
this time attacking API.106 No reference was made to CBTI. The gist of the letter was 
that textile firms that were not members of API should not be bound by API rulings. 
This referred to the API ruling (mentioned earlier in this chapter) first introduced by 
Frans Seda in April 1984, and renewed in April 1986, requiring payment of a levy into 
an API bank account prior to the issue of export quotas for garments and fabrics. The 
letter said that SEKBERTAL would not object to payment of this levy if it were deemed 
necessary by the government, and provided that the money went directly into state 
revenue rather than API’s own bank account. It argued that there were a number of 
important textile organisations outside API which played a significant role within the 
industry in supporting government policy (such as PIBTI, PERTEKSI, APSYFI and 
SEKBERTAL). And, furthermore, these organisations, unlike API, had the added 
legitimacy of being members of KADIN. (SEKBERTAL itself however, as a joint 
secretariat, was not a member of KADIN.) Finally, the letter called on the government to 
enter into consultation with these organisations and to remove API from the process of 
allocating export quotas so as to avoid a situation in which one private body, using the 
name of the government, sought to dictate to others. Three days after the letter, 
SEKBERTAL held a press conference and reiterated these various points for 
journalists.107
On October 18, Aminuddin took an extraordinary step in his efforts to 
promote SEKBERTAL. It centred around an invitation from Akbar Tanjung, Deputy 
Secretary General of GOLKAR and editor of the newspaper, Pelita, for SEKBERTAL to 
place an advertisement in his newspaper congratulating GOLKAR on its twenty-second
105 See "CBTI Di Muka DPR", Business News, 29 September 1986.
106 SEKBERTAL letter no. 020/SEKBER/X/1986, 14 October 1986. While not directly referring to 
this letter, the same material is quoted in reports from the ensuing press conference. See fn. 107 below.
107 "SEKBERTAL Tidak Keberatan Pungutan Asal Dilakukan Oleh Pemerintah", Pelita, 18 October 
1986.
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anniversary. Pelita , a newspaper associated with leading government figures 
Sudharmono and Bustanil Arifin, had given SEKBERTAL favourable press coverage in 
recent months. Aminuddin agreed to purchase half a page of advertising space, provided 
that he was free to word the advertisement as he wished. The crux of the advertisement 
was a statement that SEKBERTAL joined with GOLKAR in striving to implement the 
injunction of the President in his national address of 15 August for a national commitment 
to efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. (Appendix B contains a copy of the 
hald-page advertisement.)
While many companies and business groups had newspaper advertisements 
congratulating GOLKAR on its anniversary, it was highly unusual for them to be used 
for such overt and explicit political purposes. This rather daring public relations exercise 
'enlisted' both GOLKAR and the President for SEKBERTAL’s own lobbying efforts. 
There was a dangerous irony in this; Aminuddin's action could also have been interpreted 
as a statement that the government's rhetoric was, in fact, just that - rhetoric. After all, it 
was the same government that had, under the auspices of the tata niaga regime, created 
CBTI's monopoly, as well as those of other sole importers in other parts of the 
manufacturing sector.
Aminuddin was thus plainly engaged in a delicate political gamble by using 
the government's words more vigorously than it might have wished. That this was the 
case, and that the unusual political message was instantly recognisable and newsworthy, 
was reflected in the fact that several other major newspapers immediately contacted 
Aminuddin, expressing interest in it.108
The political sensitivity of the broader question of the tata niaga trade regime 
was thrown into sharp focus in early October by the forced closure of one of the 
country's foremost newspapers, Sinar Harapan. The reason for this action seems to have 
been governmental anger at a report in the paper leaking information about an intended
108 Interview, Husein Aminuddin 28 April 1987. The advertisement appeared in Pelita twice, on 18 
and 20 October 1986.
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deregulation of the tata niaga system. The article claimed that deregulation of a range of 
areas, including textiles, was imminent .109
Though Sinar Harapan paid a high price, its speculation about impending 
government policy reform was borne out for, on 25 October, senior economic ministers 
jointly announced a range of policy changes designed to lower local production costs and 
boost the country's trade competitiveness. Among the most important elements of what 
became known as the 'October 25 package', were the removal or simplification of import 
restrictions and the reduction of tariffs for the importation of certain raw materials vital to 
local industry but not produced, or produced in insufficient quantity locally.110
For present purposes the key aspects relate to changes to the regulations 
governing the importing of textile raw materials. Essentially this hinged around whether 
an item could be imported freely by manufacturers, or only via a government registered 
importer. (In the textile industry, CBTI was of course the sole registered importer.) 
Under the newly announced policy, polyester staple fibre and rayon staple fibre could 
henceforth be imported ffeely, without any reference to CBTI. In the case of cotton, the 
situation was somewhat different. Cotton imports could still only be conducted via a 
Registered Importer (Importir Terdaftar). However, of critical importance was the fact 
that in the ensuing implementing regulations six state-owned companies were specified as 
the Registered Importers for cotton. Thus in respect of cotton imports there had also 
been vital changes. While cotton imports were still not free, there were now six 
registered importers, and CBTI was not listed among them.* 111
CBTI/API had thus been dealt a massive blow by the government. But 
important questions still remained.
* Why had the Director General for Foreign Trade’s implementing regulations (for the 
new package) not stated explicitly that CBTI was no longer authorised as a Registered 
Importer?
109 "Pemerintah Akan Cabut 44 SK Tata Niaga Bidang Impor", Sinar Harapan, 9 October 1986.
110 For a more detailed analysis of the October 25 package see "Serangkaian Kebijaksanaan Tindak 
Lanjut Dari Devaluasi 12 September 1986", Business News, 27 October 1986; or Pangestu (1987) pp. 
29-36.
111 The relevant laws are Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh's Ministerial Decree no. 307/KP/X/1986, 25 
October 1986; and the Director General for Foreign Trade B.M. Kuntjoro-jakti's implementing regulation, 
Decree no. 129/DAGLU/KP/X/86,25 October 1986.
131
* What was the status of Rachmat Saleh's Decree no. 70 of February that year which 
appointed CBTT the sole procurer of both imported and local cotton?
* Why had cotton imports not been liberalised completely like polyester and rayon?
* What was the official policy on the absorption of local cotton? Was it to be consumed 
in a ratio of 1:10 with imports as Rachmat Saleh's Decrees nos. 1066 and 1067 of 
December 1985 stipulated, or was it to be on a proportional basis in accordance with 
the list drawn up by the Director General for Multifarious Industries following the 
meeting with Bustanil Arifin?
To pursue these matters, on 3 November, SEKBERTAL wrote yet again to 
the Ministers for Trade and Industry, with registered copies going to sixteen other senior 
political figures.112 The letter was a very detailed response to the October 25 package. It 
opened by thanking the government for the liberalisation of rayon and polyester fibre 
imports, but then asked that cotton imports be liberalised further, so that spinning mills 
might import either directly themselves, or via any of the six registered state-enterprise 
importers.
In support of this case, a range of technical arguments was deployed 
concerning the nature of the international futures market in cotton and the commercial 
advantage of being able to move quickly to take advantage of price fluctuations (rather 
than having to go via an approved trader). Excerpts from a supporting study by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development were also enclosed.
The letter further argued that the government had no cause to worry about the 
local cotton crop as it would certainly be consumed by spinners, but that it was highly 
desirable this should take place on the basis of proportional allocation and that there 
should be direct transactions between the spinning mills and the cotton producers (rather 
than having to go via a middleman of any sort). This was a reference to the fact that 
spinning mills still had to deal with CBTI in order to obtain their local cotton, which, in 
turn, (because of the 1:10 requirement) they needed to be able to import. The letter
112 SEKBERTAL letter no. 022/SEKBER/l 1/1986, 3 November 1986.
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concluded with another appeal for the prohibition of the levies API was applying to the 
export of fabrics and garments.
SEKBERTAL had a variety of reasons for attacking API over levies on fabric 
and garment exports.113
1. A number of SEKBERTAL members either had fully integrated factories that 
produced finished fabric for export, or else had financial involvements with other, 
separate, downstream factories.
2. The spinning industry as a whole had an interest in the well-being of the downstream 
industries which consume the yam they produce. If the prosperity of the fabric and 
garment industries was threatened by API levies, this would in turn have ramifications 
for the spinners: a contraction in the downstream industries would result in a 
shrinking market for their own produce.
3. The leadership of API was almost identical to that of CBTI; as such SEKBERTAL 
was predisposed to confront them at every possible opportunity, if only because of 
the possibility of API attempting to introduce some other ploy detrimental to them.
4. The SEKBERTAL leadership identified strongly with the plight of those companies 
further downstream who were having to grapple with API.
On 26 November, a variety of parties appeared before a session of Committee 
VI (chaired by Joko Sudjatmiko of GOLKAR) of the Parliament to give presentations 
concerning the situation in the textile industry. Apart from the Director General for 
Multifarious Industries and the Director for Textiles, others to appear included the heads 
of PIBTI and GINSI (the importers' association). The former launched a scathing attack 
on the API export levies, while the latter asked how much longer the government 
intended to allow import monopolies to operate. Members of the Committee reportedly 
called for API's levy practices to be reformed.114
113 Interview Husein Aminuddin, 30 April 1987.
114 Public references to this hearing can be found in, for example, "Agar Diterbitkan, Pungutan Ekspor 
Pakaian Jadi Oleh API", Prioritas, 28 November 1986; as well as, "GINSI: Berapa Lama Sistem 
’Monopoli' Diperlakukan?" and "Segala Bentuk Pungutan Ekspor Tekstil Diluar Ketentuan Agar 
Dihapuskan", Harian Terbit, 27 November 1986
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SEKBERTAL did not appear before the Committee. There were two reasons 
for this. First, SEKBERTAL leaders judged the Committee to be a less rewarding 
avenue for lobbying efforts than those they already used; and secondly, they were 
anxious to keep SEKBERTAL far removed from any activity which might be construed 
as 'playing politics'.115 While everything that SEKBERTAL was doing was of course 
'political', they were concerned not to appear to be involved in things which were 
formally identified as political - such as lobbying in the Parliament for changes to key 
aspects of government policy. The underlying reason for this was that such action might 
be seen to imply not only a questioning of the appropriateness of a particular government 
policy, but more importantly also a questioning of the government itself.
SEKBERTAL finally inched closer to another of its goals - the discarding of 
the 1:10 requirement - as a result of an action by the Director General for Multifarious 
Industries on 4 December, when he wrote to all spinning firms informing them of the 
release of a revised proportional allocation list for local cotton, covering the first half of 
1987. The letter went on to say that, in accordance with the October 25 package, cotton 
transactions could take place directly between spinning mills and cotton producers, 
though proof of purchase of a mill’s local cotton allocation would still be necessay.116
This action thus suggested that mills were now completely free to deal 
independently with local cotton producers without having to go through CBTI and also 
that the 1:10 requirement had now been superseded, with mills henceforth having only to 
consume their proportional allocation of local cotton before importing as much as they 
wished (though, still via one of the six registered importers). The reality was less clear, 
however. The problem remained that Rachmat Saleh's Ministerial Decrees had not been 
revoked, and were thus presumably still in force. The policies of Trade and Industry 
were therefore patently at odds with each other.
115 Interview with Husein Aminuddin, 18 April 1987.
116 In addition to writing to all spinners, he also wrote to the Director General for Foreign Trade, 
informing him of his move. [Director Genral for Multifarious Industries’ letters nos. 1888/DJAI/XII/1986 
and 1889/DJAI/XII/1986,4 December 1986. Public reference to aspects of this matter can be found in 
"Pembelian Kapas Lokal, Langsung Antara Industri Dan PTP”, Prioritas, 9 December 1986.]
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While the situation was still uncertain, the action of the Director General for 
Multifarious Industries was nevertheless a positive development from SEKBERTAL’s 
point of view, as it served to increase the pressure for a firm resolution. Further 
progress was achieved on another front when the Director General for Foreign Trade sent 
a letter, on 10 December, to the country's customs agents (Societe General de 
Surveillance), stipulating that the only companies permitted to operate as registered 
importers of cotton were the six state-enterprises specified in the October 25 package, 
adding that CBTI would not be permitted to open any new Letters of Credit for imports, 
or increase the value of existing ones.117
Thus, CBTTs monopoly of raw material imports had finally been brought to 
an unequivocal end. This was very welcome news to SEKBERTAL. But CBTI was not 
yet finished, for it still existed as a company. And it remained unclear whether it was still 
legally empowered to act as a middleman and the sole procurer of local cotton.
SEKBERTAL held an end-of-year press conference where it was joined by 
PIBTI in yet another attack on API's export levies and its role in the allocation of garment 
export quotas. At the press conference they listed issues which they hoped the 
government would address. Several of these stood out. They sought complete 
liberalisation of cotton imports, to bring them into line with rayon and polyester fibre. 
They called for open publication of the criteria by which garment export quotas were 
determined. And finally, they appealed to the government to step in and create a proper 
national textile body genuinely representative of the interests of the whole textile 
industry. In this respect, they again drew attention to the existence of several textile 
organisations that were also members of KADIN, but stood outside API.118
The last point had far-reaching implications. SEKBERTAL was now calling 
for APrs replacement. This was an open admission of something SEKBERTAL had 
always wanted, but had never previously declared openly. API was a much more well-
117 Director General for Foreign Trade's letter no. IMP. 102/D A G LU /4070/86,10 December 1986. For 
public reference see, "CBTI Dilarang Buka L/C Serat Kapas", Business News, 15 December 1986; and 
"CBTI Tidak Dibenarkan Buka L/C Serat Kapas", Prioritas, 15 December 1986.
118 For coverage o f this, see "Organisasi Tekstil Nasional Perlu Dibenahi", Pelita, 29 December 1986; 
and "Indonesia Perlu Diwakili Dalam Federasi Tekstil ASEAN", Prioritas, 2 January 1987.
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established entity than CBTI. This was the reason for the invocation of KADIbTs name, 
as an attempt to gamer legitimacy around the non-API organisations.119
SEKBERTAL's continuing efforts were evidently not in vain, for following 
hard on the heals of the 25 October and 10 December reforms, the tata niaga regime was 
given another dramatic reform by the government with the announcement of further 
major policy changes on 15 January. The essence of these new changes was a relaxation 
of the restrictions on imports in the textile and steel industries. Of the 300 classifications 
of import items contained in this package (the October 25 package had covered only 153 
items) the textile industry was by far the major winner with 227. However, the single 
most dramatic item was the complete liberalisation of cotton imports. Spinners were now 
free to import directly if they did not wish to use any of the six registered importers. 
This brought cotton import procedures into line with rayon and polyester which had been 
freed up on 25 October.
This was widely seen as constituting a sweeping victory for SEKBERTAL, 
with Aminuddin quoted in many places as expressing his gratitude to the President and 
the government.120 In order to persuade the government to introduce these changes, 
SEKBERTAL had had to maintain continuous pressure from 25 October onwards. But 
since this particular lobbying effort had been directed exclusively at the government 
(rather than at API or CBTI), different tactics had been employed. A vociferous and 
provocative media-based campaign had no longer been appropriate. Instead, 
SEKBERTAL had adopted a low-profile approach, involving continuous lobbying by 
way of letters and frequent telephone calls providing large quantities of technical data and
119 Yet in this respect SEKBERTAL itself was, as already noted, deficient, being only a joint secretariat 
In order to improve its status in this regard, SEKBERTAL transformed itself into a himpunan (an 
association or club) - with the new title Himpunan Industri Pemintalan "SEKBERTAL”. The by now 
well-recognised name ’SEKBERTAL’ was deliberately retained in the title. Prior to this SEKBERTAL's 
only formal standing was through the letter reporting its establishment to the Jakarta regional office of 
KOPKAMTIB. In confronting API it would help to enhance its legitimacy by becoming a formal 
sectorally representative organisation. [The legal act transforming SEKBERTAL was gazetted in, 
Tambahan Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, no.104, 30 December 1986. Press reference to it can be 
found in "SEKBERTAL Masuk Berita Negara", Pelita, 6 February 1987.]
120 For general coverage of the situation, see for example "Tekstil: Hura Buat Pengusaha", Tempo, 24 
January 1987; and "Kebijaksanaan 15 Januari Untuk Tingkatkan Daya Saing Industri", Business News, 
19 January 1987. The key new regulation was Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh's Ministerial Decree no. 
09/KP/I/87, 15 January 1987. The complete text of the new law is reproduced in, Business News 19 
January 1987.
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argument to key state officials. In all this, SEKBERTAL had found the Department of 
Industry, while sympathetic, rather slow-moving in pushing for change. As a result it 
had shifted the focus of its lobbying attention to a more senior figure, B APPENAS head 
Sumarlin, a measure which had clearly proved successful.121
A New Threat
By mid-January 1987 SEKBERTAL had achieved its fundamental aims, the 
abolition of the import monopoly on all raw materials, and the restoration of the freedom 
to import independently. No sooner had this victory been achieved, however, than a 
different dark cloud emerged on the regulatory horizon. Decrees issued by Rachmat 
Saleh and the Director General for Foreign Trade on 23 and 24 January determined that 
spinning mills were able to import cotton independently, but only on a 1:10 basis with 
purchases of local cotton. This was a reaffirmation of Rachmat Saleh’s original ruling in 
December 1985, and it thus served to strengthen the contradiction between the policies of 
the Department of Trade and the Department of Industry.122
The first person to draw critical attention to the implications of this situation 
was the head of GINSI, Zahri Ahmad. Speaking to the press, he said that the new 
regulations had the potential to do great damage to the textile industry by providing an 
opportunity for speculators to cause havoc with cotton purchases. He argued that 
because the price of local cotton had recently dipped below that of imported cotton,123 
there was a danger that certain ’’unnamed groups” with large amounts of capital might 
purchase most, if not all, of the local cotton and use this as the basis for a new 
monopoly.124
121 Interview Husein Aminuddin, 30 April 1987.
122 The Decree went on to stipulate that if  local cotton supplies were exhausted, upon obtaining written 
proof from the grower, a spinning mill would be given special dispensation to proceed with imports, and 
the unfullfilled obligation to purchase the local cotton would be carried forward into the next season. 
Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh's Ministerial Decree no. 18/KP/I/87, 23 January 1987, and the Director 
General for Foreign Trade's (implementing) Decree no. 005/DAGLU/KP/I/87, 24 January 1987. These 
regulations are discussed in press reports such as, "Ekspor Tekstil Yang Diatur Tata Niaga Masih 53.35 
Persen", Pelita , 26 January 1987; and "Tak Perlu Khawatir Ada Spekulasi Dan Monopoli Pembelian 
Kapas", Pelita, 6 February 1987.
123 As a result o f fluctuations in the international market, local cotton had suddenly beome somewhat 
cheaper than imported cotton - Rp 2,097 per kilogram as opposed to Rp 2,250 - 2,500 per kilogram.
124 "Juklak Dirjen Daglu Tentang Impor Kapas Meresahkan", Angkatan Bersenjata, 5 February 1987; and 
"Tak Perlu Khawatir Ada Spekulasi Dan Monopoli Pembelian Kapas", Pelita, 6 February 1987.
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Almost as if to confirm Zahri Achmad's concerns, Frans Seda announced 
before a Parliamentary committee on 9 February that API had submitted a request to the 
government for authority to purchase as much as 150,000 bales of local cotton, a figure 
equivalent to the total national production for a five year period. This, he argued, would 
greatly assist local cotton growers, as it would provide them with financial security in 
advance for up to five years of cultivation.125
GINSI's outburst was very close to what SEKBERTAL might have said. 
The two organisations were in fact in complete agreement in their views of what was 
desirable for the textile industry. Although they were in regular communication, they did 
not actively coordinate their actions, since GINSI had a more diverse membership, and 
was primarily concerned with the broader trade milieu.126
That SEKBERTAL was refraining from public comment was indeed unusual. 
The SEKBERTAL leaders were certainly alarmed by the situation, viewing it as a 
deliberate attempt by the Department of Trade to leave open a window of opportunity for 
its associates in API. Aminuddin insisted, however, that SEKBERTAL refrain from 
further criticism of Trade Department policy so soon after the breakthrough achieved with 
the January 15 package (following, as that did, from the other beneficial reforms of 
October 25 and December 10). To do so, he believed, would risk causing the uppermost 
echelons of the government to view SEKBERTAL as ungrateful, or worse, simply 
committed to attacking government policy.127
SEKBERTAL therefore maintained a low media profile through late January 
and the first half of February, concentrating on advising and assisting PEBTI and the 
garment manufacturers in mounting criticism of API's export levies, and the allocation of 
export quotas.128
Aminuddin did contact Rachmat Saleh discreetly, however, and obtained a 
meeting with him on 2 February. At this private meeting he argued strongly against the
125 See "API Bersedia Serap Produksi Kapas Dalam Negeri Selama 5 Tahun", Suara Pembaruan, 10 
February 1987.
126 Interview with Zachri Achmad (head of GINSI), 29 April 1987.
127 Indeed, two key SEKBERTAL sympathisers, Sumarlin and Hartarto, had in late 1986 appealed to 
Aminuddin to moderate SEKBERTAL’s press campaign.
128 Interview with Husein Aminuddin, 30 April 1987.
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illogical 1:10 policy, emphasising that local cotton production could satisfy only five 
percent of spinning industry needs. The spinning industry could only abide by the new 
regulation by halving production, something that was plainly undesirable.129
Following considerable press scepticism about API's new plan, and more 
generally, the merit of the 1:10 cotton procurement policy, Rachmat Saleh came out and 
publicly defended it, insisting that there were no monopoly plans lying behind it, as 
spuming mills could import independently if local supplies were certified inadequate. 
(However, a mill which was given special authorisation to import would still have to 
fulfil its outstanding obligations in the following season, further compounding the 
situation.) He said that API's proposal to buy a five year supply of cotton was not 
sinister, and that no devious monopoly would result. Significantly, however, he added 
that API would be permitted to proceed with its plan provided that it did not inflate the 
price of cotton unreasonably to secure a large windfall profit.130
By mid-February, SEKBERTAL was no longer willing to remain a passive 
observer. In a press conference with widespread favourable coverage, Aminuddin 
attacked the API plan and called on the government to reject i t  He advanced a number of 
reasons for this, among them that it would ruin the good communications that had 
developed between the cotton growers and the spinners under the proportional system of 
the Department of Industry. He claimed that this communication was beneficial to both 
sides, ensuring that the correct quality and pricing information passed from one side to 
another. This would be lost, he claimed, if API were allowed to step in as a middleman, 
adding that API would surely introduce a surcharge for the resale of cotton to the 
spinning industry, thus grossly increasing the price. He concluded that API should 
instead address the questions about its levies on exports, for the explanation recently 
given by Frans Seda in Parliament was factually inaccurate.131
129 Interview with Husein Aminuddin, 30 April 1987.
130 "Tidak Ada Monopoli Dalam Tata Niaga Impor Kapas", Prioritas, 12 February 1987.
131 "SEKBERTAL Tolak Monopoli Kapas Dalam Negeri", Berita Yudha, 16 February 1987; and 
"Memborong Kapas Dalam Negeri, Dinilai Sebagai Mengembalikan Monopoli", Prioritas, 16 february 
1987. For reference to API’s appearance before the Parliament see, "API Usulkan Pembentukan Pusat 
Pakaian Jadi", Pelita, 10 February 1987; and "Pungutan Wajar, Karena API Memerlukan Dana", Prioritas, 
10 February 1987.
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A week later, Aminuddin took the opportunity to attack API again and speak 
out in support of the garment industry when commenting on a scandal that had erupted 
over the manipulation of garment export quotas to the United States, which had seen a 
number of garment manufacturers lose their export licenses and five Trade Department 
officials relieved of their duties. He told journalists that the crisis could have been 
avoided if the quota allocation was conducted in an fair, open manner, asserting that the 
whole system would operate more smoothly if API was prevented from levying 
exports.132
That API was keen to reassert itself within the spinning industry and seize 
the opportunity opened by the new trade regulations was made clearer with a newspaper 
report on 11 March.133 An article in Bisnis Indonesia (a paper sympathetic to API) 
reported that an agreement had been reached between Rachmat Saleh, the Director 
General for Multifarious Industries, cotton growers and the textile industry for the 
creation of a buffer stock of local cotton in order to guarantee price stability. The article 
noted that this was essential because the price of imported cotton had recently risen above 
that of local cotton. In March prices were Rp. 2,300 per kilogram and Rp. 1,986 per 
kilogram respectively. It stated that to further help the local cotton growers, the spinning 
industry would not object to paying a standardised price for local cotton, set at Rp. 100 
below imported cotton, with the revenue generated as a result of the price differential 
being quite substantial. The article concluded that it would be desirable for a non­
government body to manage the scheme, as Rachmat Saleh had indicated he wished to 
see the textile industry manage its own affairs.
The meaning of the article was quite clear to those involved in the spinning 
industry. API, possibly via a revived CBTI, would purchase a five year supply of local 
cotton and generate a large profit for itself by reselling it to spinning mills at a price set 
artificially at Rp. 100 below the international price, which was expected to continue to 
rise.
132 "Disesalkan, Pencabutan Sementara ETPT Tanpa Ada Pemberitahuan Langsung", Prioritas, 28 
February 1987; and "Lima Pejabat Kanwil Perdagangan DKI Jakarta Ditarik Dari Jabatannya", Kompas, 
26 February 1987.
133 "Kalangan Tekstil Menyepakati Ide Dana Penyangga", Bisnis Indonesia, 11 March 1987.
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Developments on this front received a major setback, however, when the 
Director General for Multifarious Industries publicly denied both knowledge of, and 
support for, the notion of some form of large cotton stockpile.134 SEKBERTAL's 
response was to continue to target the Trade Department's 1:10 policy, seeking its official 
replacement with the proportional system of the Industry Department, a system which left 
no scope for the sort of activity API was apparently considering as the individual 
allocation of cotton to each spinning mill would be predetermined.
In April, SEKBERTAL sent its strongest letter yet to the government It was 
addressed solely to Rachmat Saleh, but at the end of the letter there was a staggering list 
of twenty-three key political figures, including the President, who had been sent 
registered copies.135 Though politely worded, the letter was an unequivocal call for 
Rachmat Saleh to reconsider his Decree of 23 January (as well as the implementing 
Decree of the Director General for Foreign Trade of 24 January) which reaffirmed the 
1:10 requirement. It stated openly that the regulation imposed great costs and 
administrative burdens upon the spinning industry, distorting the market and hampering 
their attempts to increase productivity and competitiveness as called for by the President 
in his budget speech earlier in the year.
The letter (a lengthy one, with many attachments), set out a range of 
arguments against the 1:10 system, and appealed for the spinning industry to be allowed 
to follow the proportional system designed by the Director General for Multifarious 
Industries. Prominent among the arguments used was the claim that domestic cotton 
production only amounted to five (as opposed to ten) percent of industry need. Hence in 
this situation the 1:10 regulation provided an opportunity for "certain groups" seeking a 
monopoly to purchase a large share of the local cotton supply, thereby creating price 
havoc. It noted that it was administratively very costly for spinning mills to have to 
obtain letters of confirmation from the cotton growers that no local supply was available. 
(The cotton sales centre was in East Java, which necessitated a trip there by the spinners
134 For reference to this, and some of the critical press coverage o f the idea o f a cotton stockpile see, 
"Tidak Ada Kesepakatan Dana Penyangga Kapas", Prioritas, 14 March 1987; and "Kehadiran Diijen Aneka 
Industri Ke Dep. Perdagangan Dimanfaatkan Pihak Tertentu”, Sinar Pagi, 16 March 1987.
135 SEKBERTAL letter no. 005/SEKBER/4/1987,14 April 1987.
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every time a letter was required.) This, it said, would all be unnecessary under the 
proportional system.
The letter argued that the Trade Department's regulation discouraged further 
investment and threatened the business climate in the industry, despite the fact that it was 
one in which Indonesia enjoyed a comparative advantage. The letter concluded with 
copies of letters and numerous telexes to SEKBERTAL from spinning mills complaining 
of great difficulties being experienced as a result of the January 23-24 regulations. One 
letter, from T.D. Pardede, was given particular prominence. Pardede, one of only three 
pribumi business people in the spinning industry, was a highly respected and well- 
known Sumatran business and political figure. Aminuddin sought to capitalise as much 
as possible on Pardede's letter, which detailed problems caused by the 1:10 regulation, 
and (very conveniently) urged Aminuddin to struggle for a review of the policy.
SEKBERTAL was clearly putting considerable pressure on the Trade 
Department, both with this letter and with its public campaign in support of fabric and 
garment exporters who were experiencing problems with the allocation of export quotas 
and the large export surcharges. As already mentioned, SEKBERTAL wanted to avoid 
being seen as engaging in too open a conflict that primarily concerning downstream 
industries. However, it was very keen for what Aminuddin described as a "second 
front" (ie. the garment industry) to be opened against API and the Department of Trade.
Traditionally, PIBTI had voiced garment manufacturer grievances, but while 
it had taken some action to criticise API and Trade, many garment manufacturers appear 
to have felt that the PIBTI leadership was not being sufficiently active.136 In this 
situation, Aminuddin advised and assisted a number of garment manufacturers who came 
to see him for help in establishing an organisation equivalent to SEKBERTAL for their 
industry. This resulted in the formation of SEKBERPAK, the Garment Manufacturers' 
Joint Secretariat. SEKBERPAK was greatly influenced by SEKBERTAL, as indeed its
136 p i b t I was headed by Arnold Baramuli and Suwoto Sukendar, both o f whom had major business 
activities outside the garment industry. Also both were very senior within KADIN cirlces, and were sen 
as typifing the ineffective representation associated with so many business organsiations, and KADIN in 
particular.
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very name suggests, with Aminuddin giving continual assistance and tactical advice to its 
leader Mrs Wien Dewanta.137
By this means SEKBERTAL could ensure that the pressure was maintained 
on the Department of Trade and API on issues over which they were currently 
vulnerable. Criticisms of the export quota allocation and the issue of the unaccounted 
levies on exports gained considerable supportive media attention. In this context, 
assistance came from the continuing scandal involving the manipulation of export quota 
documents by Trade officials, together with a fresh scandal that erupted concerning 
impropriety by Trade officials over coffee exports.138
These various factors closing in on the Department of Trade came to a head 
on 11 May with the announcement of a Presidential Decree replacing two of its most 
senior officials, the Director General for Domestic Trade and the Director General for 
Foreign Trade.139
This was the first time that Suharto had simultaneously dispensed with two 
officials of such a senior rank. It was made more remarkable by the fact that the more 
senior of the two, the Director General for Domestic Trade, who was widely seen to be 
very closely associated with API, reportedly also had business links to the President's 
family.140
SEKBERTAL drew great encouragement from this development, interpreting 
it as an extraordinary and unequivocal indication that very senior sections of the
137 Interviews with Wien Dewanta 28 April 1987, and Aminuddin 28 & 30 April 1987. For public 
reference to the formation of SEKBERPAK, see "Pengusaha Pakaian Jadi Berusaha Atasi Masai ah Dengan 
Kebersamaan", Prioritas, 14 April 1987. SEKBERPAK was in no sense opposed to PIBTI, indeed the 
there was very great overlap between the two organisations. The former was merely more action-oriented 
than the latter.
138 For references to these various problems being faced by API and the Trade Department, see for 
example: "Kemelut Landa Industri Pakaian Jadi", Prioritas, 7 May 1987; "Digugat, Ketertutupan Dan 
Cara Pembagian Kuota Ekspor Tekstil", Kompas, 4 April 1987; "Setelah Heboh Kuota Tambahan", 
Tempo, 21 March 1987; and "Manipulasi Ekspor Tekstil Dan Kopi Pelajaran Buat Seluruh Aparat Dep. 
Perdagangan", Sinar Pagi, 18 March 1987.
139 The decision to replace the two was apparently actually taken on 2 May, at a meeting involving the 
President, BAPPENAS head Sumarlin, Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh and Finance Minister Radius 
Prawiro. [Interview with Indrawan (economics editor of Kompas), 8 May 1987.]
154 The business link was apparently via a palm oil plantation in Prapat, North Sumatra.
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government, and even the President, were not deaf to their complaints.141 The removal 
of the two Director Generals was another major blow for API.
In the wake of all this, SEKBERTAL heightened its efforts to push for a 
reform of Rachmat Saleh's 1:10 ruling. Much confusion existed as to the legal situation 
with regard to the link between the purchase of local cotton and the importing of cotton. 
Rachmat Saleh's Decrees (nos. 1066 and 1067) of December 1985 officially linked the 
two by a 1:10 ratio. Then, following SEKBERTAL's campaign and the October 25 
package, the Director General for Multifarious Industries had appeared to supersede the 
December 1985 ruling with his instruction, on 4 December 1986 to spinning mills that 
the importing of cotton would henceforth be governed by his system of proportional 
distribution of local cotton. This had been followed up with a letter to the Director 
General for Foreign Trade, calling on him to instruct the foreign exchange banks as to 
these new arrangements. Then, to further confuse the whole situation, Rachmat Saleh 
and the Department of Trade had struck back on 23-4 January with Decrees reaffirming 
the authority of the original (December 1985) ruling requiring the 1:10 link.
This was a clear case of one arm of the government, the Department of 
Industry, saying one thing, while another, the Department of Trade, was saying 
something not only different, but quite contradictory.
It therefore fell to the banks to determine what they believed to be the official 
policy. It was the foreign exchange banks, whether state, private or foreign-owned, 
which ultimately had to decide whether or not to proceed and open a Letter of Credit for a 
spinning company wanting to import cotton. In this respect they had to weigh a renewed 
Minister's Decree against a slightly older Director General's instruction. The question 
confronting them became: which enjoyed greater political authority?142
The result was great confusion in both the banking and spinning industries, 
with some banks apparently agreeing to process the applications of spinning mills, which
141 The decision to replace the Director Generals, as noted above, was reportedly taken taken on 2 May. 
Aminuddin had been made aware o f  the decision by 3 May. In addition, his sources within the 
Government apparently indicated to him that the strong letter SEKBERTAL had sent on 14 April had 
been a major factor in persuading the President to act against the Trade Department. Interview, Husein 
Aminuddin 1 August 1987.
142 For a summary o f this conflict in departmental policy, see "Kebijakan Perindustrian Perdagangan 
Tabrakan", Priorität, 26 May 1987.
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adhered to the Department of Industry's proportional system, and others refusing, citing 
the Trade Department ruling.143
The Department of Industry maintained its support for the SEKBERTAL 
campaign against the 1:10 regulation in 1987, despite Rachmat Saleh's 23 January 
Decree. The Director General for Multifarious Industries persisted in issuing his updated 
proportional allocation list, and Industry Minister Hartarto reiterated that local cotton 
production only amounted to five percent of spinning industry needs.144
Consequently, SEKBERTAL sought a way by which the 1:10 regulation 
could be, if not revoked, at least superseded or side-stepped. The solution which 
emerged was a joint agreement between cotton growers and spinners providing for the 
institutionalisation of direct links between the two via the proportional system. The 
agreement included specific provisions to ensure that the new arrangements were clear in 
respect of the processing of applications for Letters of Credit by the banks.145
The agreement, which was reached after a series of negotiations initiated by 
SEKBERTAL, was signed by SEKBERTAL (representing the spinning industry) and 
executives from the cotton plantations' controlling and marketing bodies on 13 July. 
Importantly, the signing took place in the Directorate General for Plantations and was 
witnessed by the Director General for Plantations and the Director General for 
Multifarious Industries. This represented a very convenient solution to a delicate political 
situation. Rachmat Saleh’s Decree had been quietly by-passed and a new procedure 
established in such a way as to minimise loss of face for him and the Trade Department. 
It was very significant that the new agreement had been endorsed by two departments. 
One of the two, the Department of Agriculture (under which the Directorate General for
143 It seems that foreign banks on the whole stuck to the 1:10 ruling as it had the status of a Ministerial 
Decree, while a number of local banks judged the proportional system (even though not a Decree) to be in 
the political ascendancy.
144 On 23 March, the Director General issued a revised list in his letter no. 366/DJAI/III/1987. For 
public reference to this, see "Alokasi Serap Kapas Masa Panen Tahap II", Prioritas, 14 April 1987. 
Reference to public remarks by Hartarto can be found in, for example, "Hartarto: SEKBERTAL Wadah 
Mumi Penampung Aspirasi Industriawan Sejati", Berita Yudha, 11 April 1987; and "Regulation 
Hampers Supply Of Cotton Raw Materials", Jakarta Post, 12 May 1987.
145 The clause covering procedures governing the link with banks (paragraph 2, item 4 o f the agreement) 
was deliberately included to overcome the uncertainty in banking circles. For public reference to the joint 
agreement, see "Kesepakatan Penyerapan Serat Kapas Ditandatangani", Kompas, 15 July 1987; and 
"Kesepakatan Bersama Penyerapan Kapas Dalam Negeri", Berita Yudha, 15 July 1987.
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Plantations falls), was seen to be directly representing the interests of cotton growers - 
the same interests that the Department of Trade had been claiming to represent with the 
1:10 regulation. This, together with the fact that the absorption of the local cotton crop 
was still guaranteed, meant that Trade and API could not readily claim that the new 
system would harm the interests of small cotton farmers. Furthermore, the fact that the 
new agreement enjoyed the support of two departments meant that in terms of political 
clout the balance had tilted away from the Department of Trade's ruling.
The 1:10 regulation had, de facto, been superseded, and the proportional 
system firmly established, ensuring direct links between cotton growers and users, at the 
same time precluding the possibility of any group buying up a large portion of the crop 
(and hence possibly manipulating prices). In short, the situation had been returned to the 
status quo as it was prior to Rachmat Saleh's first decrees back in December 1985. The 
only significant difference was that spinners were now required to use local cotton, 
something that had originally been optional. This was a relatively small burden, 
however, since the crop was distributed proportionately throughout the entire industry. 
It was a tiny price to pay for the victory that had been achieved.
The only potentially threatening cloud that remained on SEKBERTAL's 
horizon was API. This was because SEKBERTAL still believed that API might try to 
introduce some other venture detrimental to SEKBERTAL members (perhaps by reviving 
CBTI),146 and because it continued to be a source of anxiety to SEKBERTAL's allies in 
SEKBERPAK and PIBTI. SEKBERTAL was therefore keen to see API's power 
reduced, if not eliminated altogether.
An opportunity to push in this direction had emerged shortly before the 
signing of the joint-agreement with the cotton growers. This centred around KADIN's 
need to review and reform its membership structure to bring itself into line with the new 
KADIN law (discussed in Chapter 3) ratified by the President in January 1987. One 
specific aspect of the law was that all member associations had to be sectorally based.
146 This concern o f SEKBERTAL stemmed from a belief that the API leadership had had to outlay a very 
large sum of money to the Trade Department in return for the granting o f the initial monopoly rights. 
SEKBERTAL was thus worried that API was under pressure to recoup this and might try to do so at the 
spinning industry’s expense.
146
This meant that cross-sectoral organisations, or federations, could not be accepted as 
members of the newly constituted KADIN.147
Following the promulgation of the new law, KADIN chief Sukamdani 
Gitosardjono had instructed the heads of all the different Sections within KADEN to 
examine the status of their member organisations. The textile industry fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Sections for Multifarious Industry, Small Industry and 
Pharmaceuticals, headed by Sunarto Prawirosujanto. When he came to consider the 
textile industry, he was immediately confronted with the problem that API was a cross- 
sectoral association. There was also the problem that some of the associations that had 
been 'fused' into the new API back in March 1985, remained as individual members of 
KADEN, as did PEBTI, APSYFI and PERTEKSI, the three textile associations that had 
boycotted the fusion. It was therefore decided to create a new representational structure 
for the textile industry which would be in harmony with the new KADIN law.148
After consultations, Sunarto decide to unravel the maze of textile 
organisations and create a simpler four-fold division for KADIN's new textile 
representational structure which would embrace the main areas of production from 
upstream to downstream - synthetic fibre-making, spinning, weaving and garment- 
making. It was well-recognised that this change would be very unpopular with API. 
Both Aminuddin and Arnold Baramuli (the head of both PIBTI and APSYFI, as well as 
the deputy head of KADEN) actively promoted this outcome, knowing full well that it 
would present an official representational alternative and thus a challenge to API's 
position as the supreme textile organisation.
It was envisaged that PIBTI149 and APSYFI would fill the positions created 
for garment-maker and synthetic-fibre maker associations. This was natural, as they 
were already members of KADEN. SEKBERTAL, however, anxious as it was to fill the 
spinning vacancy, faced the problem that even though it had upgraded its status and had
147 For reference to the emergence of the KADIN issue in relation to associational status generally, see, 
"Pergulatan KADIN Indonesia Dengan Asosiasi Berlangsung Hangat", Prioritas, 16 June 1987.
148 Interviews with Sunarto Prawirosujanto (Head o f the Section for Multifarious Industry, Small 
Industry and Farmasi, KADIN) 21 May 1987; and A lif Martadi (Secretary General o f PIBTI) 22 May 
1987.
149 PIBTI was put forward rather than SEKBERPAK as the latter had no associational status, and also 
because it was necessary that Baramuli himself have a place.
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become a himpunan, it could only be accepted by KADIN if it was an association 
(asosiasi). To this end it was decided that SEKBERTAL should indeed become an 
association by a further name change. In an effort to preserve (yet again) the name 
SEKBERTAL, the title Asosiasi SEKBERTAL was composed, with SEKBERTAL now 
standing for Sektoral Kebersamaan Permintalan, (the Joint Spinning Sector 
Association).150
SEKBERTAL was officially received as a member of KADIN on 25 July. 
After the inauguration ceremony, Baramuli (acting in his capacity as deputy head of 
KADIN) addressed a press conference together with Aminuddin. Aminuddin used the 
occasion to attack API, as did Baramuli in announcing that even if API applied to join 
KADIN, its application would be rejected.151
A month later, on 21 August, KADIN head Sukamdani announced to the 
press that a new textile federation had been formed, the Indonesian Textile Industry 
Federation, or FITI. He said that FITI had been formed spontaneously by the four 
sectoral associations recognised by KADIN (the fourth, after APSYFI, SEKBERTAL 
and PIBTI, was ASPINDO152, representing the weaving industry). He added that the 
new federation would be headed by Kusnaeni, the widely respected leader of ASPINDO, 
with Aminuddin as deputy head (and de facto leader). In offering strong endorsement of 
FITI, Sukamdani declared that he would inform the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and 
the ASEAN Textile Federation that FITI (and not API) was now Indonesia's sole 
representative for the textile industry.153
In doing this KADIN was clearly throwing its weight behind the new 
organisation and seeking to discredit API. FITI further strengthened its claims to
150 Interviews with Sunarto Prawirosujanto, 21 May 1987; and Husein Aminuddin, 1 August 1987. 
The change from a himpunan to an asosiasi was made necessary by the technicality that the new law did 
not specifically mention the term himpunan, referring instead only to asosiasi and gabungan. See, 
Undang-Undang no. 1,1987 (otherwise known as Undang-Undang KADIN), chapter 4, paragraph 1, clause 
10.
151 See, "SEKBERTAL Yang Mewakili 48 Perusahan Masuk KADIN", Kompas, 27 July 1987; and, 
"KADIN Tidak Mengakui Ekistensi Asosiasi Pertekstilan Indonesia", Suara Pembaruan, 27 July 1987.
152 As mentioned earlier in fn. 12, ASPINDO's status following the 1985 'fusion' was ambiguous. It 
had not dissolved itself, and had remained a member of KADIN. This meant it was sufficiently distinct 
from the API clique to be acceptable to Aminuddin and Baramuli.
153 See "Asosiasi Industri Tekstil Dan Pakaian Jadi Bentuk Federasi", Antara, 22 August 1987; and 
"Federasi Industri Tekstil Indonesia Dikukuhkan Ketua Umum KADIN Indonesia", Berita Yudha, 24 
August 1987; and "Industri Tekstil Bentuk Federasi", Kompas, 24 August 1987.
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legitimacy several days later when Aminuddin (acting in his capacity as a FITI 
representative) conducted a well-publicised courtesy call to Industry Minister Hartarto's 
office.154 This served to create the distinct impression that Hartarto also endorsed FITI.
The tide was now running strongly against API/CBTI. In November the 
standing of their principal opponent, Aminuddin, was further enhanced when he was 
appointed to the Advisory Council of KADIN, and chosen as one of the private sector 
representatives for the special conference convened to transform KADIN in line with the 
new KADIN law. Aminuddin's appointment was welcomed in the press, as representing 
the rise of a new breed of entrepreneur championing the cause of business interests.155 
Through developments such as this, SEKBERTAL was gradually able to shed its 
reputation for rebelliousness and as a body that operated 'outside' officially approved 
patterns. Indicative of this was the fact that Aminuddin, as deputy-head of FITI, was 
invited to appear before a special Parliamentary Committee (VI) hearing into the textile 
industry. Whereas SEKBERTAL had earlier deliberately avoided contact with the 
Parliament, it now welcomed the opportunity, being more secure under the FITI 
umbrella.156
SEKBERTAL's complete victory was to be confirmed the following year, 
with the replacement of Rachmat Saleh by Arifin Siregar as Trade Minister in the new 
Cabinet. Siregar, shortly after a much publicised cordial meeting with the FITI 
leadership in May 1988,157 issued a decree finally and formally revoking all the decrees 
that had been introduced by Rachmat Saleh that had provided for the existence and 
authority of CBTI.158 The slate had now been wiped completely clean. Rachmat Saleh
154 See, "Menteri Hartarto Hanya Dukung Entrepreneur Sejati", Berit a Yudha, 29 August 1987.
155 See, for example, "Keberhasilan MPI, Cermin Kesatuan Tiga Pelaku Ekonomi", P elita , 28 
September 1987; "Musyawarah Pengusaha Indonesia Dinilai Berhasil', Berita Yudha, 28 September 1987; 
and "Cuplikan Ekspresi-Ekspresi Kegembiraan Dari Munassus KADIN dan MPI", Angkatan Bersenjata, 
28 September 1987.
156 At the hearing with Committee VI (13 November 1987), in addition to oral evidence FITI submitted 
a detailed written presentation providing copious statistical data on the commerical circumstances of the 
different different textile sectors. In particular, it used the opportunity to further criticise API for harming 
both the spinning and garment industries.
157 For reports o f this see, for example, "FITI Bersuara Di Perdagangan", Tempo, 14 Mei 1988; "Isi 
Pertemuan Menperdag Dengan FITI Sangat Menarik", Angkatan Bersenjata, 9 Mei 1988; or "Keterbukaan 
Depdag Ben Angin Segar", Merdeka, 9 May 1988.
158 For a discussion of the decree (no. 165/Kp/VI/88, 10 June 1988), see "Mencabut Akar Inefisiensi", 
Tempo, 25 June 1988.
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had been replaced as Trade Minister, the two Trade Director Generals most closely 
associated with API had been discharged, FITI had been successfully established as a 
rival to API and was moving to eclipse it, and all of CBTTs authority had now been 
categorically removed. Perhaps the most telling indication of the magnitude of 
SEKBERTAL's achievements was Frans Seda's decision in late June 1988 declining to 
continue as head of API.159
Conclusion
This case-study has been lengthy and rather complex. What have been the 
main elements of the story? Briefly, the Department of Trade, responding to the initiative 
of a client group in the leadership of API, granted to an API-created and API-controlled 
company a wide-ranging monopoly over the procurement of the raw materials used by the 
spinning industry. This was coupled with a further requirement that spinners import not 
more than ten times the amount of cotton that they purchased from local cotton growers. 
Once CBTI was established and in operation, it sought to introduce a modus operandi as 
well as a number of specific revenue-raising measures which large sections of the 
spinning industry saw as highly injurious.
The issue was politically very sensitive in view of the widespread controversy 
over the government's tata niaga policy. This made it hard for aggrieved spinners to 
protest against the decision. However, beyond the fact that the existing political climate 
discouraged action relating to the broader import monopoly issue, there was also a range 
of other important factors that suggested strongly that the spinners would be unlikely to 
contest the policy. First and foremost was the fact that the position of CBTI seemed 
almost unassailable to the majority of spinners. It was seen to have strong links to the 
Department of Trade and even to the President, while its position had also been 
sanctioned not just by a Ministerial decree, but by a formal Cabinet decision. In addition 
this, CBTI was made up of influential members of the API leadership, some of whom
159 See, "Menghindari Antiklimaks", Tempo, 2 July 1988.
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were well-known and forceful pribumi figures. As most of the spinners were less well- 
connected Chinese Indonesians or foreign investors, it was unlikely that they would be 
willing to stand up and oppose CBTI.
Despite this, a small group of spinners, angered by CBTI proposals to 
introduce a heavy financial levy, and headed by one of the very few pribumi in the 
industry, formed an organisation with the explicit aim of persuading the government to 
reconsider its recently introduced bundle of policies governing the spinning industry and 
the procurement of its raw materials. SEKBERTAL soon grew in number as other 
spinners began to offer their support. Its strategy was, in essence, twofold It set out to 
mount an active media campaign highlighting the problems it saw CBTI generating and 
attempting in this way to discredit CBTI. At the same time it maintained discreet lines of 
communication to various strategically placed figures in the state appartus through 
numerous detailed letters and direct meetings. In this SEKBERTAL sought always to 
couch its arguments and claims in the government's own rhetoric of economic reform, so 
as to minimise the appearance of being a group that was challenging state authority.
Ultimately SEKBERTAL achieved sweeping success by not only persuading 
the government to withdraw CBTI's monopoly and review the 1:10 import requirement, 
but also by discrediting API as the peak organisation of the textile industry. At the time of 
writing, an alternative body, FIT1, was well-established as a rival representative body for 
textile industry needs.
SEKBERTAL’s success was clearly quite extraordinary in view of the 
circumstances. But what does this case tell us about the nature of the Indonesian polity 
and the question of state-society relations? At the most basic level, the argument here is 
that this case pulls in a different direction to that of the existing interpretations of these 
matters. As seen in the discussion of the theoretical literature on Indonesian politics, the 
prevailing view is that participation in policy formation by societal interests is very 
limited. In so far as there is any scope in most of the literature for extra-state interests to 
be transmitted upwards to policymakers, it is via patron client-client links, corporatist 
channels, or indirect 'osmotic' means. And yet what makes this case so interesting is that 
it shows societal actors having a direct input into policy formation in ways that are not
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easily accommodated by most of the existing frameworks for interpreting Indonesian 
politics.
In this case we have seen a situation where the government reversed not only 
a Ministerial decree, but also a Cabinet decision within the space of twelve months. How 
did this extraordinary policy reversal come about? Unquestionably, state actors played a 
central role in influencing the final outcome. The list of major participants from within the 
state apparatus included not only several departments and their senior officials, but also 
ministers, senior sections of the military and even the President himself. And yet quite 
clearly, were we to confine the list to other participants who played a vital role in the story 
would be omitted. These are of course the societal actors. Most striking of all in this 
respect, was the role of SEKBERTAL. It is extremely difficult to imagine that Rachmat 
Saleh's policies would have been reversed in the manner that occurred, had 
SEKBERTAL (or some similar body) not been there to oppose them. The press also 
played a very important role. It was both a disseminator of soceital groups' and 
individuals' demands on the state, as well as being an active participant itself, advancing 
certain preferred ideas of its own. To a lesser extent, KADIN also played a part, not so 
much as the standard bearer of industry interests, but rather as a sort of power broker, 
lending prestige to SEKBERTAL and the other textile associations which sought to form 
an alternative peak organisation to replace APL
Can SEKBERTAL's success be explained in terms of patron-client links? To 
do so, it would be necessary to argue that the crucial variable was Aminuddin's personal 
connections to key figures within the state, particularly Sumarlin and Wijoyo. No doubt 
these links were of considerable importance. But this in itself, cannot explain everything. 
Aminuddin did not have a patrimonial relationship with these men; it was not a case of 
them awarding concessions to a client. SEKBERTAL was a group-based struggle for 
collective goals which offered generalised benefits for all spinners, and not merely a select 
few. Aminuddin would have had little chance of success had he not been supported by the 
majority of the spinning industry, for it is highly unlikely that Aminuddin alone would 
have been able to overcome the political resources of the API camp. The whole logic of 
the SEKBERTAL argument was that API and CBTI were endangering an entire industry -
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an assertion attested to by the size of the SEKBERTAL membership. Moreover, the 
vigorous and very high-profile manner in which SEKBERTAL pursued its aims is utterly 
inconsistent with patrimonial behaviour. Its behaviour bore none of the hallmarks of a 
client seeking special favours from a patron. The controversy generated in the media was 
indicative of an effort to push the government into doing something it would not 
otherwise do.
Not only is it difficult to satisfactorily account for SEKBERTAL's behaviour 
in terms of patrimonial links, reliance on corporatism as an explanatory variable has 
problems as well. Certainly there are some remarkable corporatist features in the 
representational arrangements within the textile industry. API is a good example of an 
authoritative state-designated association, and the 'fusion' of 1985 served to enhance 
API's capacity to control its membership and suppress demands for policy reform. 
Moreover, the patrimonial links between API and the Department of Trade can be 
comfortably accommodated by a corporatist framework. But with the rise of 
SEKBERTAL, however, the whole nature of interest representation in the textile industry 
changed radically. The conflict over CBTI generated a quite different mode of interest 
intermediation. Most noteworthy in this regard, was the way in which a major section of 
the spinning industry broke away from API and spontaneously formed an organisation 
with the express aim of lobbying the government, precisely because the designated 
corporatist body, API, had failed to represent their interests satisfactorily. This was 
carried even further with the moves to replace API altogether with F1T1. In short, the 
corporatist structure of API was unable to contain industry demands, so a group of 
producers simply broke out of the official representative structure and sought to deal with 
the with the state on an independent basis. Whether FITI does ultimately completely 
replace API, and if so, the nature of the representational behaviour that emerges, remains 
to be seen. It is quite possible, for example, that after period, when the memory of the 
'API threat' has passed, FITI will fall back into corporatist patterns. Equally, however, 
FITI may assume some of the trappings of corporist organisations to better establish 
itself, while in practice still continuing to operate in a decidely non-corporatist manner.
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All of this is not to argue that the existing frameworks for the interpretation of 
Indonesian politics are somehow fundamentally flawed or in error. They do help us to 
make sense of some of the political phenomena here. All three of the mechanisms linking 
state and society in the existing literature were present at least in some degree. But above 
and beyond these sorts of links between societal interests and policy makers, the central 
feature of this case is the way in which an industry group pushed hard and openly to 
secure a preferred policy outcome. This is a qualitatively quite different phenomenon.
This argument obviously is intended to challenge state-centred explanations of 
Indonesian politics; it is an assertion that societal interests were in this case able to 
influence a major policy issue directly and decisively. Against this, it might be argued 
that the major policy reversal in this affair can be quite satisfactorily accounted for by 
reference to dynamics internal to the state: in short, a policy reform already set in train by 
the technocrats, with SEKBERTAL playing the role of a curious 'supporting actor*. 
Certainly there was significant momentum within key sections of the state apparatus for 
movement towards liberalisation of many aspects of economic policy, particularly tata 
niaga. Major policy initiatives such as the sweeping banking reforms of 1983, the 1985 
overhaul and privatisation of customs functions in the ports, and the May 6 package of 
1986 liberalising some investment and export procedures, were all in place either before 
SEKBERTAL was established or before it had had any significant impact Undoubtedly, 
the technocrats within the government and the corresponding sections of the bureaucracy 
wished to move much further in this direction. In addition, there was considerable 
pressure from the World Bank to accelerate the process of economic liberalisation. 
Moreover, all of this was taking place within the context of economic crisis following the 
dramatic deterioration of the country's trade position with the collapse in oil prices.
Clearly then, there was pressure for widespread economic reform. However, 
there was also very considerable countervailing pressures resisting economic liberalisation 
from those who were either sceptical of the economic arguments put forward, or more 
significantly, had a major material interest in the status quo. This was well illustrated by 
the piecemeal and often incremental nature of the reform initiatives. Thus reform of any 
policy area, and particular tata niaga, certainly faced major obstacles.
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But this is to focus too narrowly on the internal dynamics of the state. Why 
was it that the spinning industry was the major beneficiary of the October 25 and 
particularly the January 15 reform packages? Of the many different areas of industry in 
the Indonesian manufacturing sector, why did the spinning industry receive so much 
attention? In answering this, it is very hard to ignore the fact that the most prominent 
feature of the spinning industry in 1986 and 1987 was the political controversy generated 
by SEKBERTAL's pressure for a reversal of Rachmat Saleh's policies. It would have 
been quite extraordinary for other technocrat ministers to overturn those policies 
concerning the spinning industry that had only very recently been introduced by Rachmat 
Saleh and endorsed by the Cabinet, if there had not been some very significant extraneous 
factor involved. There was no shortage of other import restrictions that might have been 
eased. That the government should act in the way that it did is, however, readily 
understandable if one takes account of SEKBERTAL's lobbying, and especially its 
apparent success in persuading the President to intervene. Particularly telling, in this 
respect, is the fact that Mohammed Sadli, a prominent member of the technocrat circle, 
should offer the view that the spinning industry episode was a case of the government 
responding to external stimulus, rather than a deliberate and planned policy reform.160
160 Interview, 24 August 1987.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND 
THE CONFLICT OVER DRUG PRICES
In this chapter we will be looking at a policy conflict in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Basically, the story revolves around the efforts of the pharmaceutical industry 
to deal with various attempts by the Health Department to bring about a reduction in drug 
prices.
Following a long-running dispute over drug prices in Indonesia, a sudden and 
sharp controversy erupted in late 1986. A central feature of the case was the way in 
which the Directorate General for Drug and Food Control in the Department of Health and 
the Pharmaceutical Association (GPF) endeavoured to manage the furore threatening 
them. Other key actors in the story included the Minister for Health, the President, 
Committee VIII of the DPR, the Indonesian Doctors' Association (IDI), the Consumers' 
Association (YLK) and the press.
Much of the action here was taking place at the same time as the conflict in the 
textile industry was reaching a crescendo. There are important similarities between the 
cases. In both, we see a range of extra-state actors playing an important political role. In 
particular we again see an industry group very effectively promoting their interests 
through involvement in the shaping of government policy. Like the spinners in 
SEKBERTAL, the drug manufacturers in GPF were successful in achieving their aims, 
but there were differences in style, GPFs approach to dealings with the state differed 
considerably from that of SEKBERTAL. Also in common with the previous chapter, this 
case reveals important aspects of political behaviour which are not easily accounted for in 
the existing theoretical frameworks for the interpretation of Indonesian politics. Again, 
we see societal actors forcefully communicating their interests to policy makers by other 
than just patrimonial, corporatist or osmotic means.
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The structure of this chapter parallels the previous one. A brief account of the 
pharmaceutical industry and the interest representation structures in that sector will be 
provided first. Next we will proceed to a review of the factors leading-up to the mid- 
1986 situation. This will set the context for a detailed analysis of our main concern, the 
conflict over pharmaceutical prices which peaked in late-1986 and ran into 1987.
A Profile of the Pharmaceutical Industry
The pharmaceutical industry in Indonesia underwent rapid growth after 1968. 
During the Sukarno period there were some thirty to forty manufacturers, of which only a 
very small number were large scale producers. Under the New Order there has been a 
drive towards self-sufficiency in finished pharmaceutical products. Today there are 
approximately 300 pharmaceutical manufacturers in Indonesia, of which 40 are joint 
ventures with foreign firms. Among local companies, 40 are large-scale operations which 
were set up under the terms of the 1968 investment laws and are characterised by modem 
management and production techniques. The rest are mostly older, small-scale and often 
low-technology family enterprises. There are also three state-owned factories whose 
products are largely channeled into public health projects.
Pharmaceutical production in Indonesia centres around the 'assembling' of 
drugs; no research or product experimentation is undertaken. Joint ventures assemble 
products devised by the foreign parent company, while local companies assemble copies, 
or imitations of these and other drugs. Between 1971-73 there was considerable 
investment in Indoneisa by foreign pharmaceutical firms. This came after frequent hints 
by the government during 1968-69 that drug manufacturers not making direct capital 
investment in Indonesia would be excluded from the market. It did not come as a surprise 
then, when the government prohibited the importation of almost all assembled, or finished 
drugs, in April 1974.1 The major exceptions to this are small quantities of specialist "life­
saving drugs" not produced in Indonesia. The raw materials for assembling drugs are
1 Trythall (1977) p. 38.
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nearly all imported. In order to redress this dependence on raw material imports and as 
part of the drive towards self sufficiency, the government requires foreign manufacturers 
in joint ventures to produce at least one basic pharmaceutical substance necessary for the 
production of finished drugs. Of the drugs produced in Indonesia nearly all are 
consumed locally: very few are exported. In general, the pharmaceutical industry in 
Indonesia, while not as advanced as that of, for example, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico or South 
Korea, is considerably more sophisticated and developed than many other Third World 
countries.2
FIGURE 5.1
The Development of the Indonesian Pharmaceutical Market 
(Current Prices)
Source: Department of Health, 1987. [The figures actually originate from IMS (1987 a).]
The value of pharmaceutical production in Indonesia is generally agreed to be 
around US$500 million per annum.3 Figure 5.1 shows the growth patterns in the value
2 For details on the relative sophistication of national pharmaceutical industries, see United Nations 
Centre on Transnational Corporations (1984).
3 Though this study is concerned only with the modem pharmaceutical industry, it should be noted that 
there is also a growing 'traditional' medicine industry. In recent years some producers of traditional 
medicines have established large and modem mass-production facilities. Between 1971 and 1986, the 
value of traditional medicine production grew from Rp. 3.1 billion (US$ 7.4 million) to Rp. 43.8 billion 
(US$ 34.1 million), with the number of producers rising from 176 to 343. For further details, see "Obat 
Tradisional Berpeluang Menjadi Altematif Pengobatan", Kompas, 5 July 1988.
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of production in recent years.4 It illustrates the steady growth in the value of the 
pharmaceutical market during the 1970s. Similarly, it highlights the way in which the 
industry has suffered from the general economic contraction that has beset Indonesia in 
the 1980s since the collapse in oil prices. Pharmaceutical sales have declined with 
reduced consumer purchasing power.
The first thing to note about the market for pharmaceutical products in 
Indonesia is that it is highly fragmented. The largest company, Kalbe Farma Pty Ltd (a 
local firm), is estimated to hold only about 5-6% of the total market. Between them, the 
five largest companies control only about 16% of the market. However, of the 300-odd 
producers in Indonesia, the sixty largest control over 87% of the market, with the many 
other small firms having on average not more than .05% of the total.5 In other words, the 
large-scale producers, both foreign and locally owned, very much dominate the market. 
The numerous small-scale, low technology firms hold only tiny market shares. In terms 
of public-sector production, the state-owned manufacturers produce only about 5% of the 
total.6
Product competition within the industry is at once both concentrated and 
fragmented. The concentration occurs around the high-demand types of drugs, with 
approximately 27% of all drugs produced being antibiotics, 22% vitamins and 12% 
analgesics.7 Foreign and local companies compete very intensely in these areas. 
However, outside this 'central' market for the most widely used drugs, there are also 
fragmented markets for specialised types of drugs which have only limited demand.
4 Statistics for the pharmaceutical industry are notoriously difficult to obtain. The Department of Health 
has no systematic data covering the whole industry, and the estimates normally used are those produced 
annually by a Singapore-based consultancy company which regularly surveys drug manufacturers and 
retailers. The company, IMS (Index of Medical Specialities) Pty Ltd, compiles a variety of publications, 
the most important o f which, for present purposes, is the Indonesian Pharmaceutical Audit. The 
information contained in it is guarded very carefully, as the publication is extremely expensive and 
affordable to only the largest companies. It is thought that all these statistics have an error margin of at 
least ±  10%. One conspicuous factor mitigating against reliable statistics is that the data on the activities 
and production patterns of the numerous small scale producers is almost non-existent
5 These figures are drawn from an address by the Vice-Chairman o f GPF & President Director o f Pharos 
Indonesia Pty Ltd, Eddie Lembong (1987).
6 See Wanandi (1987) p. 24; and the report, "Pelaksanaan Pengadaan dan Produksi Obat s/d Tahun 
Keempat Pelita III", Varia Farmasi, (Jakarta) vol. 46, no. 5 1983, p. 8. The precise value of production 
by the few state-owned plants is not certain. The figure usually cited is 5%, though it may reach up to 
almost 10%.
7 Interview with Hanz Rivai (former Sales Director of W igo Pty Ltd), 12 August 1987.
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These specialised markets tend to be dominated by various foreign companies. 
Generally, local companies are most active in the production of those drugs which have 
the largest market. This reflects the fact that local companies (except those producing 
under licence to a foreign company) manufacture generic drugs, while the foreign 
companies rely mostly on patented, or more accurately, innovative drugs. In the 
Indonesian context, it is meaningless to talk of 'patented' drugs as there is no patent law 
to protect intellectual property rights. For this reason the term 'innovative' drugs is 
preferred. The distinction between innovative and generic drugs is important and easily 
illustrated. There is, for instance, one product in Indonesia (and the world) known as 
Valium, a tranquilliser developed by Roche Pty Ltd. The numerous imitations of it which 
exist are known as generics (or colloquially, as "me too" drugs). An example from the 
Indonesian market might be, Kalbrium, manufactured by Kalbe Farma Pty Ltd. An 
innovative drug offers some new pharmacological quality and is the product of its creators 
own research and development efforts. Generics, then, are copies of innovative drugs. 
Generic products can also be divided between those which are branded - that is they carry 
the producer's name, such as Kalbrium - and those which are unbranded. Unbranded 
generics are identified simply by the active ingredient in the product.
Innovative drugs are the most expensive, though they are closely followed in 
Indonesia by branded generics. Unbranded generics are much cheaper and tend to be 
manufactured by the very small scale producers. Innovative drugs and branded generics 
are produced for the upper end of the market by foreign and large-scale local firms.
Generic products can be produced at a fraction of the cost of an innovative 
product, as there are almost none of the enormous research and development costs 
involved. The analysis and imitation of a drug is usually a short and inexpensive process. 
In the absence of patent laws, the copying of an innovative product takes place very 
rapidly in Indonesia. Local companies are able to enjoy a direct and large windfall profit 
in this, as they not only do not have to bear the heavy research and development costs, 
but they can also import their raw materials cheaply from countries such as Italy, Spain 
and India which themselves do not have patent laws protecting raw material manufacture. 
This means the raw material import bill for local companies is very much lower than that
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for foreign companies, which import raw materials from their parent company - typically 
located in Western countries which do have patent laws. Nevertheless, there is, of course 
transfer pricing profits to be had by the parent company in these operations.8 In general, 
Indonesia is very heavily dependent on imported chemical raw materials for the 
manufacture of its drugs. Ninety five percent of industry raw material needs are 
imported, with local production still being very limited.
In order to gauge the market division between foreign and local companies, it 
is necessary to introduce an intermediate category, to cover those local companies which 
manufacture products under licence for foreign companies. Table 5.1 sets out sales by 
these three categories of producers and their shares of the various sub-sectors of the 
national market. The most important of these sub-sectors is the dispensary market. 
Dispensaries (apoteks), being modem and specialised pharmaceutical retail outlets 
employing trained pharmacists, can be distinguished from drug stores {toko obat), which
TABLE 5.1
• The 1986 Indonesian Pharmaceutical Market
MARKET
SUB-SECTOR
PORTION of 
TOTAL MKT.
%
FOREIGN 
COMPANIES 
mil US$ (%)
LICENSED 
MANUFACTRS 
mil USS (%)
LOCAL 
COMPANIES 
mil USS (%)
Dispensaries Mkt 47 116 (54) 37 (17) 62 (29)
Drug Store M kt 23 48 (46) 11 (10) 46 (44)
Institutions Mkt. 18 17 (20) 8 (10) 57 (70)
Street M kt 9 10 (25) 2 (5) 29 (70)
Plantations M kt 3 3 (25) 1 (10) 9 (65)
TOTAL 100 194 (43) 59 (13) 203 (44)
Source: IMS (1987 a).
although also registered as drug retailers are more simple shops selling an array of 
medicines, both modem and traditional. After these two sub-sectors, there follows the
8 Basically, transfer pricing involves the repatriation of profit from the subsidiary of a transnational 
corporation back to the parent company. This is done to avoid payment o f taxation and other royalties in 
the subsidiary's host country. So, for example, a subsidiary might buy raw materials for drug 
manufacture from its parent company at inflated prices as a means of transferring tax-free out of the host 
country. For a more detailed considerationof the issue of transfer pricing by transnational drug 
manufacturers operating in developing countries, see the excellent study by Gereffi (1983) especially pp. 
193-8.
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open street market, made up of peddlers and miscellaneous shops, and the institutional 
market which is contract-based, mostly supplying hospitals. The plantations sub-sector is 
only very small.
From Table 5.1 it is evident that the overall market positions of the foreign 
and locally owned companies are roughly equal. Local companies operating under 
licence to foreign companies (not themselves present in Indonesia) make up the 
remainder.9 The scope for foreign manufacturers to increase their share of the Indonesian 
market is limited by an array of government regulations. While both local and foreign 
firms complain of over-regulation, it is the latter which suffers greater restriction. 
Foreign companies are, for example, prohibited from launching any new products in the 
highly lucrative "Over-the-Counter" (OTC) drug market, and as such are forced to 
concentrate their energies in the other main category of drugs, namely, the ethical drug 
market. Ethical drugs, unlike OTC drugs, are supposed to be obtainable only upon 
prescription by a doctor. The significance of this is that foreign companies are unable to 
promote many of their products by direct advertising to the public, and must instead focus 
their promotional efforts on the doctors (as they determine which ethical drugs to 
prescribe patients). Foreign companies are not permitted to undertake new investment, 
except in the area of developing raw material production. This obviously limits the 
potential for expansion by foreign firms, as investment in raw material production is 
regarded as a burden rather than a boon. Further, unlike local companies, they are not 
permitted to distribute their products to retailers themselves. Instead local distributors, or 
wholesalers, must be used.10 More generally, there is a wide array of regulations 
governing production procedures requiring different licences, particularly with regard to 
the introduction of new products.
9 The term "foreign company" is used instead o f "joint venture" in this chapter so as to avoid possible 
confusion with licensed manufacturers.
10 Interviews with David Ojerholm (General Manager of Boehringer Ingelheim Pty Ltd & Vice Chairman 
of the International Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Group - IPMG) 12 August 1987; and Ron Young 
(Managing Director of Burroughs Wellcome Pty Ltd & Chairman of the IPMG) 7 September 1987. Both 
of these restrictions were very unpopular with foreign companies. The former because the development of 
raw materials for drug manufacture is very costly and unrewarding in Indonesia (they much preferred to 
import all ingredients), and the latter because distribution was a large factor in a drug's price structure. 
For discussion of the problems associated with the requirement to produce a raw material see Trythall 
(1977) p. 40.
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The increasing regulation of the pharmaceutical market in Indonesia marks 
what many company executives (especially those of foreign companies) resignedly 
described as the end of the of the 'golden era' of the pharmaceutical industry. This is a 
reference to international trends that have been evident for a decade and a half in Western 
industrialised countries and with which Indonesia has recently been catching up. 
Whereas the 1950s and early 1960s had been a boom period for the industry throughout 
much of the world, with many new and pioneering drugs being introduced and little or no 
government regulation in existence, the 1970s and 1980s have been much more difficult. 
Two key elements in this have been the sharp decline in the rate of development of new 
products, and the increasingly critical attitude of Western societies and their governments 
towards the pharmaceutical industry. Following a series of scandals (such as that over 
Thalidomide), governments came to demand far tighter quality control procedures in drug 
manufacturing. This, in turn, contributed to rising cost structures. At the same time, 
faced with the problem of aging populations and rapidly rising national health bills, 
governments have seen drug costs as one area which can be conveniently targeted for 
attack in the name of limiting overall health care costs.11 The tarnished reputation of the 
pharmaceutical industry has contributed to this vulnerability. All of this has inclined 
Western governments to adopt a tougher approach to the pharmaceutical industry, 
especially on the question of costs.
This trend towards greater regulation of the pharmaceutical industry spread 
into Indonesia (and other developing countries12) during the 1970s, assisted by the fact 
that in Indonesia (as in other developing countries) a high proportion of the total health 
care bill was made up by the cost of drugs. Whereas in Britain, for example, drugs 
represent about 10% of health care spending, in Indonesia the figure is between 40- 
50%.13 Though Indonesia does not have exactly the same problems as Western countries 
(for example, an aging population), the fact that pharmaceuticals constitute such a high
11 For a very useful summary o f the overall situation in the pharmaceutical industry internationally, see 
Wyke A., "Pharmaceuticals: Harder Going" (special survey), The Economist, 7 February 1987 pp. 3-18.
12 For a broader consideration o f the problem of drug costs in developing countries see, Gereffi (1983), 
and the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (1984).
13 For further details, see the address by the Special Adviser to the Health Minister, Biantoro Wanandi 
(1987) p. 22.
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percentage of the national health bill has nonetheless stimulated the government in Jakarta 
to take considerable interest in the price levels of drugs.
An important and interesting question in its own right is: Who is 
'responsible' for existing pharmaceutical price levels in Indonesia and are they unusually 
high? But that is not the focus of this study. Instead we are concerned with a question 
about interest intermediation and the way in which the pharmaceutical industry has 
responded to attempts by the government to reduce prices. Nevertheless, a brief 
discussion of some of the factors contributing to the high prices is instructive.
The pharmaceutical industry is just one of the links in the chain which places 
drugs in the hands of consumers. Other links which have an important role - at least in 
terms of influencing the prices paid by consumers in Indonesia - include distributors, 
dispensaries and doctors. During the conflict over drug prices in 1986-87, it was 
generally assumed that the manufacturers were the principal cause of the problem. The 
basis for this assumption is not, however, clear. An argument often heard in 
pharmaceutical industry circles is that the ex factory prices (the prices at which 
manufacturers sell their products to distributors) are no higher in Indonesia than 
elsewhere in the region. Table 5.2 provides comparative data for other Southeast Asian 
countries which tend to support this claim.14 Though these figures are for the net price at 
which dispensaries purchase drugs, that is, the price at which they are sold by distributors 
to dispensaries, and are thus one step removed from ex factory prices, they do suggest 
that unless distribution costs in Indonesia are substantially less than elsewhere in the 
region (something most unlikely15) ex factory prices must compare favourably. To 
satisfactorily explain the fact that retail prices in Indonesia are higher than in most
14 Questions will, naturally, arise about the source of this data, but given that it was compiled, not by the 
industry itself, but by the Singapore Regional Office of IMS (Index o f Medical Specialties Pty Ltd) it can 
be treated as an independent assessment. (IMS operates throughout Southeast Asia and Australia, and is 
thus not tied just to Indonesia.)
15 The distribution, or wholesale network in Indonesia is generally regarded to be very innefficient 
because of the massive number of drug distribtuors (over 900) which must share the market This has 
meant that economies of scale have remained elusive. (In the Philippines, for example, there are only 
about half a dozen distributors). One reason for the huge number of distributors is that in the past many 
licences were granting to retiring military figures to provide them with a source of income. This has 
made rationalisation of the industry difficult. Interview with Biantoro Wanandi (Special Adviser to the 
Health Minister & Persident Director of Anugerah Pharmindo Lestari Pty Ltd - a major drug distributor) 
24 August 1987.
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countries, it is therefore insufficient to concentrate just on the production end of the chain.
Other factors that would have to be considered in a serious economic analysis of drug 
prices in Indonesia would include:
1. problems in the system of distribution of products to retail outlets;
2. the reluctance of the medical profession to prescribe low-priced drugs;
3. the fact that price mark-up levels for distributors and retailers are artificially set at 22% 
and 50% of manufacturers' selling prices respectively .
TABLE 5.2
Comparison of Pharmaceutical Prices in Southeast Asia, 1986 
(US$ price per capsule, tablet etc.)
PRODUCT a INDONESIA THAILAND SINGAPORE MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES
1 0.18 0.17 0.27 0.23 0.19
2 0.30 0.21 0.51 0.46 0.17
3 0.33 0.23 0.66 0.58 0.37
4 0.72 0.73 - - 0.61
5 0.07 - 0.07 0.07 0.12
6 0.80 0.70 - - 0.59
7 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.20 0.24
8 0.26 - 0.28 0.29 0.21
9 0.42 - - - -
10 0.46 0.50 0.31 0.30 0.35
11 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.11
12 0.37 - - - -
13 0.46 0.25 - - 0.29
14 0.81 0.70 1.25 1.43 0.77
15 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.23 0.25
16 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.13
17 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.27
18 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.16
AVERAGE b 0.26 0.23 0.36 0.37 0.27
Source: IMS (1987 b).
a Selected leading pharmaceutical products.
The average is calculated on the basis of those products for which there was data from all five countries.
At the manufacturing end of the chain, profit margins, industry sources claim, are slim.16 
A key element in the cost structure of drug manufacturing in Indonesia is the dependence
16 In the absence of systematic microeconomic analysis, this assertion can only be supported with 
circumstantial evidence. Certainly, for instance, declining profit margins were a constant refrain in 
producer circles. More pointedly, the highly competitive and fragmented nature of the pharmaceutical 
market, together with the fact that none of the major business groups associated with 'rent-taking' 
practices in Indonesia have so far been attracted to the pharmaceutical industry, all seem to point in the 
direction of profitability not being especially high. By contrast, some of the support industries linked to 
drug manufacturing, such as capsule production, are marked by monopolistic trade regulations and do seem 
to be very profitable. This is reflected in the fact that Bambang Trihatmodjo has enetred into partnership 
with Wim Kalona via Kapsulindo Pty Ltd. Similar operations are Liem Soe Liong's Gelatino Pty Ltd and 
General (Ret.) Sumitro's Ria Sima Pty Ltd.
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on imports for up to 95% of raw materials. As much of this import bill is denominated in 
foreign currencies, it is subject to price fluctuations. Aside from the dependence on raw 
material imports, another important factor bearing on production costs is that the size of 
the pharmaceutical market is relatively small, thereby preventing producers from attaining 
economies of scale. This problem has been accentuated in a recessional environment. 
Despite the country's large population, it is estimated that the pharmaceutical industry 
supplies not more than 10% -20% of the people on a regular basis. Figure 5.2 shows per- 
capita drug consumption in variety of Asian countries.
FIGURE 5.2
Per-Capita Consumption of Pharmaceuticals in Selected Asian Countries, 1986
(US$)
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Source: IMS (1987 b).
In sum, the main points to be noted about the pharmaceutical industry in 
Indonesia are that it has highly a competitive and fragmented market which is dominated 
by a small number of large-scale producers. Ownership is heavily concentrated in the 
hands of the private sector, with foreign and local firms having roughly equal shares.
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Interest Representation in the Field of Pharmaceuticals and Health
This section provides an overview of interest representation in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Special attention is given to the character and dynamics of GPF, 
the Pharmaceutical Association, but other other major actors in the case, the Department 
of Health, the Doctors' Association, the Consumers' Association, Committee VTI of the 
DPR and the press are also discussed. Noteworthy, in terms of the theoretical concerns 
of this study, is the diversity of extra-state actors together with the corporatist 
characteristics of several of them.
GPF and the Pharmaceutical Industry
GPF is the organisation formally responsible for the representation of the 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry. In addition to the manufacturers, however, it 
also represents other segments of the pharmaceutical sector, distribution and retailing. To 
this end it is divided into four constituent parts, with individual sections for the 
manufacturers, distributors, dispensaries and registered drug stores. The four sections 
are formally equal, although in practice the manufacturers are dominant. For example, 
while each section has its own leader, the overall head of GPF has always been drawn 
from the ranks of the manufacturers, reflecting their greater economic importance. 
Indeed, GPF is commonly seen as primarily concerned with the interests of the 
manufacturers, rather than, for instance, with dispensaries or distributors. (Therefore, 
for the sake of brevity, when the abbreviation GPF is used here, it should be taken as 
referring only to the pharmaceutical manufacturers, but not the other sections as well, 
unless so indicated.) As with other government-approved business associations, GPF 
has a national structure with regional branches spread throughout the country.
KADIN (of which GPF is a member) also has a nominal role in facilitating 
interest intermediation in the pharmaceutical industry, in so far as it has umbrella 
responsibility for all facets of business in Indonesia. KADIN has a specific department 
to handle pharmaceutical affairs within its Section for Multifarious Industry, Small 
Industry and Pharmaceutical Industry. (This, it may be recalled, also happens to be the
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section handling the textile industry.) In practice KADIN is rarely used by the 
pharmaceutical industry, and all industry attention tends to be focused instead on GPF.
As a representative organisation, GPF exhibits a number of strikingly 
corporatist features. Formed in 1969, it was formally designated in the enabling decree 
issued by the Health Minister of the day as the peak association for all the pharmaceutical 
businesses that came within the purview of the Health Department.17 In other words, this 
decree anointed GPF as the only legitimate representative organisation for the 
pharmaceutical industry in the eyes of the state. Since the early 1970s, moreover, 
membership has been compulsory for all companies, a requirement that was later 
extended to embrace foreign companies.18 The requirement for foreign firms to join 
GPF, meant that they could no longer maintain in Indonesia a branch of the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, the international drug manufacturers' 
organisation based in the United States. As a result, they were restricted to just a sub­
section within GPF known as the IPMG (International Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' 
Group) which held only a minority voting position within the GPF structure (one vote in
fifty).
Especially noteworthy, in terms of a corporatist framework, is the fact that 
manufacturers may not approach the government independently. All approaches to state 
officials must be made via GPF, except on specific issues concerning individual 
companies. This arrangement potentially concentrates state control over all aspects of the 
pharmaceutical sector. It also places great influence over industry affairs in the hands of 
the leadership of GPF, particularly Eddie Lembong (the head of the manufacturers' 
section and the key figure within GPF), as the great bulk of interaction between the state 
and industry is via GPF - and thus through Eddie Lembong. This corporatist 
representation structure has great potential for restricting the flow of demands by the 
pharmaceutical industry on the state.
17 For background on this, see Marsyaid Yushar (1981) p. 9.
18 Compulsory membership was first introduced by the former Director General for Drug and Food 
Control, Sunarto Prawirosujanto (who is now head of KADIN's Multifarious Industry, Small Industry and 
Pharmaceutical Industry Section). Interview, 5 September 1987. The extension of this to include foreign 
firms was introduced by his successor, Midian Sirait.
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In its dealings with the pharmaceutical industry a particularly important source 
of strength for the state, or more accurately, the Directorate General of Drug and Food 
Control, are its formal regulatory powers, especially the licensing of new products. The 
introduction of new drugs, regardless of whether they are genuinely innovative or simply 
generics, is governed by testing and licensing procedures controlled by the Director 
General, Midian Sirait. This is a crucial power, as the introduction of new products is 
critical to the prosperity of most manufacturers. Thus all manufacturers are, to some 
degree, at the mercy of the Department of Health. Foreign companies are generally seen 
to be in an especially weak position, however. It is commonly said by the heads of 
foreign firms, that whereas it might take from six to twelve months for a local company to 
obtain a licence for a new product, foreign companies can expect to wait for up to three 
years. Their situation is made still more difficult with respect to innovative drugs because 
of the risk that their chemical properties will be leaked directly to local manufacturers. 
The general sense of insecurity and weakness felt by the foreign companies is reflected by 
the apparent disdain in which they are held by the Directorate General of Drug and Food 
Control. Even though the size of the pharmaceutical market in Indonesia is still relatively 
small and profitable, the Directorate General correctly assumes that foreign firms are very 
unlikely to surrender their toe-hold in a market which they believe must assuredly expand. 
While the Directorate General does not want the foreign companies to leave, it has no 
qualms about favouring the development of local rather than foreign producers.19
The political weakness of the foreign companies is compounded by the 
requirement that lobbying activity take place through GPF channels, which means that the 
foreign companies are forced to make use of Eddie Lembong (himself a leading local 
manufacturer) as their spokesman. The difficulty in this is that local and foreign 
companies frequently have quite divergent interests.20 While foreign companies are
19 Interviews with Ron Young (Managing Director of Burroughs Wellcome Pty Ltd & Chariman of the 
IPMG) & 7 September 1987; David Ojerholm (Managing Director Boehringer Ingelheim Pty Ltd & Vice 
Chairman of the IPMG) 12 August 1987; J.W. Sudomo (President Director of Squibb Pty Ltd & member 
of IPMG Executive) 10 August 1987; Slamet Soesilo (Director for Drug Control, Department of Health) 
7 September 1987; and Soekaryo (Secretary General, Department of Health) 4 September 1987.
20 This problem was highlighted with the recent move to introduce a legislative basis for intellectual 
property rights protection in Indonesia. Foreign drug companies were extremely anxious that such a law 
cover the pharmaceutical industry (and not just, for example, the music industry) as they were the ones 
who developed the new drugs. Local companies were naturally opposed to this, and supported by the
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generally resentful of the requirement that they deal through GPF, they do concede that 
their interests are at least honestly and reasonably represented. Thus, although it is 
inevitable that GPF will tend to favour the interests of local manufacturers, there is 
nonetheless a working and professional relationship between the IPMG and the rest of 
GPF.
Three final characteristics which have a bearing on interest intermediation in 
the pharmaceutical industry are of a more sociological nature. The first concerns the fact 
that of all the pharmaceutical companies in Indonesia, only one is pribumi-owned. The 
overwhelmingly Chinese character of the industry is seen by many as making the task of 
promoting industry interests more difficult. There was some feeling in industry circles 
that the image of Chinese business people exploiting a 'social good' complicated the task 
of lobbying, especially in relation to the issue of medicine price. Some industry leaders 
believed that Midian Sirait and Slamet Soesilo (respectively, the Director General and 
Director) were unfavourably disposed towards the industry because of its heavy Chinese 
dominance. It should be noted, however, that while this perception of vulnerability 
because of the 'Chineseness' was fairly common within the industry, Eddie Lembong 
(himself Chinese Indonesian) was dismissive of what he labelled this "paranoia". While 
conceding that 'Chineseness' is often an issue in Indonesian politics, he insisted that it did 
not inhibit GPF in promoting pharmaceutical industry interests or interfere in his 
relationship with the government21
If paranoia arising from ethnicity is debatable, more clear-cut are the self­
doubts stemming from the broader image problems of the pharmaceutical industry. This 
relates to the tendency of both local and foreign drug manufacturers to assume that they 
are held in a poor light by the public. The pharmaceutical industry's sensitivity to 
criticism and periodic paranoia, led the Director for Drug Control, Slamet Soesilo, to
Department of Health, they succeeded in ensuring that the new law (of June 1988) did not embrace 
pharmaceutical products.
21 It should be noted in this context that Eddie Lembong comes from North Sulawesi where, by his own 
admission, the status of Chinese Indonesians is considerably better than in other parts o f Indonesia. This 
may be an important ingredient in his cultural self-confidence and out-spokeness. Also to be noted here, 
is that although Eddie Lembong was the Head of the Manufacturing Section, the Deputy Chairman of all 
GPF and the driving force behind the organisation, the actual Chairman and formal head of GPF, Amir 
Basir (head of the state-owned Indofarma) was a pribumi.
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describe it as a "neurotic industry".22 To say that the pharmaceutical industry suffers 
from paranoia does not mean that it does not have some real image problems. 
Recognising that the industry's poor image had in the past restricted its political 
effectiveness, Eddie Lembong was concerned to improve its public relations. This was a 
key factor behind, for example, GPFs introduction of a Code of Ethics to govern 
promotional practices by manufacturers in 1981 and similarly the donation of medicines to 
the victims of the Mount Galunggung disaster in West Java in 1982. By working to 
bolster the image of the pharmaceutical industry, GPF was hoping to make the industry 
less vulnerable to public criticism, and, by extension, less vulnerable to regulatory 
intervention from the Health Department
A third sociological feature to be noted concerns the closely-knit nature of the 
pharmaceutical community. This stems from the fact that most of the heads of Oocal) 
companies are university-trained pharmacists. Moreover, of those that are, the majority 
were educated at a time (the 1950s) when only two institutions - the Bandung Institute of 
Technology and Gadjah Madah University - offered degrees in pharmacy. In 
consequence, many were educated together and have known each other for a long time. 
Significantly, this also applies to the bureaucrats. Eddie Lembong, for example, has 
known Midian Sirait since university days. Personal familiarity, together with the 
generally high level of education amongst industry leadership, contributes to a more fluent 
and sophisticated style of interest representation.23
There is a general perception within the industry (foreign and local firms 
alike), the Department of Health and press circles, that GPF is a very competent and 
professional business association. In its dealings with the government, the GPF 
leadership moves both at its own initiative (through anticipation of membership concerns) 
and also at the direct suggestion of members. Formal GPF meetings are largely 
ceremonial. If members have a grievance the usual process is to contact Eddie Lembong 
directly, requesting that GPF intercede on their behalf. In the case of foreign companies,
22 Interview with Slamet Soesilo (Director of Drug Control, Department of Health) 7 September 1987.
23 Interviews with, for example, Eddie Lembong, 31 September 1987 and Wim Kalona (President 
Director of Wigo Pty Ltd) 2 September 1987.
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the first step is usually the discussion of the problem with other foreign drug companies 
of the same language group. Thus, in the first instance, German-speaking companies are 
likely to consult with each other, and Japanese with other Japanese speaking-companies. 
Subsequently the matter would be raised with the IPMG executive which meets monthly, 
which would then approach Eddie Lembong. (In the event that the matter did not involve 
the Health Department, the IPMG executive could make approach the institution 
concerned directly, without going via the GPF leadership.) If this proves unsatisfactory, 
there remains the possibility of using national chambers of commerce (particularly the 
American Chamber of Commerce), as well as embassies.24
A feature of GPFs strength has been the quality of its leadership. Eddie 
Lembong was widely acknowledged as a shrewd operator and very successful promoter 
of industry interests. Previous GPF leaders had also enjoyed a high reputation as 
effective industry representatives. An important factor in the quality of GPFs leadership 
seems to have been its competitive elections for office. High standards have apparently 
been expected of GPF leaders. Eddie Lembong, for example, devotes approximately 
90% of his time to GPF affairs, relying on managers to oversee his own company.25
GPFs relationship, via Eddie Lembong, with the Directorate General for 
Drug And Food Control has generally been smooth and amicable. Lembong emphasised 
that almost all major problems are handled through negotiation in private and informal 
meetings between himself and the relevant officials. In his view, a key element in GPFs 
normally successful negotiating strategy has been the avoidance of situations creating a 
loss of face for government officials, even if this necessitated short term sacrifices. In 
other words, GPFs usual approach was to adopt a low-profile method of negotiation 
with officials on a private basis, without recourse to more public avenues.26 This is also 
bound up, of course, with the industry's sensitivity about its image.
24 Interview with David Ojerholm (Managing Director of Boehringer Ingelheim Pty Ltd & Vice 
Chairman of IPMG) 12 August 1987.
25 Interview with Eddie Lembong, 21 August 1987.
26 Interviews with Eddie Lembong, 31 July 1987, and 21 August 1987.
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The Department o f Health
Drug manufacturing is one of only three industries not under the umbrella of 
the Department of Industry, the others being mining and agriculture. This is of 
considerable significance since the bureaucrats in the Health Department who preside over 
the pharmaceutical industry are trained in pharmacy, but have little or no expertise in 
business and industrial development. Many pharmaceutical firms believe this predisposes 
the Department of Health to be philosophically unsympathetic to their quest for profits, 
seeing drugs as social, rather than commercial goods. As one local company executive 
lamented: there is little controversy in Indonesia over the fact that sugar and fertilizer 
prices are among the most expensive in the world, but there is over drugs because they 
are seen primarily as a social good, hence their price becomes a matter of sensitivity.
The 'health' rather than 'business' orientation of the Directorate General of 
Drug and Food Control does, however, also provide the pharmaceutical industry with 
some advantages. As many people emphasised, the lack of economic skills among the 
bureaucrats tended to induce a measure of dependence on GPF for advice about business 
conditions in the industry. As will be seen in this case-study, GPF exploited this 
opportunity very effectively.
Health policy is not an area that normally receives highest priority in 
Indonesia. While health policy is certainly not a peripheral matter to the government, it 
does ranks well behind security and economic management. Within this context, drug 
policy is one major aspect of Health Department activity. Because of the technical and 
specialised nature of pharmaceutical matters, the Directorate General for Drug and Food 
Control has usually acted with considerable autonomy. Health Minister Suwardjono, 
lacking technical expertise, has generally not involved himself in drug policy issues. 
Midian Sirait, the Director General, has thus been the highest source of authority on most 
drug policy issues. Under him, Slamet Soesilo, the Director for Drug Control, has 
responsibility for the daily management of pharmaceutical affairs. Significantly, not only 
has the technical and specialised nature of drug policy issues generally discouraged 
involvement by the Health Minister, it has also discouraged other ministers from taking an 
interest. Thus, unlike the situation in the spinning industry where we saw a variety of
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ministers become directly or indirectly involved, in the pharmaceutical industry this very 
rarely happens.
Midian Sirait, the Director General, received pharmacy training in West 
Germany, and was a member of the GOLKAR fraksi in the DPR before joining the 
Health Department. As a member of GOLKAR, he was on the political staff of the 
influential General Ali Murtopo. From this period, Sirait apparently earned the reputation 
as a "thinker" in GOLKAR circles.27 When Sirait was appointed Director General in 
1978, the pharmaceutical industry was at first quite wary of him, viewing him as being 
disturbingly sympathetic to anti-business attitudes.28 This was heightened by a 
pronouncement he made before the DPR shortly after joining the Health Department to the 
effect that drug prices were too high and that he would ensure they were brought down by 
one means or another.
The Directorate General seems to view the pharmaceutical industry as a force 
which must be reckoned with, even if it is not especially liked. While the pharmaceutical 
industry is an obvious opponent to any notions of forcing down drug prices, it is a force 
that state officials must deal with if they want key policy initiatives to have much chance 
of success. Despite an initial distrust, however, GPF and Sirait soon established 
channels for the maintenance of a mutually satisfactory dialogue to handle policy matters 
of concern. Sirait had the authority to make policy determinations vital to the 
pharmaceutical industry, and GPF had the capacity to deliver valuable industry 
cooperation in support of government initiatives when required, as well as to offer 
'guidance' on the likely commercial ramifications of different policy options.
The Indonesian Doctorsf Association
Another of the major players in this story is IDI, the Doctors' Association. 
The status of doctors in Indonesia is hazy, for in some respects they are considered to be 
civil servants. This stems from, among other things, the requirement that all new doctors
27 Interview with Eddie Lembong, 21 August 1987.
28 Sirait had been a member of the Indonesian Socialist Party in the early 1960s, while at the Badung 
Institute of Technology.
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do service-time in public hospitals, and thus become members of KORPRI, the 
corporatist civil servants' organisation. In practice, however, the focus of associational 
loyalty for doctors is unquestionably IDI. Unlike most other existing business or 
professional associations, IDI was established long before the New Order. By virtue of 
its continued existence as the national doctors' representative organ over a long period of 
time, IDI has attained a considerable measure of independence and has avoided being co­
opted by the government into corporatist styles of interest intermediation. It is not 
however in any sense an anti-government or even politically disruptive organisation. 
Though IDI has basically escaped New Order remoulding, it does exhibit some 
corporatist features. It is, for instance, the sole officially recognised voice for the whole 
medical profession, and membership of it is unavoidable: doctors require a letter of 
recommendation from IDI in order to gain registration. Further, it does serve as a conduit 
which regulates the flow of demands upon the state. Nevertheless, IDI has a well 
established tradition of autonomy from the state.29 Apart from its long history, another 
factor contributing to this autonomy may be that it has members scattered in various 
influential positions throughout society. Not only are doctors located in the hospitals and 
major universities, there are also some occupying senior positions within the state 
apparatus. Suwardjono, the Health Minister, for instance, is a doctor. Moreover, several 
senior members of IDI are reportedly within the President's circle of confidants.30
One striking feature of IDI is its long liberal and 'civic' tradition - at least 
among the national leadership. It has traditionally been concerned not merely with the 
promotion of doctors' material interests, but also with the promotion of ethics and social 
justice within the health field. The current IDI leader, Dr Kartono Muhammad, is very 
much a part of this tradition. It is much less clear, however, that the rank and file 
membership of IDI shares the idealism of its leaders. Indeed the high principles of the 
IDI leadership have at times been a source of difference within the medical profession.
29 This has come under pressure recently with the Health Department considering taking over the 
administration of all doctor registration requirements. See TDI-Depkes: Retak Berat?", Tempo, 24 
October 1987.
30 Interviews with Dr Kartono Muhammad (Head of IDI), 28 July 1987; and Jimmy Supangkat (Health 
Editor of Tempo), 29 July 1987.
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This tension became quite evident with the involvement of EDI leaders in the 1986-87 
controversy over pharmaceutical prices and their attempts to eliminate unethical links 
between some pharmaceutical companies and doctors.
The Consumers' Association
An organisation with a similar civic orientation to that of IDEs leadership is 
the Consumers' Association, the YLK. Unlike IDI or GPF (or API or SEKBERTAL) 
which are formally classified as representative associations, the YLK is an NGO. 
Beyond a small number of formal associates, the YLK's constituency is in theory society­
wide, as nearly all members of society are consumers. In practice, however, the principal 
beneficiaries of its activities are the urban middle classes - the major cost- and quality­
conscious purchasers of consumer goods.
The YLK was formed in 1973, with the original aim of promoting 
consumption of good-quality local products. Since that time it has become more oriented 
towards middle-class consumer concerns. As an NGO, the YLK is very concerned to 
preserve its autonomy from the state. Nevertheless, approximately twenty five percent of 
its running costs are subsidised by various state agencies, including, among others, the 
Jakarta City government, BULOG (the powerful national logistics board) and even 
Bantuan President (official Presidential Financial Aid). Apart from these official sources 
of funding, the YLK generates revenue through the sale of its monthly magazine Warta 
Konsumen and bulletin of consumer news abstracts Sari Berita Konsumen, as well as 
through organising workshops and training sessions for bureaucrats and social groups. 
In total, the YLK has sixteen full-time staff, of which seven are professionally qualified 
and receive a small salary, the remainder being volunteers.
A prominent aspect of the YLK's activities is the consumer complaints service 
it offers. Under this, the YLK takes up consumer grievances about faulty produce or 
deficient service with the company or state body concerned. The usual procedure is to 
allow three weeks for the offending organisation to offer reparations, after which the 
YLK takes the story to the media. (Table 5.3 sets out a summary of YLK activities of this 
sort for 1983-1985) As the press is more than happy to publish these sorts of 'human
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interest' stories, the YLK thus has no trouble gaining press coverage. Indeed, the press 
is one of the main weapons at its disposal.
TABLE 5.3
Complaints Serviced by the Consumers' Association
TYPE OF COMPLAINT 1983 1984 1985
Food & Beverage 29 39 25
Drugs & Cosmetics 8 19 18
Clothing 9 6 1
Tobacco 5 3 3
Services 54 183 83
Household Utensils 7 15 6
Energy (oil & gas) 4 15 15
Housing & Environment 14 15 6
Electronics 21 37 12
Motor Vehicles 9 15 17
Construction Materials 8 70 2
Miscellaneous 12 70 23
TOTAL 180 424 201
Source: YLK statistics
Beyond this, the YLK conducts ten to twenty product surveys each year, for 
which it purchases and systematically tests all products of a given kind on the market. 
This independent evaluation of consumer goods is evidently something valued by the 
government, as various departments (usually Trade, Industry or Local Goods Promotion) 
supply the funds to purchase the necessary products. This introduces some scope for 
various state officials to influence the sorts of products tested , as they are in a position to 
decline to fund any YLK survey which they do not favour. While this problem has arisen 
in the past, it apparently does so only occasionally.31
The YLK has at times irritated various state officials (and certainly many 
business people) but so far it has not come under threat or scrutiny in the same way as, 
for example, the outspoken Legal Aid Institute. The YLK earned a reputation for 
abrasiveness as a result of the vociferous style of its previous President, Permadi. 
Permadi's direct and outspoken manner apparently alienated many officials. In October
31 Interviews with Ema Witoelar (President of the YLK) 15 August 1987; and Tini Hadad (Secretary of 
the YLK) 18 August 1987.
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1986 he was succeeded by Erna Witoelar, the former head of another NGO, the 
environmental organisation, WALHL32 While not as abrasive as Permadi, Witoelar is 
seen as a tough, formidable and probably more effective spokesperson for the YLK.33
The YLK has come into increasing contact with the Directorate for Drug and 
Food Control as it has widened its scope of activity. The two bodies often conduct 
parallel surveys of new food products, and not infrequently reach quite different verdicts. 
In mid-1987 the YLK conducted a major survey of powdered milk products imported 
from Europe following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. The results attracted widespread 
media attention, and resulted in dramatic sales losses for those products which were 
criticised.34 Evaluation of drugs has so far been beyond the reach of the YLK, due to the 
prohibitive cost involved in purchasing and testing products. The Health Department has 
been unwilling to fund the exercise, regarding drug analysis as its own domain. Unable 
to probe the pharmacological qualities of drugs, the YLK has become increasingly 
involved in the cost side of drugs. This reflects the considerable consumer interest in the 
subject which culminated in the controversy of 1986-87.
Committee VIII of the DPR
Another actor of significance in this case is Parliamentary Committee Vffl. 
Committee VHI is responsible for health, family planning and social affairs. Many of its 
members are themselves doctors, or else people with other health-related professional 
qualifications. The question of drug prices has been high on the list of the Committee's 
concerns, and it is an issue that it has pursued with considerable vigour.35
The main avenue by which Committee VTH has sought to involve itself in the 
issue of pharmaceutical prices has been the convening of public hearings to address the 
matter. (This, of course, is the path adopted by any active Parliamentary Committee.)
32 Interviews with Permadi (former President of the YLK) 24 May 1986; Ema Witoelar (current 
President of the YLK) 15 August 1987; and Aswab Mahasin (Director of the LP3ES) 14 February 1988.
33 Ema Witoelar’s husband, Rachmat Witoelar, is a senior GOLKAR figure. She was in the same 
Socialist Party circles as Midian Sirait in Bandung in the early 1960s.
34 See for example, "Menguji Cemaran Radioaktif Pada Susu Bubuk Di Indonesia", Kompas, 28 June 
1987; and, "Pengusaha Berhati-hatilah", Kompas, 16 July 1987.
35 Interview with Mrs. Legowo (Committee VIII leadership, GOLKAR fraksi) 31 August 1987.
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Committee VIII has held numerous public hearings on the question of drug prices to 
which it invited senior Health Department officials, as well as representatives from the 
YLK, IDI, GPF and academia. Because of the sensational nature of the issue, press 
coverage was always guaranteed. By this means, the Committee has provided a forum or 
platform for the projection of information and opinions it favoured. In particular, it has 
given prominence continuously to arguments in favour of lower-cost drugs. Though the 
Committee has not been able to compel the Health Department to undertake policy reform 
aimed at the lowering of drug prices, it has embarrassed key officials and drawn greater 
attention to the matter, thereby increasing the pressure for action on the Health 
Department. Aside from these public hearings, the Committee has also held regular 
closed-door working sessions with the Health Minister and senior officials.36
GPF has viewed Committee VIH, like the YLK, as being unsympathetic to 
pharmaceutical industry interests because of its commitment to pushing for cheaper drugs. 
As a result, it has rarely attempted use the Parliament as a springboard for the promotion 
of its own views.
The Press
The last of the major actors in this case-study requiring mention here is the 
press. As with the DPR, the principal reason for GPFs reluctance to make more use of 
the press has been its sensitivity to the negative light in which the pharmaceutical industry 
is perceived, both within Indonesia and internationally. There has been a tendency within 
the pharmaceutical industry to assume that the press is unfavourably predisposed towards 
it, and that any press coverage of the industry was likely to be critical and unhelpful.
This does not mean that GPF never deals with the media; it does. Eddie 
Lembong is very accessible to journalists. The difference between GPF and 
SEKBERTAL in this regard was that GPF did not, of its own initiative, seek out the 
press. Within the field of health affairs there are, according to one estimate,
36 Interviews with Mrs. Legowo (Committee VIII leadership, GOLKAR fraksi) 31 August 1987; Djoko 
Sudjatmiko (Committe VI leadership, GOLKAR fraksi) 6 June 1987; and Slamet Soesilo (Director for 
Drug Control) 7 September 1987.
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approximately forty journalists at the national level.37 Of these, two journalists stand out, 
Tempo health editor, Jimmy Supangkat and Kompas writer Irwan Julian to. These two 
enjoy senior status as the only journalists with expertise and on-going research of 
particular health issues. As a result, health stories published in either Kompas or Tempo 
are usually reproduced by the journalists of other publications. Certainly in the 1986-87 
controversy over drug prices, articles written by Irwan Julianto acted as a catalyst in 
stimulating a flurry of press activity and ultimately political action.
The Background to the Controversy Over Drug Prices
The 1986 controversy over drug prices was not, in itself, long and 
complicated in the way that the conflict within the spinning industry over CBTI was. 
Indeed, by comparison, it was a short and relatively straight-forward episode. Basically, 
it centred on the pharmaceutical industry's response to the sudden flare-up of latent 
sensitivity over medicine prices, and the subsequent introduction by the Health 
Department of a special program (the DOPB program) to address the problem However, 
while this particular conflict is comparatively uncomplicated, it can only be understood in 
the context of a long-running dispute over drug prices. Because of this, it is necessary to 
spend a little time rehearsing the principal elements of the story which lead up to the 
episode in question. To this end, the present section is devoted to introducing the main 
themes to the dispute and the events which lay behind it.
As seen earlier, during the 1970s and 1980s Indonesia came to follow the lead 
of many other countries in introducing a tighter regulatory regime to control the conditions 
of drug manufacturing and pricing.38 Health authorities in Indonesia, as elsewhere, were 
confronted with the problem of rising drug prices in their efforts to promote national
37 Interview with Dr Frans Tshai (Director of Pharmaceutical Policy & Public Affairs, Ciba-Geigy Pty 
Ltd), 13 August 1987.
38 For an intersting study of the same basic problem in a European setting, see Sargent (1985); while for 
a useful general overview of the main themes on this subject see the special issue "Another Development 
in Pharmaceuticals", Development Dialogue, (Uppsala, Sweden) vol. 2 ,1985 .
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health standards. As in other developing countries pharmaceutical medication constituted 
the largest slice of an increasingly expensive health-care bill. Health authorities thus had a 
budgetary incentive to reduce the cost of drugs. More pressing still was the desire to 
lower drug prices so as to bring modem medication within the financial reach of the great 
majority of the population. High prices meant that pharmaceuticals were inaccessible to 
all but the affluent.
An early step to address this problem in Indonesia was the Obat Inpres 
program (medicines subsidised with special Presidential funding), commenced in the mid- 
1970s. Under this scheme, subsidised medicines were made available to low income 
people via Puskesmas (local level public health clinics). Health officials could be 
confident that these medicines were actually reaching the poorer sections of the 
community since well-off people were most unlikely to attend the rudimentary Puskesmas 
clinics. Medicines for the Obat Inpres program were produced by the state-owned 
company, Kimia Farma, as well as by private manufacturers on contract.
The scope of the Obat Inpres program was, inevitably, limited. As a result, 
the scheme had little impact on overall prices, as the great majority of drugs consumed 
were still being obtained via the private rather than public health market. This meant 
manufacturers were still largely unrestricted with regard to the pricing of drugs. As the 
1970s progressed, a momentum for state intervention aimed at limiting increases in the 
cost of drugs gradually developed. As noted earlier, soon after his appointment to the 
position of Director General for Drug and Food Control in 1978, Midian Sirait indicated 
publicly that he believed medicine prices were too high in Indonesia and that he would be 
taking action to remedy the situation. This was, of course, an attitude that the 
pharmaceutical industry viewed with concern.
Round One: a First Flare-up
The issue of drug prices came into sharp focus in the wake of the dramatic 15 
November 1978 devaluation of the rupiah, when the prices of drugs rose steeply. The 
matter became politically very sensitive with the Minister for Health, Suwardjono
I
Suijaningrat, having a special meeting with the President on 18 November. After the
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meeting, Suwardjono told a press conference that the government was extremely 
concerned about medicine prices and that the sudden jump in prices after the devaluation 
was unreasonable. He went on to say that the government was considering production of 
essential medicines itself with a view to easing price pressure.39 Several days later, 
Midian Strait announced to the press that the Health Department would take action against 
any drug manufacturer who withdrew products from the market as a result of the 
devaluation.40 Ultimately there was decisive government intervention, with Admiral 
Sudomo, the head of the security apparatus ,KOPKAMTIB, Admiral Sudomo, 
summoning the leadership of GPF to a meeting, and subsequently announcing that all 
drug prices would return, for the time being, to their pre-devaluation levels.41
This sudden flare-up of controversy over medicine prices following the 1978 
devaluation can be viewed as setting the pattem for state action over the next decade in the 
on-going conflict with the pharmaceutical industry . Drug prices had been an issue prior 
to the devaluation, but it was the dramatic and widespread jump in prices following the 
devaluation which stimulated the crisis. The Directorate General for Drug and Food 
Control under Sirait had two basic strategies that were established in late 1978 and came 
to characterise its whole approach to the problem of drug prices. On the one hand, it was 
strongly attracted to some form of control: if not direct price-setting, at least indirect price 
limitation. On the other, it also sought to challenge the pharmaceutical industry's whole 
cost structure through the introduction of competition from state enterprises. It was 
hoped that the state-owned pharmaceutical companies could act as price leaders and force 
the private manufacturers to follow them in the low-cost production of generic products 
(especially unbranded ones) to remain competitive. In other words, if private 
manufacturers wished to retain their market share, they would, it was thought, lower their 
prices.
A general feature of the Health Department's approach in its dealings with the 
pharmaceutical industry over the price issue, was the way it consistently argued in the
39 "Obat-Obatan Murah Dibuat Oleh Pabrik-Pabrik Milik Depkes", Berit a Yudha, 20 November 1978.
40 "Jangan Coba-Coba Menghilangkan Obat-Obatan Dari Pasaran", Antara, 23 November 1978.
41 "Harga Obat-Obatan Diturunkan Seperti Sebelum Kebijaksanaan 15 November", Sinar Harapart, 27 
November 1978.
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language of social needs. The pharmaceutical industry was frequently upbraided for 
selfishly exploiting a social good essential to the well-being of the whole community. 
There was constant allusion in the government's rhetoric to the need to bring medicine 
within the reach of all sections of society. In this respect there were striking parallels at 
the level of ideology to the textile case-study, with the government concerned to be seen 
defending the interests of low income sections of society by ensuring their access to 
essential goods.
In the wake of the November 1978 devaluation and KOPKAMTIB's 
intervention, the Health Department took further action on the price issue. On 5 January 
1979, the Minister for Health announced that, following consultations with Trade and 
Cooperatives Minister, Radius Prawiro, a special committee headed by Midian Sirait 
would be established to examine production costs for drugs in order to identify 
appropriate pricing levels following the devaluation. He added that any company failing 
to give full and accurate information on its cost structure would have its production 
licence revoked.42
This intervention to set price limits for pharmaceuticals did not last for long, 
being intended only as a stabilising measure after the turmoil of the devaluation. 
Nevertheless, it was sufficient to induce profound concern within the pharmaceutical 
industry that the government was considering the introduction of systematic price 
controls.43 At the same time, there was also anxiety about the other arm of the Health 
Department's strategy, namely the introduction of downward price competition from 
state-owned drug manufacturers.
Coinciding with the Health Department's introduction of direct price-fixing, 
senior government figures were also dropping strong hints in the media that the 
government might be forced to expand its own pharmaceutical production capacities to 
ensure a satisfactory pricing profile for drugs. Comments by Health Minister
42 "Pemerintah Akan Mencabut Ijin Produksi Obatnya", Berita Buana, 6 January 1979, and "Mungkin 
Dilarang, Jika Produsen Obat Tidak Serahkan Kalkulasi Harga", Kompas, 19 January 1979. As well as 
drug costs, the committee also looked into the prices of medical instruments.
43 Interview with J.W. Sudomo (President Director o f Squibb Pty Ltd & member o f the IPMG 
Executive), 10 August 1987.
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Suwardjono following his meeting with the President in late November 1978, and Midian 
Sirait in mid-December, indicated that the Health Department was considering the 
introduction of the World Health Organisation's (WHO) essential medicine concept44
The idea of a list of essential medicines had been put forward in an influential 
WHO report published internationally in 1977.45 The WHO report was concerned to 
tackle the problems of the cost of drugs and the resulting high levels of public health 
expenditure sustained in developing countries. Underlying the essential drugs list concept 
was a belief that the recent massive proliferation of near-identical generic products was 
central to the problem of drug prices. The compilation of a list of the most important 
types (as opposed to brands) of medicines would enable cost-savings for public medicine 
programs. Predictably, WHO's essential medicine concept, together with the whole 
"basic human needs" and "health for all" ideology was anathema to the pharmaceutical 
industry around the world and was strongly opposed by the pharmaceutical industry 
internationally.
Sirait had said in December 1978 that the government would have to think 
seriously about making use of WHO's list of 200 essential medicines in view of the large 
number of drugs on the Indonesian market. This was pursued further in January 1979 
when Radius Prawiro told a press conference, following a meeting with the President, 
that the government would encourage doctors to write only the generic names of drugs on 
prescription forms so that patients could negotiate with dispensaries to obtain a product 
which was appropriately priced. In other words, if doctors only stipulated the type of 
drug on the prescription form, patients would be given the option of chosing from among 
cheaper unbranded generic drugs, or more expensive branded generics and innovative 
products.46 (If the doctor prescribed a specific product, dispensaries were not able to sell 
the patient any other.) Shortly after, Health Minister Suwardjono announced in a 
television interview that the state would produce essential medicines itself, and that this 
would set an example for private drug manufacturers by demonstrating that drugs could
44 "Diturunkan Harga Obat 'Kimia Farma'", Kompas, 22 November 1978, and "Depkes Akan Tentukan 
Bahan-Baku Obat Yang Boleh Diproduksi", Kompas, 18 December 1978.
45 WHO (1977) and (1979).
46 "Mungkin Dilarang, Jika Produsen Obat Tidak Serahkan Kalkulasi Harga" JCompas, 19 January 1979.
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be produced at much lower prices. He was reported as saying that hopefully this would 
encourage them to fulfil their social obligations by doing likewise.47
If fully implemented, the concept of an essential medicines list would have 
severely challenged major pharmaceutical manufacturers (both in Indonesia and 
elsewhere) as it would encourage a shift to unbranded generics with much lower profit 
margins than either branded generics or innovative products. However, after the furore 
surrounding the devaluation subsided, the issue gradually slipped from prominence. 
Similarly, the return to pre-devaluation prices that had been enforced by KOPKAMTIB 
was lifted in February 1979 by Cabinet decision, though price monitoring was nominally 
continued.48 In short, the threat to the pharmaceutical industry receded.
Despite this lull in the controversy, the Health Department continued to push 
these issues intermittently through 1979. Midian Sirait appeared before Committee VIII of 
the DPR in June, and then again in October, to restate the government's commitment, 
both to the introduction of an essential medicines list, and the expansion of state 
production of many of these products, in order to tackle the problem of the affordability 
of drugs. He said that the government was moving to promote unbranded generics to 
overcome the situation in which, for example, the anti-biotic, Tetracycline, sold for Rp. 
27 per tablet as an unbranded generic, while branded generics were priced at up to Rp. 75 
per tablet. He added that to this end, unbranded products would be exempted from a 
2.5% sales tax.49
The sales tax issue did not especially alarm the large producers which 
dominated GPF. This was because their major market lay with the urban elite, who 
obtained drugs from dispensaries rather than Puskesmas, and so were unlikely to select or 
be prescribed unbranded generics. The sales tax really only affected the small-scale 
producers of unbranded generics who largely supplied the public sector institutional 
market anyway. While manufacturers would, of course, have preferred to avoid the tax, 
it was a burden they were willing to bear in view of the political sensitivity of the pricing
47 "Pemerintah Akan Memproduksi Obat Pokok", Kompas, 30 January 1979.
48 For a summary of this see The GPF Executive's Laporan Umum for 1978-81 p. 4.
49 "Pemerintah Sedang Kampanyekan Penyebutan Genetik Saja Dalam Penjualan Obat-Obat Di Apotik- 
Apotik", Antara, 5 October 1979.
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issue. Of much greater concern at this stage, though, was the Health Department's 
persistence with the idea of the "registration" of all drugs and their pricing structure. 
Following the experience of late 1978 and early 1979, producers viewed this as another 
thinly disguised attempt to institutionalise some form of price regulation. Early in 1980 
Sirait notified the GPF executive that he was seeking to develop the "registration 
concept", and sought their views on the matter. GPF’s response was to suggest several 
modifications to the proposal. Typically, GPFs approach was quiet, but firm. It did not 
oppose Sirait's idea outright, but instead argued that if pricing information was to be 
included in the formal registration process, it should only take the form of ex post facto 
notification of the prices of products and any changes to them. In short, manufacturers 
should only be required to inform the Department of prices they were already charging, 
rather than having to justify proposed changes to price levels.50
Round Two: the C-5 and the DOEN
Late in 1980, the Health Department took two major steps in developing its 
two-pronged approach to the price issue. It unveiled a cluster of regulations51 providing 
for new price-monitoring requirements and also the introduction of the WHO essential 
medicines concept. The former required drug manufacturers henceforth to register all 
their products and submit both pharmacological and pricing details for each product. 
This new requirement, which came to be known by the registration form number, C-5, 
was the first major step under the New Order towards the long-term and systematic 
monitoring of prices. While Sirait and others went to considerable lengths to argue that 
this did not constitute a form of price control (which, indeed, it did not), it is quite clear 
that the C-5 requirement was intended to act as a direct retardant to further price rises by 
manufacturers. Henceforth manufacturers would have to explain how they determined 
their selling prices.
50 See the GPF Executive's Laporan Umum for 1978-81, p. 18. *
51 The key elements were Health Minister Suwardjono's Ministerial Intructions no. 
389/Men.Kes/Per/X/80 (9 October 1980) & no. 394/Men.Kes/X/80 (11 October 1980), together with his 
Ministerial Decree no. 3433/A/SK/80 (11 November 1980) and Governemntal Regulation PP no. 
25/1980.
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The second prong of the strategy was the formal introduction of an essential 
medicines list; the DOEN as it became known. This provided for the production of 330 
of the most important types of drugs as unbranded generics. The Health Department 
reactivated a disused state-owned pharmaceutical plant in Jakarta to produce many of 
these drugs. In many ways this represented an extension of the Obat Inpres scheme via 
the Puskesmas, in that it aimed at promoting the use of unbranded generics (especially 
those manufactured by the state) to help meet the needs of the poor.
This double-fronted approach by the Health Department was its response to 
the very considerable political pressure that had built up over the issue of drug prices. 
Both prongs of the strategy, the DOEN and the C-5, had the potential to present serious 
long term challenges to the pharmaceutical industry. Ultimately, however, neither did. 
As 1981 and 1982 progressed it became clear that both the government's DOEN and C-5 
initiatives were failing to achieve their stated objectives. Both were strongly opposed by 
GPF. As it turned out, the DOEN faltered because of fundamental design flaws. Little 
action was needed by GPF apart from quiet and continual nagging of the Health 
Department. By contrast, GPF was closely involved in the emasculation of the C-5 
initiative.
The problems faced by the DOEN policy were twofold. It was failing to 
reach most low income people (other than the existing users of public health institutions); 
and it was also failing to have any effect as a 'price leader' in inducing downward price 
pressure on private drug manufacturers. The first of these failings, inability to reach the 
broader public, was in large measure due Health Department's failure to account for the 
role of doctors in their calculations. In focusing on the manufacturers as the source of 
the problem they had overlooked the fact that doctors - the principal intermediary between 
producers and consumers of drugs - play a vital part in determining consumption patterns. 
While the Health Department had drawn up and publicised the DOEN, and cheap generic 
drugs were indeed being produced, the awkward fact remained that doctors were simply 
not prescribing them to patients. It was quite evident that the great majority of doctors 
preferred to prescribe branded products rather than the unbranded generics produced 
under the DOEN scheme, as the Director General for Health Services, Dr. Brata Ranuh,
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conceded to the press. This, he said, was despite the fact that the DOEN drugs were up to 
one-tenth the price and of guaranteed quality.52
The second problem for the DOEN scheme was its failure to generate any 
downward pressure on the pricing policies of private drug producers, a central aim of the 
whole DOEN strategy. In part, the inability to induce downward price movement was
linked to the fact that there was only limited support for the DOEN and thus the scope of
%
the operation was not great. More important, though, was that 90% - 95% of all the 
essential medicines were being produced by the private sector, as Health Minister 
Suwardjono acknowledged in August 1982.53 Even though state firms were indeed 
producing cheap drugs for the DOEN and other public health projects, the fundamental 
problem remained that the vast majority of drugs in circulation were being manufactured 
by the private sector. The state-owned factories were incapable of acting as price leaders 
because their market share was too small. Furthermore, such consumption of the 
unbranded DOEN generics as there was took place almost exclusively via public health 
institutions such as puskesmas, public hospitals and health schemes for civil servants. 
The DOEN was thus little more than an extension of the Obatlnpres program, which also 
supplied unbranded generics to public health institutions. As the pharmaceutical industry 
soon realised, the DOEN scheme would not become the threat that it might have.54
If the DOEN scheme failed to have any substantial impact on the problem of 
making medicines more affordable, the other arm of the Health Department's strategy, the 
policy of price monitoring via the C-5 registration form was equally ineffectual. Although 
manufacturers were indeed very concerned by the C-5 system when it was introduced, 
persistent negotiations by GPF with the Health Department ensured that it did not become 
a constraint on price-setting. GPFs argument that it should be an ex post facto record of 
price movements was accepted. Once the Health Department agreed to this, it was clear
52 "Para Dokter Lebih Suka Menulis Resep Obat Merek Tertentu", Antara, 14 January 1982.
53 "95% Pengadaan Obat Dikuasai Usaha Swasta", Antara, 8 August 1982.
54 Interview with Professor Iwan Darmansyah (Professor of Pharmacy at the University of Indonesia, and 
adviser to the Health Department on the DOEN), 28 July 1987; and Dr Kartono Muhamad (Chairman of 
the Indonesian Doctors Association - IDI), 28 July 1987.
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that the C-5 would 'have no teeth' and become little more than a formality. Certainly, it 
had no significant impact in halting price rises.55
Round Three: C-5 Becomes IHO
As if in acknowledgment of the failure of the C-5 system to retard price 
increases, the Health Department moved to expand and strengthen the registration system. 
Appearing before Committee VIII of the Parliament in June 1983, Midian Sirait, 
announced that the Health Department would be publishing a complete list of all 
medicines, and their prices, to be distributed to every, doctor in the country. He said that 
previously doctors had not been fully aware of the price differentials amongst drugs, and 
that this new publication, known as the IHO (Drug Price Information) manual would be 
used as a point of reference by doctors to write prescriptions which were in accordance 
with the purchasing power of patients. It was thus assumed that upon digestion of the 
IHO manual, doctors would vicariously respond to market forces and direct patients to 
unbranded generic products. This in turn would lead to price competition, it was hoped, 
and a downward spiral in drug prices.56
Under the new regulations, manufacturers were still required to submit the 
C-5 registration form detailing prices for each drug. A vital modification to the C-5 
system, however, was that manufacturers would not be permitted to alter these prices for 
a period of six months , after which time a new round of C-5s would be submitted, and a 
new IHO manual published and distributed to doctors. Thus each IHO manual would 
remain in force for six months, during which time prices could not be adjusted. The only 
opportunity for price change came with the preparation of the next IHO, at which time 
producers could submit detailed pricing information to justify any proposed increases.
This was a much more serious attempt to restrict price rises. The Health 
Department was seeking to induce price competition by the publication of the prices of all
55 Interviews with, for example, Eddie Lembong, 31 July 1987; J.W. Sudomo (President Director of 
Squibb Pty Ltd & member of the IPMG Executive) 10 August 1987; Dr Frans Tshai (Director of 
Pharmaceutical Policy & Public Affairs for Ciba Geigy Pty Ltd) 13 August 1987; and Irwan Julianto 
(health reporter for Kompas) 8 August 1987.
56 "Semua Dokter Akan Peroleh Buku Informasi Harga Obat", Suara Karya, 22 June 1983.
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drugs, as well as attempting to delay any price rises by requiring adherence to those 
registered in the C-5 and published in the current IHO manual.
While the introduction of the IHO manual certainly threw the manufacturers 
into a panic, it failed absolutely to induce downward price competition. Indeed, the result 
was precisely the opposite. Prices rose faster than ever, for the simple reason that, 
fearing the loss of freedom to adjust prices for six month intervals, producers inflated 
their prices in advance and at an exaggerated rate. By this means they sought to guard 
against the possibility of the six-month price moratorium being extended or of losses 
resulting from, for instance, unforeseen currency fluctuations. Another major factor 
underlying IHO's lack of success was that, like the DOEN scheme, it relied on doctors 
choosing to prescribe the less expensive products. As with DOEN, doctors seem simply 
to have not behaved in the manner expected by the Health Department.
Once again flawed policy-design had played a hand. But as with the earlier 
C-5 initiative, GPF also played an important part in speeding the demise of the IHO 
system. The pharmaceutical industry had been very unhappy with IHO, regarding it as an 
administrative nightmare which cut their pricing flexibility.57 As such, they were 
anxious that it be 'reviewed'. GPF therefore pursued an active, but low-profile campaign 
to dissuade the Directorate General for Drug and Food Control from its chosen path. 
Emphasis was placed on the failure of IHO as a policy instrument. After much 
negotiation, GPF succeeded in having the policy very substantially modified.58
Ultimately, the IHO manual was published only three times. During 1984, 
Eddie Lembong succeeded in persuading Midian Sirait that it should be put out only once 
yearly, rather than twice, and that manufacturers be permitted to adjust their prices 
whenever they wished, provided they registered this price change with the Health 
Department Such price changes would be published periodically in an IHO Supplement 
These changes represented a major dilution of the original IHO policy as they eliminated
57 See, "Daftar Kenaikan Harga Obat", Kompas, 19 January 1984.
58 Interviews with J.W. Sudomo (President Director of Squibb Pty Ltd & member o f the IPMG 
Executive) 10 August 1987 and Eddie Lembong, 9 September 1987. The details of the regulatory change 
can be located in the circular letter o f 5 February 1985 from the GPF executive to all members published 
in Varia Farmasi, no. 57, January-February 1985, p. 37.
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the moratorium on price increases. With a view to scuttling IHO completely, GPF 
offered to 'assist' the Health Department's drive to lower drug prices by (generously) 
undertaking the responsibility for the publication of the EHO Supplement in its magazine 
Varia Farmasi. By this means, GPF in effect gained control of IHO. The Health 
Department was happy to unload the administrative cost of compiling, publishing and 
distributing the IHO pricing information (which had become something of an 
embarrassment); and GPF was more than happy to bear this cost in the short term. After 
a period GPF simply informed the Health Department that it could no longer 'afford' to 
provide the service and that it would have to lapse unless the Department again assumed 
responsibility for it. In short, GPF ensured that the whole scheme quietly wound to a 
halt. Eventually, after having fallen from view, the IHO policy was officially abandoned 
(in early 1987). In order to save Sirait himself from having to make the somewhat 
embarrassing announcement that the IHO scheme had been dropped, GPF undertook to 
write to all its members informing them that it had been discontinued.59 Once again, this 
was typical of the low-profile and non-confrontational lobbying of GPF which continued 
to return good dividends for the pharmaceutical industry. Put simply, GPF had 
persuaded the Health Department to abandon a policy opposed by the pharmaceutical 
industry.
The complete abolition of the IHO scheme was a slow process. The 
immediate victory for GPF and the pharmaceutical industry in 1984 was the rescheduling 
of the IHO manual's publication and, more importantly, the cessation of the six month 
price increase moratoriums. These were significant achievements. They were, however, 
set against a backdrop of increasing, if undefined, hostility towards the whole health 
services sector over the price of medical treatment. While the pharmaceutical industry 
was not seen as the only 'villain' - it was widely recognised that doctors, wholesalers and 
retailers all had a major role - there was a tendency to single out manufacturers. This 
seems to have been in large measure a product of the internationally poor image of the
59 GPF letter no. 03.001/PP.APT/1987, 12 March 1987.
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pharmaceutical industry, and the widespread view of it as singularly unscrupulous. Yet is 
difficult to identify precisely where hostility to medicine prices emanated from. Much of 
the criticism was carried in the press, or in some case was initiated by the press itself. 
State officials, especially those from the Health Department, as well as Parliamentarians 
and the YLK (the Consumers' Association) often decried the cost of drugs. And yet, that 
section of the population seen as being the chief victim of high drug prices, the vast low- 
income tier of Indonesian society, was in effect silent. In part, this no doubt reflected the 
fact that the scope for interest articulation by the mass of the population was limited: this, 
after all, had been an aim of all the corporatist restructuring described in Chapter 3. More 
fundamentally though, it pointed to the fact that the issue of drug prices was really an 
urban middle class concern. They, it must be remembered, were the main consumers of 
drugs.
Round Four: Another Scandal, Another Policy
In August 1984, the political sensitivity of the drug price issue was again 
inflamed by a major expose in the weekly magazine,Tempo.60 The article reported that 
enquiries by the Legal Aid Institute had led to the investigation of four doctors for 
malpractice. The doctors were alleged to have accepted extensive bribes from drug 
manufacturers in return for prescribing their products. The article argued that the practice 
of pharmaceutical companies offering commissions and various other material incentives 
to doctors was widespread. This story, in turn, generated considerable critical media 
interest in the question of drug prices. The GOLKAR-linked newspaper, Suara Karya, 
for example, ran a very large feature series examining factors underlying the price of 
drugs in Indonesia.61 The series, which was spread over five consecutive days, served to 
heighten further the prominence of the issue and the negative attention being paid to the 
pharmaceutical industry.
60 "Daftar Hitam Di Tengah Banjir Obat Dan Komisi", Tempo, 4 August 1984, pp. 63-7.
61 "Segitiga Emas Obat Muncul Di Indonesia", Suara Karya, 26-30 November 1984. The series actually 
provides a very useful overview of the whole issue of drug prices.
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Despite the various initiatives that had been launched by the Health 
Department to prevent continued price spiraling, little real progress had been achieved. In 
this situation, there was clearly mounting pressure for some palliative action. Critical 
media attention served to increase the political pressure on the Health Department quite 
directly. In early December, Midian Sirait appeared again before Committee VIII of the 
DPR, to answer questions on the price issue.62
No doubt in direct response to the controversy of late 1984, Sirait announced 
yet another policy initiative, in April 1985, designed to tackle the problem. The new 
scheme was in some respects a reformulation of earlier initiatives. The gist of it was that 
the Health Department would undertake the production of thirty four of the most essential 
medicines and launch them into the open market (as distinct from the public health 
market). These products would be designed as direct competitors to other privately 
manufactured equivalents and would, if necessary, be promoted by professional detailers 
(pharmaceutical sales representatives) to ensure marketing success. Sirait told the press 
that this project would be undertaken by the state-owned factory, Indofarma, in joint 
venture with any private firms which chose to participate. He said that he expected that 
this venture would operate in the same way as BULOG (the state logistics board which 
controls rice marketing) and that in this way it would be able to act as a price leader and 
achieve price stability for these products at much lower levels.63
This move can be seen as an attempt to increase the government's capacity to 
influence drug prices via expanded public sector production. That it was a direct 
campaign to compete with and erode private sector control of the drug market is revealed 
in Sirait's statement to the press that it was the responsibility of journalists to encourage 
doctors to choose the less expensive drugs for their patients (in other words, those 
manufactured by state enterprises).
Sirait discussed this initiative in advance at a meeting with the heads of Kimia 
Farma and Indofarma (the two large state manufacturers) and Eddie Lembong on behalf 
of GPF. None of the three industry figures opposed Sirait's proposal, although all three
62 "Mahalnya Harga Obat Mendapat Sorotan DPR", Suara Kory a, 6 December 1984.
63 "Depkes Akan Produksi 34 Macam Obat Amat Esensial Tahun Ini", Kompas, 25 April 1985.
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viewed it as being fraught with difficulties. Though initially silent, GPF subsequently 
made its strong reservations clear to Sirait. The proposed new products were supposed to 
enter the market by September of 1985. If implemented, the plan could have been very 
threatening to the pharmaceutical industry. It seems that after several months a 
combination of scepticism on the part of the state-owned manufacturers about the viability 
of the project, together with the persistent lobbying of GPF, was sufficient to deter Sirait, 
and the entire plan was quietly aborted and sank from view without remark.64 Yet another 
initiative thus fell by the wayside, and yet again, the pharmaceutical industry breathed a 
collective sigh of relief.
The issue of drug prices remained politically sensitive, however, though it 
began to recede from media prominence as 1985 progressed. Evidence of its continuing 
sensitivity can be found in the persistent interest of Committee VIII of the DPR in the 
subject Although the Committee lacked the authority to demand executive action from 
the Health Department, it did have the capacity to embarrass the officials by attracting 
unwanted critical attention from senior echelons within the government through press 
coverage. Certainly the Health Department officials did not treat appearances before the 
Committee lightly.65
In late May the YLK (the Consumers' Association) appeared before the 
Committee and called on the DPR to take action to overcome the drug price problem.66 
Several days later Midian Sirait was before the Committee, this time declaring that the 
Health Department would commence the direct importing of drugs if prices became too 
high.67 This seems to have been primarily a piece of political posturing intended to 
threaten manufacturers and impress the DPR, rather than a seriously considered policy 
proposal. In mid-September, Sirait again appeared before the Committee, this time 
together with the Secretary general of the Health Department, Soekaryo. On this occasion
64 Interviews with various industry figures.
65 Interviews with Soekaryo (Secretary General of the Health Department) 4 September 1987; Slamet 
Soesilo (Director for Drug Control in the Health Department) 7 September 1987; and Mrs Legowo 
(Committee VIII leadership, GOLKAR fraksi) 31 August 1987.
66 "DPR Diminta Jembatani Tingginya Harga Obat", Merdeka, 21 May 1985.
67 "Pemerintah Akan Impor Obat Apabila Harga Obat Produksi Dalam Negeri Lebih Mahal”, Antara, 29 
May 1985.
194
Sirait reiterated his appeal for low-income people to use generic medicines and save 
money.68 A month later, the executive of GPF came before Committee VHI to respond to 
criticism about prices, and argued that the responsibility did not lie with the 
manufacturers, but was widely dispersed.69
This section has endeavoured to outline the factors which culminated in the 
1986 dispute. To recapitulate, there was a widespread perception that drug prices in 
Indonesia were too high and that this could be overcome by state intervention - thereby 
bringing modem medication within the reach of the bulk of the people. The Directorate 
General for Drug and Food Control was committed to somehow tackling this problem, 
something made plain by its persistent efforts in the four bouts reviewed here. And yet 
with each attempt it was unsuccessful. In part, these failures can be explained by the 
inherently difficult nature of the socio-economic engineering it was contemplating and the 
associated problems of policy design. But another consistent feature was the steady 
opposition of the pharmaceutical industry. The pharmaceutical industry, represented by 
GPF, quietly, but effectively, resisted all attempts by the government to restrict upward 
price mobility. Although GPF did not score high-profile, knock-out victories, by the end 
of each round the government's policy initiatives had faltered and the pharmaceutical 
industry had managed to secure the minimum conditions it sought.
By 1986, then, the question of medicine prices was a familiar and well 
established item on the political agenda. Apart from the continued circling of the Health 
Department and GPF, other players to become increasingly involved were the press, 
Committee VIII of the DPR and the YLK. Their involvement served to raise the profile of 
the issue, and thus increased the pressure on the Health Department to somehow cut 
through the problem and deliver "health for all". But the more pressure that was applied
68 "Obat Paten Dan Genetik, Khasiat Sama Harga Jauh Berbeda", Antara, 15 November 1985.
69 "Low Domestic Consumption Causes High Drug Prices", Jakarta Post, 10 December 1985.
195
to the Directorate General to 'resolve' the matter, the harder GPF struggled to preserve 
what it saw as the pharmaceutical industry’s essential interests.
The 1986 Conflict Over Drug Prices
The repeated frustrations of the Directorate General for Drug and Control's 
various policy initiatives aimed at forcing down drug prices, had not by 1986, dulled 
Midian Sirait's enthusiasm. He remained committed to the idea of expanding the state's 
ability to induce downward pressure on prices via an increased public sector presence in 
the market. For Sirait, the key to inducing downward price movement lay in bringing 
market pressure to bear on private drug manufacturers. From late 1985 through the first 
half of 1986 he periodically discussed the general problem of prices with Eddie Lembong 
on an informal consultative basis. Lembong was concerned to retain the ear of Sirait, and 
so went to considerable lengths to down-play the impression that a zero-sum-game 
situation governed relations between the Health Department and the pharmaceutical 
industry on the price question. He sought to promote GPF as an organisation willing to 
cooperate and, moreover, be of assistance to the Health Department in any way it could. 
For as both sides realised, despite their fundamentally different perspectives, they had a 
common interest centring on how best to deal with the political pressure for lower drug 
prices.
On the occasions during 1986 when Sirait aired his concerns to Lembong and 
talked of his desire to boost the public-sector presence in the pharmaceutical market, 
Lembong would respond by saying that any attempt to bring down drug prices by merely 
focusing on the manufacturers was doomed to failure. He repeatedly argued that the 
support of the doctors needed to be enlisted.70 His advice to Sirait was that any new 
initiative should be predicated on a cooperative effort by the various state and non-state 
actors involved in the pharmaceutical and health services area. In stressing (accurately)
70 Interviews with Eddie Lembong, 21 August & 9 September 1987; and Slamet Soesilo (Director for 
Drug Control) 7 September 1987.
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the complexities involved, Lembong was seeking to deflect exclusive scrutiny of his 
constituency, while at the same time perhaps discouraging Sirait from taking action.
Controversy Erupts
After simmering for a number of months, the question of drug prices again 
came rapidly to the boil in July-August 1986. Following a meeting between Health 
Minister Suwardjono and the President on 10 July, Suwardjono told the press that 
Suharto had instructed him to arrange an investigation into the factors causing the high 
price levels of drugs.71 This, together with extraordinary public statements by both the 
Secretary General of the Health Department, Soekaryo, and the head of IDI ( the 
Indonesian Doctors' Association), Dr Kartono Muhammad, to the effect that Indonesia 
had the third most expensive medicine prices in the world (after Switzerland and West 
Germany), signalled the onset of yet another round of the drug price battle and saw a 
rapid build up of political pressure on the price issue.72 When Suwardjono, after a further 
meeting with the President on 13 August, again spoke to the press, it was apparent that 
something of a political crisis was erupting in the health services world.73 Suharto 
apparently found the idea that the majority of people could not afford medicine 
unacceptable. Furthermore, he was reportedly disturbed that this should be an issue in 
the period leading up to the 1987 general election. Apparently Suharto indicated that he 
wished the problem 'solved' forthwith.74
Confronted with these extraordinary public pronouncements on drug prices 
by leading figures and highly critical press coverage, Sirait was under intense political 
pressure to provide a solution. Ministerial and, moreover, Presidential intervention were 
sure signs of top-level political disquiet. Undoubtedly, the controversy was far more 
acute in this round than in the earlier ones. The Directorate General was left in no doubt as
71 "Presiden Instmksikan Agar Depkes Meneliti Harga Obat", Suara Karya, 11 July 1986.
72 For reference to the remarks by Dr Kartono Muhamad and Soekaryo see "Harga Obat-Obat Di 
Indonesia Terkenal Paling Mahal Di Dunia", Berit a Buana, 25 August 1986, and "Hangat, Masalah Harga 
Obat”, KompaSy 30 August 1986.
73 "Menkes Imbau Masyarakat Agar Tidak Terkecoh Dengan Merek Obat", Pelita, 14 August 1986.
74 Interviews with Sunarto Prawirosujanto (former Director General for Drug and Food Control, Special 
Adviser to the Health Minister, and head of the KADIN Section for Multifarious Industry, Small Industry 
and Pharmaceutical Industry) 21 May 1987.
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to the urgency of the matter, or that it was being held responsible for the situation.75 
Anxious to take constructive steps, Sirait convened a marathon meeting in late August 
with representatives from GPF, IDI and ISFI (the Pharmacy Graduates' Association) to 
discuss possible measures to tackle the problem.
The pharmaceutical industry was extremely worried that a restrictive package 
of regulations, possibly including price controls, was about to be introduced. Industry 
anxiety was compounded by the fact that Eddie Lembong had been overseas throughout 
August - a coincidence which had the effect of robbing the manufacturers of their usual 
cohesiveness and sense of direction. By all accounts, the meeting called by Sirait was a 
traumatic affair.76 Sirait apparently demanded actual price reductions from the 
manufacturers in order to alleviate the political crisis. Failure by industry to make some 
concessions would result in the Health Department having to take firm (and by implication 
draconian) measures itself, he reportedly threatened. This created panic in the industry 
and precipitated a period of open and mutual recrimination among the various groups 
involved. There was thus the spectacle of local and foreign manufacturers, doctors, 
distributors and retailers all blaming each other through the pages of the press for the high 
price of drugs.77
The highly political nature of the turmoil in the pharmaceutical sector was laid 
open in an important article in the leading daily Kompas? 8 The article, by Kompas 
journalist, Irwan Julianto, had the pointed title "Medicine Prices - A Hot Issue" and was 
widely seen as marking a watershed in the conflict. Coming as it did in the wake of a 
substantial press build up, it had the effect of laying the issues bare for all to see.
Sirait's first step in addressing the crisis was to announce to the press on 3 
September that he had established a special committee to identify any "irrational" factors 
contributing to high drug costs. The committee known as the Committee of Inquiry into
75 Interview with Slamet Soesilo (Director for Drug Control) 7 September 1987.
76 Interviews with, for example, Anton Sunaryo (Vice-President of Kenrose Pty Ltd) 7 September 1987; 
and Sigit Nugraha (Director o f Bintang Toedjoe Pty Ltd) 2 September 1987.
77 See, for example, "Ekonomi Biaya Tinggi Biang Mahalnya Harga Obat", Kompas, 2 September 1986; 
"Ketua IDI Tentang Harga Obat: Pemerintah Perlu Atur Batas Keuntungan Jalur Distribusi", Kompas, 3 
September 1986; and "Biaya Pemasaran Dominasi Harga Obat", Merdeka, 4 September 1986.
78 "Hangat, Masalah Harga Obat", Kompas, 30 August 1986.
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Rational Drug Usage and Prices, or, PPKPHO, consisted of representatives from 
professional associations in the pharmaceutical sector such as GPF, EDI, ISFI as well as 
the Dentists' Association, PDGI, and was headed by Slamet Soesilo, the Director for 
Drug Control together with Amir Basir, the Chairman of GPF. Sirait emphasised that the 
government needed more complete information on the underlying causes of the problem 
before it could take action. Significantly, he specifically requested the press to allow the 
government two months grace in which to work on the problem without having it 
inflamed by the media.79 In his comments to the press, Amir Basir argued that in order to 
reduce the price of drugs it was necessary to improve marketing channels, rather than just 
focusing on issues such as production and raw material costs. His remarks were 
obviously aimed at diverting attention from the drug manufacturers, and were juxtaposed 
in the press with those of others such as IDI head, Dr Kartono Muhamad, who tended to 
emphasise the central role of industry.80
The PPKPHO Committee seems to have been set up in direct response to the 
intervention by the President and Health Minister Suwardjono's assertion of the need for 
more complete information on the price problem to guide policy. It appears that it was 
established as a demonstrative suggestion of coordinated action by the Directorate General 
for Drug and Food Control.
The pharmaceutical industry had still to determine how it would approach this 
inflamed situation and try to defuse the very real risk of the the Health Department 
introducing new regulations which might threaten its modus operandi.. Despite being 
overseas during this period, Eddie Lembong had been in contact with Sirait urging him to 
avoid taking any drastic measures. Lembong also communicated with industry figures, 
strongly advising them to hold fast and not be panicked into conceding voluntary price 
reductions.81
79 "Depkes Bentuk Panitia Untuk Teliti Harga Obat", Kompas, 4 September 1986. There was some 
confusion surrounding the precise name of the PPKPHO Committee, with several different combinations 
of initials circulating.
80 See, for example, "Biaya Pemasaran Dominasi Harga Obat", Merdeka, 4 September 1986.
81 Interview with Eddie Lembong, 21 August 1987 and 9 September 1987.
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When Lembong returned to Jakarta early in September, his first priority was 
to regain the initiative for GPF in dealings with not only the government, but also the 
other professional associations in the health services sector and, importantly, the press. 
For well over a month the pharmaceutical industry had been the subject of consistently 
critical coverage in the press, and held responsible for the medicine price controversy. 
This of course rendered the pharmaceutical industry the easiest target for unilateral reform 
action by the Health Department. The industry would have few supporters if the 
Department moved strongly against it.
An opportunity emerged for GPF to regain some initiative only a matter of 
days after Lembong's return. On 12 September the government announced a surprise 
devaluation of the rupiah, nominally by 45%. The normal follow-on from this would 
have been for the pharmaceutical industry, like other industries reliant on imports, to raise 
the price of its goods by a corresponding amount. At Lembong's instigation, the GPF 
executive decided that as a public relations manoeuvre, it would seek a price rise of only 
15%. This was a very modest increase. Following executive endorsement of this 
scheme, the GPF leadership contacted Midian Sirait at his home on the evening of 13 
September.82 Sirait greatly appreciated the proposal and was happy to give it his 
approval, since if the industry had sought to increase prices by the full 45%, his problems 
would have only further compounded, for the outcry over medicine price-hikes would 
have been unrestrained.
By this move GPF earned kudos of two sorts. On one hand, it was seen as a 
bold gesture in that it grasped the price nettle firmly. (Price increase proposals were 
always very sensitive for any industry in the wake of a devaluation.) By its daring, the 
move thus enhanced GPFs reputation as a wily and professional association. But on the 
other hand, and more importantly, the move was also widely seen as a gesture of restraint 
- something which helped to redress the pharmaceutical industry's image of profiting 
from the misfortune of others. That the post-devaluation price restraint went some way to
82 Interviews with Eddie Lembong, 31 July, 21 August & 9 September 1987.
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at least temporarily improving the industry's tarnished reputation was illustrated by the 
fact the level of press criticism began to fall away immediately.
By this ploy, the industry managed to retrieve some tactical initiative and earn 
Sirait's gratitude, at very little cost to itself. Pharmaceutical manufacturers normally had a 
stockpile of most of the imported raw materials needed for drug assembly. As these 
would thus have been purchased at pre-devaluation prices, producers were suffering no 
loss at all in offering to sell their post-devaluation produce at prices increased by only 
15%. In reality, the industry was merely foregoing a greater margin of windfall profit - 
and only for a limited time, as the price restraint was just a temporary measure.
At the meeting with Sirait on 13 September, Lembong took the opportunity to 
discuss more than his post-devaluation price restraint proposal. He recognised the 
inevitability of Sirait having to adopt some concrete reform measures to both appease his 
superiors, and dampen the criticism from the press. (By this stage some press items had 
begun to present Sirait's stewardship in a critical light.83) In this situation Lembong was 
anxious to ensure that any policy changes which did ensue were not inimical to the 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry. To this end, he suggested to Sirait, in private, 
that this might be the ideal moment to unveil a reformulation of his aborted April 1985 
scheme - in other words, state manufacture of generic goods to be sold on the open 
market and targeted at low income people.84 Lembong's reasoning was that the 
politically charged atmosphere made it certain that Sirait would take action of some form, 
and that a modified version of the April 1985 scheme was a less bad outcome than others 
readily imaginable - such as outright price regulation.
This was a risky manoeuvre. In encouraging Sirait to revive a version of his 
earlier project, Lembong was gambling that the new scheme would not be too harmful to 
industry interests. There seems to have been an implicit bargain involved: GPF would 
support Sirait in a new policy initiative addressing the price problem, and in return, the 
policy would be tailored in a way not overly injurious to the pharmaceutical industry.
83 See, for example, the editorial "Tingginya Harga Obat", Sinar Harapan, 1 September 1986; and, 
"Depkes Bentuk Panitia Untuk Teliti Harga Obat", Kompas, 4 September 1986.
84 Interviews with Slamet Soesilo, 7 September 1987; and Eddie Lembong 31 July and 9 September 
1987.
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The DOPB Scheme
While Lembong and Sirait had discussed the latter's lingering determination to 
reintroduce some form of public sector competition for private manufacturers over a 
period of months, it seems evident that Lembong's sudden endorsement and offer of 
support for the idea had a critical bearing on Sirait's thinking. A mere two days later, on 
15 September, Sirait unveiled the rough outlines of the new policy initiative while 
appearing again before Committee VIII of the DPR to answer questions (in a session 
which lasted for five hours) on the price controversy. Though the new initiative had not 
been finalised, Sirait's statement indicated that it would basically involve a revival of his 
old scheme, plus the incorporation of Eddie Lembong's idea for the enlistment of the 
doctors' cooperation. Sirait told the Committee that the government would control the 
prices of eighty of the essential drugs most widely used by the people, and that the Health 
Department would finalise the list with the cooperation of representatives of the 
pharmaceutical and medical associations. He emphasised that this list of eighty drugs 
would be made up of unbranded generics which would be produced mostly by the public 
sector and would have their prices set at very low levels. In particular, he said that the 
project was aimed at helping low income people who could not conveniently attend the 
puskesmas and who had heretofore been forced to obtain their medicines via private 
doctors and dispensaries. (Puskesmas clinics are only open during office hours, and are 
thus inaccessible to many workers.) He explained that under the new scheme doctors 
would be able to write special prescription forms for low income patients whom 
dispensaries would then be required to supply with one of the low cost drugs from the 
new list.85
A press conference was held several days later to launch the new scheme, 
which now bore the acronym, DOPB (Joint Program Medicine List). The press 
conference was attended by Health Department officials and the leaders of the 
professional associations already involved in the PPKPHO Committee (GPF, IDI, ISFI
85 "Harga 80 Jenis Obat Esensial Akan Dikontrol Pemerintah", Kompas, 16 September 1986.
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and PDGI) who were presented as the co-sponsors of the program. It was announced 
that a pilot project of the DOPB scheme would be launched in Jakarta as of 1 October 
1986, and that if successful, the program would be extended to the rest of Indonesia.86
The political significance of these developments was well illustrated several 
days later when Health Minister Suwardjono reported again to the President, and spoke 
afterwards to the press. For a minister (especially one responsible for a portfolio outside 
critical security and economic management areas) to see the President for three special and 
publicised meetings within a relatively short period was quite unusual, and pointed to the 
fact that the issue had now assumed such a level of prominence as to involve the President 
on a continuing basis. After emerging from his meeting with the President, Suwardjono 
told reporters that for too long low-cost medicines had suffered from a lack of promotion, 
and thus lost out in competition with heavily promoted high-cost products of almost 
identical pharmacological specifications. He then went on to accuse drug producers of 
engaging in unreasonable promotion practices and of paying doctors commissions on the 
basis of the number of prescriptions for their products made out by the doctor.87
Sirait and Suwardjono were plainly very pleased with the DOPB scheme, as it 
promised to advance a favoured policy objective (cheap medicine) as well as provide them 
with a panacea for their political predicament. The general perception was that the DOPB 
scheme had been imposed on the pharmaceutical industry and was decidedly injurious to 
its interests. For the first time, cheap, publicly produced drugs were to be launched on to 
the private market. Indeed, many members of the pharmaceutical industry itself seem to 
have believed that they had just been dealt a major blow by the Health Department and that 
state produced DOPB drugs would cut into their market shares. An indication of the 
extent of concern within the industry can be gleaned from the fact that when GPF 
convened a meeting to discuss the issue with members, over 120 company representatives 
attended a gathering at which seating had been provided for only seventy five.88
86 "Mulai 1 Oktober Berlaku Resep Murah Di Dokter Praktek Jakarta", Suara Karya, 22 September 1986.
87 "Bangsa Indonesia Terlalu Dicekoki Promosi Obat", Kompas, 26 September 1986.
88 This general initial anxiety among the rank and file o f the pharmaceutical industry was mentioned in 
interviews by numerous producers. For instance, interviews with Sigit Nugraha (Director of Bintang 
Toedjoe Pty Ltd) 2 September 1987; Con Sradaputta (Marketing Director of Ciba-Geigy Pty Ltd) 19 
August 1987; and Anton Sunaryo (Executive Vice-President of Kenrose Pty Ltd) 7 September 1987.
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This initial alarm within pharmaceutical industry circles was quite misplaced, 
however. As the GPF executive and Sirait recognised, the DOPB would pose almost no 
threat to private manufacturers. GPF’s support of the DOPB scheme was therefore a 
shrewd manoeuvre. As with the post-devaluation price restraint, active support for the 
DOPB scheme was very helpful in stemming the tide of criticism of producers over drug 
prices. The image of drug manufacturers actively participating in a campaign assisting the 
poor directly held great public relations value. In late September, for example, Eddie 
Lembong was telling the press how GPF (as distinct from the Health Department) had 
been voluntarily conducting deliveries of the DOPB medicines to dispensaries around 
Jakarta to assist the pilot project. Further, several prominent pharmaceutical companies 
were publicly thanked by IDI head Dr Kartono Muhamad for having helped to ensure the 
success of the DOPB program by arranging for their sales representatives to assist in the 
delivery of the special DOPB prescription booklets and price lists to some 4,000 doctors 
around Jakarta.89 This was precisely the sort of publicity the pharmaceutical industry 
urgently needed.
Not only did the DOPB scheme bring valuable public relations benefits for the 
industry, it was almost cost free. Concerns that DOPB drugs would take sales from 
private sector products were quite unfounded - as the GPF leadership foresaw. The 
market for drugs for low income groups, the stated target of DOPB, was in effect a 
separate market from that of most private drug manufacturers. The target group for their 
products were the more affluent sections of society who could afford the higher prices of 
branded products. Certainly there would be some overlap if people of relatively limited 
means who would otherwise have managed to afford expensive branded drugs were 
instead prescribed a DOPB drug by their doctor. But here GPF was able to assume 
confidently that the scope of DOPB would, inevitably, remain limited. First, because it 
could reasonably be expected that both doctors and dispensaries would remain sceptical of 
the scheme, and second, because the enthusiasm of the state-owned companies 
manufacturing the drugs was likely to wane rapidly as a result of low profit levels. There
89 See, "Masyarakat Dilayani 'Resep Khusus’ Untuk Bisa Memperoleh Obat Murah", Pelita, 30 
September 1986; and, "Program Bersama Obat Murah Bermutu Dimulai", Komaps, 1 October 1986.
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were at least three grounds for expecting scepticism by doctors towards the DOPB 
program.
1. Many doctors would be genuinely reluctant to place their trust in the pharmacological 
qualities of unfamiliar and unbranded generics, preferring instead the more familiar 
and 'reliable' branded drugs. This was in part the result of a common perception that 
some unbranded generics were under-dosed and thus not efficacious.
2. A second reason for lack of enthusiasm by doctors was one identified publicly by IDI 
head, Kartono Muhamad. This concerned likely practical difficulties which the DOPB 
scheme created for doctor-patient relations. How, for instance, were doctors to 
ascertain which patients should be given the "poor peoples’ medicine" or no. No 
doubt many patients would feel embarrassed to request the DOPB products, and many 
doctors would be reluctant to risk insulting patients by offering to prescribe cheap, as 
opposed to normal medicine for them.90 This problem was highlighted in Kompas 
with the cartoon in Figure 5.3 in which the doctor tells his patient he has
oom pasikom
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90 For reference to Dr Kartono's querying of this, see "Harga 80 Jenis Obat Esensial Akan Dikontrol 
Pemerintah", Kompas, 16 September 1986.
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3. The third potential problem with DOPB in the eyes of doctors - or at least those who 
had been receiving commissions of any sort from private drug manufacturers - was 
that there would of course be a material disincentive to prescribe DOPB drugs.91
Whereas there were several reasons likely to discourage doctor support of the 
DOPB, for dispensaries there was only one. It was nonetheless very powerful. DOPB 
drugs - with their prices set by the Health Department - carried a much lower profit 
margin for retailers than ordinary drugs. This meant that dispensaries were decidedly 
unenthusiastic about the whole scheme. As an illustration of antipathy towards the 
program by dispensaries and their willingness to circumvent it, one pharmaceutical 
company executive cited an anecdote from his own experience. Shortly after the 
commencement of the DOPB scheme one of his household servants fell ill. The 
executive, not wanting to outlay more money than was necessary on the servant's medical 
bill, instructed her to request a prescription for a DOPB drug from the doctor - which she 
did. However, upon proceeding to the dispensary to purchase the actual DOPB drug, the 
servant was told by the proprietor that, alas, they had just run out of that particular DOPB 
drug. He was however quite happy to sell her a different, non-DOPB, product!
The attitude of the state enterprises manufacturing the DOPB drugs also seems 
to have been ambivalent at best. Like the dispensaries, their major qualm was that there 
was little profit in it for them. This was not too onerous to begin with as they were able 
to produce the DOPB drugs using raw materials which had been imported prior to the 13 
September devaluation. Once this limited stockpile of cheap raw materials was exhausted 
their support for the scheme would, as GPF foresaw, be severely tested.
In short, there was a surfeit of major players on the scene who were either 
unenthusiastic, or totally opposed to DOPB. In this context, GPF did not need to oppose 
the policy, it could leave that task to the others. GPF could thus proceed to support fully 
the implementation of DOPB in the knowledge that its chances of survival were limited. 
The irony was exquisite.
91 For discussion of these points, I am grateful to Dr Kartono Muhamad (Head of IDI) 28 July 1987; Jim 
Supangkat (Tempo health editor) 29 July 1987) and Irwan Julianto (Kompas health writer) 23 July 1987.
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From GPFs point of view, the DOPB scheme, while potentially threatening 
if implemented on a thorough-going basis (something most unlikely), was thus really a 
low-cost, high-return public relations exercise. What seemed to be a great set-back and 
threat to the pharmaceutical industry had in fact been turned to its advantage. There were 
two general indicators of the success of GPFs strategy. The first, already mentioned, 
was the fact that the level of overtly critical press coverage of the pharmaceutical industry 
receded. The second was more unusual, involving a signal that the government, and 
more importantly the President, viewed with favour GPFs backing of DOPB. This 
emerged obliquely when Eddie Lembong had the opportunity in late October to speak, 
albeit briefly, with Suharto. Lembong was in a reception-line with a group of dignitaries 
(unrelated to the pharmaceutical industry) greeting Suharto at an official function. When 
Lembong's turn to shake the President's hand came, he decided to take the opportunity to 
speak to Suharto about the drug price question. He therefore introduced himself to 
Suharto as a leader of GPF, which he emphasised, was an enthusiastic sponsor of 
DOPB. To Lembong's surprise, Suharto's face lit up with recognition, and he proceeded 
to convey his approval and appreciation of GPFs involvement.92
This may seem a trivial and fleeting incident. However given that access to 
the President is a very scarce commodity, for Eddie Lembong this presented an invaluable 
opportunity to gauge Suharto's feelings on the drug price issue. While Suharto was, of 
course, well aware that controversy existed over medicine prices - he could scarcely avoid 
it - it was less certain that he would have continued to monitor a health policy matter. 
Under normal circumstances, his indications of concern to Health Minister Suwardjono 
would have been sufficient to ensure a shake-up of departmental policy. It was for this 
reason that Lembong was surprised to discover that Suharto recognised and understood 
the term DOPB: he had clearly continued to follow the issue. More significant for 
Lembong though, was that the President was evidently pleased by GPFs association 
with it. To Lembong, this signalled that the pharmaceutical industry was not dangerously 
out of favour. That medicine prices were not actually falling did not seem to matter. The
92 Interview with Eddie Lembong, 21 August 1987.
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important point was that cooperative effort was being made to assist the poor, even if only 
in a small way.
Actors and Interests
One need not be excessively cynical about the motives of the various players 
in the DOPB story. Eddie Lembong and GPF did derive sincere pride from the 
pharmaceutical industry's support for the DOPB. They were not insensitive to the 
humanitarian aims of the scheme. As business people, however, their chief interest in 
DOPB lay in what it might mean for their industry. Midian Sirait and Slamet Soesilo at 
the Directorate of Drug and Food Control also had a genuine and long standing 
commitment to the idea of making medicine more affordable both for humanitarian 
reasons and reasons relating to the management of the national health bill. However, the 
state officials also had the overriding need to respond rapidly and demonstratively to the 
political pressure which was being applied to them from the press, the Health Minister 
and indeed the President
The situation with regard to IDI was somewhat more involved. This was 
primarily because the national head of IDI, Dr Kartono, held a decidedly more 
progressive view on the subject of the cost of health services than many of his 
constituents. Many doctors in private practice did not take kindly to efforts to sever their 
symbiotic links with the sales representatives of drug companies. To this extent, there 
was a perception that Kartono was in danger of being too far ahead of a significant 
number of his colleagues. In spite of this, he was a very active campaigner for greater 
social justice in the provision of health services. His public statements on the subject of 
medicine prices played an important part in raising the level of political debate to the point 
where the Health Department was forced to act. He saw the DOPB program as an 
instrument for achieving genuine reform. Being something of an idealist, he was 
apparently less conscious of the machinations that had taken place between GPF and the 
Health Department behind the scenes to bring DOPB into existence - for what were 
primarily ulterior motives.
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The other groups which were both members of PPKPHO committee and joint 
sponsors of the DOPB program were the dispensaries, the pharmacists and the dentists. 
The dentists played a very minor role in the whole affair and can be set aside. The 
pharmacists, or rather the pharmacy graduates’ association, ISFI, also played a largely 
formalistic role in the discussions over DOPB. This was in large part because pharmacy 
graduates did not have any common set of material interests. There were, after all, 
pharmacy graduates scattered right throughout the health services sector. Lacking a 
central focus, ISFT was not a particularly decisive political body.. The position of the 
dispensaries in the DOPB was, however, somewhat more enigmatic. They had a clear 
and very considerable interest in the DOPB saga. Quite simply, every DOPB drug that 
they sold represented lost revenue. So, they were the group who stood to lose the most 
from DOPB, and yet they did relatively little about it. For an explanation of this one must 
look to the standing of the dispensaries in terms of interest articulation. In this, their 
principal problem was that as one of the sub-sectors within GPF, their interests were to a 
very large degree overshadowed by those of the manufacturers. The manufacturers 
dominated GPF, and it was widely seen as an instrument primarily representing their 
interests, and only secondarily those of wholesalers and retailers.
One actor that did not come to the centre of the political stage on the DOPB 
issue until late in the scene was the Consumers' Association, the YLK. Along with Dr 
Kartono, the YLK shared what was essentially an altruistic interest in the question of the 
price of drugs. The YLK was seen as one of the most trenchant critics of the 
pharmaceutical industry, particularly under the leadership of Permadi. It was not only the 
pharmaceutical industry that was uncomfortable with the YLK under Permadi; the Health 
Department was also very wary of him because of charges he had made about corruption 
among Health officials. Indeed, when it was proposed by journalists to Midian Sirait at a 
press conference in late September that the YLK be included in the membership of the 
PPKPHO committee along with the other professional representative bodies, one Health 
Department official was quoted as responding with a pointed question as to whether or
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not Permadi was still leader of the YLK.93 Under Permadi, the YLK did nonetheless 
attempt to involve itself itself in the drug price issue. In late September, for instance, he 
appeared before Committee X of the Parliament, and declared that a major cause of the 
high prices was that the government was not sufficiently brave to set the prices of 
pharmaceutical raw materials.94
While it must be acknowledged that Permadi’s highly outspoken style was a 
major factor in the YLK's not having been included in the deliberations on the question of 
drug prices, it nonetheless remains a striking fact that the bodies which were invited to 
participate in negotiations were all involved in the production or delivery of drugs and 
health services rather than their consumption. In other words, there was no formal 
mechanism for the articulation of consumer interests into the policy formation process 
beyond the de facto role of the media in acting as a conduit for the expression of these 
sorts of interests.
The scope for participation by the YLK increased in October 1986 when 
Permadi was succeeded as head by Ema Witoelar. While not as abrasive as Permadi, she 
nonetheless had a reputation for being a strong figure in non-governmental organisation 
circles. It was hoped that with the replacement of Permadi by Witoelar, the YLK might 
achieve greater political access as a result of her sophisticated approach to government. 
This expectation was ultimately borne out with the invitation in early November for the 
YLK to join the PPKPHO and participate as a panelist in a special forum on drug prices 
on 10 November 95
Here again, however, the potential for policy inputs by the YLK on the drug 
price issue was severely circumscribed. As was noted in the press at the time, YLK's 
inclusion was not likely to have any real bearing on policy recommendations by the 
PPKPHO, as these had been already determined. YLK Secretary, Tini Hadad, was 
quoted as saying that it seemed that their inclusion was merely a formality, intended only 
to promote the impression that consumer interests were in fact being represented. She
93 See, "Konsumen Akan Masuk Panitia Pengkajian Penggunaan Obat", Kompas, 22 September 1986.
94 "Pemerintah Tak Berani Tetapkan Harga Bahan Baku Obat'\Berita Buana, 27 September 1986.
95 Interviews with Permadi (24 May 1986) and Ema Witoelar (15 August 1986).
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went on to complain that the YLK should have been included from the beginning, and in 
passing, also offered thinly veiled criticism of GPF in noting that it had appeared to be 
continuously on the defensive over the price issue.96
In a telling revelation quoted in the press, Drug Control Director, Slamet 
Soesilo, who headed the PPKPHO, said that had the YLK been included any earlier in the 
consultative process it would have simply sidetracked discussions by talking nonsense. 
He went on to suggest that while the PPKPHO had already finalised its position, there 
was still scope for the YLK to contribute at the 10 November forum.97
Clearly then, the YLK's ability to make positive inputs into policy formation 
on the drug issue were limited. In spite of this, it was able to contribute, via the press, to 
an increase in the clamour for serious attention to be given to the matter. This was not 
insignificant, as indeed was suggested by the wariness of the major actors towards the 
YLK. Nevertheless, the fact remains that its influence was only indirect Furthermore, it 
should not be forgotten that the YLKs eleventh hour inclusion in the PPKPHO seems to 
have been largely the result of a journalist having pressed Midian Sirait on the matter at a 
public press conference, and then subsequently reporting Sirait's ambivalence.98 The 
press, or more accurately the few key journalists who set the agenda, were the most 
important countervailing force (apart from the pressure from the President and Health 
Minister) with which GPF and the Directorate General for Drug and Food Control had to 
contend. Midian Sirait acknowledged this indirectly when he publicly thanked the press 
for its role in the drug price issue and for supporting societal aspirations to have 
medicines made more affordable.99
All the various organised interests that were involved in the drug issue came 
together under one roof at the 10 November forum organised by the PPKPHO. The 
Health Department, GPF, EDI, PDGI, ISFI, YLK and even the press (represented by 
Kompas's Irwan Julianto) participated in the open panel. As already hinted though, the 
event was mostly a formality. The forum represented the culmination of the PPKPHO
96 "YLK Diundang Setelah Rumusan Rampung", Kompas, 4 November 1986.
97 "YLK Diundang Setelah Rumusan Rampung", Kompas, 4 November 1986.
98 "Konsumen Akan Masuk Panitia Pengkajian Penggunaan Obat", Kompas 22 September 1986.
99 See, "Dirjen POM Terima Kasih Kepada Pers", Prioritas, 13 October 1986.
211
Committee's meetings over the period since its formation in August. The Committee 
produced a list of broad suggestions for the Health Department on how the price problem 
might be tackled. There was, however, no coherence in this as each of the different 
groups put forward ideas that were consistent with its own interests and placed the onus 
for reform on the other groups. The meeting did not result in any changes being made to 
the DOPB program.
GPF was, not surprisingly, pleased with the way in which it had managed to 
turn a potentially disastrous situation for the pharmaceutical industry into a minor victory. 
While the political pressure for action on drug prices abated somewhat from its peak in 
August-September, it continued to receive steady media attention into 1987 - for the 
problem, after all, still remained. In April the DOPB program was expanded from the 
original Jakarta area pilot project to embrace the capital cities of all provinces in Indonesia. 
But as GPF had expected, the extent to which the DOPB drugs were actually used was 
not great. A survey conducted by the government-controlled news agency Antara 
suggested that in Jakarta, at least, dispensaries were receiving on average merely ten to 
fifteen prescriptions for DOPB drugs per month.100 At that rate the pharmaceutical 
industry clearly had nothing to fear. Despite the persistence of a poor public relations 
image, prospects for the industry had begun to improve considerably with the receding of 
the immediate threat of price regulatory measures. It was at this time also, it may be 
recalled, that GPF was able to announce to its membership that the IHO system of 
publishing price levels had finally been abandoned by the Health Department.
A Sting in the Tail
What was for the pharmaceutical industry a generally more benign situation 
was dramatically interrupted in June, however, when, to the complete amazement of 
virtually everyone in the health services sector, Health Minister Suwardjono unilaterally 
decreed that henceforth pharmaceutical companies would be prohibited from producing 
the drug samples traditionally provided to doctors.101 Indonesia thus became one of the
100 "Pelayanan Obat Murah Di Apotik Belum Banyak Peminatnya", Antara, 1 July 1987.
101 Ministerial Decree no. 437/Menkes/SK/VI/1987,11 June 1987.
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very few countries in the world where drug samples were not permitted. The decree 
seems to have been intended to be another step towards inducing downwards pressure on 
medicine prices. This reflected the perception in some quarters that promotional costs by 
drug companies were one of the factors underlying high prices which could be reduced. 
Suwardjono had publicly offered the view that sales promotions made up nearly 60% of 
total costs.102 Sirait suggested that promotional costs involved with drug samples 
represented up to five percent of the total cost of medicines.103 In addition to the belief 
that samples contributed unnecessarily to high prices, there was also a widely held view 
that they were representative of unethical promotional practices by pharmaceutical 
companies. This was because the samples provided to doctors - ostensibly to introduce 
new products to them - were in fact a form of material incentive, as apparently doctors 
frequently sold them to patients or drug sellers on the open market, thereby receiving a 
substantial windfall gain. In announcing the decree, Suwardjono said that samples had 
diverged too far from their original purpose, and that in future pharmaceutical companies 
could promote their products by distributing brochures or convening seminars to outline 
the chemical properties of their new products.104
It seems clear that this decision emanated not from Midian Sirait and the 
Directorate General for Drug and Food Control, but from the very top of the health 
bureaucracy, the Minister himself. It appears that there was little consultation with Sirait 
on the matter, if only because the measure was extremely unlikely to achieve its intended 
aims and because the pharmaceutical industry was strongly opposed to it. It is likely that 
had the idea been Sirait's initiative, there would have been some prior discussion with 
GPF on the matter. As drug manufacturers argued in the press (and in interviews) it was 
ridiculous to believe that eliminating samples would bring down prices. Promotional 
activity was inevitable in a competitive market, and samples were in fact one of the 
cheapest forms. Other forms of information dissemination (and material incentives for
102 "Menkes: Obat Murah Terpojok Karena Tak Didukung Promosi”, Sinar Harapan, 25 Septmeber 
1987.
103 See, "SK Menkes Diharapkan Turunkan Harga Obat, 'Detailmen' Kaget", Suara Karya, 13 June 
1987.
104 "Menkes Larang Produksi Contoh Obat", Kompas, 12 June 1987.
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doctors) would just be more expensive. That promotional activity would nevertheless 
continue, was certain. In terms of eliminating unethical practices, the move was a 
complete failure. According to industry sources, the use of material incentives worsened 
after the banning of samples. The move was further regarded as ill-conceived because the 
chief losers from it would be not so much the pharmaceutical companies (they would 
inevitably find other promotional avenues and pass on the cost to consumers), but the 
armies of detailmen, or sales representatives, that they employed. These were the people 
who visited doctors on a regular basis seeking to promote their companies' products by 
providing them with information, samples and other inducements. The Health Minister’s 
decree placed their jobs in immediate jeopardy.105 Indeed, discontent among the sales 
representative personnel, estimated at some 3,000 in Jakarta alone, was so high that they 
contemplated industrial action by convening a mass meeting to consider their plight in the 
wake of the new regulation.106
While pharmaceutical companies, and particularly their sales representatives, 
opposed the move, the YLK and the leadership of IDI openly applauded. It is less clear, 
however, that the sanguine attitude of Dr Kartono and the IDI leadership was shared by 
the rank and file of doctors, a significant proportion of whom would presumably lose 
special supplements to their incomes.
The decree does seem to have been an inspiration on the part of the Minister, 
but his motives remain unclear. Some speculated that the action was stimulated by a 
desire to demonstrate (not least to the President) that he was capable of taking decisive 
action to address a problem. Whatever his motives, his timing certainly left everyone 
perplexed, for the intense controversy of late 1986 had abated. Almost as if to underline 
the inability of Suwardjono's initiative to lower price, prices of many drugs rose by up to 
fifteen percent very soon after. The reasons for the increase, were in fact, more 
complex, but they served to discredit the banning of samples. When questioned on this 
by reporters after he emerged from a meeting with the President in July, Suwardjono
105 "'Sample' Hilang, Komisi Tetap Terbilang", Kompas, 17 June 1987.
106 See, "Pancaroba Moral Dan Mental Masih Pengaruhi 'Detailer'", Kom pas, 27 July 1987; and, 
"Pedagang Besar Farmasi Dan Apotik Yang Harus Ditertibkan", Suara Pembaruan, 28 July 1987.
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would only say that the DOPB program needed to be promoted further, and that doctors 
and dispensaries needed to be "encouraged” to support it.107
For present purposes, the significance of the banning of drug samples was 
that it showed that while GPF was often able to achieve much of what it wanted by 
careful lobbying and bargaining with the Directorate General for Drug and Food Control, 
there was little it could do, at least in the short term, if senior government figures moved 
decisively. Access to one part of the state-apparatus did not ensure access to another, 
even though closely linked. As an aside, it nicely illustrates the diversity of interests 
which operate even within this relatively narrow area of the state: Suwardjono was quite 
prepared to intervene in pharmaceutical affairs, over the top of Sirait, to satisfy his own 
purposes.
It is interesting to note that in July, in the wake of the prohibition of samples, 
GPF, apparently not content with its normal low-profile approach to the task of 
persuading policy-makers, took the unusually bold step of sending an unsolicited 
submission for the 1988 GBHN to Cabinet Secretary, Murdiono.108 The letter was a 
detailed argument concerning the conditions necessary for the future prosperity of the 
pharmaceutical industry in particular, and the Indonesian economy in general. The 
outstanding feature of the letter was a sentence in its conclusion to the effect that it was 
essential for the government to recognise that apart from having 'social dimensions', the 
pharmaceutical industry was an enterprise which was inescapably governed ineluctablely 
by the laws of economics. Registered copies of this letter were also sent to, among 
others, the head of BAPPENAS, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, the 
State Secretary, the Minister for Research and Technology, the Minister for Industry, and 
the Minister for Health.
GPFs letter was a very conspicuous statement of dissatisfaction with the 
ideological orientation of the Health Department towards the pharmaceutical industry. It 
was a clear assertion of an argument for the minimisation of state intervention in business 
affairs. But beyond this, the remarkable thing about the exercise was that it stepped
107 "Menkes Serakan Para Dokter Dan Apotik Turut Manfaatkan DOPB", Antara, 22 July 1987.
108 e p p  letter no. 07.02l/PP.UM/1987, o f 23 July 1987.
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outside the normal channels of communication between Eddie Lembong and Midian Sirait 
and went instead right over the top of the Health Department's head to the Cabinet 
Secretary. Following Health Minister Suwardjono's intervention, stronger tactics were 
needed. This was an extraordinary move and seems to suggest an increased willingness 
on the part of GPF to push much harder to bring about a policy environment more 
compatible with industry interests.
Conclusion
What significance does this case-study have for our theoretical concerns? Let 
us start by looking at the main elements in the story. By mid-1986, the beginning of our 
episode, there was already a long-standing debate over the price of drugs in Indonesia. In 
the immediately preceding years, the Directorate General for Drug and Food Control had 
on a number of occasions introduced measures attempting to reduce pharmaceutical 
prices. None, however, had succeeded more than temporarily. In August 1986 there 
was a sudden flare-up of the controversy which was fanned vigorously by the press. The 
controversy became so intense that not only was the Minister involved, but also the 
President on a number of occasions, who was, reportedly, disturbed by the broader 
implications of any popular resentment that might arise over drug prices in the period 
leading up to a general election. The Director General, Midian Sirait, came under intense 
pressure to do something to resolve the problem. Correspondingly, there was extreme 
concern within the pharmaceutical industry that some form of price control might be 
introduced as Sirait cast about for a rapid solution. In a bid to avoid such an outcome, 
GPF encouraged Sirait to move down a policy avenue that adequately met both his 
minimum needs and those of the pharmaceutical industry. Thus it was that the DOPB 
scheme was bom, and subsequently presented as an innovative cooperative venture 
designed to make cheap medicine readily available. In reality, though, DOPB was never 
likely to have more than a temporary and sporadic effect on the price of drugs. It did, 
however, succeed admirably in resolving the immediate problems of both the Health 
Department and the pharmaceutical industry.
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As in the textile case, we again see the press playing a very important role. 
The impact of the press was so clear that senior officials appealed explicitly for a 
minimisation of critical press coverage. The press thus served as something of a 
countervailing influence to that of the two other major players, the Health Department and 
the pharmaceutical industry. Interestingly, we see the press and Committee Vm  of the 
DPR functioning not just as mouthpieces for other interests, but also as independent 
participants. Kompas journalist, Irwan Julianto, consciously pushed the question of 
drug prices to a position high on the political agenda in August - September 1986.109 The 
DPR was a less influential force than the media and served largely as a forum of the 
weak. And yet its activities were certainly not without significance: pronouncements in 
the DPR were noticed. Also very definitely noticed were the pronouncements of the IDI 
leadership. The status of IDI as a respected professional association ensured that it would 
be heard. Interestingly, however, although IDI was successful in helping to promote 
arguments for attention to high drug prices, this was not a cause which all of its 
membership would have supported. The YLK although largely excluded from formal 
participation in the development of the DOPB, also contributed in a manner similar to IDI. 
The irony of this case is that, with all these various actors participating in some form or 
other in the discourse on drug prices, the poor, in whose interests the whole issue was 
ostensibly being debated, were almost wholly uninvolved. They participated, if at all, 
only vicariously through the indirect utterances and actions of self-appointed 
spokespeople such as the Health Department, the press, the DPR, IDI and the YLK. 
Contained in almost all of the rhetoric was the notion that the well being of the poor was 
of paramount concern. This is the sort of phenomenon that Liddle had in mind when he 
argued that the interests of the weak in Indonesia are sometimes taken up in policy 
deliberations without their direct involvement
As a case-study then, this story is revealing in that it casts useful light upon 
the processes of interest intermediation and policy formation in a particular issue area. It 
shows a part of the state apparatus, the Directorate General for Drug and Food Control,
199 interview with Irwan Julianto, 23 July 1987.
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and a section of industry, the drug manufacturers, after having fought on-and-off for 
years, cooperating to deal with an immediate and pressing political problem, even though 
their underlying interests were almost diametrically opposed. It shows the DPR, and 
particularly the press, influencing the course of the debate. It shows other societal actors, 
principally IDI and the YLK, contributing to the debate as well. In short, even more than 
the textile case, it reveals a wide range of actors and interests which all, to varying 
degrees, participated in the shaping of a major policy issue.
Like the textile case-study then, this one also presents material which pulls in 
a different direction to the conventional wisdom. This plurality of participants and the 
nature of their involvement are not easily accounted for by existing models of Indonesian 
politics. This case suggests that policy formation is more complex than essentially state- 
centred interpretations of Indonesian politics would indicate. A reliance on the notions of 
patron-client relations and corporatism would leave us unable to account for much of the 
substance of the drug price conflict. Extra-state actors, particularly GPF, played an 
important part in shaping the outcome. Indeed, it is fair to say, that without GPFs 
support, the DOPB scheme would never have come into existence. But pointing to the 
limitations of the established frameworks for interpreting Indonesian politics should not 
be equated with dismissing them. The corporatist approach, in particular, would alert us 
to a number of the distinctive features of this story.
GPF, for example, exhibits many of the characteristics of a corporatist-style 
representative organisation. The facts that membership is compulsory, that it is the sole 
recognised representative body, that a number of diverging groups are placed under the 
one umbrella (producers, distributors and retailers) and that almost all negotiations with 
the state are channeled via the GPF leadership, are all very suggestive of a corporatist 
mode of interest representation. And yet one of the remarkable features of this case is the 
extent to which pharmaceutical manufacturers have been able to turn this structure to suit 
their needs very satisfactorily. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that rather than 
functioning on behalf of the state to limit political representation by the drug producers 
and indirectly control them, GPF has in fact served the interests of the industry to a far 
greater extent than those of the state. The pharmaceutical industry has carved out much
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more independence of operation for itself than the formal structures would seem to imply. 
Therefore, unlike the spinners in the previous case, who were forced to break away from 
the existing corporatist representative organisation (API) and form their own association, 
this has not been necessary in the pharmaceutical industry. Instead, GPF was, over a 
period of time, steadily turned to serve the interests of the client group rather than state. 
In short, the tail began to wag the dog.
Qualification is needed here, though, for GPF does not serve all of its 
industry constituents equally well. Local manufacturers, for example, appear to benefit 
more from GPF than do foreign companies. While foreign producers do derive 
considerable benefit from GPF representation (as, indeed, this very case illustrates), they 
tend to suffer when their interests diverge far from those of local manufacturers. 
Similarly, GPF as a whole seems to operate rather more effectively for manufacturers in 
general, than it does for the smaller sections within the organisation, the distributors, 
dispensaries and drug stores. Thus, it should be acknowledged that the corporatist 
framework that exists in the pharmaceutical field does operate to limit the potential for 
interest articulation by these weaker groups. In sum, it seems that the pharmaceutical 
producers (especially local ones), being large, well organised and determined, have been 
able to twist the corporatist representational structure to their advantage, while the smaller 
business interests in the other sections of GPF, and perhaps the foreign drug 
manufacturers, have been more restricted.
What can we say about the manner in which GPF sought to promote 
pharmaceutical industry interests? Undeniably, the 'behind-the-scenes' personal links 
between Eddie Lembong and Midian Sirait were a very significant ingredient in the 
symbiotic character of their relationship. But to present this story as just another example 
of patrimonialism would be to abuse an otherwise valuable concept. Their relationship 
was not patrimonial: the two figures had roughly equal standing. More generally, one of 
the most important aspects of GPFs behaviour is that, as with SEKBERTAL, it was 
group-based. It was an organisation striving for collective rather than particularistic 
benefits. Even though this was often done in a low-profile and highly personal manner 
(unlike a good deal of SEKBERTAL’s activities), the fact remains that here again we have
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a societal group which manages to persuade the government to do something it would not 
otherwise have done. The conventional, state-centred, approaches to the interpretation of 
Indonesian politics have little to say about such phenomena.
The very effective representation afforded the pharmaceutical industry by 
GPF is one of the outstanding features of this case. It is therefore worth pausing to 
consider why this section of the business community should be so endowed. A number 
of factors can be adduced to account for this.
1. The pharmaceutical industry is fairly cohesive. This cohesiveness has several 
sources. One is the fact that many of the heads of the local drug companies have 
known each other for many years. Another is the high degree of geographical 
concentration of pharmaceutical plants in Java, and especially around Jakarta. Both of 
these factors lead to a relatively high level of intra-industry interaction. More 
generally, a factor which applies to foreign and local companies alike, is the 
indefinable sense of neurosis or even paranoia of the pharmaceutical industry, which 
somehow seems to incline drug manufacturers to band together for common 
protection. Put differently, there appears to be a sense of common vulnerability which 
inclines the pharmaceutical industry to operate in concert on matters of shared 
concern.110 Arguably, the fact that all but one of the local producers are Chinese 
reinforces this tendency. These various elements all combine to constitute an 
unusually cohesive industry in so far as self-preservation is concerned.* 111
2. A second factor underlying GPFs success, is the comparatively sophisticated and 
educated nature of the industry’s leadership, with a great many company heads being 
university trained.
3. One factor of special importance is the overwhelming preponderance of private 
ownership within the pharmaceutical industry. Unlike many other industries in
110 The world-wide peak association for drug manufacturers - the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’
Association - based in Washington is merely a larger manifestation of this phenomenon.
111 This is not to suggest that the pharmaceutical industry is always harmoniously united around a 
common purpose; naturally there are issues which give rise to internal division. What is striking about 
the industry, however, is the extent to which it is able to cooperate when the occasion requires. 
Otherwise existing cleavages were completely overidden in responding to the threat o f price limitation.
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Indonesia, the market-share of state-controlled enterprises is not great in drug 
manufacturing. Widespread private ownership appears to have inclined the industry 
to be more active and determined in asserting its interests. It was apparent, for 
example, that the state-controlled firms, even though members of GPF, were less 
willing to push the Health Department (to which, it must be remembered, they were 
answerable).
4. Closely linked with this ownership factor is the intensely competitive nature of the 
pharmaceutical industry. The fact that the industry was so highly competitive and 
individual market shares so small - particularly in a time of economic contraction - 
served to further promote industry assertiveness. Threats to industry profitability 
became a driving motive.
A direct product of this amalgam of factors - cohesiveness, educated 
leadership, predominance of private ownership and intense competition - was that the 
pharmaceutical industry demanded high standards of leadership from its representative 
organisation. Hence Eddie Lembong's position was far from a merely formal one. By 
far the great part of his time was devoted to GPF affairs, rather than those of his own 
company. He was accountable to his membership, and could readily be replaced via the 
regular leadership ballots. All of this served to make GPF an organisation that was finely 
attuned to the interests of its constituency, and vigorous in pursuing these in dealings with 
the state. GPF is certainly not always successful in winning the concessions it seeks 
from the government, however, when its considerable organisational resources are 
combined with an industry-wide sense of urgency, or determination on a particular issue, 
it can be a formidable force.
Much emphasis has been given to GPFs tendency to adopt a low-profile, 
non-confrontational approach in its political activities. While this has certainly been the 
case in recent years, there are signs that it is coming to adopt a more assertive and self- 
confident style. A striking example of this was GPFs decision in July 1987 to send a 
submission for the GBHN to the Cabinet Secretary. Another illustration is Eddie 
Lembong's proposal to bring out a "White Paper" on the future of the pharmaceutical
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industry.112 His plan was to produce a formal public document highlighting the 
contributions made by the pharmaceutical industry, as well as the problems it faced. By 
this means he hoped to enhance the industry's image and identify problems requiring 
policy reform by the government. More generally, Lembong was planning to make 
greater use in the future of the press and the DPR to better promote pharmaceutical 
industry interests.113
Several reasons can be offered to explain this possible trend towards greater 
assertiveness by GPF. One conspicuous factor is the harsher economic environment of 
the mid-1980s. Declining sales and profit margins have forced the industry to become 
more assertive. As will be discussed later in this thesis, intertwined with the economic 
down-turn has been a greater receptivity to calls for economic liberalisation and promotion 
of business needs. Calls for the granting of more leeway to the private sector are 
increasingly common. A factor encouraging greater assertiveness by GPF is what Eddie 
Lembong refers to as the demands of the new generation of company heads within the 
pharmaceutical industry.114 Younger proprietors and managers are apparently impatient 
with the low-profile approach to interest representation which has characterised GPFs 
activities in the past.
The pharmaceutical industry's self doubts will not recede quickly. GPF is 
unlikely in the foreseeable future to adopt the strident approach of SEKBERTAL. 
Nevertheless, it does seem that GPF - already a remarkably successful business 
association - is likely to become more open in its efforts to secure what it regards as a 
satisfactory policy environment
Postscript
Since the completion of research for this case-study there have been a number 
of noteworthy personnel changes within the pharmaceutical sector. At the (four-yearly)
112 Interview with Eddie Lembong, 9 September 1987. The term "White Paper” refers to a Westminster 
Parliamentary practice of governments publishing frornal statements o f policy direction on particular 
issues. The term came to prominence in Jakarta mid-way through 1987 when there was wide media 
coverage of an Australian government White Paper on defence policy.
113 Interviews with Eddie Lembong, 21 August & 9 September 1987.
114 Interview with Eddie Lembong, 9 September 1987.
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GPF National Conference in November 1987, Eddie Lembong contested the position of 
Chairman. Up until then he had been Vice-Chairman as well as head of the Industry 
Section. In contesting the Chairmanship he stood against the incumbent, Amir Basir, the 
pribumi head of the state-owned Indofarma. Lembong was unsuccessful in his attempt, 
reportedly because the GPF membership was unwilling to have a non -pribumi in the top 
position. At the express request of Midian Sirait he agreed to stay on as Vice-Chairman. 
The Head of Industry position, which he did not contest, was filled by Anton Sunaryo, a 
member of the so-called new generation of pharmaceutical industry leaders.
The significance of this is that it illustrates not only the competitiveness of 
GPF leadership positions, but also the persistent importance of the pribumi issue. The 
rest of GPF apparently did not share Eddie Lembong's confidence that ethnic origins 
were not a political liability. Even though Amir Basir is not the driving force of GPF, it 
seems that GPF members are keen that, as a pribumi, he should stay on as formal 
leader.
The other personnel changes came with the announcement by the President of 
the new Cabinet in April 1988. Slamet Soesilo, the Director for Drug Control, was 
promoted to replace the retiring Midian Sirait, and outgoing Health Minister Suwardjono 
Suijaningrat was replaced by Dr Adhyatma, a respected epidemiologist
CHAPTER SIX
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND THE 
SEARCH FOR A BASIS IN LAW
This chapter presents a case-study of the campaign to introduce an insurance 
law. A clear legislative basis was sought by insurance companies because the existing 
legal framework governing the industry was unclear in parts, and subject to ready change 
by administrative fiat. The lack of a clear legal framework was a source of considerable 
industry uncertainty. It was hoped that an insurance law passed by the Parliament would 
help overcome the existing ad hoc arrangements, facilitate greater predictability and long 
term planning as well as lay the broad foundations for the future development of the 
industry. Ultimately however, even though there has been no strong opposition to the 
idea, the insurance industry has been unable to persuade the government to introduce a 
law. While it seems likely that one will, sooner or later, be promulgated, the industry has 
to date been unable to achieve its aim.
Unlike the other two case-studies then, in this instance the industry does not 
'win'. Also unlike the other two cases, the issue at stake here was not dramatic and the 
conflict was not heated. Instead, this case is a more common-place example of the 
mechanisms of interaction between business and the state. It deals with a more routine set 
of grievances, and thus provides a useful contrast with the two earlier case-studies. And 
yet, despite its seemingly unremarkable character, it is nonetheless very illuminating and 
throws up interesting material for debate about the nature of the Indonesian polity. In 
common with the two earlier cases, important aspects of the representational efforts of the 
industry group do not conform with the established theoretical frameworks. In short, 
once again we see a societal group actively seeking to influence policy, and once again the 
means by which their interests were transmitted to policy makers were not simply 
patrimonial, corporatist or 'osmotic'.
The case focuses on the years 1985-86, when the idea of an insurance law 
was most vigorously promoted by the industry. The main features of the study are the
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way in which sections of the insurance industry and its representative organisation, the 
Indonesian Insurance Council (the DAI), sought to induce the law by lobbying, in 
particular, the Department of Finance and the Parliament. As with the other two case- 
studies, an introductory profile of the insurance industry, together with an overview of 
interest representation in this section of the Indonesian business world, will be provided 
prior to addressing the details of the story.
A Profile of the Insurance Industry
The insurance industry can be be described on a functional basis in terms of a 
number of distinct sub-sectors. These are set out in graphic form in Figure 6.1. The first 
component in the diagram is the reinsurance sector. Reinsurance companies are, in effect, 
the insurers of the insurance industry itself. They underwrite the risks accepted by the life 
insurance and general insurance sectors. The life insurance industry, as its name 
suggests, sells life insurance policies. The general insurance sector (alternatively known 
as the non-life, or loss insurance) sells insurance policies to cover risks in areas such as 
fire, theft, marine and commercial insurance insurance.
FIGURE 6.1
Structural Overview of the Insurance Industry
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The life and general insurance sectors are strictly separated; life insurance firms do not sell 
general insurance, and vice versa. Business people wishing to operate in both the sectors 
must set up separate companies in each. This has led to considerable criss-crossing of 
ownership networks across sectoral borders. Social insurance is a special segment of the 
market in Indonesia which is wholly monopolised by the state. It covers such areas as 
civil service pensions, civil service health insurance and workers compensation. The life, 
general and social insurance industries all deal directly with individual and corporate 
consumers. In the case of the general insurance sector, however, there is also a broking 
industry which acts as an independent intermediary between interested consumers and the 
general insurance firms, tailoring policies and seeking competitive prices.
In 1949 there were no locally incorporated insurance firms in Indonesia; all 
were foreign-owned. In 1955, of the 135 companies in operation, twenty were local. By 
1985 the total number of companies was down to eighty-nine, but the number locally- 
owned had risen to seventy-seven. Much of this change took place during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the years of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, when many of the foreign 
companies were either nationalised, or ceased operating in Indonesia. At the same time 
the viability of the life insurance industry was seriously threatened by the high inflation 
levels and political turbulence of this period.1 During this period the insurance industry 
came increasingly under the control of state enterprises.
As with most other areas of business in Indonesia, the insurance industry 
underwent rapid growth following the transition to the New Order government. At the 
beginning of the New Order, state-owned insurance firms massively dominated the 
market. In a bid to revive the private sector, the government introduced a series of 
regulatory changes. A key element was Decree no. 422 of the Minister of Finance in 
1968, which declared that in order to rehabilitate the national insurance industry, equal 
opportunity must be afforded to private and state firms alike.2 The purpose of this decree 
was to assist the privately-owned firms by scaling down the complete domination of the
1 McLeod (1984) p. 86; and Emery (1970) pp. 205-6.
2 I am much indebted here to Henri Gunanto’s valuable paper on insurance law in Indonesia. Gunanto 
(1985) pp. 4-6. Also important was the Minister of Finance’s Decree no. 118 of 1966.
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insurance market in the public and private sector. This was significant because of its 
implication that henceforth no objects for life or general insurance, regardless of whether 
located in the public or private sector, were to be the sole preserve of state-controlled 
firms. This was a landmark decree which helped greatly to boost the prospects of 
privately-owned insurance firms. However, despite the implication that private firms 
were now able to sell insurance to institutions in the public sector, the practice has been 
for most of that business to remain in the hands of state insurance firms. In other words, 
despite the introduction of this regulation, state institutions continued to buy most of their 
insurance from state insurance firms, rather than turning to private insurance firms as an 
alternative.
FIGURE 6.2
The Development of the Indonesian Insurance Industry 
(figures in constant prices)
> Source: Department of Finance (1986) p. 2.
Note: This data was converted to current prices using a deflator index based on the Jakrta 
C.P.I., with 1974 being the base index of 100. See Appendix D for details.
Further legislative reform of the insurance industry came in 1969 with 
Presidential Decree no. 65. This had two main aspects: it permitted foreign firms to 
transact general insurance business in Indonesia, and it required that local reinsurance 
possibilities be exhausted before insurance firms sought reinsurance outside Indonesia.
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This latter element was designed to protect the small local reinsurance industry. The 
Presidential Decree was later reinforced by an implementing Decree of the Minister of 
Finance (no. 578, 1969) which gave explicit emphasis to the principle of free choice of 
insurer, taking this beyond the earlier established freedom of choice between public and 
private firms to embrace foreign firms as well.
In this more attractive environment, investment again began to flow into the 
insurance industry, from both foreign and local sources. Figure 6.2 (above) lays out the 
growth of the insurance industry (measured in terms of total gross premiums) and shows 
the way in which this growth has paralleled the growth in the Indonesian economy.
The relative size of the different sectors of the insurance industry in terms of 
assets3 can be seen in Figure 6.3. The life and general sectors are considerably larger 
than the social and reinsurance sectors. Because the different sectors are largely 
independent of each other, some brief consideration must be given to each, although 
greater emphasis will be given to the life and general insurance sectors which are the two 
most important for the purposes of this study.
FIGURE 6.3
Total Assets of Insurance Industry by Sector, 1985 
(figures in billions of Rupiah)
Source: Department of Finance (1986) pp. 3, 14, 74 & 78.
3 It is technically difficult to compare the size o f life and general insurance industries. Assets are only a 
rough guide, since in the life insurance industry assets are not a good measure of strength or profitability. 
(This is because a large portion o f a life insurance firms assets are held in trust for policy holders.)
Life Insurance
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The first point to be made here is that Indonesia is substantially 
"underinsured" for life insurance on a per-capita basis. A crude method for comparing 
the reach of the life insurance industry in different countries is to examine the value of 
total volume of insurance premiums earned. This gauges the absolute value of industry 
earnings, but does not take account of population differences. In order to measure 
"insurance density" in different countries it is necessary to compare average per-capita 
premium volume. To highlight the low level of life insurance in Indonesia, Table 6.1 lists 
both the absolute value of total life insurance premiums and the relative per-capita measure 
for a selection of countries. It also lists Indonesia's ranking on an international basis for 
both measures. It will be noted that on the more telling per-capita measure Indonesia's 
ranking slips from 34th to 52nd.
TABLE 6.1
International Ranking of the Life Insurance Industries of Selected Countries, 1985
TOTAL PREMIUMS 
(millions US $)
INTERNATIONAL
RANKING
TOTAL PREMIUMS
PER-CAPITA 
(US $)
INTERNATIONAL
RANKING
Indonesia 141 34th 0.8 52nd
Mexico 291 25th 3.7 38th
Philippines 243 26th 4.5 37th
Thailand 233 27th 4.6 36th
Malaysia 345 24th 22.2 26th
Singapore 172 29th 67.2 21st
USA 114,026 1st 476.6 2nd
Source: Swiss Re.(1987) pp. 14-15.
Having a small small average per-capita income and large population, 
Indonesia's ratio of life insurance policy holders to population, w hile gradually 
increasing, still remains very low. Table 6.2 compares the level of insurance in 1976 
with that in 1985.
TABLE 6.2
Life Insurance Policy Holders Relative To Population in Indonesia
POLICY HOLDERS POPULATION A/B %
(A) OB)
1976 1,325,493 135,190,000 0.98%
1985 2,739,303 165,153,000 1.66%
Source: Department of Finance (1986) p. 5.
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Among the factors underlying the low level of investment in life insurance,
four stand out. First, and most obviously, only a small percentage of the overall
population has money incomes sufficiently high to consider a life insurance policy.
Second, the small number of potential policy holders is whittled down further by
regulatory restrictions. Investment in life insurance, unlike bank "time-deposits", is
subject to tax - thus reducing its attraction as a savings instrument. Similarly, the 
• • •requirement that life insurance policies be denominated only in rupiah is also a 
disincentive to use them as a savings instrument because of the continued depreciation of 
the rupiah..4 Third, the existence of the state pension savings funds in the social 
insurance sector not only reduces the disposable incomes of public sector employees, but 
also acts as a disincentive for them to purchase an independent life insurance policy.5 
Fourth, the insurance industry generally suffers froma tarnished reputation in terms of 
reliability. Occasional company failure or insolvency has helped to create an image of 
questionable reliability.6
In all, there are twenty-one firms in the life insurance sector, the oldest being 
the state owned firm Jiwasraya, which was established in 1859 as the Dutch firm Nillmij, 
and subsequently nationalised in 1957. Bumiputera 1912, as it name suggests, has been 
in continuous operation as a "mutual society" (as distinct from a limited liability company) 
since 1912. It is the only mutual insurance society in Indonesia, although there is also a 
small cooperative life insurance company Koperasi Asuransi Indonesia.7
Table 6.3 sets out a profile of the life insurance industry on a firm-by-firm 
basis. It highlights the total assets of each firm, the amount of new business it wrote that 
year, and also the nature and ethnicity of a firm's ownership. The amount of new 
business an insurance firm writes is one measure of its dynamism. It will be noted from 
the table that some firms, though having only small total assets, managed to sell a
4 The fact that insurance firms are not permitted to sell foreign currecny policies has led to an apparendy 
sizeable 'under-the-counter' trade in such policies. In the early 1970s life insurance firms were permitted 
to write policies denominated in foreign currencies.
5 Skully (1985) p.134.
6 Interviews with Suratno (Director o f Bumiputera 1912 and Head of the DAI’s Life Insurance Section) 
10 June 1987; and Amiril (Director o f Asuransi Jiwasraya Pty Ltd) 17 June 1987.
7 Wibisono (1987) p. 23.
230
relatively large amount of new insurance. In the ownership category one company is 
listed here as being quasi-state owned. This is because the state holds a major share in it
TABLE 6.3
Profile of the Life Insurance Industry in 1985
___________________________________(millions of Rupiah)___________________________________
COMPANY_________________________ ASSETS NEW BUSINESS a OWNERSHIP ETHNICITY
Jiwasraya 
Bumiputera 1912 
Panin Putra 
Bumi Asih Jaya 
QcrarAbadi 
Bumiputera 1974 
Central Asia Raya 
Buana Putra
Koperasi Asuransi Indon. 
Pumamala Intml. Indon. 
Aken Life
Bumi Arta Reksatama 
Century Lifindo Perdana 
Universal Life Indo 
Lippo Life
Pertanggungan Jaminan 
Dharmala Manulife 
Iman Adi 
Mahkota Sahid 
Pura Nusantara
167,097 336,797
156,648 349,457
29,328 7,426
18,559 30,659
7,680 35,233
6,949 22,230
6,723 15,051
4,155 8,622
1,915 154
1,653 816
1,255 8,622
1,364 368
1,511 -
1,399 983
1,350 14,306
1,049 3,852
- 2,479
state -
private pribumi
private Chinese
private pribumi
joint venture b pribumi
private c pribumi
private Chinese
private pribumi
cooperative -
private Chinese
private pribumi
private Chinese
private pribumi
private Chinese
private Chinese
private mixed
joint venture b Chinese
private Chinese
private pribumi
private pribumi
TOTAL_____________________________ 408,635__________ 837,055
Source: Department of Finance (1986) pp. 71 & 91.
Note: For some firms there is no data entry. This is because they failed to submit the relevant
information to the Department of Finance by the required time.
a Measured in terms of the total value of the sums assured.
b These firms are listed here as joint ventures although it must be noted that in 1985 joint ventures
had not yet been approved.
c Bumiputera 1974 has an unofficial arrangement wiith a large American mutual firm, John Hancock, 
which may be a precursor to a formal joint venture.
A striking feature of the table is the concentration of business in the hands of a 
very few firms. The largest single company is the state-owned Jiwasraya with 41% of 
total industry assets. It is closely followed by the private mutual, Bumiputera 1912. 
Between them, they control 79% of industry assets. If the next two largest firms are also 
included, 91% of the total is accounted for. Another notable feature from the table is the 
unusually high level of pribumi involvement in the industry. There are eight pribumi- 
owned firms and seven owned by Chinese. In terms of assets, if  Bumiputera 1912 is
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included with the other pribumi firms, they together control 82% of the local private 
sector total, with the Chinese firms having only 18%.8
General Insurance
Perhaps the first point to note here is that the level of penetration of general 
insurance in a country can be regarded as an indication of the country's acceptance of 
modem business practices over more traditional ones. By way of illustration, from Table 
6.4 it can be seen that Indonesia has a very low per-capita general insurance premium 
figure, compared with those of Singapore or the USA. This is indicative of the 
persistence of traditional commercial practices and small-scale agriculture in the economy 
of the former, and trade and more commercial activity in the case of the latter two.9
TABLE 6.4
International Ranking of the General Insurance Industries of Selected Countries, 1985
TOTAL PREMIUMS 
PER-CAPITA 
(US$)
INTERNATIONAL
RANKING
Indonesia 3.0 53rd
Philippines 3.6 52nd
Thailand 4.2 51st
Mexico 11.2 39th
Malaysia 30.8 31st
Singapore 103.1 22nd
USA 780.2 1st
Source: Swiss Re. (1987) p. 15.
Table 6.5 sets out a profile of the general insurance sector similar to that 
above for the life insurance sector, the only difference being that instead of gauging 
company dynamism by the value of new business written, another measure is used, profit 
margin. Apart from the large number of individual firms in the general insurance sector, 
the most conspicuous feature is the heavy dominance of state and quasi-state firms. The 
largest company, the state-owned Jasa Indonesia, alone represents 23% of the total assets 
in the general insurance sector. If the next three largest firms (one a state firm, another a
8 These figures are illustrative only. Several factors make them of questionable accuracy. Most 
importantly, because Bumiputera 1912 is a mutual firm, rather than limited liability company, its actual 
ownership is dispersed among all policy holders. Nevertheless, it is widely regarded as a pribumi 
controlled firm. More generally, figures are obviously not available for all the firms in the list.
9 Skully (1985) p. 136.
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quasi-state firm, and the third a joint venture with a state firm as the local partner) are 
included, 61% of total assets are accounted for. In all, those firms which are either 
entirely state-owned or in which the state has a major holding together represent 69% of 
assets in the general insurance industry.
TABLE 6.5
Profile of the General Insurance Industry in 1985 
(millions of Rupiah)
COMPANY ASSETS PROFIT OWNERSHIP ETHNICITY a
Jasa Indonesia 115,475 21,973 state
Tugu Pratama 88,807 31,314 quasi-state -
Jasa Rahaija 83,879 35,225 state -
Jayasraya 23,145 2,184 jnt vnt - state -
Timur Jauh 15,723 2,365 quasi-state -
Wahana Tata 14,880 3,247 private Chinese
Central Asia 11,408 734 private Chinese
Ramayana 11,007 773 private pribumi
Insindo Taisho 8,581 1,673 jnt vnt-qsi state -
Bin tang 6,400 248 private pribumi
Royal Indrapura 6,281 691 joint venture pribumi
Union Far East 6,067 1,729 joint venture pribumi
Pool Indonesia 6,011 106 private Chinese
Cigna Indonesia 5,885 621 joint venture Chinese
Jasa Tania 5,512 11,159 state -
Indrapura 5,464 -326 private pribumi
Antar Malayan Bali 4,798 507 joint venture Chinese
Indon. America Barn 4,791 743 joint venture pribumi
Indonesia (M.A.I.) 4,174 186 quasi-state -
New Hampshire Agung 4,126 513 joint venture pribumi
Nasuha 3,497 -1,425 joint venture Chinese
Perusahaan Tri Pakarta 3,257 -314 quasi-state -
Periscope 3,243 72 private pribumi
Inda Tamporok 3,232 320 joint venture pribumi
Pan Union 3,079 256 private Chinese
Raya 2,952 99 quasi-state -
Bina Darma Arta 2,863 161 private Chinese
Multi Arta Guna 2,808 -70 private Chinese
Independent 2,777 93 private Chinese
Buana 2,768 5 private Chinese
Djakarta 1945 2,721 -72 private Chinese
Arthapala 2,661 1 private Chinese
Lloyd Indonesia 2,605 340 private Chinese
Sagita Sarana Rahaija 2,516 66 private pribumi
Dayin Mitra 2,457 22 private Chinese
Laut & Kebakaran Samarang 2,173 -214 joint venture Chinese
Parolamas 2,131 51 private pribumi
Umum Wuwungan 2,116 94 private pribumi
Sinar Mas Dipta 1,916 233 private Chinese
Dharma Bangsa 1,896 402 quasi-state -
Sonwelis 1,813 100 private Chinese
Harapan Aman Pratama 1,743 120 private Chinese
Dana Aman Sejahtera 1,702 23 private Chinese
Timur Besar 1,613 3 private Chinese
Puri Asih 1,561 50 private pribumi
Artarindo 1,557 127 private Chinese
Sari Sumber Agung 1,506 134 private mixed
Patriot 1,259 -11 private Chinese
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TABLE 6.5 CONTINUED
COMPANY ASSETS PROFIT OWNERSHIP ETHNICITY2
MargaPusaka 1,254 71 private Chinese
Rama Satria Wibawa 1,223 48 private mixed
Nirbayasraya 1,215 1 private Chinese
Pertiwi Agung Prawira 1,179 62 private Chinese
Dcrar Lloyd 1,161 35 private Chinese
Bumiputera Muda 1967 1,152 -143 private pribumi
Purwanjasa 1,098 -142 private Chinese
Nugra Pacific 1,070 11 private pribumi
Tjahjana 963 -49 private Chinese
Eka Lloyd Jaya 957 92 private Chinese
Pelita 753 122 private Chinese
Agung Asia Sejahtera 724 5 private Chinese
Gajah Mada 656 -96 private pribumi
Ampuh - - private Chinese
Fadent Mahkota Sahid - - private pribumi
Mumi - - quasi-state -
Teladan - - private pribumi
Wann gin Lloyd - - private pribumi
Yasudascope - - joint venture mixed
TOTAL 512,241
Source: Department of Finance (1986) pp. 82-85.
a In the case of joint ventures the ethnicity of the local partner is listed where the local partner is not 
a state, or quasi-state firm.
Two of the quasi-state firms warrant special attention. Tugu Pratama, the 
second largest of all general insurance firms, has as its principal shareholders the state oil 
enterprise, Pertamina, and the Nusamba business grouping. Nusamba, in turn, is owned 
by President Suharto's oldest son, Sigit Haijojudanto and Bob Hassan, a prominent 
Chinese business figure closely associated with the President. A key factor behind Tugu 
Pratama's great size is the fact that it enjoys a de facto monopoly over all general 
insurance business in the oil industry. The second important quasi-state enterprise is 
Timur Jauh, the fourth largest company in terms of assets. Timur Jauh is owned by the 
Berdikari group which, in turn, is controlled by the politically important National 
Logistics Agency (BULOG) headed by Bustanil Arifin. The head of Timur Jauh is 
Tantyo Sudharmono, the son of State Secretary Sudharmono. 10 Both Timur Jauh and 
Tugu Pratama benefit from enhanced reputations, as they are perceived to enjoy
10 Sudharmono was appointed Vice-President in March 1988. However, he will here be referred to as 
State Scretary as this was the position he held during 1985-87, the years of this case-study.
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government backing and access to special insurance business opportunities, even though 
they are not officially classified as state enterprises.
Like the life insurance sector, the general insurance sector is marked by a high 
degree of concentration of industry assets among a small group of large firms. The top 
eight firms have 71% of sector assets, with the remainder being shared among some sixty 
smaller companies. Unlike the life insurance sector, there are quite a few joint ventures. 
In all, however, the twelve joint ventures represent only 14% of total general insurance 
assets. In terms of ethnicity, pribumi firms again have an unusually high profile. While 
their share of local and privately held assets is not as great as in the life insurance sector, a 
figure of 32% is nonetheless still remarkably high.
Social Insurance
By contrast with life and general insurance, relatively little public information 
is available on the social insurance sector. It is made up of a small number of different 
institutions which variously handle pension funds for civil servants (TASPEN) and 
members of the armed forces (ASABRI), health insurance (ASKES), and workers 
compensation (ASTEK).11 The institutions in this sector are each the sole operators in 
guaranteed markets. For example, ASABRI and ASKES have monopolies in their 
respective areas, and participation is compulsory for their client groups. Social insurance 
firms are thus qualitatively quite different from firms in the other sectors, as they do not 
have to compete on a commercial basis at all. Not surprisingly, they are seen by the rest 
of the insurance industry (and indeed see themselves) as occupying a quite separate 
sphere of business.12 Therefore, while the social insurance sector must be mentioned 
here (if only because it involves very large capital reserves) in this case-study, its role is 
minor.
11 Not included here is Jasa Raharja, the state owned passenger accident insurance firm. While Jasa 
Raharja is often considered a social insurance firm (it bears all the hallmarks) many Finance Department 
statistics treat it as a general insurance firm. For consistency, this classification will be followed. For 
further detail on social insurance see, McLeod (1984) p. 87-89.
12 Interview with J. Tinggi Sianipar (Director of Jasa Raharja Pty Ltd) 19 June 1987.
235
Reinsurance
The reinsurance sector, like social insurance, has very few participants. 
There are three local reinsurance firms, two of which are state-owned. These two firms, 
Reasuransi Umum Indonesia (Indo Re) and Asuransi Kredit Indonesia (ASKRINDO), 
between them had assets totalling Rp. 263 billion in 1985. By contrast, the sole private 
company, Maskapai Reasuransi Indonesia (MAREIN) had assets of only Rp. 3 billion.13 
As noted earlier, the reinsurance industry is protected by Presidential Decree no. 65 of 
1969, which provides that 75% of all reinsurance needs should be covered by Indonesian 
reinsurance firms. In practice, however, this limit of 25% foreign reinsurance coverage is 
frequently breached, since the local industry is unable to cover all risks, particularly high 
cost ventures.
Broking
The broking industry is the smallest and least developed of all sectors. Many 
insurance firms in Indonesia view brokers as parasites, operating as unnecessary 
middlemen. At present, brokers may only operate in the general insurance sector. 
Insurance brokers in Indonesia do not enjoy the well-established position that their 
counterparts in the West do, although this is gradually changing as some of the larger 
insurance firms, especially the joint ventures, come to make more use of them.
Overall, the main points to note about the insurance industry are that state 
enterprises play a very large part in the market and that the industry is sharply fragmented 
into several sectors. Table 6.6 provides a summary breakdown of each sector on the 
basis of assets and ownership. (Note, however, that the earlier-mentioned quasi-state 
firms have not been included in the state classification here.) Taking the two most 
important sectors, life and general insurance, the state firms control 40% of total assets.
13 Department of Finance (1986) p. 78. A fourth reinsurance firm, Tugu Reasuransi Pty Ltd, was to 
open in late 1987. The firm, a subsidary of the giant Tugu Pratama Pty Ltd in the general insurance 
sector, seems likely to become a dominant force in the reinsurance sector.
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(If the assets of all the firms in which the state has a major share are included, this figure 
rises to 63% of the combined life and general insurance total.) An overall figure for the 
entire industry, thus also counting the heavily state dominated social and reinsurance 
sectors, shows that state firms (again, not including quasi-state firms) hold 62% of all 
assets.
TABLE 6.6
Total Assets of the Insurance Industry by Sector and Ownership, 1985 
figures in billions of Rupiah)
LIFE GENERAL SOCIAL REINSURANCE BROKERS
STATE 167 199 333 263 5 a
PRIVATE 242 240 - 3 25 a
JOINTVENTURE 2 b 73 - - -
TOTAL 409 512 333 266 30
Source: Department of Finance (1986) pp. 3,14,71,74,78.
a These figures are estimates only, as details on the state-private breakdown of total broker assets 
are not available. The estimates are based on the ratio of the number of firms in each category. 
b As noted in Table 6.3, in 1985 these joint ventures had not yet been approved.
Interest Representation in the Insurance Industry
Standing at the centre of the insurance industry is the Indonesian Insurance 
Council, the DAI, the association responsible for articulating industry interests in dealings 
with the state. It covers all areas of the insurance industry except the brokers who have 
their own association. The DAI was established in 1957. In July 1965 it temporarily 
ceased operation because of the requirement of the Sukarno government (discussed in 
Chapter 3) that business representative organisations form themselves into OPS 
(Organisations of Homogenous Enterprises) units. Under the New Order, the DAI was 
resurrected in July 1967. In common with many other business associations in Indonesia 
today the DAI has corporatist characteristics. Most obvious, is that membership is 
virtually compulsory. Recommendation by the DAI is a prerequisite both for securing a 
licence from the Department of Finance to sell insurance as well as buying reinsurance. 
Thus no firm could operate without being a member of the DAI.
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Universal membership does not, however, necessarily guarantee an energetic 
and effective organisation. In practice the firms which are active within the DAI's 
structure and seek to make the most of it tend to be the more professional and dynamic of 
the privately-owned firms. These firms are also typically (though not always) the larger 
ones. One company head estimated that, at most, only 40% of firms could be placed in 
this loose category.14 The managements of the state-owned insurance companies are less 
committed to the operations of the DAI for the simple reason that coming within the 
control of the Department of Finance, they have their own direct channels of access to 
policy makers. Moreover, they are usually reluctant to be seen taking a public position in 
the DAI which is at variance with that of their superiors in the Department. This is not to 
suggest that the state-owned firms ignore the DAI. They do not. In fact, members of 
their management usually hold a number of offices within the DAI’s structure. Rather, 
the point to be made is that they have little need to look to the DAI for the representation 
of their interests to the state.
Apart from the state-owned firms, the numerous very small insurance firms 
(many of which are marginal commercial propositions) make little use of the DAI. The 
managements of these firms are typically preoccupied with the day-to-day fortunes of 
their business and have little interest in macro issues bearing on the future of the industry 
as a whole. The fact that little use of the DAI is made by the large state-owned firms, or 
by many of these small firms, has served to circumscribe its authority. Many company 
managers are apparently unwilling to commit the necessary time and energy to participate 
actively in DAI affairs. Indeed DAI meetings sometimes lapse because a quorum cannot 
be achieved. Hence, there tends to be relatively little competition among company 
representatives to fill positions within the DAI administration. Managers from the already 
mentioned professionally-oriented companies usually fill these positions. The one 
exception to this generalisation, however, is the position of chairman of the organisation, 
which is always hotly contested.15 This position tends to go to a senior figure from
14 Interview with H.L. Rumamby (President Director o f Asuransi Sari Sumber Agung Pty Ltd and 
member of the DAI executive) 7 August 1987.
15 A nice illustration of this was the competition and controversy surrounding the selection of the 
chairman for the 1987-89 period. It was widely expected that Tantyo Sudharmono, the very young head of
238
within the state-owned firms rather than the private companies. The most frequently 
encountered explanation for this pattern is a perception that the leaders of the state-owned 
firms will be more acceptable to the Department of Finance and thus achieve a greater 
level of access for the DAI. From the viewpoint of the industry, one problem associated 
with the tendency for the DAI chairmanship to be filled by a state firm executive (and a 
useful reminder of the importance of patrimonialist behaviour) is their reluctance to 
confront or oppose the wishes of their bureaucratic superiors in the Department of 
Finance in the event of diverging industry and departmental interests. Usually these state 
firm executives serve only one term as chairman of the DAI before retiring to their 
company. This pattern of leadership mitigates against the emergence of a strong and long 
serving leader of the calibre of Husein Aminuddin of SEKBERTAL, or Eddie Lembong 
of GPF.
Another important aspect of DAI operations - and interest representation 
generally within the insurance industry - is that the various sectors tend to operate in 
isolation. The two major sectors, general and life insurance, have very little to do with 
each other. This is not a function of rivalry or enmity, but simply quite separate areas of 
enterprise. The separation is also reflected in the DAI's structure and the way it operates. 
Each of the different sectors thus has its own organisational units within the DAI's 
structure. Similarly, life insurance firms, for instance, (or at least the active ones) tend to 
consult only with each other and co-ordinate their dealings with the state quite 
independently of the other sectors. Nevertheless, while frequently operating 
independently, the various sectors do all march under the DAI flag for some purposes so 
as to enhance their standing, and promote the impression that they are not just speaking 
on behalf of only one segment of the insurance industry. In other words, DAI 
membership is invoked to suggest a broader-based constituency than is in fact usually 
concerned with any given issue.
the large (quasi-state) Timur Jauh company and son of State Secretary Sudharmono would get the 
position. In a surprise outcome it went instead to the head of Reasuransi Umum Indonesia, the state- 
owned reinsurance firm, following considerable lobbying to and fro. For a lively account of this see 
"Purwanto, Ketua Baru Asuransi", Prioritas, 8 December 1986.
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In many respects the DAI is more significant to the insurance industry as a 
neutral adjudicator on technical matters than it is as an aggregator and articulator of 
interests. One of the DATs functions in this respect is the setting of insurance tariff 
levels. Standard tariff levels are determined on a periodic basis by a special DAI 
committee, and are subsequently approved by the Department of Finance.16 Another 
"technical” function the DAI occasionally performs is to act as arbitrator in disputes 
between policy holders and insurance firms when there is a need for an out-of-court 
settlement.
While the focus of attention here is on the DAI, it should be remembered that 
there is also a separate association to represent the broking industry, the Insurance 
Brokers' Association of Indonesia. Reflecting the recent development of that industry, 
the Brokers' Association was only founded in 1978. Membership of the Association is 
not compulsory, although nearly all broking firms have joined. To an even greater extent 
than the DAI, the Brokers' Association suffers from the problem that only the more 
professional and forward-looking firms have any real commitment to its activities. Beside 
the DAI, the Brokers' Association appears as a very small organisation. Because the 
broking industry provides what is really a non-essential service, the Brokers' Association 
is not regarded as an especially important or influential body.17 Our concern here is more 
with the DAI than the Brokers' Association. Nevertheless, much of what is said in 
relation to the DAI, applies also to the Brokers' Association.
As with other areas of business in Indonesia, the insurance industry has three 
basic channels available to it, should it seek to influence government policy. The first is 
to deal directly with the Department of Finance; the second, to approach the Parliament; 
and the the third to attempt to use the press. As with the other case-studies, this chapter 
exhibits all three techniques for attempting to bring pressure to bear on policy-makers.
16 In the case of fire insurance tariffs, the committee is chaired by a representative of the Department of 
Finance.
17 Interviews with Tanto Sudiro (Chairman of the Brokers' Association) 23 June 1987; and Djonny 
Wiguna (President Director of Indosurance Broker Pty Ltd) 1 July 1987.
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Approaches to these various institutions might take place either via the DAI (and Brokers' 
Association), or else on an individual and ad hoc basis. Brief comment will be made 
about each.
Of the three, the Directorate for Financial Institutions within the Department of 
Finance is definitely the main focus of industry attention in terms of influencing 
government policy. It is the source of most key policy decisions affecting the insurance 
industry. On the whole the DAI and the insurance industry generally enjoy good relations 
with the Directorate. The Director, Marzuki Usman, is seen as being both reasonable and 
sympathetic, as well as accessible. The DAI has institutionalised meetings at an executive 
level with the Directorate several times each year. In addition, the life and general 
insurance sections within the DAI have their own regular meetings with Marzuki, on a 
less formal basis, every few months. Further, individual firms are free to approach the 
Directorate at any stage, outside the auspices of the DAI. The DAI thus does not 
monopolise access to the Department of Finance to the extent that GPF does in the case of 
the Health Department. By the same token, the Department of Finance does not seem 
concerned to limit deliberately access by individuals from the insurance industry. In 
short, arrangements are rather more open and 'uncorporatist' in this regard.
The major problem the industry has to contend with in seeking to gain a 
favourable hearing on an issue with the Directorate for Financial Institutions is that the 
Directorate is a small body and is responsible for the entire range of the non-bank 
financial services sector. As such, the various sub-sectors of the insurance industry must 
compete not only with each other for Marzuki’s attention, but also the pension funds and 
leasing industry. This is compounded by the fact that there is a shortage of technically 
competent officials within the Directorate, which serves to increase the demands made 
upon the time of Marzuki and the small number of key assistants surrounding him.
In situations in which the DAI or sub-sections of the insurance industry are 
unable to gain satisfaction from the Department of Finance, Committee VII of the 
Parliament is sometimes used as an alternative point of access. Committee VII is the 
Parliamentary Committee responsible for such matters as finance, the Central Bank and 
trade. Key figures within the leadership of the GOLKAR and ABRI factions of the
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Committee have been readily available to approaches by industry representatives to 
discuss matters of concern. Importantly, not only were these few Committee leaders 
generally sympathetic to the insurance industry, they also possessed a working 
knowledge of some of its technicalities. Moreover, they represented the two main 
factions within the Parliament. Meetings with these Committee faction leaders 
(principally Beren Ginting of GOLKAR and Benny Moerdoko of ABRI) usually took 
place on an informal and consultative basis. They were, though, willing to convene 
formal and public Committee hearings into a specific issue if it was of sufficient 
importance. Of special relevance here is that they were sympathetic to the industry's 
arguments about the importance of the rapid introduction of an insurance law to provide 
greater predictability and stability for industry planning.
The third possible target for representational activity by insurance firms and 
the DAI when seeking to influence policy is the press. On this front, however, the 
industry suffers from something of a handicap, for insurance affairs are usually of little 
interest to circulation-conscious newspaper editors. Because much of the stuff of the 
insurance industry is of a detailed and technical nature it is often considered to be too dull. 
This problem of perceived lack of 'newsworthiness' is compounded by the fact that the 
insurance industry is not seen as a central facet of the economy. Because it is relatively 
insignificant in terms of capital mobilisation (in contrast with the banks), it tends to be 
overlooked in the financial sections of the press. The conspicuous, and unwanted, 
exceptions to the tendency for limited press coverage are the occasional dramatic closures 
of insurance firms or controversial disputes between an insurer and policy holder.
This is not to say that the press is, in effect, closed-off as a potential channel 
by which the insurance industry can lobby policy makers. It is merely that the insurance 
industry finds it more difficult than some others (certainly far more difficult than, say, 
SEKBERTAL) to attract press attention. This public relations difficulty is not made easier 
by a lack of journalists with the technical competence to cover insurance affairs 
adequately. At least part of the blame for this situation lies, however, with the insurance
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industry itself, because it has to date failed to pursue and cultivate press links as 
vigorously as it might.18
The Background to the Insurance Law Issue
The issue of the need for formal legislation, rather than merely administrative 
regulation, to govern the operations of the insurance industry is not a new one. At least 
as early as 1963 the Department of Finance had been giving consideration to a bill for 
presentation to the Parliament.19 The impetus for the introduction of a formal insurance 
law has come from both the industry itself as well as the state, or more accurately, the 
Directorate for Financial Institutions.20
In very broad terms, the DAI, and the insurance industry generally, saw an 
insurance law as a means for providing a more stable environment in which long term 
industry planning could take place. Unlike an administrative regulation or ministerial and 
presidential decrees, laws promulgated by the Parliament are far less readily altered. 
There are over seventy decrees regulating the insurance industry, any of which can be 
superseded or revoked by the government at will. A law passed by the Parliament can 
only be revoked by another act of Parliament, a much more cumbersome process than 
executive fiat. With a firm legal basis setting out the relationship between the state and 
business, the insurance industry hoped to secure greater freedom from unwanted state 
intervention by administrative fiat
Beyond protection from the state (or a clearer definition of its role), the 
insurance industry sought clarification of regulations to guard against dubious business 
practices by some of its own members which risk bringing the whole industry into further
18 It should be noted, though, that this is a problem for insurance industries the world-over; the highly 
technical nature o f the business has often deterred media interest
19 Interview with Sri Muardjo Srimardji (President Director of Lippo Life Pty Ltd), who was an official 
with the Department of Finance in the early 1960s, 26 June 1987.
20 In the early 1960s there had been a Department of Insurance, and then a Directorate o f Insurance before 
insurance industry affairs were brought under the ambit of the Department of Finance in 1969. Interview 
with W ibowo Wirosudiro (Head of the Sub-Directorate for General Insurance, in the Directorate for 
Financial Institutions) 14 July 1987.
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disrepute .21 An example of this would be clarification of procedures governing 
bankruptcy situations. Because the insurance industry has an image or credibility 
problem in Indonesia, instances of company failure - which almost inevitably receive 
considerable press coverage - are viewed with grave concern by most firms. There is 
some desire to see stricter solvency margins and reserve deposits introduced, as well as 
clear procedures set down in law to provide for consumer compensation. Thus, by 
seeking to have the Department of Finance introduce stricter requirements for the 
operation o f insurance businesses, the industry as a whole hopes to benefit from 
improved public standing.
If then, in broad terms, these have been the main interests of the insurance 
industry in pushing for the introduction of an insurance law, what have been the main 
concerns of the Department of Finance? To begin with, it should be noted that the 
introduction of an insurance law was part of a broader project of the Department to clarify 
the legal terrain throughout the whole financial services sector. To this end it was drafting 
a set of three laws for submission to Parliament; one covering insurance, and the others 
being for banking and pension funds. Of the three, the insurance law was the one which 
stimulated greatest industry interest, and was generally considered to be the most 
pressing.22
21 The emphasis here is very much on the relationship between the insurance industry and the state, 
rather than the industry and the consumer. The latter relationship - between the insurer and the insured - is 
the subject of contract law, technically a part of private law rather than public law. Our concern here is 
primarily with the public law side. At present the private law governing commercial contracts is 
embodied in the Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Per data and the Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Dagang, 
bodies of legal statute left over, almost as relics, from colonial times. Because the relevance of these to 
modem disputes over insurance contracts is so cloudy both parties to disputes have often been unable to 
have the matter brought before a court. In this situation it has been necessary to reach 'out-of-court' 
settlements, sometimes adjudicated by the DAI or possibly KADIN. Many insurance executives believe 
that this has necessitated financial pay-outs which would not have been required were the matter to be 
decided by a court [Interviews with, for example, Djonny Wiguna (President Director of Ausransi Jiwa 
Central Asia Raya Pty Ltd, and DAI co-treasurer) 1 July 1987; and Gerit Hutabarat (Director Reasuransi 
Umum Indonesia Pty Ltd and member of the DAI Legal Section) 11 July 1987.] Some confusion arises 
surrounding the distinction between public and private law. In relation to insurance, public law regulates 
the overall operation of insurance enterprise, while private law pertains to contract law. However, this 
distinction in principle is not consistent in actual practice as there is considerable blurring, with some 
aspects of public law governing private law. Although this case-study is concerned with the public law 
governing the insurance industry, it should be noted that parallel with the Department of Finance's 
consideration of reform to the public law governing the insurance industry, the Justice Department, in a 
separate exercise, is reviewing insurance contract law. It needs to be emphasised, then, that reference here 
to the preparation of an insurance law by the Finance Department should be understood as relating to 
public law. For further details on the distinction see, Gunanto (1985) pp. 2-4.
22 Interviews with Priasmoro Prawiroardjo (President Director of Bank Perkembangan Asia) 6 June 
1987; and Beren Ginting (Deputy Head of Committee VII, GOLKAR fraksi) 13 June 1987.
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With regard to the proposed insurance law, departmental interests have in part 
overlapped with those of industry, and in part diverged. In common with the industry, 
the Department has consistently viewed a formalisation and rationalisation of the legal 
ground-rules of the insurance business as integral to its further development and the 
protection of consumers. The Department wants the industry to grow, if only so that it 
might play a larger role in the generation and mobilisation of capital funds for economic 
development. Unlike the situation in most Western countries, the insurance industry in 
Indonesia has played a relatively small role as a source of capital funds for the economy. 
The banks have played the dominant part But beyond stimulating the insurance industry 
to assume a larger role in national development, the Department of Finance has also been 
concerned to oversee it and guard against the public resentment and political sensitivity 
associated with malpractice and company failure. The Department would thus, for 
instance, like to see an insurance law provide it with a clear legal basis for intervening and 
taking action against failing insurance firms before they actually collapse. At present, the 
Directorate for Financial Institutions has some hesitancy about doing this.23
To this extent, Department of Finance and industry interests largely coincide. 
Differences exist, however, over the extent to which the Department should refrain from 
intervening in industry affairs. The industry has generally taken the view that an 
insurance law should specify in detail the circumstances under which the Department of 
Finance is able to intervene, and that beyond this a laissez-faire attitude should be 
adopted. In short, the insurance industry took the view that state-intervention in the 
market should be strictly limited to certain necessary tasks. Predictably, though, the 
Department of Finance (in keeping with the Indonesian state's strongly interventionist 
ideology and track-record) is reluctant to surrender its authority and capacity to intervene 
in industry affairs on instances it deems appropriate. This is in part because in some 
respects it does not yet have full confidence in the 'maturity' of some elements in the 
industry, but also because, as a political creature, the Department of Finance (or more 
broadly, the state) is inevitably reluctant to limit its own powers. This difference is largely
23 Interview with Amiril (Director of Jiwasraya and formerly an insurance official with the Department of 
Finance) 17 June 1987.
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a matter of degree. Both sides see a need for at least some state intervention; industry 
however wants this limited to matters which the DAI is unable or reluctant to handle, such 
as malpractice by individual firms. This difference of opinions is reflected in the form 
which the two sides wish to see the proposed insurance law take. The insurance 
industry, broadly speaking, favours a more detailed law which specifies precisely the 
roles and powers of the state vis-a-vis the industry, whereas the Department of Finance 
wishes to preserve maximum flexibility and authority for itself.
In essence, these have been the parameters of the debate about preparation of 
an insurance law which has been continuing on a sustained basis since 1979, and 
intermittently as far back as 1963. While some of the details have changed over this time, 
the crux has remained the same. The main variable which has fluctuated over the years 
has been the determination of the key actors to see a draft law finally submitted to the 
Parliament for enactment. In 1967, the Department of Finance apparently got as far as 
approaching the Parliament over the possible submission of a bill for consideration, 
though the proposal was subsequently withdrawn.24
In the late 1970s, the pressure for the introduction of an insurance law became 
more serious. In 1979, in a bid to accelerate the process, the DAI submitted its own 
complete and detailed draft proposal for an insurance law to the Directorate for Financial 
Institutions. The draft put forward by the DAI was modelled on the insurance legislation 
in other ASEAN countries, and particularly that of Malaysia. However, the proposal was 
apparently too specific for the Directorate of Financial Institution's liking in that it 
delineated the role of the Department of Finance too precisely, thereby restricting its 
freedom for action.25 The DAI then submitted a second draft proposal for the law, which 
was a diluted form of the previous one, in the hope that it would be acceptable. Again, 
however, the Department was unhappy with the submission.
24 Interview with R.G. Doeriat (Executive Director of Ramayana Pty Ltd and former DAI Director); see 
"Mengapa UU Perasuransian Perlu Diciptakan?", Berita Buana, 22 April 1980.
25 Interviews with Rudy Sidharta (President Director of Tugu Reasuransi Pty Ltd and former head of the 
DAI) 30 June 1987; Amiril (Director of Jiwasraya Pty Ltd and formerly an insurance official with the 
Departmentof Finance) 17 June 1987; and Marzuki Usman (Director for Financial Institutions) 13 July 
1987.
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In mid 1980 a series of detailed press articles appeared that were sympathetic 
to the needs of the insurance industry, arguing strongly, often in a polemical manner, for 
the immediate introduction of an insurance law to facilitate the industry's development26 
However, rather than accept the DAI's detailed draft law as a basis from which to work, 
the Directorate for Financial Institutions in 1980 appointed a team of officials to examine 
the subject and produce a more flexible draft. Although there were no industry 
representatives on the special team set up by the Department, there was consultation with 
the DAI to ascertain industry views. Despite the fact that this team had been set up by the 
Department of Finance itself, the draft law it ultimately produced, like those of the DAI, 
failed to gain the approval of the Department's leadership. Again the stumbling block 
appears to have been that the proposals were too detailed and constrictive.
In addition to this general problem, there existed also some specific 
substantive issues over which there was controversy. One concerned the fear of the 
insurance industry that the banks were encroaching on their territory. Though banks were 
prohibited from selling insurance directly, there was growing concern among some 
sections of the insurance industry about banks achieving indirect influence in the market. 
Concern focused on bank pension funds (separate legal bodies) either owning or 
acquiring a major share in insurance and insurance broking firms. This was seen as 
unhealthy by those insurance firms (at that stage a majority) which did not have special 
links with a particular bank. The nub of such worries was the possibility of banks 
encouraging their investors to buy insurance policies from the insurance firm in which 
that bank had an interest. Because the number of investors with banks far outweighed the 
number of insurance policy holders this was seen as potentially providing an unfair 
advantage to insurance firms which had links with a major bank. Apart from the practical 
difficulties involved in legislatively eliminating the scope for this sort of activity, the 
Department of Finance was, inevitably, sensitive to possible political problems arising
26 See for example "Mengapa UU Perasuransian Perlu Diciptakan?”, Berita Buana, 22 April 1980; 
"Dunia Asuransi Dikhwatirkan Jadi Penghambat Pembangunan", Kompas, 2 June 1980; and "Sektor 
Asuransi Perlu Dibenahi", Soar a Karya, 30 June 1980.
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from any such attempt, as one of the most conspicuous cases of a bank owning or 
controlling an insurance company was that of the Liem Soe Liong business grouping.27
Aside from the question of the involvement of banks in the insurance 
industry, another specific issue of controversy pertaining to proposals for an insurance 
law was the status of the so-called social insurance sector. Private and state firms alike in 
the life and general insurance sectors viewed with concern the prospect of an ever- 
expanding social insurance sector. Concern centred on the fact that the state enterprises in 
the social insurance sector all had effective monopolies in their respective product areas, 
and thus did not have to operate on a commercial basis. Worried about its continued 
expansion, the life and general insurance sectors sought a clear delineation of the limits to 
the territory set aside for the social sector. Furthermore, the life insurance industry was 
anxious to be able to expand into health insurance, which hitherto had been, by default, 
within the domain of social insurance.
In 1981, in a bid to push the case for the rapid introduction of an insurance 
law more quickly, the then head of the DAI, Doeriat, gave a number of these matters a 
public airing at an open insurance conference attended by the Director for Financial 
Institutions, Marzuki Usman.28 But by this stage, following repeated failure, the 
momentum required to push the matter was beginning to flag. Throughout 1981 the issue 
lay dormant. Then, in 1982, the Directorate for Financial Institutions decided to produce 
a private draft of its own. This was done with assistance from a small group of 
consultants from the Harvard Institute for International Development. During 1982-83 a 
very broad and general draft was developed, but was not shown to the industry. This 
came to form the basis of the Department's position in all future discussions of the issue.
27 Liem Soe Liong is widely seen as enjoying very close relations with the President. His vast interest 
in the financial services sector of the Indonesia economy centre around Bank Central Asia (Indonesia's 
largest private bank). In the insurance industry he owns or has major and direct shares in Asuransi Jiwa 
Central Asia Raya Pty Ltd (life), Asuransi Lippo Life Pty Ltd (life), Maskapai Asuransi Djakarta 1945 
Pty Ltd (general), Ausransi Central Asia Pty Ltd (general), Maskapai Asuransi Nasuha Pty Ltd (general), 
Maskapai Asuransi Marga Pusaka (general), Asuransi Pertiwi Agung Prawira Pty Ltd (general), Ausransi 
Purwanjasa Pty Ltd (general). For further details o f Liem Soe Liong's business activities, see Robison 
(1986 a) and Harahap (1986).
28 Interview with Doeriat (President Director of Maskapai Asuransi Ramyana Pty Ltd and former head of 
the DAI) 9 July 1987. For public reference to this, see "Ketua DAI: Masih Tetap Ada Perusahaan 
Asuransi Yang Nakal", Kompas, 16 February 1981.
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Though its role in this case is only small, the Brokers' Association also had 
an interest in the introduction of an insurance law. The biggest problem faced by the 
broking industry was that its role was not wholly accepted by the insurance industry. 
Many insurance firms would have preferred to see the broking industry wither. For this 
reason the Brokers' Association was very anxious that any insurance law introduced 
should give explicit recognition to the existence and significance of the broking sector. In 
1981 the Association had made a major submission to Marzuki on this issue and had 
pursued it intermittently since. Their voice in the insurance world was, however, only a 
small one.29
The Campaign for the Introduction of an Insurance Law
By 1984 something of a stand-off had developed on the issue of the insurance 
law. The Department of Finance had, as just seen, already developed a draft law of its 
own, but had not revealed the contents of it to the industry. In this situation it was 
difficult for industry activists to lobby for or against the inclusion of particular aspects, as 
they simply did not know whether or not the Department's draft took account of their 
concerns.
The industry had not been wholly united on the idea of pushing for the 
introduction of an insurance law. Some of the very small private firms which had only 
limited capital assets behind them were, predictably enough, wary of the prospect of a 
more stringent set of legal parameters governing the operation of their business. The 
question of higher solvency margins was just the most obvious issue to concern such 
companies. These companies tended, however, to be only marginally involved with the 
management and consideration of industry-wide interests. They had little to do with the 
DAI and tended to focus only on the day-to-day concerns of their business. Apart from 
these small firms, joint ventures, or more accurately, the foreign partners in the joint 
venture companies, also took little interest in the subject. While they were happy to see
29 Interviews with Wahjoe (President Director of Bimantara Graha Pty Ltd) 30 June 1987; and Tanto 
Sudiro (Chairman of the Brokers' Association) 23 June 1987.
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an insurance law introduced, it was not a cause in which they were willing to invest 
significant time or resources. As the foreign partners had to reduce their maximum 
permitted share holding from 70% to 40% after ten years, and then to not more than 30% 
after twenty years, they did not have the same incentive or long term commitment to the 
Indonesian insurance industry that local firms might have.30
Among the firms that did take an interest in the future development of the 
insurance industry and participate in DAI affairs (some of which were also small, though 
nevertheless outward looking and expanding) there was some division between those 
which sought a detailed and specific insurance law, and those which favoured only a 
broad and general law. Here the division was effectively between state-owned and 
private firms. The latter were anxious to see a detailed insurance law so that the role of 
the Department of Finance was more clearly delineated and, preferably, circumscribed. 
The heads of the state firms, were, on the other hand, opposed to this idea both because it 
would not really advantage their enterprise, and also because it was the clear preference of 
their superiors within the Department of Finance that a too specific law be avoided. In 
this latter respect they were thus merely reflecting departmental policy.
In assessing overall industry attitudes, the concerns of those small firms 
which felt threatened by the prospect of the introduction of an insurance law, and 
particularly a rigorous and far reaching one, can largely be set aside. This is because their 
number was not great and their political significance even less. Indeed it was the 
questionable business practices of precisely these sorts of less professional firms that both 
the DAI and the Department of Finance sought to eliminate. Of more significance was the 
attitude of the state-owned firms. However, their unwillingness to support strongly the 
arguments for a detailed law did not amount to outright opposition or violent hostility to 
the idea. Indeed many state-owned insurance firm managers no doubt saw an insurance 
law as being quite beneficial to the industry's long term future, but because their superiors 
in the Department were opposed to the idea of a very detailed law, they were likely to
30 Unlike many other industries in which a satisfactory return can usually be obtained within such a time 
frame, the insurance industry generally requires a longer period to fully realise investment potential. The 
relevant regulation here is article 6 o f the Minister of Finance's Decree no. 292/KMK.011/1982.
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indicate only luke-warm support for it. After all, an insurance law was not something of 
great significance to the state firms, for regardless of the sector they were in, their 
foreseeable future was assured by virtue of their operations' enormous assets and the fact 
of their being guaranteed by the government. Thus even the commercial state-owned 
firms (those operating in the life, general and reinsurance sectors) which had to compete 
with other firms were not dependent on an insurance law to brighten their futures.31
By contrast, there was a very strong commitment to the need for introducing a 
thorough-going insurance law among the more professionally-oriented and progressive 
private firms. Unlike the state-owned firms which did not really care about the issue and 
the small private marginal firms which felt vaguely threatened by it, the active and 
expanding private firms saw great advantage in a law which on the one hand delineated 
the role of the government in the industry and on the other served to rationalise business 
practices. They saw an appropriately constructed law as laying the foundations necessary 
for the further growth and development of a healthy insurance industry. This 
commitment to the introduction of an insurance law among those more dynamic 
companies stretched uniformly across sectoral boundaries. Thus, there were life, general 
and reinsurance firms all anxious to see a law promulgated as soon as possible. It was 
companies of this sort which were most active within the DAI in pushing for a vigorous 
promotion of the case for the rapid introduction of a detailed law. As one company 
president and former DAI head put it, the whole issue of the need for an insurance law 
was intimately bound up with the push to make the entire insurance industry more 
professional and sophisticated.32 It was for this reason that companies with an eye to the 
future were committed to the idea.
Apart from the general desire to encourage the development and rationalisation 
of the insurance industry, many people also saw the introduction of an insurance law and 
the campaign for it, as an important step in promoting the industry's status and profile. 
The tendency for the insurance industry to be viewed as the poor cousin of the banking
31 Interviews with Henri Gunanto (Attorney at Law, Gunanto, Prasasto & Co) 14 July 1987; Amiril 
(Director o f Jiwasraya Pty Ltd) 9 July 1987; and J. Tinggi Sianipar (Director of Jasa Rahrja Pty Ltd) 19 
June 1987.
32 Interview with Rudy Sidharta (President Director o f Tugu Reinsurance Pty Ltd) 30 June 1987.
251
industry was much resented in insurance circles. The achievement of a law was thus seen 
as a means for overcoming this status problem at the same time as boosting the industry's 
image with the general public.33 However, because this sort of enlightened attitude was 
one which no-one wished to be seen to be out of step with, over time those state-owned 
and small private firms which had initially been ambivalent about the proposed law, 
gradually moved into line behind the activists. While the active proponents of an 
insurance law were, as has been emphasised, limited to the more professionally oriented 
firms, they came to be seen to be representing (if still vicariously) the interests of all 
members of the insurance industry.
Paralleling this apparent de facto convergence of industry ranks was a decline 
in debate over the details of the law. Many of the specific issues proposed for inclusion 
in the law which had been the subject of controversy, gradually fell by the wayside. This 
was in part because it was clear that if any bill at all was to be put to Parliament by the 
government, it would be only very general and flexible. Thus many of the questions of 
detail would simply not arise. At the same time, some of the specific issues, such as the 
question of the covert involvement of banks in the insurance industry, were simply over­
taken by events. By the mid 1980s almost all major insurance firms had established direct 
links with a particular bank. This either took the form of the bank having an indirect 
shareholding in the insurance firm via a third corporate entity such as a pension fund, or 
else a bank and an insurance firm simply establishing an informal symbiotic relationship. 
Bank involvement thus went from being controversial to almost universal.
By 1984 the industry was well aware that the Directorate for Financial 
Institutions had completed work on its preferred draft bill. In this situation clamouring 
from industry circles receded in the expectation that introduction of a law was imminent. 
There was still some prompting, such as, for example, when Tantyo Sudharmono, the 
Executive Director of the large general insurance company Timur Jauh, appeared before 
Committee VII of the Parliament and called for an expeditious introduction of the law.
33 Having a basis in law is widely seen as an affirmation of status. The explicit refemce to the insurance 
industry in REPELITA. IV (1984), was for example, seen as an important first step in promoting the 
industry's standing. The quest for an actual law was thus in many respects comparable to KADIbTs 
obsession with pursuing recognition in law.
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Being an active figure within the DAI and the son of the powerful State Secretary 
Sudharmono, Tantyo Sudharmono's urgings inevitably received press attention.34 
Generally speaking, however, the industry was relatively quiet during 1984. There were 
several reasons for this. In part it was because the initiative had been removed from their 
hands following the failure of their two earlier submissions to win acceptance. Carriage 
of the matter thus lay exclusively in the hands of the Department of Finance. In this 
situation there was a feeling that industry interests would be better served by refraining 
from making demands about the type of law desired, as this might jeopardise or delay the 
introduction of any law at all. It was not simply a case of the industry having been 
'frozen-out' of deliberations, though. There existed considerable optimism that the 
Director for Financial Institutions, Marzuki Usman, was sympathetic to the future needs 
of the insurance industry and would thus attempt to expedite the submission of a bill to 
the Parliament. In short, industry activists constrained from making too many demands 
about the nature of the draft law, and simultaneously hopeful that Marzuki Usman would 
deliver a satisfactory product within a short time.
Certainly there were plenty of official hints during 1984 that the submission 
of an insurance bill to the Parliament was imminent. Public statements by the Director 
General for Domestic Monetary Affairs in the Department of Finance, Oskar 
Suijaatmadja, in January and again in August, as well as Committee VII leader, Beren 
Ginting, and Minister of Finance, Radius Prawiro, in March all seemed to herald a quick 
climax to the matter.35
Expectations were to be disappointed however. No bill was submitted to the 
Parliament. After the relative quiet of the immediately preceding years, a changing mood 
came over the insurance industry during 1985-86.
34 See, for example, "Perlu Dibatasi Pemberian Izin Pendirian Asuransi Bara", Pelita, 13 February 
1984.
35 For public reference to statements presaging an imminent introduction o f an insurance law see, "RUU 
Tentang Pokok-Pokok Usaha Perasuransian Akan Diajukan Ke DPR", Kompas, 5 January 1984; "Konsep 
RUU Usaha Perasuransian Tengah Disiapkan", Business News, 20 August 1984; "Bara 20-30 Persen 
Masyarakat Golongan Mampu Terserap Asuransi", Antara, 24 March 1984; and "Pemerintah Menyiapkan 
RUU Perbankan Dan Perasuransian", Kompas, 2 April 1984.
253
A Heightened Industry Effort
The failure of the government to submit a bill to the Parliament led industry 
activists in the DAI to become impatient. During 1985-86 industry attempts to pressure 
the Department of Finance into the early introduction of an insurance law were rekindled 
and reached their peak. Apart from impatience, another important stimulus for industry 
action was the financial instability resulting from the severe buffeting the industry was 
experiencing during the economic downturn. Not only was profitability being pressured 
across the industry, some smaller firms were faced with insolvency.36 In this context, 
the introduction of an insurance law came to be seen as offering almost a panacea for 
industry woes.
Industry attempts to accelerate the introduction of the law took a number of 
forms. At the most formal level the DAI held regular and institutionalised discussions 
with the Directorate for Financial Institutions at which the matter was pushed in 
discussion with Marzuki and other officials. As well as being the most formal channel for 
communications between the industry and the Department of Finance, this was also 
perhaps the least significant. Because it was such an official occasion the scope for frank 
exchanges between the two sides was limited. While the DAI continued to make formal 
representations of this sort, a number of the more active insurance leaders felt that more 
needed to be done to stimulate the Department of Finance into action. There was a 
perception that because the DAI was headed by the chief officer of a state-owned firm, it 
was not likely to push the case for the introduction of an insurance law as vigorously as 
might be hoped. This widely held view rested on the fact that the managements of state- 
owned insurance firms were directly answerable to the Department of Finance. In 
addition, the DAI was denied some of its authority by the tendency of the life and general 
insurance sectors to operate in isolation of each other. Instead the various DAI sectoral 
groupings tended to raise the matter independently in their own informal monthly 
meetings with Marzuki. In this situation, meetings amongst like-minded company heads
36 Interviews with Rudy Wanandi (President Director of Wahana Tata Pty Ltd and Deputy Head o f the 
DAI) 23 July 1987; and H i .  Rumamby (President Director of Asuransi Sari Sumber Agung Pty Ltd and 
DAI executive) 7 August 1987. For reference to the forced closure of one firm see, "Dicabut, Izin Usaha 
Perusahaan Asuransi Rafelsa Raya", Pelita, 29 June 1985.
254
in each sector saw the initiative move to activists within the sectoral divisions of the DAI. 
The various sectoral units were not however operating in complete isolation of each other 
on this matter, it was an issue which concerned them all. So, for example, the life 
insurance section of the DAI was well aware that the general and reinsurance sections 
were also anxious to see the promulgation of a law expedited. In addition, they would all 
have been fully cognisant of the deliberations on the issue by the DAI's legal section 
during 1985-86. The introduction of an insurance law was, after all, a top priority issue 
on the DAI executive agenda. Typically there was a loose and semi-coordinated effort by 
the different sectors of the insurance industry to use consistently the valuable opportunity 
for forthright exchange provided by the regular meetings with Marzuki to raise the 
question of the progress of the draft law and the likely length of time before its 
submission to the Parliament.37 In this, the DAI executive, and the organisation's 
various sectoral components, were now no longer seeking to introduce any new variables 
into the equation. They had thus reduced their pressuring of the Department about the 
specifics of the proposed law. Instead, they focused their efforts on persuading the 
Department to submit its still unrevealed draft (upon which it had been brooding since 
1984) to the Parliament for ratification as soon as possible.
In addition to these initiatives taken by the sectoral units within the DAI, 
parallel informal efforts were made outside DAI channels. These usually took the form of 
loosely organised lobbying of the Department of Finance on a personal basis by 
individual company heads. Thus, for example, concerned leaders of the life insurance 
industry would agree informally to push the question of an insurance law at every 
opportunity provided by meetings with state officials. Though this was an ad hoc 
approach to the issue, many company heads viewed it as being of at least as much use as 
the periodic promptings which came from the DAI. These informal, individual 
approaches to the Department were not in any way opposed to, or even distinguished 
from those of the DAI. Indeed, many of the company leaders who pushed for the
37 Interviews with Djonny Wiguna (President Director of Asuransi Jiwa Central Asia Raya Pty Ltd and 
co-Treasurer o f the DAI) 1 July 1987; and Sujono Soepeno (Director o f Auransi Panin Putra Pty Ltd and 
Deputy Head o f the life Insurance Section of DAI) 3 July 1987.
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introduction of a law outside the the DAI's channels, were also the same people pushing 
from inside the DAI. This was not surprising, as a company leader who was concerned 
about the future direction of the industry to the extent of being willing to lobby the state 
over the matter, was also highly likely to be an active member of the industry's 
professional association. The significant point, however, is that many of these people felt 
that the DAI was not a sufficiently forceful vehicle for the delivery of their message, and 
that supplementary efforts were needed.
The insurance industry's efforts - both from DAI and individual channels - 
were not confined solely to the Department of Finance. Committee VTI of the Parliament 
was also a focus for attention. The leaders of the GOLKAR and ABRI factions of the 
Committee viewed favourably the industry's arguments for the need of a rapid 
introduction of an insurance law in order to provide greater predictability and stability for 
industry planning. Meetings with the leaders of Committee VH, as with the Department 
of Finance, took place on both a formal and informal level. The Brokers' Association 
followed the DAI's lead in this and also lobbied Committee VTI.
Key figures within Committee VTI sought to assist the insurance industry by 
speaking both publicly and privately on their behalf. Apart from arranging official 
Committee hearings on the subject of the insurance industry and the question of an 
insurance law, they were also active in openly speaking in favour of the early 
introduction of a law at various public meetings.38 In addition, they also decided to push 
the matter in private discussions with senior officials in the Directorate of Financial 
Institutions.39
By these several means the insurance industry approached a variety of facets 
of the state structure, both in a formal and unified manner, as well as informally on an ad 
hoc basis in an effort to expedite the introduction of the law. Apart from the already 
mentioned Department of Finance and the Parliament, other areas to be targeted were the
38 For reference to public occasions on which senior Committee VII figures have spoken openly on this, 
see, for instance, "Haras Teijamin, Kepastian Hak Pemegang Polis Asuransi", Kompas, 30 June 1986; 
"Pengusaha Asuransi Di Indonesia Beijalan Sendiri-Sendiri", Suara Karya, 11 August 1986; and "Dana 
Asuransi Jiwa Bisa Gantikan Posisi Pinjaman Luar Negeri", Merdeka, 27 October 1986.
39 Interviews with Beren Ginting, (Deputy of Committee VII, GOLKAR fraksi) 13 June 1987 and 19 
August 1987.
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State Secretariat, BAPPENAS, the Department of Industry, the National Investment 
Board and even the Co-ordinadng Minister for Social Welfare.40 This push to achieve an 
insurance law came to be regarded as somehow symbolising, or encapsulating almost all 
the insurance industry's grievances. Indeed, in some quarters there were quite 
exaggerated and near-messianic expectations that somehow the attainment of an insurance 
law would be the panacea for all the industry's problems.41
At times the campaign to promote the law was conducted in a very vigorous 
manner. For example, at one public seminar organised to address the issue, one of the 
speakers, Tantyo Sudharmono, spoke in strident terms about the failure of the 
government to assist the development of the insurance industry and the lack of facilities it 
received by comparison with other parts of the financial services sector, such as 
banking.42
Bumiputera 1912 and the Insurance Law
While there was a broad interest in the question of an insurance law within the 
industry, we have seen that some companies were far more active in promoting the idea 
than others. One firm, in particular, stood out. Bumiputera 1912, had a unique interest 
in the whole issue of an insurance law. Bumiputera 1912 was the only firm structured as 
a mutual society, as distinct from a limited liability company. While this form of 
enterprise is not uncommon in the insurance industries of the West, it is unique in 
Indonesia. This only became significant after it emerged that the Department of Finance, 
following consultations with the Harvard Institute for International Development advisory 
team, was contemplating the insertion of a requirement in the new law that all insurance 
firms be structured as limited liability companies 43
40 Interview with Tantyo Sudharmono (President Director o f Timur Jauh Pty Ltd and member of the DAI 
Advisory Council) 24 August 1987.
41 Interviews with Catherine Prime and Andrew Giffin (Harvard Institute for International Development 
consultants to the Department o f Finance) 13 June 1987.
42 "Pengusaha Asuransi Di Indonesia Berjalan Sendiri-Sendiri", Suara Karya, 11 August 1986.
43 Two factors lay behind their preference for the limited liability company rather than the mutual. 
First, there was seen to be less effective control by "shareholders" over the direction of firm policy in 
mutuals for the simple reason that shareholders in a mutual are the thousands o f individual policy holders, 
as opposed to the relatively few initial capital investors who found a limited liability company. 
Secondly, mutuals were seen to be of relatively less use for the ultimate goal o f assisting national 
economic development (via the mobilisation o f capital resources) as the firm's earnings were dispersed
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Bumiputera had an interest in the proposal for an insurance law on two levels. 
First, as one of the most prosperous and well established firms it had a strong interest in 
the introduction of a law to help strengthen the industry's future. At a deeper level 
though, it had a more immediate and urgent interest in it, centring around the very future 
of the firm .44 The possibility that Bumiputera might be forced to restructure itself as a 
limited liability company was viewed with horror by the firm's management. The 
management's position was made more difficult by the fact that it was somewhat isolated 
on the issue, with no obvious source of support. Indeed, it might reasonably have been 
presumed that some of Bumiputera's competitors in the life insurance sector would 
welcome the prospect of the firm having to transform itself and cope with all the ensuing 
administrative and commercial headaches. In this situation, Bumiputera sought to have 
the proposal for the elimination of mutuals erased from the - still unseen - draft law which 
the Department of Finance had before it.
The main strategic asset the firm's management had in their battle was that 
Bumiputera was one of the two giants of the life insurance industry. Furthermore, it had 
been in operation for a very long time, with a proven commercial track-record, and was 
generally regarded as a good example of what local enterprise could achieve. Bumiputera 
thus argued that the Department of Finance would be foolish to contemplate radically 
disturbing what was, after all, an Indonesian and pribumi success story.
The first hurdle the Bumiputera management faced in seeking to promote this 
view was that the people they most needed to convince, Marzuki Usman and the 
Directorate of Financial Institutions, were seen as sceptical of their position. The 
Department of Finance, far from being a neutral broker on the matter, was the source of 
the opposing viewpoint. Bumiputera was therefore forced to seek other routes to bring
among policy holders rather than accumulating as retained earnings. Interviews with Suratno (Director of 
Bumiputera 1912 and Head of the DATs Life Insurance Section) 9 July 1987; and Wibowo Wirosudiro 
(Head o f the Sub-Directorate for General Insurance, Department of Finance) 14 July 1987.
44 For much of this material on Bumiputera's experience I am grateful for interviews with, among 
others, Suratno (Director o f Bumiputera 1912 and Head of the DATs Life Insurance Section) 10 June 1987 
& 9 July 1987; Wibowo Wirosudiro (Head o f the Sub-Directorate for General Insurance, Department of 
Finance) 14 July 1987 & 25 August 1987; and Beren Ginting (Deputy Head o f Committee VII, 
GOLKAR fraksi) 13 June 1987 & 19 August 1982.
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pressure to bear on the Department of Finance to have it reconsider its position. Attention 
was thus shifted to the Parliament, and, to a lesser extent, the press. The Bumiputera 
management approached the leadership of Committee VII on an informal basis to sound 
them out on the question of mutuals and the proposed insurance law. Like the DAI, it 
focused their attention on leading figures within the GOLKAR and ABRI factions of the 
Committee.
Bumiputera argued its case on two main grounds. First, it insisted that a 
highly reputable and well-established firm should not be placed in jeopardy because of an 
organisational technicality. Drawing on useful technical data from the United States 
(supplied to the Bumiputera management by a joint venture partner)45 it argued that 
mutual societies were in no sense inferior to limited liability companies. Second, and 
more tellingly, it argued strongly that the mutual society should, in principle, be defended 
as a form of business enterprise, as it was in effect sanctioned in the Indonesian 
Constitution. This was a very skillful appeal on the basis of Section 33 of the 
Constitution which embodies the rhetorically much vaunted "family principle" (discussed 
in Chapter 3). The family principle - with its emphasis on co-operation and sharing - is a 
central tenet of the official ideology of the Indonesian state. Bumiputera was able to strike 
a resonant chord with key members of Committee VII at both this subjective ideological 
level, and at the more concrete level that the firm was a great success and should not be 
threatened.
After a series of informal meetings with the leaders of Committee VTI had 
revealed that they were sympathetic to Bumiputera's plight, it was agreed that the 
Committee would convene a formal and public hearing on the issue. The discussion 
would then be re-run in a public setting so that Bumiputera's arguments would be able to 
attract press attention and also the notice of senior echelons of the Department of Finance 
as well as other sections of the state elite. In September 1986, the Committee conducted a 
special hearing into the question of the proposed new insurance law, at which the
45 Bumiputera 1912 has an informal arrangement (which seems to be a precursor to an official joint 
venture) with the large US based mutual insurance firm, John Hancock, in Asuransi Pensiun Bumiputera 
1974.
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Executive Director of Bumiputera made a high-profile appearance. Responding to 
questions from the Committee he argued that the proposed insurance law must be guided 
by Section 33 of the Constitution and provide for the three forms of economic enterprise 
recognised as legitimate - cooperatives, mutuals and limited liability companies. 
Bumiputera also made a point of inviting journalists to observe the session.46 Publicity of 
this sort, and the linking of mutuals to cooperatives (there is also one small cooperative 
life insurance firm) served to make it considerably more difficult for the Department of 
Finance to eliminate mutuals. While such arguments may well have been based on 
rhetoric and emotive ideology, it was nonetheless widely recognised that the government, 
and particularly the President, had a long-standing official commitment to this form of 
enterprise as a presumed means for promoting economic egalitarianism.
Bumiputera thus made extensive use of Committee VTI's commitment not 
only to the rapid introduction of an insurance law, but also to the preservation of mutuals. 
Beyond this, other measures used to promote Bumiputera's profile and wider awareness 
of the important position it held within the life insurance industry included the convening 
of a special seminar on insurance industry affairs to which leading figures from industry, 
government and Parliament, as well as journalists, were invited. This opportunity, 
together with a similar one provided by celebrations to mark the firm's seventy-fifth 
anniversary, were used to promote the case for the rapid introduction of an insurance law 
in tandem with the case for the preservation of mutuals.47 Significantly, in all of its 
efforts, Bumiputera sought to downplay its own narrow self-preservation interest in the 
mutual issue, emphasising instead its broad commitment to the introduction of an 
insurance law. Other small ways in which it sought to disguise its particular interest were 
to use those of its executives who were also office holders within the DAI as public 
spokesmen, as well as using DAI stationery for letter writing, thus promoting the 
impression that the DAI (and by extension, the whole insurance industry) endorsed their 
arguments.
46 See, for example, "Perlu Diciptakan Persaingan Antar Perusahaan Asuransi", Berita Buana, 23 
September 1986.
47 See, "Perasuransian Tak Punya Kekuatan Karena Belum Ada Undang-Undangnya", Pelita, 28 
November 1986.
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The Department of Finance and the Proposed Insurance Law
Thus far, emphasis has been given to the role of industry in promoting the 
insurance law issue. It is important to recall, however, that much of the initiative lay with 
the Directorate for Financial Institutions. The Directorate was, after all, also keen to see 
the law finally promulgated. This was something which industry advocates occasionally 
overlooked. By 1985-86, as we have seen, the only real issue in question was not 
whether in fact an insurance law should be introduced, or what form it should take, but 
simply when it should happen. Marzuki Usman also had a major interest in seeing the 
law introduced as soon as possible. He was widely seen as having a personal 
committment to the realisation of an insurance law, as well as the other two proposed 
financial services sector laws (banking and pension funds). The introduction of the laws 
would represent one of the important achievements of his stewardship.
In a bid to advance the progress of the issue, Marzuki during 1985 arranged a 
series of informal meetings with various figures within the insurance industry to ascertain 
for himself 'grass-roots' industry attitudes. These meetings were intended to act as a 
supplement to the various talks held with the DAI.48 At the same time, he convened 
discussions with the key members of Committee VII so as to sound out possible 
Parliamentary objections in advance of the draft law actually being submitted to 
Parliament as a bill for consideration. This was the principal opportunity for the activist 
committee members to have an input to the policy formation process. The Department of 
Finance would, as a matter of course, seek to take account of possible Parliamentary 
reservations at this preliminary stage, long before the issue came before the Parliament 
formally. During these discussions, committee members were able to air matters of 
concern of their own about the proposed law, as well as those which had been thrown up 
by their negotiations with industry figures.49
48 Interviews with Sonni Dwi Harsono (President Director Tugu Pratama Pty Ltd) 25 June 1987; 
Marzuki Usman (Director for Financial Institutions) 9 & 13 July 1987; and Wibowo Wirosudiro (Head of 
the Sub-Directorate for General Insurance) 14 July 1987.
49 Interviews with Beren Ginting (Deputy Head of Committee VII, GOLKAR fraksi) 13 June 1987; and 
Marzuki Usman (Director for Financial Institutions, Department of Finance) 9 & 13 July 1987.
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Following the finalising of the draft by the Directorate for Financial 
Institutions, it was passed upwards through the Department of Finance for approval, and 
thence on to the State Secretariat, which checks all legislation before submission to the 
Parliament At the time of writing, the bill has not emerged from the State Secretariat and 
industry still remains largely ignorant of its contents. The only significant exception to 
this is that there were suggestions that Bumiputera has been successful in its bid to lobby 
against the inclusion of a clause for the elimination of mutuals.
Conclusion
In 1984 the insurance industry was given clear indications by officials as 
senior as the Minister of Finance that an insurance law would be submitted to the 
Parliament in a very short time. In 1985 the DAI was given a firm assurance that a bill 
would be submitted to Parliament by early 1986 at the latest. As 1986 progressed, the 
date was again pushed back, this time to before the general election of 1987. When, in 
turn, this deadline came and went, they were told not to despair as it would definitely be 
out by the time of the confirmation of the positions of President Suharto and his Vice 
President in March 1988.
Why was it that the insurance law on several occasions came very close to 
being submitted to the Parliament, but did not actually get there? As we have seen, not 
only the insurance industry, but also the Directorate of Financial Institutions were very 
much in favour of the introduction of such a law. An important part of the answer seems 
to have been that the introduction of an insurance law simply was not a priority issue on 
the government's overall legislative agenda. Under the Indonesian Constitution, both the 
government and members of the Parliament are able to introduce legislation for 
consideration. As emphasised in Chapter 3, the practice of the New Order period has, 
however, been for all bills to be initiated by the executive, with the Parliament playing a 
more passive role. In this situation, it has been the State Secretariat which has had 
primary responsibility for co-ordinating with other departments and setting the legislative 
agenda, thereby determining which proposals are processed into laws. The problem the
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insurance law proposal has faced has been competition both with other issues requiring 
legislative attention within the purview of the Finance Department, and also at a higher 
level, with all the many priorities of the numerous different areas of government activity 
that are inevitably channelled via the State Secretariat- Other issues which have in the past 
been given precedence over the insurance law include taxation law, the KADIN law, the 
intellectual property rights law and state protocol law. Thus despite the fact that the 
Directorate for Financial Institutions supported the submission of a bill to the Parliament, 
the matter needed the concurrent full support of both the Minister of Finance and the State 
Secretariat, a set of conditions which has to date not existed.
Why has the insurance law been unable to secure a high ranking in the 
government’s priorities? A number of factors stand out. First, and foremost, there has 
been no acute crisis in the insurance industry which has demanded urgent government 
attention. While there was some concern in late 1985 about the closure of insurance firms 
- which did at the time, it should be noted, generate increased activity by the Department 
of Finance - there has not been a high profile crisis or controversy in the industry. 
Ironically, had the insurance industry been conspicuously in dire circumstances in terms 
of company failure and the like, its chances of having the insurance law introduced 
promptly would have been very much greater. In the absence of such controversy (such 
as existed in the textile and pharmaceutical case-studies) it has, almost inevitably, been 
difficult for the case for an insurance law to win a priority ranking. In Indonesia, as 
elsewhere, management of 'crises' consumes much of the time and energy of political 
leaders, and as such, problems that are not acute do not quickly come to the attention of 
government.
A second factor, which is closely linked to the first, is that the insurance 
industry is not a vitally important industry. It does not occupy a strategic position in the 
national economy such as that of rice or oil production, or the banking industry. 
Similarly, it is not an important export revenue earner - a key criterion since the slump in 
oil prices. Nor does it perform a socially and politically sensitive function in the way that, 
for instance, the pharmaceutical industry does. (Widespread company failure in the 
insurance industry would, however, presumably be an emotive issue with people losing
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long term savings and investment.) A third factor is that despite the exaggerated 
expectations of some sections of the industry as to the benefits an insurance law might 
bring, it was not crucial to the industry’s survival. The introduction of an insurance law, 
while desirable, was not critical. The industry would, and did, continue to operate and 
grow without it. The Department of Finance was clearly cognisant of this, and thus not 
susceptible to being overwhelmed by industry rhetoric.
A final factor is that the political clout of the insurance industry (which, as 
already noted, is not great50) was diminished further by the fact that although during 
1985-86 no one opposed the idea of the law, it was quite evident that only a portion of all 
firms were strongly committed to pushing for it. Many of the numerous small insurance 
firms were preoccupied with survival rather than the future of the industry; and in 
addition, a substantial number of joint ventures have not been particularly interested in the 
issue. But more importantly than this, the state-controlled firms have not been avid 
supporters of the law. This is especially significant in the insurance industry - where 
unlike the spinning or pharmaceutical industries, state enterprises loom very large. Being 
so dominated by the state-controlled firms, the concerns of the activist private sector firms 
have tended to be overshadowed in the insurance industry.
All of these various factors have so far combined to deny the industry activists 
their prize. Sooner or later the government will introduce an insurance law - it has no 
reason not to.51 Too much time and money have been in invested in preparing a draft and 
steering it to the stage of being 'on-hold' in the State Secretariat. This investment will not 
lightly be discarded.
50 It might be thought that the public commitment of Tantyo Sudharmono to the early introduction of 
an insurance law would have guaranteed success because of the fact that his father was the extremely 
influential State Secretary. While this would have afforded a nice illustration of patrimonialism, in 
practice the 'connection' proved unrewarding. Though in a senior position, Tantyo was a very young 
man. He resigned from his position at Timur Jauh in early 1988.
51 Noteworthy in this regard are the comments made at the meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (the county's foreign financial backers) in June 1988 by the new Finance Minister, Sumarlin. 
Speaking after the meeting, Sumarlin told reporters that, in order to enhance the country’s capability for 
domestic capital mobilisation, work was underway on the drafting of a set of laws on the insurance, 
pension and banking industries. See, "Optimists Pour in More Money", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
30 June 1988.
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What does this case-study have to offer in terms of the theoretical debates 
about the nature of the Indonesian polity? Certainly the DAI's story is less dramatic than 
those of either SEKBERTAL or GPF. Not only did the insurance industry not 'win', it 
also did not organise itself in an especially remarkable way. Furthermore, this has not 
been a case in which the industry was the 'initiator' of a policy change. Unlike the 
spinning or pharmaceutical cases where, it was argued, much of the initiative lay with the 
industry group, in this case it cannot be claimed that the Department of Finance was 
primarily responding to an industry stimulus. Though the Department of Finance was not 
insensitive to industry wishes, carriage of the matter remained very much in its hands. 
Indeed, an adequate account of the story of the insurance law could be given with only 
short reference to industry activities. And yet, in many respects this is precisely what 
makes this such a useful case-study, for it provides us with a more typical illustration of 
the dynamics of relations between business and the state in Indonesia. After all, it is not 
everyday that an industry is locked into an intractable dispute with the government such as 
that concerning CBTI in the textile industry.
There are certainly aspects of this case-study which fit comfortably with both 
corporatist and patrimonial accounts of state-society linkages. In terms of the former, the 
fact that membership of the DAI, was virtually compulsory, did serve to herd all 
companies together for representational purposes. In this regard, we have also seen that 
there has been a tendency for the chairmanship of the DAI to be filled by the heads of state 
enterprises, and that they have been reluctant to push the Department of Finance with 
much vigour.52 Similarly, in terms of patrimonial links, when activist industry leaders 
became frustrated with the inability of the DAI to deliver on this issue, they reverted to 
individual approaches to the Department of Finance, relying more on their own personal 
relationships with key officials to promote the early introduction of an insurance law. 
Further, there was also clear evidence of indirect or osmotic transmission of industry 
interests. The difference in outlook of Committee VII and the Department of Finance was
52 Note the contrast with GPF here. Although the overall Chairman o f GPF was from a state-owned 
firm, this did not restrict effective representation of industry interests because state enterprises did not 
dominate the industry. As we saw in Chapter 5, the private pharmaceutical manufacturers managed to 
ensure very effective promotion o f their interests.
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a good illustration of bureaucratic pluralism. Equally, Bumiputera's appeals on the basis 
of the family principle (section 33 of the Constitution) highlighted the potential 
significance of ideology in constraining policy makers described by Liddle.
And yet even in this, the least 'unusual' of the case-studies, there is evidence 
which does not sit easily with existing accounts of Indonesian politics. For example, if 
we looked closely at the indirect, or, osmotic transmission of industry interests we would 
notice that the industry actors were actively manipulating this situation. What is 
interesting then, is not just that Committee VII and the Department of Finance held 
different views, but also that industry representatives sought to play them off against each 
other. Similarly with the family principle, what is noteworthy is the way in which 
industry deliberately attempted to exploit this pervasive set of ideas in order to constrain 
state officials. In short, the societal actor, industry, was not just the passive recipient of 
indirect political benefits, it was actively seeking them itself.
To take another example, the individual, or patrimonial-like approaches to the 
Department of Finance, were, it must be remembered, part of a broader, albeit loosely 
coordinated, effort towards a collective goal. In using personal relationships to advance 
the case for an insurance law, the industry activists were not just seeking a private benefit 
for themselves, they were promoting a collective industry goal. This is not a tenet of 
patrimonialism. Furthermore, the recourse to the Parliament by the DAI was an at least 
gentle attempt to openly pressure the government to move on the issue. Most notable 
though in this respect were the efforts of Bumiputera, both to expedite the law, and 
ensure that it did not preclude mutual insurance firms. Bumiputera waged a vigorous and 
open campaign to influence a policy outcome which does not fit at all well with the 
various state-centred approaches.
Similarly, the suggestion that the DAI exhibited some quasi-corporatist 
features requires important qualification. There are two reasons for this. First, the failure 
of the DAI to bring about an early introduction of an insurance law was not a matter of 
great moment or controversy in the industry. While it was viewed with disappointment 
by industry activists, it was not critical. Thus it is not a case of corporatist structures 
suppressing vital industry interests. And second, insofar as these industry activists were
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dissatisfied with the DAI's performance, they simply took matters into their own hands. 
Certainly the Department of Finance does not appear to have attempted to confine 
representational activity to the DAL Thus, if the DAI was a corporatist pen, the fences 
were not high.
While the action of a section of the insurance industry to take charge of 
promoting the law itself was not on a scale comparable to the SEKBERTAL movement, it 
was nonetheless indicative of the ability of the industry to pursue alternative channels for 
interest representation, to the extent that it was so motivated. In this respect it is salutary 
to note, regardless of the immediate fate of the law, the way in which the history of this 
issue from 1985 onwards has paralleled an increase in the insurance industry's capacity 
for interest intermediation.
There are signs that the industry's ability to gain an effective hearing from the 
government is improving. This change has come on two fronts: first, the government, 
and more broadly the state elite, is now more willing to listen, and second, the insurance 
industry is refining its interest intermediation capabilities. In the case of the former, the 
Department of Finance appears to be following a pattern that has emerged in Indonesia 
during the mid-1980s for government agencies to deal with industry groups on a more 
sensitive and sympathetic basis. The Department has become increasingly willing to pay 
attention (even if not necessarily act upon) insurance industry opinions. DAI leaders have 
been obtaining far better access at higher levels within the Department. Whereas, 
traditionally, access above the level of Director for Financial Institutions has been very 
limited, industry representatives have recently been gaining reasonable access at the much 
more powerful Director General level. Symbolic evidence of the greater attention being 
accorded to the industry by the Department can be found in the fact that the Minister of 
Finance, Radius Prawiro, officially opened the annual insurance congress in January 
1987. This was the first time that a Minister had done so, and it was a gesture from 
which industry leaders drew considerable satisfaction.53 More concretely, there were 
suggestions in 1987 that the Sub-Directorates handling insurance (within the Directorate
53 Interview with H T . Rumamby (President Director o f Asuransi Sari Sumber Agung Pty Ltd and DAI 
executive) 7 August 1987.
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for Financial Institutions) would be strengthened, or even, perhaps, that the 
administrative architecture of the Department of Finance would be altered, with the 
insurance industry being upgraded to a Directorate of its own. Changes of this sort 
would significantly enhance the industry's profile politically, and strengthen the Finance 
Department's ability to respond to industry needs.
Change to interest intermediation capacities has also come from the industry 
itself. An important step in this respect was the DAI's decision to appoint a full-time and 
professionally qualified Secretary General to administer the organisation. In the past, 
apart from clerical assistance, the DAI has been dependent on company executives 
voluntarily giving their time outside working hours. Since the appointment of a Secretary 
General the organisation has been not only more efficiently run, but also better informed 
and equipped to represent industry interests. A second change to the industry's approach 
to representation has been the recognition of the value of developing working links with 
sections of the Parliament, and particularly the press. Experience has shown both the 
DAI and individual companies that these two institutions can be of value in seeking to 
influence policy formation. Effort has been made by the DAI, for example, to promote 
understanding of and interest in the insurance industry among journalists and cultivate 
links with the more professional of them.54 The broking industry, in a smaller way, has 
also been following this path, seeking to increase its capabilities to advance broking 
industries.
The catalyst for these internal industry reforms of representational capabilities 
has been dissatisfaction with the past performance of the two organisations - inspired by 
the more difficult economic conditions associated with economic downturn. Whereas in 
the past the passive performance of the DAI might have been acceptable, in the tighter 
commercial conditions of the mid-1980s pressure for change has emerged. The more 
dynamic of the privately owned firms, in particular, became increasingly dissatisfied with 
the performance of the DAI. If membership in the only officially sanctioned 
representative organisation was, in effect, compulsory, company heads wanted to see
54 Interview with Sujono Soepono (Director of Panin Putra Pty Ltd and DAI official) 3 July 1987.
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some return on their regular membership fees. While dissatisfaction led some companies 
to pursue their own dealings with the state rather than rely on the DAI, discontent has not 
been sufficiently acute to generate the sort of revolution that took place in the 
representational arrangements in the textile industry. There has been no wholescale 
abandonment of the DAI. Instead it has been gradually reformed. The DAI has thus 
quietly evolved from being a passive quasi-corporatist body to become a more active and 
professionally competent representational organisation. A key factor in determining 
whether this process develops much further seems likely to be whether the industry 
continues to be dominated by placid state-owned companies. If they are forced to operate 
on a more competitive basis or, alternatively, the private sector is able to significantly 
increase its share of the market, changes in representational patterns may follow.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SOME CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has attempted to look in a detailed way at the processes of interest 
intermediation between business and the state, and more broadly, policy formation, in 
order to understand better the nature of the Indonesian polity.
The three case-studies provided have shown instances in which particular 
industries, or large sections thereof, have sought something from policy-makers. In the 
textile and pharmaceutical cases the industry group was successful in achieving its major 
goals, while in the insurance case they are still waiting. Aside from industry groups, we 
saw a range of other extra-state actors all playing a part in the shaping of policy outcomes. 
Particularly notable here was the role of the press: it proved to be very important as an 
articulator of interests from both in and outside the state, as well as a vigorous player in 
its own right. Beyond this we have also seen examples of the diverse range of interests 
that are scattered through the state structure. In other words, we have seen political 
jockeying within and between different components of the state playing an important part 
Undoubtedly though, the central feature of the case-studies has been the 
activities of the industry representative associations. And here, more important than 
whether or not they actually 'won', was the way in which each industry's interests were 
promoted. In this respect, although there were differences among them, the three cases 
all basically point in the same direction: sections of business in Indonesia today can and 
do organise themselves in an independent and group-based fashion to promote their 
collective interests. This behaviour, together with the evident success of the business 
groups in two of the cases, is not something which can be easily accommodated by the 
existing literature on Indonesian politics with its heavy state-centred emphasis.
As we saw in Chapter 2, apart from the consensus in the literature that 
influence over policy is almost wholly limited to the state, there were three basic means by
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which societal interests might come into play in the formation of policy: patron-client 
relationships, corporatist channels and what we called 'osmosis'. Undoubtedly all three 
of these links between state and society played a part in the case-studies. That is not in 
dispute. However, vital aspects of the representational activities of the various industry 
associations were qualitatively different from any of these three.
In order to account for this within the terms of the bureaucratic 
polity/patrimonialism approach, for example, it is necessary to argue that the phenomena 
can best be understood in terms of patron-client links. It would be to abuse the concept of 
patrimonialism, however, to try stretching it to include the broad and organised group- 
based activities of SEKBERTAL, GPF and (even) the DAI in pursuit of their collective 
interests. These organisations did not rely primarily on patrons in pursuing their goals. 
State corporatist theories do not satisfactorily explain their behaviour either. What is 
striking in this respect is the way in which two of the organisations, SEKBERTAL and 
GPF, operated quite independently of state control, and in the case of SEKBERTAL 
arose spontaneously. Neither of the associations was in any real sense controlled or 
managed by the state. They did not function to limit societal demands, but rather 
facilitated them.
This is not to suggest that the ideas of either the bureaucratic polity cluster or 
the corporatist interpretations are somehow in error. Rather, it is simply that they cannot 
adequately account for important aspects of the evidence presented here. Both certainly 
have considerable explanatory power. Patrimonialism is an endemic feature of 
Indonesian social life. Similarly, in terms of corporatist accounts, there indeed is a vast 
corporatist network which does, on the whole, serve to stem the upward flow of demands 
from the business sector. However, one of the things to emerge from this study is the 
way in which business can turn a corporatist organisation to its own purposes (rather than 
those of the state), or, sometimes, burst out of a constraining corporatist structure and 
create a new association which serves it better.
This study also has implications for the other major interpretative approaches. 
It both confirms and extends the main ideas put forward by Emmerson, Liddle and 
Robison. With regard to Emmerson's arguments , the material here certainly affirms the
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phenomenon of bureaucratic pluralism. The three cases, as well as KADINs experience 
in pursuing a legislative basis for itself, all highlighted the existence and significance of 
competing actors and interests within the state. But as with the bureaucratic polity 
approach, the concept of bureaucratic pluralism is incomplete insofar as it does not deal 
with the question of extra-state attempts to influence policy.
A number of conclusions drawn here also support the arguments that have 
been made by Robison about an emergent bourgeoisie. Like Robison, this thesis argues 
that business in Indonesia is in fact much more developed and independent of the state 
than has been acknowledged by most others. However, Robison's argument about an 
emergent capitalist class is taken a step further here, even if coming from a different 
theoretical starting point. In Robison's neo-Marxist framework the link between the 
interests of the emergent capitalist class and state policy is not seen as instrumental, but 
rather structural. Economic policy is not favourable to the interests of capital because of 
direct political lobbying or pressuring. According to Robison, the state does not represent 
the interests of capital, but rather it constitutes them. The structural imperatives of the 
domestic and international economy constrain the state to sustain the long-term interests of 
capital.
In this respect, Robison's argument here does not depend on a neo-Marxist 
approach; after all, essentially the same analytical point has been made by a wide variety 
of scholars using very different theoretical frameworks. Though the language varies (and 
there are questions of 'determinism'), we can see writers as diverse as Miliband,1 Offe,2 
Hall3 and Lindblom4 all accepting that business enjoys a 'privileged position’ among the 
many different interests in society. Lindblom has expressed this in a straight-forward 
manner5.
In the eyes of government officials, therefore, businessmen do not appear simply as 
the representatives of a special interest, as representatives of interest groups do. They 
appear as functionaries performing functions that government officials regard as
1 Miliband (1977) and (1982). Miliband, though seen as an instrumentalist, nonetheless saw the state as 
being constrained to assist the process o f capitalist accumulation in order to sustain the economic base. A 
far stronger structuralist approach was of course used by Poulantzas (1973).
2 Offe (1984).
3 Hall (1986).
4 Lindblom (1977).
5 Lindblom (1977) p. 175.
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indispensable. When a government official asks himself whether business needs a tax 
reduction, he knows he is asking a question about the welfare of the whole society 
and not simply about a favour to a segment of the population, which is what is 
typically at stake when he asks himself whether he should respond to an interest 
group.
In market-based economic systems the strategic position occupied by the business sector 
renders a minimum level of business prosperity - and thus investment, growth and 
employment - indispensable for broader social prosperity. The point to be made is thus 
not a complicated one: structural factors set very broad parameters within which 
governments formulate economic policy. Though these parameters mitigate against the 
adoption of policies which are seriously injurious to the business sector, or, seriously 
injurious to business confidence (the two need not be identical), there is still considerable 
scope for policy variation.
While he certainly points to the existence of this "political dimension", for 
Robison it is ultimately structural factors which serve to induce policy outcomes generally 
favourable to business interests.6 He does not see business, as a class, as having yet 
established direct (instrumental) influence over policy. This study would certainly 
endorse the proposition that business as a class does not have direct or broad influence in 
economic policy formation. KADIN, the only body which can be considered as being 
broadly representative of business interests, is as we have seen, conspicuously 
ineffectual.7 However, if we step back from class as a unit of analysis, and focus instead 
on sub-sections of business, a different picture starts to emerge. It is in this area that we 
can extend Robison, for, beyond accepting that fundamental business interests are taken 
into account by the state because of constraining economic parameters, the argument here 
is that business groups can have a direct and instrumental influence over policy formation. 
To be sure, there is no claim that this is universal, or even especially widespread. What 
the case-studies suggest is that some sectors of business have been able to organise on a 
group basis and successfully influence major policy issues.
A central component of the argument is thus that account must also be taken 
of the potential for societal actors to influence policy. In this regard, Liddle's 'restricted
6 For clear statements of this sort, see Robison (1988) and (1985).
7 This is not to mention the obvious problems of various fundamental cleavages within business (not the 
least being race in Indonesia) which beset the use of class as analytical tool.
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pluralist' image of Indonesian politics finds much favour here. In particular, his 
emphasis on there being a plurality of participants in the policy formation process, 
including some located outside outside the state apparatus, is strongly supported. These 
cases have shown a range of actors involved, which, though largely overlooked by the 
other approaches, would come as no surprise to Liddle. Included among them were, 
business associations, the press, individual Members of Parliament, professional 
associations such as the Doctors' Association, and also NGOs such as the Consumers' 
Association. Whereas Liddle was primarily interested in economically weak groups, and 
identified their generally indirect (or 'osmotic') means of influencing policy issues, this 
project has focused on comparatively powerful economic interests, and in addition to 
finding indirect influence, it also finds direct influence in blatant group lobbying efforts.
To recapitulate, one of the central findings of the case-studies is that some 
sections of industry can and do mobilise in order to influence policy. But this gives rise 
to a further question: are we able to predict which sections of business these are likely to 
be? Was it simply a random occurrence that it should be the textile and pharmaceutical 
industries which mobilised successfully, or are there some common variables?
On the basis of these cases, a number of factors suggest themselves. Some 
have been noted by analysts working in other areas. Bates,8 working on agriculture in 
Africa, and Ramsay on sugar in Thailand,9 concur on three factors affecting the 
propensity of producers to organise themselves on a group-basis: the level of 
concentration of production, the size of producers and their geographical spread. They 
found that producers were more likely to mobilise effectively if the farms (or firms) were 
relatively large, ownership was concentrated in relatively few hands and production was 
not too geographically dispersed. That is, it is much easier for business people to 
organise themselves successfully if they are fewer, larger and near to each other.
These are all sound propositions which are supported by the material here. It 
was a common-place observation in the textile industry, for example, that the weaving 
sector had never been well organised or represented because there were so many
8 See Bates (1981) especially chapters 5 & 7.
9 Ramsay (1987).
274
producers, many of them small, and they were scattered widely. The spinning sector, by 
contrast, had comparatively few producers and they were very largely concentrated in 
Bandung and nearby Jakarta. Similarly, in the pharmaceutical industry, though there 
were some 300 manufacturers, the salient fact was that the great majority of production 
was concentrated in the hands of about 80 firms which were nearly all based in Jakarta. It 
was these firms which were the driving force behind pharmaceutical industry 
representation in GPF.
Another factor (which Ramsay also notes10) is the importance of the quality of 
industry leadership. In both GPF and SEKBERTAL a striking feature of their success 
was the political astuteness of the leadership. Related to this is the degree to which an 
industry, or an industry association, is riven with divisions and factional cleavages. A 
united and cohesive political group will always stand a better chance of success.
More important than any of these various factors, however, seems to be the 
question of ownership. Privately owned firms (especially those of medium to large scale) 
tended to be much more active within their industry association than state owned 
enterprises or cooperatives. Thus, it can be hypothesised that industries in which the 
private sector is dominant are more likely to organise an effective representative 
association to promote collective interests. This was one striking difference between the 
pharmaceutical and spinning industries on the one hand, and the insurance industry on the 
other. And yet, even in the insurance industry, though the private sector did not 
dominate, it was precisely the private firms which were the most active in seeking to 
mobilise for collective action. This proposition does not rest just on the idea that risk­
taking by private capital, with its short-term profit drive, begets greater dynamism.* 11 
There is also an obvious political disincentive for state enterprise managers to be active in 
prodding the relevant section of the state to undertake policy reform.
10 Ramsay (1987) p. 266.
11 It is o f course quite possible for public enterprises to be well managed. Hal Hill has indeed argued 
that a number o f the state-owned firms in Indonesia do fall into this category. He emphasises, though, 
that on the whole, the state enterprises perform very poorly, whether due to firm-level inefficiencies, or 
government constraints; see Hill (1988) p. 139.
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Another variable suggested by the case-studies is the strategic importance of 
an industry within the national economy. An industry which produces a vital good or 
service, is a major employer, is a major generator of export revenue or mobiliser of capital 
will find it much easier to command the sympathetic attention of policy-makers than a 
relatively unimportant one.
These various criteria give us some idea of the sectors of industry which are 
more likely to be politically active. It is only a very rough guide they provide, however. 
Circumstantial factors are also important. Most obviously, it depends on the importance 
of the particular issue under contention. Business people (like others) will naturally tend 
to mobilise more cohesively and effectively on a matter of great concern to them, than on 
a less pressing issue. The sense of urgency and determination is a vital ingredient. The 
failure of the DAI to secure an insurance law illustrated this. Possibly SEKBERTAL or 
GPF would have been less able to intervene effectively on matters of not such 
fundamental interest to their membership. In the context of authoritarian countries, such 
as Indonesia, it will obviously also be more difficult to mobilise group action on an issue 
which is imbued with a high degree political sensitivity.12
If the basic thesis about the significance of societal groups developed here is 
valid, why has it not been propounded before now? Why have other observers not drawn 
similar conclusions? Two types of explanation suggest themselves. One line of 
argument is that the subject of our inquiries has been changing. In other words, the 
politico-economic character of Indonesia is in a state of flux, and that the phenomena 
identified in this study are indicative of these changes. The second possible explanation 
for this puzzle is that political scientists have been consistently misinterpreting, or at least 
overlooking, important elements of political life in Indonesia.
12 A case in point is the plastics industry. The plastics industry in Indonesia is beset with an import- 
monopoly linked to one of the President's sons. Because o f this, criticism of the tata niaga trade regime 
has to be very circumspect in relation to this particular industry. One prominent business leader, who had 
achieved considerable success in pushing his industry's interests was contacted privately by plastics 
producers asking him to organise a lobbying campaign for the removal o f tata niaga restrictions in their 
industry as well. He declined.
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Taking the first of these explanations, it is clear that there have fundamental 
changes to Indonesia's political economy during the mid-1980s. Changes have been 
basically of three types: economic, institutional and ideological.
Changes on the economic front have been the most obvious and dramatic. It
is now clear that the private sector plays a much greater role in the Indonesian economy
than at any time since independence. As the economist Anne Booth13 noted in 1986:
Indonesia is now at a watershed in its post-independence economic history. 
Throughout much of the early independence and the Guided Democracy periods, and 
during the two decades of the New Order, government has, for better or worse, been 
the main driving force behind the economy. For a range of complex historical, 
ethnic and cultural reasons the private sector has been relegated to secondary 
importance... The decline in real resources available to the government over the past 
two years has coincided with growing sentiment in favour of deregulation and 
liberalization in many aspects of Indonesia’s economy. For the first time in her post­
independence history it now seems as if the private sector could become the engine of 
growth for the national economy.
In addition to the secular trend towards a greater role for the private sector in 
the Indonesian economy, there was another economic stimulus thrusting it into the 
limelight during the mid-1980s. As was discussed at the end of Chapter 3, the down-turn 
in the international economy, along with the collapse in oil prices, together induced an 
economic recession in Indonesia and presented the government with a fiscal crisis. As 
state revenue declined in correlation with tumbling oil prices, the government was forced 
to look to the private sector to assume a greater role in domestic investment. During the 
years that the government enjoyed the fiscal luxury created by the oil boom, there was 
less necessity to heed the demands of business. The great bulk of tax receipts was from 
the oil and gas industry - which flowed directly to the government. Similarly, foreign 
loans also flowed directly to the government. The government did not rely greatly on the 
private sector for its revenue, with non-oil domestic taxes remaining very low. In this 
situation the state enjoyed considerable financial autonomy. With the onset of the fiscal 
crisis, however, it has been forced to change its attitude towards the private sector. 
Industry complaints could not be so readily ignored.
Business has not just been a passive actor in these developments. The reason 
the state is now more attentive to industry grievances is not solely because of its own
13 Booth (1986) p. 24.
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objective needs; it is also because business has been shouting louder. Whereas during the 
boom years of the 1970s business was more willing to abide by government policies with 
which it disagreed, in the leaner times of the mid-1980s this has begun to change. Hit 
hard by declining domestic demand and mounting surplus capacity, many producers were 
driven from their 'political docility'. The need to communicate effectively with policy­
makers became more pressing. This has led to change on an institutional front, in 
particular with the existing representation structures, headed by KADIN. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the activist industry associations have long been unhappy with their lack of 
influence within KADIN. This, it will be recalled, centred around the fact that they did 
not have voting rights for the election to determine the KADIN executive. Only the 
regional KADIN branches, the KADINDA, held voting rights. Following the 
introduction of the KADIN law in January 1987 and the ensuing need to restructure the 
organisation and its constitution to embrace the state enterprises and cooperatives as 
members, the question of voting rights again became a hot issue. It was indicative of the 
pressure for reform by the activist associations that a compromise agreement was reached 
whereby the associations would at least be permitted to participate in leadership elections, 
even if on a minority footing.14 While certainly not a decisive victory for the activist 
associations, it was reflective of their growing strength and determination to achieve better 
representation channels.15 In a similar vein, the associations were at best ambivalent 
about the inclusion of the state enterprises and cooperatives in KADIN, fearing that this 
might lead to further diminution of an effective voice for private sector interests. This 
concern erupted into open conflict in 1988 with the prospect of a public sector business 
leader (that is, one from state enterprise) securing the chairmanship of the Jakarta branch
14 The compromise reportedly agreed to was for a total o f 60 votes to be divided into four blocks with the 
KADINDA having 27, and the associations, the state enterprises and the cooperatives having 11 each. 
Interviews with Probosutedjo (Deputy Chairman of KADIN) 8 September 1987; Ariono Abdulkadir (Head 
of KADIN’s Mining & Energy Section) 8 September 1987; and Sjahfiri Alim (President Director of 
Goodyear Pty Ltd & Head of KADIN’s Chemical Industries Section) 10 September 1987.
15 An indication of the frustration of the associations was a report in the state-run paper Suara Karya in 
mid September 1987, during the lead-up to a special KADIN executive conference. It was reported that 
KADIN had recently been severely criticised for its failure to work for its members, and the head of the 
Metal and Machinery Industries' Association, Suhari Sargo, was quoted as criticising the KADIN 
leadership for being self-serving and failing to serve members' interests. This was reproduced in the 
"KADIN under Attack" in, Jakarta Post, 18 September 1987.
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of KADIN.16 After KADEN central, the Jakarta branch is the most important, with its 
membership being very heavily made up of individual industry associations (which are 
largely concentrated in Jakarta). This conflict provided clear evidence of both the 
associations’ desire to enhance their representational capacities, as well as of the cleavage 
between them and the other elements of KADIN.
In short, the battles within KADIN represent a microcosm of the broader push 
by activist elements within the private sector to achieve more effective representation. 
Perhaps one of the most telling signs of the seriousness of this trend was the appointment 
of SEKBERTAL head, Aminuddin, to the KADIN Advisory Board in late 1987. Indeed 
Aminuddin's ascension to this position in KADIN (previously he was not even a member 
of KADIN) was greeted in the press as the elevation of a champion of business 
interests.17 This is is not to argue that KADIN is about to grow overnight into a dynamic 
institution effectively representing business interests. That still seems a remote prospect 
What does appear to be happening, though, is that the voice of the associations is 
increasing within KADIN. This, in turn, is likely to enhance the associations’ capacity to 
lobby policy-makers effectively themselves, quite independently of KADIN. 
Furthermore, it seems plausible that the now more conspicuous behaviour of the activist 
associations may set an example for those many others which have atrophied or remained 
docile within the corporatist network.
The third area of change in recent years has been in the realm of ideas. It 
appears that social attitudes towards business are altering and that some of the ideological 
stigma attaching to it is receding. Inevitably, propositions of this sort are shaky, for firm 
evidence of shifts in ideological outlook, or perhaps of political culture, is scant. There 
are, however, a number of pointers in this area. A very important one was the historic 
formal recognition of profit-making as something legitimate in the KADIN law of January 
1987. As discussed in Chapter 3, this was truly a watershed development. Similarly,
16 See, "Pihak Swasta Keberatan Nonswasta Pimpin KADIN" in, Suara Pembaruan, 14 July 1988.
17 See, for example, "Keberhasilan MPI, Cermin Kesatuan Tiga Pelaku Ekonomi" in, P elita , 28 
September 1987; "Musyawarah Pengusaha Indonesia Dinilai Berhasil' in, Berit a Yudha, 28 September 
1987; or "Cuplikan Ekspresi-Ekspresi Gembiraan Dari Munassus KADIN dan MPI" in, Angkatan 
Bersenjata, 28 September 1987.
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during 1986-87 there was very lively public debate in Indonesia about the possible 
privatisation of state enterprises. The idea of selling state instrumentalities to the private 
sector would have been inconceivable ten, and probably even five, years earlier. 
Although the debate subsequently trailed off, it is indeed remarkable that it arose at all. 
Another indicator of change of this sort has been the mushrooming of business magazines 
in recent years.18 More generally, the images presented in advertisements for consumer 
goods (often a good guide to prevailing attitudes and values) are also revealing. While 
commonplace in Western nations, it is remarkable how the images of success promoted in 
advertisements in Indonesia are now widely defined in terms of successful business 
figures. Another indication, though one which can at best be considered only suggestive, 
was the frequency with which interviewees would express that their sons, unlike their 
own generation, would go into business rather than the bureaucracy.
These various straws in the wind do not represent a conclusive argument that 
major ideological change has occurred. Taken together, though, they do suggest 
changing public attitudes towards business. That public attitudes should become more 
positive and the status attaching to business people should improve is, of course, scarcely 
surprising for a developing country. The immediate significance of this development is 
that, in future, state officials are presumably less likely to take a disdainful attitude 
towards business representatives, while, conversely, business organisations are less 
likely to be hesitant about openly pursuing business causes.
Daniel Lev19 has located these changing attitudes towards business in the 
context of a consideration of a broader sea-change in middle-class ideology and values. 
He sees this change as taking place on three fronts - greater currency for liberal economic 
views, greater demand for some form of political liberalisation, and a redefinition of 
religious values. Thus for Lev, changing attitudes towards business are a part of an 
ethical and ideological realignment in Indonesia: a desire for change after more than 
twenty years of the New Order.
18 la m  grateful to Ahmad Habir of the Department of Political & Social Change, Australian National 
University (and the Indonesian Institute for Management Development) for this observation.
19 Lev (1988). See also paper Lev (1986).
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If we take this argument concerning movements in ideology and link it with 
those concerning changes to the representational institutions for business and the 
structural changes in Indonesia's economic fortunes, a strong case can be made that there 
have indeed been significant changes in Indonesia's political economy in recent years. 
Furthermore, these changes have been such as to make it likely that the nature of 
business-government relations in Indonesia is indeed in the process of altering. While 
this flux reflects both long-term secular trends in economic development, it does also 
seem that the externally induced shocks to the country's economy during the mid-1980s 
served to accelerate change. The potential importance of this link between stimuli in the 
international economy and changes to domestic politics has been highlighted recently in 
another context by Peter Gourevitch.20 One of the main ideas developed by Gourevitch is 
the way in which the state's relationship with society, or more particularly certain 
elements of it, can change over time, especially as a result of major crises.21 In this 
context, it is perhaps possible that the mid-1980s will eventually be seen as marking 
something of a turning point in the trend during the New Order years for the state to 
strengthen its capacities and autonomy. In the future it may appear that this was the 
period in which the state began to come under greater constraint from parts of the 
business sector at least, and possibly societal interests more generally. In this light, it 
becomes somewhat less surprising that other analysts (many of whom were writing in the 
early 1980s, before the economic downturn) have not drawn similar conclusions to those 
of this study.
If there appear to be strong grounds for accepting the first possible 
explanation for the failure of other political scientists to recognise the greater plurality and 
complexity of Indonesian politics, what of the second: that the problem is one of 
misperception rather than (or perhaps, in addition to) changing reality? The evidence here 
is far less clear. In entertaining this possibility, it is useful to consider the arguments of 
Jerry Hough in connection with the American scholarship on the Soviet Union.22 Writing
20 See his excellent study, Gourevitch (1986).
21 Gourevitch (1986) p. 221-40.
22 Hough (1977).
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in 1977 (and thus well before the Gorbachev years), Hough argued that American 
political scientists had steadfastly overlooked the complexity of state-society relations in 
the Soviet Union. He speculated about possible reasons for this, and noted, among 
others, the likely influence of the ideological conditioning of the Cold War. Hough went 
on to argue that in attempting to address the question of how responsive to societal 
demands or inputs one political system (the Soviet Union) is compared to another (the 
United States), political scientists have tended to focus primarily on the extent to which 
Western notions of civil rights are guaranteed in a country.23 Comparable observations 
have been made in the context of a study of Indonesia by at least one analyst, Liddle, who 
argued that true complexity of state-society relations is often overlooked "because political 
scientists are too caught in the search for ways to transform rightist dictatorships into 
regimes more to our normative taste."24
Looking back on the currents of scholarship on Indonesian politics, it is clear 
that since about the time of Herbert Feith's analysis25 of the decline of constitutional 
democracy in the late 1950s, there has been growing moral discomfort about the 
increasingly authoritarian and anti-democratic nature of Indonesian politics. This 
normative vein grew markedly after the coup attempt of 1965 and the rise of Suharto's 
military-based New Order government. It is not hard to understand the concerns of these 
many writers. Be that as it may, the point to made here is that, particularly since 1965, 
there has been a tendency for scholars to focus on the way in which power has become 
concentrated inside the state in the hands of a small number of mostly military figures. 
Scholars have tended to emphasise the way in which societal interests have been 
increasingly excluded from political participation and policy formation. This has reached 
the stage, as we saw in Chapter 2, that in the literature of the last five to ten years there is 
very little recognition of the possibility of significant societal inputs at all. It is in this 
respect that a comparison with studies of the Soviet Union becomes interesting. The link, 
of course, is the undivided attention to the state. It is intriguing to note the way that,
23 Hough (1977) p. 187.
24 Liddle (1987) p. 128.
25 Feith (1962).
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while still remaining state-centred, corporatist and bureaucratic pluralists accounts of 
Indonesia have been put forward, just as they were in Soviet studies.26 The point of 
raising Hough's critique of Soviet studies is not to suggest that the Indonesian and Soviet 
polities are similar (though there are some striking parallels). Rather than the actual of 
nature of the Soviet political system (which is itself the subject of much debate), of greater 
interest here are the changing scholarly interpretations of it. Students of Indonesian 
politics might well benefit from a consideration of Hough's arguments, regardless of the 
validity of his account of the Soviet Union.
The more familiar channels of interest representation in Indonesia may well be 
lifeless, as indeed was argued in Chapter 3. Certainly the political parties are no longer a 
force and certainly most of the interest associations have been herded into corporatist pens 
and castrated, while more generally, the military does seem to be far from sympathetic to 
spontaneous and autonomous interest representation activities. And yet, as this study has 
shown, there are still signs of political life. It is no longer tenable, if it ever was, to 
argue that political influence is confined solely to the state elite, barring individual 
patrimonial links.
There is a danger in making this claim, for it is separated by only a fine line 
from vulgar apologies for the New Order. It must therefore be emphasised that this is in 
no way meant as a 'legitimation' of the New Order or defence against the charges of 
repression or excessive exclusion of societal actors; it is merely an argument that more is 
going on in Indonesian politics, even if only among economic interests, than an almost 
exclusively state-centred approach has allowed us to see.
To summarise, then, the basic argument of this thesis is that political life in 
Indonesia has had more complex patterns of state-society relations than the scholarly 
literature on the subject suggests. Interest intermediation is too important a topic to be 
overlooked in the way that it has: it is an important facet of Indonesian politics. Societal 
interests can and do participate in the formation of policy. Moreover, some industry 
groups, at least, have done so in manner which we are not led to expect in Indonesia.
26 See for example, Skilling (1966); Kelley (1976); Kelley (1980); and Ziegler (1986).
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The interests of SEKBERTAL, GPF and the DAI were not primarily relayed to the 
relevant segments of the state apparatus by way of patron-client links, corporatist 
representation or osmosis. To varying degrees, the salient method was a group-based 
pursuit of collective goals. This should not, it must emphasised, be taken as implying 
that Indonesian political life somehow approximates the rosy picture of American politics 
painted by the pluralists in the 1960s. It does not - by a long margin. Without doubt the 
state must stand at the very centre of any understanding of Indonesian politics today. My 
argument, however, is that we have not gone much beyond this none-too-surprising 
proposition. Our analysis has been so state-centred that we have overlooked real and 
significant society-based political activity.
Is an alternative label, or more grand still, an alternative model for the 
interpretation of Indonesian politics being offered? The short answer is no. Yet another 
clever label is something which we can well do without in political science. More 
fundamentally, the argument that has been developed here does not amount to a claim for 
a whole new model of the Indonesian political system, or not yet at any rate. The 
empirical material presented here can be thought of as a snapshot of one important aspect 
of political life in Indonesia, as it was in the mid-1980s. It has been argued that the polity 
is in a state of political flux, largely brought on both by secular economic development 
and the sudden sharp economic shocks that the country has been dealt in this period. We 
will need to wait several more years yet before we know whether business, and 
particularly the private sector, is able to continue to expand without being checked by 
major state intervention or political suppression. It may well be that Indonesia's 
economic and political systems will evolve slowly in ways comparable to those of say, 
Thailand, South Korea or Taiwan. In this event we could with considerable confidence 
retire some of our existing theoretical approaches. This is precisely what happened, for 
example, with the bureaucratic-polity model in the case of Thailand.27 Economic and 
political development in Indonesia, however, has not yet progressed nearly so far as 
Thailand.
27 See, for example, Girling (1984) & (1981); Ramsay (1987); and Anek Laothamatas (forthcoming 
Ph.D. dissertation in the East Asia Institute of the School of International Affairs, Columbia University).
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In the meantime, what we need in the study of Indonesian politics is greater 
theoretical flexibility to accommodate the uncertain changes which are underway. 
Attempts to capture the dynamics of political life in a single model are, at present, doomed 
to an at-best brief period of relevance. Models are too static to keep pace with the current 
changes. In this situation, unashamed eclecticism seems the order of the day. Plainly, 
the argument here is that we need to move to new ground which affords us a better view 
of the action taking place outside the state. If we continue to be fixated upon the state we 
will be missing some of the most dynamic elements in Indonesian politics today.
This study commenced by referring to broad currents of debate in political 
science generally about approaches to the subject of state-society relations. What, if 
anything, do the arguments developed in this thesis have to contribute to these continuing 
debates about the place of the state in political theory. One of the most frequently noted 
studies in this vein is the volume, Bringing the State Back In.2* In her introductory essay 
to this work Theda Skocpol argues that the American pluralists and structural- 
functionalists of the 1950s and 1960s, together with more recent neo-Marxists, have all 
been fixated on society-centred approaches and have thus not recognised the importance 
of the state as an independent actor in its own right.29 While we can probably go along 
with Skocpol in this with regard to scholarship on Western industrialised countries, it is 
less clear-cut in the case of developing countries. As Stepan30 declares in the opening 
sentences of his essay in the same volume:
Society-centred views of political and economic transformation have never held the 
unchallenged sway in Latin America that they have in North America. The 
prevalence of "organic statist" models of society that assume a central and relatively 
autonomous role for the state has affected both policy makers and social scientists.
Beginning in the late 1960s, focus on the state became particularly intense.
Similarly, the state has been at the centre of much of the work on newly 
industrialising countries of East31 and Southeast32 Asia. The reasons for this are not hard
28 Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol (eds.) (1985).
29 Skocpol (1985) pp. 4-5. See also her earlier statement of the argument, Skocpol (1979) pp. 24-33.
30 Stepan (1985) p. 317.
31 For an overview of this area see, Deyo (ed.) (1987).
32 See, Robison , Hewison & Higgot (eds.) (19871; and Higgott & Robison., (eds.) (1985).
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to find. A pattern of state-led and state-induced industrialisation as well as, in many 
cases, decidedly authoritarian governments, is common in developing countries.
In Indonesia, as we have seen, there is a very well-established trend for 
scholars to focus narrowly on the state, seeing it (either implicitly or explicitly) as an 
independent actor. While there may well be a need to "bring the state back in" to the 
analysis of a good many countries (particularly those of the industrialised West), in 
Indonesia at least, it is some time since the state has occupied a position other than centre- 
stage in most analyses. Far from scholarship on Indonesia being rooted in society- 
centred approaches, precisely the opposite is the case. As strange as this would have 
sounded just ten years ago, we are fast reaching the stage when we will need to start 
talking about 'bringing society back in'.
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Appendix A
Appendix A provides the raw data and the calculations used to deflate the 
value of oil and gas exports, as well as government receipts for Table 3.1. The first table 
here converts oil and gas exports into constant prices using a deflator index (1969/70 = 
100) based on the I.M.F.'s International Financial Statistics, C.P.I. composite figure for 
industrialised countries, as these are the source of most of Indonesia's imports. This 
provides a more realistic measure of Indonesia's international purchasing power.
YEAR VALUE OF OIL & GAS EXPORTS
Current Prices Constant Prices
(mil. US$) (mil. US$)
% OF TOTAL EXPORTS 
(at Current Prices)
1969/70 384 384 43
1970/71 443 420 38
1971/72 590 531 43
1972/73 965 830 48
1973/74 1708 1366 49
1974/75 5153 3639 71
1975/76 5273 3352 74
1976/77 6350 3727 69
1977/78 7353 3981 66
1978/79 7374 3724 65
1979/80 12340 5713 68
1980/81 17298 7157 75
1981/82 18824 7087 81
1982/83 14744 5164 79
1983/84 14449 4820 73
1984/85 13994 4454 70
1985/86 12437 3799 67
1986/87 6966 2078 51
1987/88a 8547 2477 49
Source: Department of Information (1988). 
a estimate.
The second table performs a similar function government receipts from oil 
and gas. The calculations use a deflator index based on the Jakarta C.P.I. for each each 
year, with 1969/70 being given an index = 100.
A US$ equivalent is used since much of government expenditure is 
committed to debt repayment As such this provides a better indication of spending
power. The calculations are based on the exchange rate sequence of the I.M.F.'s 
International Financial Statistics.
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YEAR GOVERNMENT OIL & GAS RECEIPTS
Current Prices Constant Pricesa Constant Prices*5
(bil.of Rp.) (bil. of Rp.) (mil. USS equivelant)
% OF TOTAL RECEIPTS 
(at Current Prices)
1969/70 66 66 202 27
1970/71 99 92 254 29
1971/72 141 130 331 33
1972/73 231 176 423 39
1973/74 382 198 476 39
1974/75 957 429 1033 55
1975/76 1248 449 1081 56
1976/77 1635 524 1263 56
1977/78 1949 568 1368 55
1978/79 2309 602 1361 54
1979/80 4260 932 1495 64
1980/81 7020 1325 2114 69
1981/82 8628 1484 2348 71
1982/83 8170 1296 1959 66
1983/84 9520 1341 1475 66
1984/85 10430 1417 1381 66
1985/86 11144 1433 1291 58
1986/87 6338 749 584 39
1987/88 6939 472 287 40
Source: Department of Information (1988).
a This is calculated using a deflator index based on the Jakarta CP.I. for each each year, with 
1969/70 being given an index =100.
b A US$ equivalent is given since much of government expenditure is committed to debt
repayment As such this provides a better indication of spending power. The calculations are 
based on the exchange rate sequence of the I.MT.'s International Financial Statistics.
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Pengkaitan Penyerapan 
Kapas Dalam Negeri dengan Impor
Dengan hormat,
Bersama dengan surat ini kami mohon sekali lagi untuk dapat kiranya Bapak meninjau 
kembali Surat Keputusan Menteri Perdagangan No.: 18/Kp/I/87, tentang Pengaitan Im­
por dan Pembelian Kapas Dalam Negeri, tanggal 23 Januari 1987 serta Keputusan Dir 
jen Perdagangan Luar Negeri No. 005/DAGLU/KP/I/87, tanggal 24 Januari 1987 yang 
menjadi dasar pelaksanaan Surat Keputusan Menteri Perdagangan tersebut.
Pengalaman industri-industri pemintalan yang tergabung dalam SEKBERTAL menunjukkan 
bahwa Surat Keputusan yang berdasarkan alokasi administratip seperti itu telah me- 
nimbulkan ketidak pastian penyediaan bahan baku serat kapas yang pada gilirannya, 
mengganggu perencanaan produksi dan menyebabkan biaya tinggi bagi industri pemin­
talan di dalam negeri.
Adanya ketidak pastian dalam pengadaan bahan baku serat kapas tersebut menimbulkan 
pengangguran mesin-mesin pintal dan tenaga kerja serta meresahkan masyarakat In­
dustri Pemintalan,yang sebenarnya tidak perlu, sehingga menambah parahnya keadaan 
ekonomi nasional kita. Adanya distorsi akibat dari alokasi birokratis yang terkan 
dung dalam Surat-Surat Keputusan itu telah menghambat pula upaya industri peminta­
lan khususnya, dan industri tekstil pada umumnya, untuk peningkatan efisiensi, pro 
duktipitas, dan daya saing sebagaimana diharapkan oleh Bapak Presiden Soeharto da­
lam Pidato Pengantar RAPBN di depan Sidang DPR pada awal tahun ini.
Adapun keberatan kami atas Surat-Surat Keputusan di atas adalah sebagai berikut :
1. Sebagaimana Bapak ketahui, tidak ada satu akhli pun yang dapat meramalkan de­
ngan tepat akan berapa besarnya produksi kapas kita di dalam negeri pada setiap 
musim tanam. Seperti halnya dengan jenis tanaman lainnya, produksi kapas sa- 
ngat dipengaruhi oleh keadaan iklim dan hama tanaman yang tidak dapat dikontrol 
oleh manusia. Produksi kapas di Indonesia menjadi lebih sulit untuk diramalkan 
karena sering berubahnya luas areal tanaman kapas rakyat dan masih belum terse- 
dianya irigasi di berbagai areal penanaman;
2. Waktu yang diperlukan untuk tersedianya informasi tentang jumlah realisasi pro­
duksi serat kapas di dalam negeri langsung mengganggu rencana pengadaan serat 
kapas yang dapat di impor oleh industri-industri pemintalan karena dikaitkan 
oleh kedua Surat-Surat Keputusan Departemen Perdagangan tersebut, maksimum se- 
besar sepuluh kali dari jumlah kapas dalam negeri. Dalam realita, produksi ka­
pas di dalam negeri baru dapat memenuhi kira-kira 5 persen dari kebutuhan bahan 
baku serat kapas oleh industri-industri pemintalan nasional;
/ 2. ..
P. 2.9^
NO. 005/SEKBER/4/1987
14 April 1987
2 _
3. Untuk dapat membuka Letter of Credit importir cukup menunjukkan bukti kontrak 
jual beli yang ditanda tanganinya dengan produsen kapas di dalam negeri sesuai 
dengan perimbangan 1 : 10 di atas. Ketentuan seperti in i dapat disalah gunakan 
oleh seg e lin tir  orang yang selalu ingin menguasai/pelaksana tunggal mengatur da 
lam posisi sebagai perantara dengan selalu  menyandarkan d ir i pada bantuan apa- 
ratu r Perdagangan atau pedagang kapas yang bukan industri pemintalan atau kelom 
pok lainnya, yang menutup kontrak seluruh atau sebahagian besar dari produksi 
kapas dalam negeri untuk memonopoli impor serat kapas dan pada gilirannya mem- 
permainkan industri pemintalan yang membutuhkan bukti penyerapan bahan baku se­
ra t  kapas dalam negeri sebagai syarat mengimpor kapas kebutuhan patalnya.
4. Seperti yang telah kami usulkan berkali-kali dalam surat kami sebelumnya dalam 
tahun 1986 dan terakhir kami kemukakan langsung kepada Bapak pada tanggal 2 Pe- 
bruari 1987 di ruang kerja Bapak, maka untuk mencegah kemungkinan negatip dalam 
penguasaan bahan baku serat kapas seperti tersebut dalam point (3) di a tas, me- 
la lu i surat in i kami kembali memohon agar sera t kapas produksi dalam negeri k i-  
ranya dapat dialokasikan secara langsung dan proporsional kepada industri-indus 
t r i  pemintalan di dalam negeri dan dibayar menurut prinsip-prinsip se rta  norma- 
norma transaksi perdagangan yang berlaku sesuai dengan i s i  dan makna Surat dari 
Dirjen Aneka Industri kepada Dirjen Perdagangan Luar Negeri, No.: 1889/DJAI/XII/ 
1986, tanggal 4 Desember 1986, Perihal : Alokasi Kapas Produksi Dalam Negeri. 
Melalui sistim  alokasi langsung dan proporsional seperti in i , pengkaitan yang 
diperlukan sebagai persyaratan antara penyerapan serat kapas produksi dalam ne­
geri dengan impor adalah bukti rea lisas i pembelian serat kapas Produksi Kapas 
Dalam Negeri dari KPB-PTP dan atau dari PP PT Berdikari /PT Kapas Indonesia In- 
dah sehingga kapas produksi dalam negeri tetap terserap sedangkan pengadaan ba­
han baku sera t ex impor bagi industri-industri pemintalan dalam negeri tetap 
tidak terganggu oleh hambatan-hambatan b irokratis yang d is to rtip ;
5. Melalui alokasi langsung dan proporsional seperti di a tas, dapatlah dihindarkan 
mata rantai birokrasi yang menghambat, yang terkandung pada diktum ke (4) dari 
Surat Keputusan Menteri Perdagangan. Diktum (4) tersebut yang berbunyi sbb.:
"Apabila persediaan kapas produksi dalam negeri pada produsen telah tidak mencu 
kupi atau habis, maka dengan menunjukkan bukti pernyataan dari produsen tentang 
tidak cukupnya atau tidak adanya pembelian kapas, importir dapat melaksanakan 
impornya sedangkan s isa  kewajiban membeli kapas dalam negeri dapat dilaksana -  
kannya pada masa panen berikutnya."
tidak diperlukan lagi dalam sistim  alokasi langsung dan proporsional. Sebagai- 
mana Bapak ketahui, ketentuan seperti in i hanyalah sekedar menambah birokrasi 
dalam hal in i produsen kapas dalam negeri (PTP XVIII, PTP XXIII, PTP XXVI, PTP 
XXVII dan PT Kapas Indonesia Indah) serta  Bank Devisa yang mengelola pembukaan 
Letter of Credit;
6. Adanya sistim  pengadaan bahan baku serat kapas yang tidak rasional sebagaimana 
diatur oleh kedua Surat-Surat Keputusan Departemen Perdagangan di atas telah 
mengganggu iklim usaha yang menghambat investasi baru pada industri pemintalan, 
walaupun keunggulan komparatip ekonomi Indonesia cukup besar di sektor i n i ;
7. Oleh karena s if a t  komoditinya,cara penentuan harganya, serta  orien tasi pemasa- 
ran produknya yang sangat berlainan, pengadaan bahan baku serat kapas tidak da­
pat d iatur seperti susu segar yang digunakan sebagai bahan baku industri peng- 
olahan susu.
Susu adalah kemoditi yang lekas rusak jika  tidak segera diolah dan diawetkan 
("perishable") sedangkan sera t kapas bukan "perishable goods." Untuk melindu- 
ngi petani produsen di negaranya masing-masing negara-negara industri mensubsi- 
di secara besar-besaran tingkat harga produk-produk yang dibuat dari susu se­
hingga tingkat harga susu internasional tidak mencerminkan biaya produksi yang 
sebenarnya. Kalaupun ada susbsidi pada tingkat harga kapas di negara-negara po 
dusen maju, jumlah susbsidi tersebut tidak sebesar subsidi harga susu. Tingkat 
harga kapas di pasar internasional, ditentukan oleh perkiraan jumlah produksi 
dan konsumsi di masa datang di seluruh dunia ("future market"). Pabrik-pabrik 
susu di dalam negeri hanya berorientasi pada pasar dalam negeri, sedangkan in­
dustri-industri pemintalan berorientasi pada pasar dalam dan luar negeri. Seba-
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gaimana Bapak ketahui, pasar dalam negeri dapat dipengaruhi oleh Pemerintah me- 
lalui kebijakannya seperti tarif dan quota. Di lain pihak, oleh karena posisi 
ekonomi Indonesia yang sangat kecil dalam perdagangan kapas, benang tenun, teks 
til dan pakaian jadi dunia, pasar internasional sama sekali tidak dapat dipe­
ngaruhi atau digoyahkan oleh kebijakan Departemen Perdagangan.
Untuk melengkapi permohonan kami di atas, bersama ini kami lampirkan satu berkas 
surat dari PT Pertekstilan T.D. Pardede di Medan termasuk foto-statics telex-telex 
dari beberapa industri pemintalan pengelola kapas kepada SEKBERTAL yang mengeluh 
akibat diterbitkannya dua surat Keputusan Departemen Perdagangan tsb.
Atas perhatian Bapak Menteri kami sampaikan terima kasih.
Wassalam,
HIMPUNAN INDUSTRI. PEMIMTALAN
IEXBERTAL
Ir. AMINUDPIN
Ketua Umum
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